Skip to navigation – Site map

HomeIssues XXVIII-1Consensus and Pragmatic Adaptatio...An Assessment of the Significance...

Consensus and Pragmatic Adaptation: The Core of One Nation

An Assessment of the Significance of the 1947 Industrial Charter in Shaping One Nation Conservatism

Analyse de l’importance de la Charte industrielle (1947) dans la formation du conservatisme One Nation
Josh Williams

Abstracts

Following the Conservatives’ heavy defeat in the 1945 election, The Industrial Charter (1947) arguably demonstrated the Conservative Party had reconciled itself with a shift to the left in British politics. The Charter provided the basis for what would become the Postwar consensus, accepting the mixed economy, the advocacy of industrial partnership, social reform and achieving full employment in a free enterprise system. Although the degree of consensus is disputed within the existing literature, the Conservative governments of 1951-64 would utilize these concepts in their approach to economic, industrial relations and trade union policy, satirically labelled as “Butskellism” after Labour and Conservative Chancellors, Hugh Gaitskell and Richard “Rab” Butler respectively. This approach was later defended by those in the Conservative Party who would identify themselves as One Nation Conservatives opposing the Party’s adoption of Thatcherism in 1979. Contemporary depictions of One Nation Conservatism invoke notions of a more moderate, paternalistic and pragmatic Conservative Party when contrasted with the currently hegemonic and arguably ideologically led Thatcherite doctrine. This article explores the conceptional analysis of One Nation Conservatism, determining that One Nation Conservatism should be considered a product of its time, confined within the Conservative governments of 1951-64. This article will then examine the significance of The Industrial Charter on One Nation Conservatism as a political doctrine and demonstrate that The Industrial Charter asserted the Conservative Party’s compulsion to transform as a means of preventing an existential crisis and set the course for a decisive change of approach. In addition, those Conservatives who opposed Thatcherism, would coalesce around the ideas expressed in the Charter and subsequent writings published by the Party. This article then seeks to conclude that The Industrial Charter provided the platform for the Conservative’s approach to policy in the postwar period and remains a crucial milestone in the development of One Nation Conservatism.

Top of page

Full text

Introduction

  • 1 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)

1The Industrial Charter1 has become a footnote in Conservative Party history. Though its publication arguably heralded a new era of Conservative Party politics in post-war Britain, its significance in shaping what would be later referred to as One Nation Conservatism at the time of Consensus Politics has garnered little interest within academia. This article seeks to explore the relationship between The Industrial Charter and One Nation Conservatism and determine whether the sentiments expressed in the Charter can said to have directly influenced the direction of the Conservative governments 1951-64, where One Nation Conservatism arguably achieved its apex.

2First this article will provide a definition of One Nation Conservatism. Second, this article will explore the One Nation Conservative themes expressed in The Industrial Charter. Third, this article will provide an analysis of the Charter’s influence on Conservative government policy 1951-64. Finally, this article will draw conclusions to the extent in which the Charter should be considered an important milestone in the formation of One Nation Conservatism.

Defining One Nation Conservatism

  • 2 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil, or The Two Nations, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1895).

3In order to establish to what extent The Industrial Charter influenced One Nation Conservatism, the term must first be defined. Throughout its history, the term One Nation has often considered to have emerged from Victorian Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s attempt to broaden support for the Conservative Party. Disraeli himself never used the expression although he penned the novel Sybil or The Two Nations (1845)2, that the phrase One Nation has been said to derive. The term One Nation with which we are familiar, was first used forty years after Disraeli’s death by Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. Following a landslide victory in 1924 Baldwin gave a speech in which he asserted:

  • 3 Stanley Baldwin quoted in Alistair Lexden, One Nation Conservatism - Created by Baldwin, boosted by (...)

We [the Conservative party] stand for the union of those two nations of which Disraeli spoke two generations ago: union among our own people to make one nation of our own people at home which, if secured, nothing else matters in the world.3

  • 4 Iain Macleod, and Angus Maude (eds), One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems (London, Conser (...)
  • 5 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London, Macmilla (...)
  • 6 Robert Walsha,, ‘The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and Organization’, 195 (...)
  • 7 David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics, (New York and London, Cont (...)
  • 8 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London (...)
  • 9 David Willetts, Modern Conservatism, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1992), p. 11.
  • 10 Raphaele Espiet Kilty, ‘What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a “One Nation Conservative Government”? T (...)

4The use of One Nation resembling a label within the Party can be traced to the general election of 1950 where a small group of newly elected Conservative MPs used the phrase as the name of their publication One Nation (1950)4 and subsequently applied it to their exclusive dining club, the One Nation Group. Despite this, One Nation as a label is not unequivocal, the diversity of definitions has included, although not exclusively and on occasion a combination of: a “tradition”;5 an “unofficial backbench club”;6 a strategy “to aid the process of depoliticization”;7 an approach to policy pursued by the Conservative Party up to 1979;8 a “powerful theme in conservative thought9 and a rhetorical device, described by Kilty “as a flexible notion that is defined by whoever dominates the debate of ideas at the time”.10

Approaches to One Nation

  • 11 Richard Hayton, ‘The demise of the One Nation tradition’, Global Discourse 5:1 (2014), p. 93.
  • 12 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Ju (...)

5Defining One Nation Conservatism as a concept within conservative political thought has invited a number of scholarly works within the study of British conservatism. Hayton attributes One Nation within the scope of “progressive strand of thinking11 in Conservative Party politics and this approach is consistent with a number of interpretations in the existing literature.12 It is worth noting that scholars within this field have offered alternative definitions of One Nation. Along with the Progressive Strand, the definitions of One Nation can also be broadly placed into the categories of the One Nation framework and One Nation as a rhetorical device. These categories should not be taken as an absolute, as there are several discernible associations between them in how scholars have tried to define the term One Nation.

  • 13 Robert Walsha, ‘An Interview with David Willets, MP’, Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), p. (...)
  • 14 David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. (New York and London, Cont (...)
  • 15 Nick Timothy, Remaking One Nation: The Future of Conservatism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020) p. 2 (...)

6The One Nation framework provides a more conceptual basis for defining One Nation Conservatism. Scholars who have focused on this interpretation have tended to interrogate the structural framework of conservatism and the Conservative Party, emphasizing a distinction between values, ideas and policies. The term “One Nation framework” was used by former Conservative minister, David Willetts in an interview with Robert Walsha in which Willetts describes the framework as a space whereby members of the party can engage in “crucial debates” to discuss the direction of the party.13 Other scholars whose definitions fall within this category include Seawright, describing a “One Nation ethos” that acts as an umbrella to shelter any doctrinal debates.14 Timothy also falls within the category whereby he puts forward a vision of government in Britain through a critique of liberalism for which the One Nation label is conferred. One Nation for Timothy is not a set of beliefs or an approach to public policy, One Nation is to be attained by rejecting “ultra-liberalism” and pursuing a more “positive purpose” for government.15

  • 16 1998 interview with Lord Biffen quoted in Robert Walsha, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservat (...)
  • 17 Paul Addison, A Conspicuous Failure: Lord Randolph Churchill, 12 September 2017, https://winstonchu (...)
  • 18 Kevin Hickson, Robert Page and Ben Williams, ‘Strangled at birth: the One Nation ideology of Theres (...)

7One Nation as a rhetorical device is best summed up by Lord Biffen who remarked in an interview that One Nation ‘has just become a code term for trying to make the party electable and to keep the party electable’.16 This approach is not novel, Lord Randolph Churchill once referred to One Nation or what he called Tory Democracy as “principally opportunism17. Indeed, Hickson et al describe this approach as “designed to unite different sections of society18 which is perhaps closer to the Baldwinian use of the phrase. Kilty appears to lean within the rhetorical device interpretation surmising that:

  • 19 Raphaele Espiet Kilty, ‘What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a “One Nation Conservative Government”? T (...)

One Nation Conservatism is at best a flexible notion that is defined by whoever dominates the debate of ideas at the time it is appealed to or at worst an easy label that is conveniently used to make the Conservative Party seem more attractive. In fact, it is very unlikely that the mainstream has a strong notion of what One Nation Conservatism really is, especially as the majority are now more likely to be Thatcher’s children than Heath’s.19

  • 20 Stephen Evans, ‘The not so odd couple: Margaret Thatcher and one nation conservatism’, Contemporary (...)

8The approach adopted in this article, falls within the Progressive Strand, explicitly that One Nation should be considered an approach to policy pursued by the Conservative Party up until 1979 and utilized throughout the 1951-64 Conservative governments. That is not to say One Nation Conservatism cannot draw on a heritage going back to Disraeli, as Evans observes “Disraeli reinterpreted Bolingbroke, Baldwin reinterpreted Disraeli, and Macmillan reinterpreted all three”.20 Although, a more in depth discussion of the genesis of One Nation is for another time.

  • 21 Kevin Hickson, Robert Page and Ben Williams, ‘Strangled at birth: the One Nation ideology of Theres (...)

9It is worth mentioning at this juncture Hickson, Page and Williams use of the One Nation “spectrum” which is arguably aligned to the Progressive Strand definition. On one end is the “strong” definition of One Nation, not dissimilar to the approach adopted here. On the other end is One Nation as a rhetorical device and in the middle is the “soft” definition which adds a “policy dimension21 to the rhetorical device concept that:

  • 22 Ibid., pp. 338-339.

…identifies particular social problems and sees a larger role for the state than economic liberals within the Party would wish, but falling short of the deeper collectivist One Nationism of the postwar era.22

  • 23 Ibid., p. 338.

10Whilst intriguing, this “soft” definition essentially allows for One Nation to be attributed to any platform which could be considered to the left of “economic liberals23 that we can assume is a euphemism for the Thatcherite wing of the party. The “soft” definition may well have credence in a more contemporary use of the word One Nation, although that discussion remains outside the scope of this article. However, it’s through this prism of One Nation as a label, emerging as a response and in contrast to Thatcherism, for which the definition of One Nation embraced here is substantiated and discussed forthwith.

One Nation, Thatcherism and Consensus Politics

  • 24 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London (...)

11In this manner, One Nation Conservatism has invoked notions of a more moderate, paternalistic and pragmatic Conservative Party when contrasted with the currently hegemonic and arguably ideologically led Thatcherite doctrine. Gilmour and Garnett certainly provide this characterization of One Nation as a critique of Thatcherism and the New Right. Gilmour and Garnett consider that in the post-war era, the Conservative Party pursued One Nation policies up until 1979 and the start of the first Thatcher administration24. This definition of One Nation is convincing as the use of One Nation to describe a distinct faction of the Conservative Party gained traction in the 1980s which gave rise to a One Nation-Thatcherite dichotomy within the Party.

  • 25 Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler defected to the Social Democratic Party in March 1981 during a debat (...)
  • 26 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1997), p. 3 (...)
  • 27 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B.Tauris, 2 (...)
  • 28 Austin Robinson, ‘Reviewed Work: The Middle Way. by Harold MacMillan’, The Economic Journal, 48:191 (...)
  • 29 Robert Walsha, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism’, 1950–2002. Contemporary British Hist (...)
  • 30 Ibid., p. 107; David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. (New York a (...)

12The unease of One Nation advocates during the Thatcher governments was not overt, and it would be erroneous to assume a great exodus from the Party. For example, only one MP crossed the floor during Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister.25 Lord Blake observed the “coded language” from internal critics of the Thatcher administration noting “If a minister talked about ‘one nation’ and praised Disraeli, it was a safe assumption that he was attacking Mrs. Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe”.26 Those who coalesced around the One Nation mantra, harked back to the Conservative governments of the 1950s and 1960s endorsing The Middle Way. Authored by Harold Macmillan in 1938, it espoused the virtues of capitalism whilst rejecting the extremes of laissez-faire and socialism.27 To achieve this, The Middle Way advocated economic planning, a commitment to full employment theory and the establishment and centralization of a number of institutions.28 This also conferred a more collectivist, pragmatic and socially compassionate brand of Conservatism, when contrasted with the more individualistic and dogmatically driven Thatcherite agenda. The existence of the One Nation Group and subsequent appropriation of the One Nation name, may have reinforced the internal divide articulated above, as the Group became a refuge for those who were derided as Wet opponents of Thatcherism. This may be due to opponents being more likely to come from the backbenches; a condition of membership of the One Nation Group. However, the Group included members who both supported and opposed the government’s agenda so did not wholly constitute a hostile caucus.29 Though the Group’s influence is disputed30, the One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism came to signify a bygone era in which Consensus Politics prevailed and became a standard-bearer for those Conservatives who did not align themselves to the Thatcherite project.

  • 31 Dean Blackburn, ‘Reassessing Britain’s Post-war Consensus’, British Politics 13:2 (2018), pp. 195-2 (...)
  • 32 Ben Pimlott, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Is the ‘postwar consensus’ a myth? Contemporary Reco (...)

13This bygone era would denote the deployment of what would be considered One Nation policies by the Conservatives post 1945. Often referred to as the post-war consensus, commitments would include accepting the mixed economy, the advocacy of industrial partnership, social reform and achieving full employment. Although the degree of consensus is disputed within the existing literature, (a debate neatly summed up by Blackburn)31, the Conservative governments of 1951-64 would utilize these concepts in their approach to economic, industrial relations and trade union policy. This approach was satirically labelled as Butskellism after Labour and Conservative Chancellors, Hugh Gaitskell and Richard “Rab” Butler respectively. For the relevance of this debate to the definition of One Nation, we can look to Pimlott’s view of the post-war consensus. Pimlott argues that there is little evidence of consensus between parties, rather it was a label conferred by those with a “sentimental yearning” of nostalgia of the past as well the “rejectionists” who “bolster their sympathy for modern [Thatcherite] Conservatism by contrasting it with the alleged compromises of the past”.32 Pimlott’s view is not undisputable, indeed in the same publication Kavanagh and Morris argue the contrary, the merits of which will not be argued here. However, Pimlott’s conceptual assertion that consensus was a relic of commentators and historians can be applied to the use of One Nation Conservatism, given that distinguishing One Nation as a branch of Conservative Party thought, was not used by advocates until well into the Thatcher governments.

  • 33 James Prior, A Balance of Power, (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1986), pp. 133-134.
  • 34 Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent, (Second Edition, London, Sphere Books Ltd, 1985).
  • 35 Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma (London, Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1992), p. 30.
  • 36 Ibid., pp. 42-44.
  • 37 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile, (London, Futura Publications, 1989), p. 228.

14Accordingly, those considered Wet during the Thatcher governments (some of whom served in the Thatcher Cabinet) would look back fondly at time of Consensus. Consensus was not only denoting a period of political history but also an approach to cabinet government that the Wets felt had weakened since the ascendency of the Thatcher administration. Former Thatcher Employment and Northern Ireland Secretary, Jim Prior noted in his book A Balance of Power smaller groups of Thatcher “cronies” would meet to discuss and decide government business leading to “the most divided Conservative Cabinet ever”.33 In addition, Francis Pym’s aptly named memoir Politics of Consent also dwelled heavily on the authoritarian manner of the Thatcher administration34. Ian Gilmour devoted a chapter to answering the question “why the moderates [Wets or One Nationers] lost”, beginning with a quote attributed to Margaret Thatcher from 1978 where she asserted “I regard [Conservatives who believed in consensus politics] as quislings and traitors35. Gilmour concludes that the Prime Minister was not challenged by the Wets due to an exceptionally weak Labour opposition, a high probability of splitting the party and losing the subsequent general election36. One of the most telling examples of the Thatcherites’ disdain for the One Nationers, thereby emphasising the internal divide came from Norman Tebbit who described them as the “weaker willed, the craven hearted, and embittered failures amongst the Conservative Party” who “hoped she [Thatcher] would go away and let them go back to their old ways”.37

  • 38 Ian Gilmour, ‘How Major is destroying Disraeli’s legacy’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1996, p. 18. (...)

15If Consensus retrospectively denoted the era from 1945-1979, One Nation was then the term to describe Conservative Party politics at the time of that consensus. The term would evolve over the decades, whereby One Nation would come to symbolize the discontent of the Conservative adherence to Thatcherism, even after Thatcher herself left office in 1990. Gilmour discussed the continuation of Thatcherism under Major and offered “four constants” attributed to One Nation under the title How Major is Destroying Disraeli’s Legacy.38 Gilmour’s constants are vague and broad in application although there are five themes that can be attributed to One Nation Conservativism, which not only display the divergence between One Nation and Thatcherism but can also said to be present in The Industrial Charter and were demonstrated through the 1951-64 Conservative governments.

16These themes are; (1) eschewing notions of ideology; (2) accepting state intervention as a vehicle for social harmony; (3) readily embracing paternalism; (4) have a predisposition to reject laissez-faire economics and; (5) attempting to strike a conciliatory tone in industrial relations. These five themes will be elaborated on in the next section of this article alongside an analysis of the Industrial Charter.

One Nation Conservatism and The Industrial Charter

17As established above, One Nation is a term used retrospectively to designate the Conservatives’ adherence to Consensus Politics prior to 1979 and the rejection of the Thatcherite political doctrine. At its core, One Nation exhibited five key themes which could trace its philosophical origins back to Disraeli which were advanced by Baldwin and then Macmillan. Yet, it was the loss to Labour in the 1945 general election which would occasion the emergence of One Nation and the beginning of a new era for the Conservative Party.

  • 39 Robin Harris, The Conservatives: A History (London, Bantam Press, 2011), pp. 373-375.
  • 40 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1997), p. 2 (...)
  • 41 David Willetts, ‘The New Conservatism? 1945–1951’ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds.), Recover (...)
  • 42 Ibid., p. 171.
  • 43 Timothy Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, (...)
  • 44 Ibid., p. 35.

18The Labour victory of 1945 not only left the Conservative Party defeated and broken but arguably marked a shift to the left in British politics.39 There were a number of reasons the Conservative Party had failed to win in 1945 including the overreliance on the personal popularity of Churchill and the Conservatives’ association with the tribulations of the interwar years.40 Nevertheless, it was clear that the scale of the defeat signified that the Conservatives had fundamentally “lost the battle of ideas”.41 It was then an astonishing achievement that six years later, the Conservatives were able to regain power from the Labour Party and remain in office for a further thirteen years until the autumn of 1964, what Willetts observes as “an extraordinary political revival”.42 The reversal of the Conservatives’ fortunes and reconstruction of the Party post war, exceeded an invigorated policy agenda, requiring a strengthening of the Party organizationally and persuading Churchill that intellectual restitution was required.43 This multifaceted approach positioned what would later be referred to as One Nation, as a strategy for recovery.44 The progressive sentiments that would be attributed to, and expressed by the One Nation Group and embraced by defenders of the One Nation tradition were reflected in the 1947 publication, The Industrial Charter.

  • 45 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, (...)
  • 46 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London (...)
  • 47 Thomas Lindsay and Michael Harrington, The Conservative Party, 1918 – 1979, (Second Edition, London (...)
  • 48 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1980), p. 109.
  • 49 Gilmour, Ian and Garnett, Mark, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (Lond (...)
  • 50 Richard. Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 133.

19The Industrial Charter has been described as providing “the intellectual basis to the Conservative Party’s approach to economic affairs, industrial relations and trade unionism for the next 17 years45, a “decisive moment in Conservative post-war history46 and “the most important post-war policy document produced by the Conservatives”.47 The Industrial Policy Committee which authored The Industrial Charter, comprised of five members of the Shadow Cabinet: Oliver Stanley, Oliver Lyttleton, Harold Macmillan, David Maxwell-Fyfe, Richard “Rab” Butler as chairman, as well as four other backbench MPs, David Eccles, Derrick Heathcoat-Amory, Sir Peter Bennett and James Hutchinson. The composition of the committee ensured “...things moved in a progressive direction48 with most members being from “the left of the Party”.49 For Butler the task was clear, the Conservatives needed to create a new Tamworth Manifesto to signify a break with the past. Much as the Great Reform Act of 1832 had shepherded in a new age of democracy, the War had equally heralded a new dawn. As Butler commented in his memoir “As in the days of Peel, the Conservatives must be seen to have accommodated themselves to a social revolution”.50

Eschewing Ideology

  • 51 Phillip Norton, The Conservative Party, (London, Pretence Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf,1996), p. 46.
  • 52 Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics. The End of Consensus? (Second Edition, New York, (...)
  • 53 Damian Gren, ‘One Nation’ in Kevin Hickson (ed.) The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Si (...)
  • 54 Reginald Maulding, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), p. 44.

20The Charter has been described in academia as not having denoted a departure from “long established traditions”51 whilst also occasioning the Conservatives’ “accepting the new mood” post-war.52 In accepting this new mood, others note the Charter was a “clear break from Conservative economic and social policies53 which also meant embracing pragmatism and accepting a greater degree of state intervention. Indeed, Reginald Maudling who worked as speechwriter for Churchill conformed to this view by writing “We were at that time developing a new economic policy for the Conservative Party ... It marked a substantially different approach for post-war Conservative philosophy”. 54

  • 55 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)
  • 56 Ibid., pp. 6-9.
  • 57 Ibid., pp. 10-27.
  • 58 Ibid., pp. 28-34.
  • 59 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 135.
  • 60 Ibid., p. 135.

21The Charter itself began with a statement on “economic values55 followed by three substantive sections; first summarizing the immediate needs and priorities to address “the crisis” of socialist government.56 Second, the Charter outlined the objectives of government “in a free society57 and finally a “Workers’ Charter” detailing the approach to industrial relations.58 The Charter was not intended to confine the Conservatives into detailed policy commitments whilst in opposition. Churchill articulated to Butler that “When an Opposition spells out its policy in detail, the Government becomes the Opposition. So, having failed to win the sweets of office, it equally fails to enjoy the benefits of being out of office”.59 It was Churchill that subsequently described the Charter as a “broad statement of policy, to which those who are opposed to the spread of rigid Socialism can now rally”.60

  • 61 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1977), pp. 132-140.

22Supporters of the One Nation tradition would argue that the pragmatic nature of their approach would facilitate consistency as ideological differences would cause disruptive swings in policy when the party of government changed. For One Nation advocate Ian Gilmour, ideology could never provide stability as “dogma will be broken by events”.61 This pragmatic approach captured in The Industrial Charter was best summarised by Butler in his memoir The Art of the Possible:

  • 62 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 146.

We were out-Peeling Peel in giving the Party a painless but permeant facelift...Our first purpose was to counter the charge and fear that were the party of industrial go-as you please and devil-take-the-hindmost, that full employment and the Welfare State were not safe in our hands.62

23And then substantiated in the text as The Industrial Charter would forthrightly state on the first page:

  • 63 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)

We are completely opposed to the imposition of a rigid strait-jacket of doctrinaire political theory, either upon the individual regardless of his individuality or upon the nation regardless of economic facts of the moment.63

Acceptance of State Intervention

  • 64 John Barnes, ‘Ideology and Factions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (...)
  • 65 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1977), p. 236.
  • 66 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, (...)

24The Industrial Charter did not mark a sudden conversion to state interventionism, Neville Chamberlain was quoted in the House of Commons in 1925 “Our policy is to use the great resources of state…to help those who have the will and desire to raise themselves to higher and better things”.64 The One Nation approach also endorsed this meritocratic tradition as Gilmour noted “There is no ideal extent of governmental intervention. The position of government, as Mr. Macmillan once put it, is not a principle, it is an expedient”.65 In addition, Dorey notes, the One Nation approach of establishing “broad parameters” enabled the Conservative Party to pragmatically justify direct state intervention and public ownership.66

25The Charter’s second chapter “The place of government in a free society” emphasised the “partnership” between the Government, industry and the individual, whilst also making a distinction from the “meddlesome interference” of the Atlee government. The responsibility of government the authors of the Charter muse, is concerned with “major decisions” such as “the scale of national expenditure and taxation” and “to guide overseas trade” amongst others [The Government’s] “greatest duty” the authors write is to:

  • 67 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)

…ensure that such main priorities as the maintenance of employment and our well-developed social services are fulfilled before subsidiary objectives are sought and that the tasks set are not beyond the capacity of the resources available.67

26It would be erroneous to assume The Industrial Charter advocated the wholesale use of state levers. For instance, the document is peppered with warnings of “socialist authoritarianism”. The Charter best characterises the position of the Conservative Party and One Nation Conservatives as a willingness to utilise the state if the prevailing demands, be they political, social or economic require it.

Embracing Paternalism

  • 68 Ibid., p. 4.
  • 69 David Roberts, ‘Tory Paternalism and Social Reform in Early Victorian England’, The American Histor (...)
  • 70 Peter Dorey, ‘A new direction or another false dawn? David Cameron and the crisis of British Conser (...)
  • 71 Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Co (...)

27The Charter’s opening chapter avowed “Justice demands that the aim of national policy should be to provide a basic standard of living and security of outlook for all our people”.68 This would also exhibit another characteristic of One Nation Conservatism, that of paternalism. The presence of paternalism is arguably derived from several philosophical strands present in classical conservatism69 and advocates of One Nation would invoke their sense of noblesse oblige which remained “socially progressive in attitude” to justify their approach.70 For example, all nine of the Industrial Policy Committee members attended public school, with five attending Eton. Though a public education should not be considered a requisite to holding One Nation views, the sense of civic duty “imbued them [the One Nation Conservatives] with recognition that their privileges entailed corresponding responsibilities”.71 It is therefore little surprise that The Industrial Charter would exhibit sentiments befitting of their upbringing and education, that a life of privilege must be offset with a commitment to public service. The politicians of this time would have also lived through both wars which would have further impressed their sense of civic duty and seek to reconcile rather than divide. As Dorey and Garnett write:

  • 72 Ibid.

For One Nation Conservatives, the experience of war – be it 1914–1918, 1939–1945, or both – had been crucial. However, those who had witnessed the economic and social hardships of the 1930s were likely to feel the deepest affinity with an approach which envisaged the state as at least a potential healer of divisions.72

28These sentiments were also expressed in the Charter under ‘Employment Policy’, where the authors mused:

  • 73 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)

Can mass employment, the memory of which has scarred the minds of millions of British men and women be banished by modern industrial policy? The Coalition Government [wartime 1940-45] believed it could…the put their names to the statement that future governments should be held responsible for maintaining a high and stable level of employment… [The Conservative Party] would in some respects go further to ensure the demand for goods and services is always maintained at a level which will offer jobs to all who are willing to work.73

  • 74 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Pow (...)

29For Macmillan, this was to be a recurrent theme during his premiership. Having witnessed the unemployment in his constituency of Teesside during the interwar period, he wanted to assure supporters that he was committed to “never allow this shadow to fall upon our country”.74 (Turner 1996, p.331).

Rejection of Laissez-Faire Economics

30Similar to the embracing of paternalism, a longstanding tradition of the Tory Party was the rejection of laissez-faire economics. Historically, protection versus free trade had been a delicate subject matter for the Tory party which it had wrestled with going back to the days of Pitt the Younger. With the decline of the Liberal Party in the early twentieth century, the traditional defenders of the free market were marginalised, yet it left the Conservatives vulnerable to attack from the staunchly interventionist Labour Party. Accusations from the Labour Party of the Conservatives promoting laissez-faire were strongly rebuffed. Future Prime Minister Anthony Eden told an audience at the 1947 Party Conference:

  • 75 Quoted in Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One (...)

We are not a party of unbridled, brutal capitalism, and never have been. Although we believe in personal responsibility, and personal initiative in business, we are not the political children of the laissez-faire school. We opposed them decade after decade.75

  • 76 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29, Forward from the Industrial C (...)
  • 77 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)
  • 78 Ibid., p. 36.
  • 79 Ibid., p. 14.
  • 80 Ibid., p. 15.

31Where the Industrial Charter sought to strike this balance was on the matter of controls and economic planning. It is worth mentioning that during a conference address in 1948, Tory MP, David Eccles noted that the word planning was not used in The Charter speculating its absence was “tactful”. However, Eccles also establishes a position where he asserts economic planning can form part of a “strong and constructive economic policy” providing freedom forms an “integral part of the policy” and therefore, the view of “anti planners” should be rejected.76 In describing their view on controls the authors of the Charter articulate a seemingly conservative notion that “controls breed like rabbits”.77 The authors also argue that the controls on industry put in place by Labour had “hamper[ed] industry” though this was somewhat tempered where the Charter’s authors acknowledged that “some controls will have to be continued”.78 This meant the removal of “minor controls” as a means of diminishing “concentrated power” of socialism, whilst also pledging “…not to remove any control from a necessity of life until we are certain that it is in reach of every family”.79 The Charter also expressed a desire for the Conservatives to restore free markets for foodstuffs and raw materials. However, where the Charter conveyed the reconciliation between the extremes of socialism and laissez-faire, was the idea of “delegated controls” in which the authors state that the role of government should be to allocate scarce resources whilst rationing was still necessary on items such as industrial fuel and power. Described as the “decentralisation of industry”, the Charter also expressed a mechanism in which the controls could be challenged through Parliamentary scrutiny, further distinguishing the One Nation approach as the intermediate between total governmental control and non-intervention. By attempting to legitimise their strategy through established democratic institutions80, the authors sought to demonstrate the Conservatives’ detachment from socialist authoritarianism which, as mentioned was a reoccurring theme throughout The Industrial Charter.

  • 81 Ibid., p. 24.
  • 82 Ibid., p. 39.

32It was the approach to nationalisation which exhibited a more restrained Conservative Party by avoiding outright dismissal and a commitment to reverse government policy. The Charter stated the Party were “opposed to nationalisation as a principle upon which all industries should be organised”, following the authoritarian socialist theme observed above, the authors note that “If all industries were nationalised, Britain would become a totalitarian country”.81 Yet, whilst outright opposing the nationalisation of iron and steel, and advocating coal and the Bank of England remaining in public ownership, The Charter remained noncommittal on the overall approach stating “Those industries which remain nationalised will be submitted to a rigorous examination from the point of view of their economic efficiency.82 Once again, this demonstrated the pragmatic attitude of the Party, which, as discussed in the next section, would be a recurrent theme of government once the Conservatives regained power.

Conciliation in Industrial Relations

  • 83 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach (...)
  • 84 Ibid., p. 428.

33The Industrial Charter’s approach to trade unions and industrial relations is one of the standout attributes of the document. Dorey observes the difference in the Conservatives approach to trade unions prior to 1945 which signified “considerable antipathy”.83 Conversely, the 1951-64 One Nation approach to trade unions constituted a “unique phase in Conservative Party history84pursuing more positive relations with trade unions.

  • 85 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)
  • 86 Ibid., p. 28.
  • 87 Ibid.
  • 88 Ibid., p. 29.
  • 89 Ibid., p. 39.
  • 90 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1980), p. 109.
  • 91 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)
  • 92 Ibid., p. 40.
  • 93 Ibid., p. 33.
  • 94 Ibid., p. 40.
  • 95 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach (...)
  • 96 Thatcher, Margaret, The Path to Power, (London, HarperCollins 2011), pp. 109-110.

34Arguably The Industrial Charter initiated the Conservatives’ adoption of industrial cooperation, vehemently avowing the Party’s support for trade unions85 whilst also emphasising “partnership” and proclaiming the Conservatives’ goal to “humanise, not nationalise”.86 The Charter’s third chapter “The Workers Charter” declared that industry should seek to provide three “general rights” to the worker (1) security of employment; (2) incentive to do the job well and to get a better one; (3) status as an individual, and committed to establish standards which employers “must conform” .87 Practically, these standards were little more than a best practice guide, although the authors of the Charter also indicated in concurrence with acceptance of greater state intervention, that sustained resistance from industry would result in exclusion from bidding for public authority contracts.88 The authors of the Charter also expressed a reluctance legislate for any of their proposals, citing “the diversity of conditions” in industry.89 That said, many of the proposals set out under the headings of “Security”, “Incentive” and “Status of the Worker” are further demonstrative of the “progressive direction90 and the One Nation Conservatives’ willingness to utilise a more interventionist state. Under the heading of “SecurityThe Charter affirmed the Conservatives’ commitment to achieving full employment whilst also advocating that the period of notice for an employee should be linked to their length of service.91 On “Incentive” a range of measures were described in which the aforementioned “Security”, “must provide the basis for a fuller life for the man and woman in industry”. This included championing “extra rewards for extra effort”, “promotion by merit” and improvements in training and education across industry.92 The Charter also advocated equal pay for men and women although , the commitment to equal pay was absent from Labour and Conservative 1945 manifestos but appeared in the 1950 manifesto for both parties. On the “Status of the Worker”, the Charter reaffirmed the Conservatives’ individualist tendencies whilst also acknowledging the importance of the individual in collective bargaining.93 Thus, the Charter advanced the idea of “joint consultation” under a joint consultation committee. First formed in the War that would be “extended for the exchange of information and ideas” so that the Worker could “participate in discussion, understand the economic strategy of the country and relate it to his own job” .94 On trade unions The Industrial Charter signified a voluntarist approach, seeking to be conciliatory in tone.95 This approach to industrial relations would later be characterized as “appeasement” by proponents of the New Right which would inform their attitudes for necessary trade union reform in the 1980s,96 further demonstrating a contrasting approach between One Nation and Thatcherism. As will be discussed later in this article, the One Nation Tories remained committed to forging partnerships in industrial relations, even when economic demands could have elicited a change in approach.

Criticisms of The Industrial Charter

  • 97 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B.Tauris, 2 (...)
  • 98 Timothy Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, (...)
  • 99 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29 The Conservative Industrial Ch (...)

35Although well received from within and being endorsed at the 1947 Party conference, it was the right wing of the Tory Party in which the Charter garnered its most severe opposition. On the pretence of principle, critics argued the Charter marked a departure from the Conservative tradition ridiculing it as “quasi-socialist97 and “pink” socialism.98 One of the most emphatic refutations of the Charter came from Sir Waldron Smithers, Conservative MP for Orpington who proclaimed acceptance of the Charter was a matter of “life and death for Britain and therefore the world”. Punctuating his work with biblical verses, Sir Waldron also declared the Charter as “milk and water socialism”, decrying it for “its compromises with socialism and communism”.99

36When challenged at the time as “not really Conservative policy” and “seducing the Conservative Party into a progressive statement of policy” by press mogul Lord Beaverbrook in his newspapers; Harold Macmillan appeared to reinforce the Charter’s One Nation heritage by referring to it as:

  • 100 Harold Macmillan speech at Church House, Westminster, 14 June 1947, quoted in Harold Macmillan, Tid (...)

…merely a restatement in the light of modern conditions of fundamental and lasting principles of our Party…In any case, important as our critics may be, I prefer to rest upon the tradition of Disraeli, fortified by the high authority of Churchill.100

  • 101 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London (...)

37These tensions within the Party would never fully dissipate and those who advocated free markets versus a degree of economic planning created a sharper internal fault line once the Thatcherites had gained control. Even at the time of the Charter’s publication the likes of Sir Waldron were quoting Hayek leading Gilmour to remark “[Smithers] who was then considered to be on the lunatic fringe of the right, but would now probably thought to a moderate Thatcherite”.101

  • 102 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power, (London, HarperCollins 2011), p. 49.

38Despite the criticism at the time, the Charter did not garner a reputation as a meaningful departure from Conservative principles even by those who would later rebuke the One Nation approach. Margaret Thatcher writing in The Path to Power (2011) would recall: “In a sense it was no new departure: indeed, continuity and consensus were its underlying themes”.102

  • 103 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach (...)

39The Industrial Charter maintained its popularity within the Party mainstream, selling 2.5 million copies in the first three months of publication.103 Subsequent publications such as The Right Road for Britain (1949) also invoked many of its sentiments and echoed its prose stating:

  • 104 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Right Road for Britain, The Conservative Party’s Stat (...)

Industrial relations must no longer be thought of in terms of two sides with interests which are permanently opposite and inevitably conflicting. Fundamentally, both management and labour have the same interest in the prosperity of their industry, and to this they must devote their attention in a spirit of co-operation and partnership. The spirit of partnership cannot be enforced by law.104

40The Conservatives’ 1950 election manifesto titled This is the Road also reiterated the desire to implement a Workers’ Charter. This commitment was also retained in the 1951 manifesto where the Conservatives were victorious at the ballot box.

Influence of The Industrial Charter on the Conservative Governments 1951-1964

  • 105 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, (...)
  • 106 in Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation (...)

41It is the important to recognize the 1951-64 governments underpinning the progressive nature of One Nation. Dorey describes the 1951-64 governments as “One Nation in practice105 when the tradition was arguably at the height of its influence within the Conservative Party, what Dorey and Garnett refer to as “near hegemony”.106 But what influence did the Industrial Charter have on these governments?

42In his memoir Tides of Fortune, Harold Macmillan wrote of the Industrial Charter:

  • 107 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 303.

The principles laid down in this document guided our policies in the future Conservative Governments. Many of the detailed proposals have been translated into law…Nevertheless the importance of declarations of this kind, especially from parties in Opposition, lies not so much in the detailed proposals as in their general tone and temper.107

43Rab Butler would also later recall:

  • 108 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), pp. 146-147.

…what stands our very plainly is the extent to which we foresaw and foreshadowed the characteristically Conservative measures of the post-1951 period.108

  • 109 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 303; Butler, Richard. Aust (...)
  • 110 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach (...)

44Both Macmillan and Butler cite successes in government stemming from The Industrial Charter.109 However, these mentions are tenuous in terms of recognising the Charter as a quasi-blueprint for government policy, which as already established, was not its intended purpose. In fact, the Charter was scarcely mentioned by Ministers following the 1950 election.110 Indeed, where we should acknowledge the Charter’s contribution to the 1951-64 governments as Macmillan and Butler recognize, is the “tone and temper” of the Conservative governments following the Charter’s publication. We can consider three key areas in which to evaluate the 1951-64 Conservative governments against The Industrial Charter; (1) economy; (2) social policy; and (3) industrial relations.

Economy

  • 111 Ben Pimlott, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Is the ‘postwar consensus’ a myth? Contemporary Reco (...)
  • 112 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 304.

45Both Butler and Macmillan occupied the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer during the 1951-64 governments. Yet it is the satirical “Mr. Butskell” denoting Consensus Politics mentioned above, which dominates the analysis of the Conservative approach to the economy during this time.111 Post 1945, Keynesian economics became acceptable within Tory circles with Macmillan establishing himself as disciple of Keynes. For his part in contributing to the Charter, Macmillan was keen to acknowledge that the Party had pivoted along the lines of what he was advocating during the interwar period and articulated in The Middle Way.112 An often cited example of this is that the Conservative administration only denationalized two industries by the end of the their first term; iron and steel in 1953 and road haulage in 1954. This conformed to The Industrial Charter which outright opposed the nationalisation of iron and steel but gave the Conservatives room to manoeuvre within the Charter’s broad parameters.

  • 113 Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 2 (...)
  • 114 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), pp. 158-160.
  • 115 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac, The Life of Harold Macmillan, (London, Chatto & Windus, 2010), p. 286.
  • 116 Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 2 (...)

46One of Butler’s first acts at the Treasury was to impose controls such as cutting imports. Butler also increased the bank rate moderately by 0.5 percent the month after the election and then raising again to 4 percent during his first Budget the following March. This did not go against the spirit of the Charter and was demonstrative of Butler’s adherence to what Boxer describes as “the needs of the moment rather than coherent philosophy”.113 Potential conflict between the Conservatives’ predisposition to encourage private markets and the needs of the time, came with the rejection of a policy to float sterling, proposing the market determined its value. Known as Operation ROBOT, named after the civil servants who created the policy, it was devised as a means of reducing the burden on reserves when the value of sterling fell. The implementation of ROBOT would mean inflation and unemployment were likely to rise, ending the Conservatives’ commitment to full employment before it got started. The Cabinet subsequently rejected the plan as both an economic and political high-risk strategy. Butler, who was in favour, later commented “I believe the decision not to free the pound was a fundamental mistake” primarily citing the short-term pain of such a plan would have saved some of the uncertainties of stop-go economics. Butler also noted that if ROBOT had been implemented “Butskellism” may never have been invented.114 Arguably whatever decision the Cabinet took, they could claim to be consistent with The Industrial Charter’s vague commitment to “stabilise the pound”. Indeed, Macmillan himself believed there was merit in the proposal115, though there’s no evidence to suggest the Charter swayed the Cabinet’s decision. Nevertheless, the sentiments of the Charter were retained with the Conservatives maintaining their commitment to full employment and embraced economic control and management. The economic policies of 1951-55 administration continued along the lines of “the needs of the moment” and economic recovery enabled the government to declare economic success. The government also cut taxes and fulfilled a manifesto pledge to end rationing, thereby also enabling the Conservatives to claim they were reducing Labour’s economic controls. After four years, Butler could claim he had presided over a period of low inflation, full employment and growth all of which The Industrial Charter had signalled the Conservatives’ desire to deliver. However, the extent of Butler’s intervention in achieving this is disputed with scholars claiming it had more to do with world events than Tory policies.116

  • 117 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Pow (...)
  • 118 Richard Hayton, ‘The demise of the One Nation tradition’, Global Discourse 5:1 (2014), pp. 92–95.
  • 119 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Pow (...)
  • 120 Chris Cooper, ‘Little local difficulties revisited: Peter Thorneycroft, the 1958 treasury resignati (...)
  • 121 Robert .M Page, ‘‘Progressive’ Turns in Post-1945 Conservative Social Policy’, Political Studies Re (...)

47When Anthony Eden became Prime Minister, Butler was made to give way to Macmillan at the Treasury. Macmillan delivered one Budget as Chancellor before the Suez Crisis occasioned his elevation to the premiership. Macmillan sought to deliver tax cuts and full employment whilst sustaining economic growth and low inflation. This has been described by Turner as “[having] an overtly political purpose [of] marrying policy to social objectives and aiming all the time to buttress the position of the Conservative Party”.117 The Conservatives were also able to maintain the perception of governing competence118 exhibited by unemployment never reaching above one million and inflation remaining below five per cent. Throughout the 1950s, Britain was experiencing unprecedented growth and advances in living standards which the Conservatives could effectively tie the notions of affluence with governing competence.119 This position is noteworthy, though The Industrial Charter had not been referenced in nearly a decade, the Party maintained the spirit of active government. Macmillan’s first Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft famously resigned and has since been lauded as the proto-Thatcherite for his advocacy to prioritise inflation and attempt to limit public borrowing by controlling expenditure instead of raising taxes.120 Macmillan was unconvinced, and was prepared to tolerate moderate levels of inflation to ensure the maintenance of full employment as a government objective. This indicated the prioritising of social imperatives over economic ones.121

Social Policy

  • 122 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Indus (...)
  • 123 Ibid.
  • 124 Conservative Party Archives, ACP (54), Advisory Committee on Policy, 19th meeting, 18 June 1954

48The Industrial Charter was as one might expect, light on social policy, although clearly stressing the Conservatives’ role in establishing the welfare state.122 The Charter also expressed the desire for individuals to “rise above the level of security123 or in contemporary parlance, the welfare state should provide a hand up over a hand out. Arguably this outlook would reposition the Party as Butler put it ‘to prove the Conservatives were human124 whilst also denouncing Labour’s egalitarian model. The One Nation Group which was formed the year before the Conservatives returned to government, certainly embraced the mantra expressed in the Charter in their pamphlet One Nation stating:

  • 125 Ian Macleod and Angus Maude (eds), One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems (London, Conserva (...)

There is a fundamental disagreement between Conservatives and Socialists on the question of social policy. Socialists would give the same benefit to everyone. Whether or not the help is needed, and indeed whether or not the county’s resources are adequate. We believe that we must first help those in need. Socialists believe that the State should provide an average standard. We believe that It should provide a minimum standard, above which people should be free to rise as far as their industry, their thrift, their ability or genius may take them.125

  • 126 Robert .M Page, ‘‘Progressive’ Turns in Post-1945 Conservative Social Policy’, Political Studies Re (...)
  • 127 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Ju (...)
  • 128 Ian Gilmour, ‘How Major is destroying Disraeli’s legacy’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1996, p. 18.

49The 1951 election victory occasioned the appointment of more progressive ministers such as Butler as Chancellor, Iain Macleod in health, Viscount Eccles in education and Harold Macmillan in housing and also cemented the One Nation approach in government. As Page notes, the policy agendas of Churchill, Eden and Macmillan administrations all conform to the Conservative pivot to One Nation social policies.126 Bochel argues the One Nation approach to welfare, was “distinct” in that it focused on targeting, restraint on spending and use of charging.127 Despite the prevailing theme of Consensus by scholars, rather than imitating Labour, the Conservatives always sought to pursue what Gilmour attributes to Butler as “private enterprise in the public interest”.128 This encapsulates the Conservative Party’s approach to welfare which is borne out in a number of policy areas but elaborated on housing and health below.

  • 129 Paul Bridgen, ‘The one nation idea and state welfare: The conservatives and pensions in the 1950s’, (...)
  • 130 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Ju (...)
  • 131 Michael Hilll, Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, (Aldeshot, Edward Elgar Pu (...)

50The Conservatives much lauded housing programme, described by Bridgen as the exception to an otherwise unconstructive first six years in office,129 committed to building 300,000 homes a year. The emphasis for the Conservatives was on the private sector, both in terms of construction and private renting. However, to achieve the numbers of homes they had committed to building, public expenditure on housing was increased to build more council houses.130 This resulted in the reduction homes let in the private sector although the government remained committed to a mixed economy on housing and encouraged owner-occupancy. Government subsidy along with favourable economic conditions which increased individual incomes meant by 1960, private sector completions accounted for 58 percent of houses built, compared to an average of 23 percent in 1951-55.131

  • 132 Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod (Tonbridge, Andre Deutsch, 1973), p. 93.

51On health, Iain Macleod the archetypal One Nation Tory was keen to promote continuity over reform, remarking that he would like to be the first Minister of Health, not to pass any legislation.132 Klein describes the health policy of the time:

  • 133 Rudolph Klein, The New Politics of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention, (Sixth Edition, Abingdon: (...)

The triumph of the 1950s was to make the NHS work: but the price paid for creating consensus …was to introduce a bias towards inertia. The first decade of the NHS may not have solved the policy dilemmas inherent in the creation of the NHS…But made them tolerable; furthermore it created a powerful consistency for the status quo.133

  • 134 Michael Hill, Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, (Aldeshot, Edward Elgar Pub (...)
  • 135 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Ju (...)

52The NHS remained largely untouched, however it was a source of tension within the Conservative Party particularly on the issue of funding. The spiralling cost to the Treasury had already been recognised by Labour before the Conservative came to power resulting in Labour legislating for but not implementing prescription charges.134 This resulted in a number of policy papers, including from the One Nation Group advocating the move away from tax contributions to an insurance based system.135 Cuts were suggested by Chancellor Thorneycroft in 1958 prior to his resignation as means of controlling spending. Evidently this approach was not adopted, however, the One Nation commitment to the NHS had again demonstrated the prioritisation of social policy over the economy and the continued refutation of ideological pursuits from emerging economic liberals.

Industrial Relations

  • 136 Andrew J Taylor, ‘The Party and The Trade Unions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conserva (...)
  • 137 Ben Rosamond, ‘Contemporary Conservatism and Trade Unionism’ in Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (e (...)

53The Conservative approach to industrial relations during the 1951-64 governments emphasised the need not to antagonise the unions and this view had been clearly articulated in The Industrial Charter. The Conservatives had pledged to repeal Labour’s Trade Disputes Act 1946, a plan which they shelved after coming to power. This was a concern for grassroots members of the Party, which provisions such as the closed shop and political levy enhanced the power of the unions.136 As The Industrial Charter had set the tone for a conciliatory approach to industrial relations, Churchill appointed the “ultra conciliatory” Walter Monckton as Minister of Labour. Indeed, it was felt within the Conservative Party that any attempts on statutory reform would compromise the need to move to the political centre.137

54Nevertheless, the Conservative governments of this time cannot be typified as turbulence free. Government dealings with the trade unions were often strained and maintaining cordial relations with the unions in a bid to avoid “industrial trouble” led to inflationary wage settlements. Strike activity also increased from the mid-1950s, although some were avoided by appeasement. Boxer notes Eden had considered legislative action against industrial action but was deterred by Monkton who advised:

  • 138 Quoted in Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1 (...)

any government initiative in the field of industrial relations should carry out the greatest possible measure of Trade Union Congress approval and concurrence. Unless we carry with us the responsible element, who are present in the majority, we run the risk of uniting the whole movement against us.138

  • 139 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London (...)
  • 140 Andrew J Taylor, ‘The Party and The Trade Unions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conserva (...)
  • 141 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach (...)

55This approach would result in the acceptance that a commitment to full employment meant “the balance of power lies with a heavily unionized workforce”.139 Again, the resignation of Thorneycroft as Chancellor is noteworthy as his advocacy of controlling public spending in light of increasing wage costs, challenged the One Nation Conservative position. In the tradition of Churchill and Eden before him, Macmillan wanted to avoid a clash with the unions, fearing it could make control of inflation more difficult.140 Lacklustre economic performance in the 1960s prompted the Conservatives to consider altering their position. Strikes in particular were of grave concern, particularly due to the monopolistic nature of nationalised industry where small numbers of workers on strikes could cause widespread disruption.141 From the One Nation perspective, this left the government with a dilemma, maintain the conciliatory position that they had held since adoption of The Industrial Charter or seek to introduce legislation to curb union power. The government, out of fear of antagonising the unions further, opted for the former.

  • 142 Ibid., p. 427.

56The government’s commitment to a consociational approach to industrial relations, even late on in Macmillan’s premiership can be seen in the formation of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC). The Council was established in 1962 and membership was made up of ministers, trade unions and employers to consider ways to improve the British economy. As had been promoted in The Industrial Charter, as well as by Macmillan in The Middle Way, it was felt that industrial partnership could flourish through dialogue between parties, fostering trust and helping bring the unions back into line without the need to use statutory levers. However, pressure from within the Party for legislative changes remained and following Macmillan’s resignation, his successor Alec Douglas-Home sought to establish a Royal Commission on trade union law. This proposal appeared in the 1964 election manifesto whilst still advocating partnership through the NEDC (Dorey 2018, p.427),142 however, the Conservatives lost the election, ending thirteen years in government.

Conclusion

57The Industrial Charter is a One Nation Conservative document. The document itself cannot be said to have shaped One Nation Conservativism but rather provided the platform for the Conservatives’ invigorated policy agenda in the post-war period. The Conservatives’ defeat in 1945, was a turning point for the Party and a remarkable feat that they were able to mount a revival in only six years. To that end, The Industrial Charter asserted the Conservative Party’s compulsion to transform as a means of preventing an existential crisis and set the course for a decisive change of approach. Those within the Tory Party who were more predisposed to accept the ideas expressed in the Charter were given the opportunity to articulate their brand of Conservatism which recognized the shift in the political zeitgeist of post-war Britain.

  • 143 John Ramsden, ‘A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners?’ How Far Did the British Conservative Par (...)
  • 144 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Central Office 4/2/83 Woolton to Hutchinson, 1949.

58The real purpose of the Charter then was not to shift philosophy but to line up the Party behind the philosophy that, Ramsden notes, had been emerging since the 1930s143 but arguably followed Conservative traditions going back to Disraeli. This article has established that One Nation was the consolidation of these traditions, invented by Disraeli, used by Baldwin, interpreted by Macmillan, appropriated by the One Nation Group and then promoted by critics of Thatcher. The Industrial Charter was one of the first Conservative Party documents to clearly express five themes which those who self-defined as One Nation Conservatives in the 1980s would coalesce in objection to Thatcherism, explicitly: (1) eschewing notions of ideology; (2) accepting state intervention as a vehicle for social harmony; (3) readily embracing paternalism; (4) have a predisposition to reject laissez-faire economics and; (5) striking a conciliatory tone in industrial relations. One Nation Conservatism is a product of its time, confined to the Conservative government 1951-64. Exponents of One Nation would look back at post-war governments with nostalgia recalling a time of Consensus compared to the abrasive nature of Thatcherism. These sentiments in which the concept of Consensus Politics stood, were undoubtedly expressed in the Industrial Charter. However, it is not entirely clear why the Charter was not mentioned explicitly from 1950. Conservative Party Chairman, Lord Woolton had expressed in a letter to a supportive Tory MP in 1949 that negotiations were underway with the pressure group Aims of Industry to produce a document entitled “The Industrial Charter Works144 but this never materialized. One reason the Charter was scarcely mentioned could be that it had served its purpose as a propaganda piece to provide assurances to the public that the welfare state was safe in the Conservatives’ hands.

59On the question of whether the Charter directly influenced the Conservative governments 1951-64, this cannot be substantiated. However, the Charter’s tone and acknowledgement of a new settlement in post-war Britain certainly assisted in adhering the Conservatives to a centrist position that, on occasion was challenged (including by those on the right of the Party) but did not result in wild fluctuations in policy or direction. The Industrial Charter therefore remains a crucial milestone in the development and application of the One Nation tradition and should be considered a turning point in Conservative Party history.

Top of page

Bibliography

Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, Rev. ed. (London, Pimlico, 1994).

Addison, Paul, A Conspicuous Failure: Lord Randolph Churchill, 12 September 2017, https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-176/conspicuous-failure-lord-randolph-churchill/ [consulted 24 May 2022].

Barnes, John, ‘Ideology and Factions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 315-345.

Blackburn, Dean, ‘Reassessing Britain’s Post-war Consensus’, British Politics 13:2 (2018), pp. 195-214.

Blake, Robert, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1997).

Bochel, Hugh, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010), pp. 123-134.

Boxer, Andrew, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996).

Bridgen, Paul. ‘The one nation idea and state welfare: The conservatives and pensions in the 1950s’, Contemporary British History 14:3 (2000), pp. 83-104.

Butler, Richard. Austen, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971).

Conservative Party Archives, ACP (54), Advisory Committee on Policy, 19th meeting, 18 June 1954.

Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Central Office 4/2/83 Woolton to Hutchinson, 1949.

Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29 The Conservative Industrial Charter Attacked, Sir Waldron Smithers, July 1947.

Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29, Forward from the Industrial Charter, David Eccles MP, 1948.

Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947.

Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Right Road for Britain, The Conservative Party’s Statement of Policy, 1949.

Cooper, Chris, ‘Little local difficulties revisited: Peter Thorneycroft, the 1958 treasury resignations and the origins of Thatcherism’, Contemporary British History 25:2 (2011) pp. 227-250.

Disraeli, Benjamin, Sybil, or The Two Nations, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1895).

Dorey, Peter, ‘A new direction or another false dawn? David Cameron and the crisis of British Conservatism’, British Politics 2:2 (2007) pp. 137-166.

Dorey, Peter, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B.Tauris, 2010).

Dorey, Peter, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951-1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), pp. 408-436.

Dorey Peter and Garnett, Mark, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Conservatism, Global Discourse 5:1 (2015), pp. 69-91.

Dutton, David, British Politics since 1945: The rise, fall and rebirth of consensus (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997).

Evans, Stephen, ‘The not so odd couple: Margaret Thatcher and one nation conservatism’, Contemporary British History 23:1 (2009) pp. 101-121.

Fisher, Nigel, Iain Macleod (Tonbridge, Andre Deutsch, 1973).

Gamble, Andrew, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London, Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988).

Gilmour, Ian, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1977).

Gilmour, Ian, Dancing with Dogma (London, Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1992).

Gilmour, Ian, ‘How Major is destroying Disraeli’s legacy’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1996, p. 18.

Gilmour, Ian and Garnett, Mark, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997).

Green, Damian, ‘One Nation’ in Kevin Hickson (ed.) The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Since 1945, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) pp. 214-218.

Greenleaf, William H., The British Political Tradition, Vol. 2: The Ideological Heritage, (New York, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1983).

Harris, Robin, The Conservatives: A History (London, Bantam Press, 2011).

Hayton, Richard, ‘The demise of the One Nation tradition’, Global Discourse 5:1 (2014), pp. 92-95.

Heppell, Timothy, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

Hickson, Kevin, ‘Thatcherism, poverty and social justice’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010) pp. 135-145.

Hickson, Kevin, Page, Robert and Williams, Ben, ‘Strangled at birth: the One Nation ideology of Theresa May’ Journal of Political Ideologies 25:3 (2020) pp. 334-350.

Hill, Michael, Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, (Aldeshot, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1993).

Kavanagh, Dennis, Thatcherism and British Politics. The End of Consensus? (Second Edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990).

Kilty, Raphaele, Espiet, ‘What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a “One Nation Conservative Government”? The Case of Boris Johnson’, Revue française de civilisation britannique, XXV:3 (2020) pp. 34-52.

Klein, Rudolph, The New Politics of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention, (Sixth Edition, Abingdon: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd, 2010).

Lexden, Alistair, One Nation Conservatism - Created by Baldwin, boosted by the ghost of Disraeli, 22 December 2019, https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/news/one-nation-conservatism-created-baldwin-boosted-ghost-disraeli [consulted 24 May 2022].

Lindsay, Thomas and Harrington, Michael, The Conservative Party, 1918 – 1979, (Second Edition, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979).

Macleod, Iain. and Maude, Angus (eds), One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems (London, Conservative Political Centre, 1950).

Macmillan, Harold, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969).

Maulding, Reginald, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978).

Norton, Phillip, The Conservative Party, (London, Pretence Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf,1996)

Page, Robert .M, ‘‘Progressive’ Turns in Post-1945 Conservative Social Policy’, Political Studies Review 12:1, (2014) pp. 17-28.

Pimlott, Ben, Kavanagh, Dennis and Morris, Peter, Is the ‘postwar consensus’ a myth? Contemporary Record 2:6 (1989), pp. 12-15.

Prior, James, A Balance of Power, (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1986).

Pym, Francis, The Politics of Consent, (Second Edition, London, Sphere Books Ltd, 1985).

Ramsden, John, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1980).

Ramsden, John, ‘A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners?’ How Far Did the British Conservative Party Really Change after 1945?’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 37 (1987), pp. 49-63.

Reynolds, Lloyd. G, ‘Reviewed Work: The Middle Way: A Study of the Problem of Economic and Social Progress in a Free and Democratic Society by Harold Macmillan’, Journal of Political Economy 47:5 (1939), pp. 722-723.

Roberts, David, ‘Tory Paternalism and Social Reform in Early Victorian England’, The American Historical Review, 63:2 (1958), pp. 323-337.

Robinson, Austin, ‘Reviewed Work: The Middle Way. by Harold MacMillan’, The Economic Journal, 48:191, (1938) pp. 551-554.

Rosamond, Ben, ‘Contemporary Conservatism and Trade Unionism’ in Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (eds.) Contemporary British Conservatism, (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), pp. 185-201.

Seawright, David, One Nation, in Kevin Hickson, (ed.) The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Since 1945, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 2005), pp. 69-90.

Seawright, David, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. (New York and London, Continuum, 2010).

Taylor, Andrew J, ‘The Party and The Trade Unions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 499-547.

Tebbit, Norman, Upwardly Mobile, (London, Futura Publications, 1989).

Thatcher, Margaret, The Path to Power, (London, HarperCollins 2011).

Thorpe, D.R. Supermac, The Life of Harold Macmillan, (London, Chatto & Windus, 2010)

Timothy, Nick, Remaking One Nation: The Future of Conservatism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020).

Turner, John, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power since 1783, (London, Fontana Press, 1996), pp. 317-358.

Walsha, Robert, ‘The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and Organization’, 1950-55, Twentieth Century British History, 11:2 (2000), pp. 183-214.

Walsha, Robert, ‘An Interview with David Willets, MP’, Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), pp. 129-137.

Walsha, Robert, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism’, 1950–2002. Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), pp. 69-120.

Willetts, David, Modern Conservatism, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1992).

Willetts, David, ‘The New Conservatism? 1945–1951’ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds.), Recovering Power, The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867, (London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005) pp. 169-191.

Top of page

Notes

1 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947.

2 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil, or The Two Nations, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1895).

3 Stanley Baldwin quoted in Alistair Lexden, One Nation Conservatism - Created by Baldwin, boosted by the ghost of Disraeli, 22 December 2019, https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/news/one-nation-conservatism-created-baldwin-boosted-ghost-disraeli [consulted 24 May 2022].

4 Iain Macleod, and Angus Maude (eds), One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems (London, Conservative Political Centre, 1950).

5 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism (London, Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988) p. 151.

6 Robert Walsha,, ‘The One Nation Group: A Tory Approach to Backbench Politics and Organization’, 1950-55, Twentieth Century British History, 11:2 (2000), p. 184.

7 David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics, (New York and London, Continuum, 2010), p. 119.

8 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), p. vii.

9 David Willetts, Modern Conservatism, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 1992), p. 11.

10 Raphaele Espiet Kilty, ‘What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a “One Nation Conservative Government”? The Case of Boris Johnson’, Revue française de civilisation britannique, XXV:3 (2020), p .45

11 Richard Hayton, ‘The demise of the One Nation tradition’, Global Discourse 5:1 (2014), p. 93.

12 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010), pp. 123–134; Hickson, Kevin, ‘Thatcherism, poverty and social justice’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010) pp. 135–145; Heppell, Timothy, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

13 Robert Walsha, ‘An Interview with David Willets, MP’, Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), p. 130; Robert Walsha, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism’, 1950–2002. Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), p. 105.

14 David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. (New York and London, Continuum, 2010), p. 25.

15 Nick Timothy, Remaking One Nation: The Future of Conservatism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020) p. 228.

16 1998 interview with Lord Biffen quoted in Robert Walsha, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism’, 1950–2002. Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), p. 105.

17 Paul Addison, A Conspicuous Failure: Lord Randolph Churchill, 12 September 2017, https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-176/conspicuous-failure-lord-randolph-churchill/ [consulted 24 May 2022].

18 Kevin Hickson, Robert Page and Ben Williams, ‘Strangled at birth: the One Nation ideology of Theresa May’ Journal of Political Ideologies 25:3 (2020) p. 338.

19 Raphaele Espiet Kilty, ‘What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a “One Nation Conservative Government”? The Case of Boris Johnson’, Revue française de civilisation britannique, XXV:3 (2020), p .45.

20 Stephen Evans, ‘The not so odd couple: Margaret Thatcher and one nation conservatism’, Contemporary British History 23:1 (2009) p. 105.

21 Kevin Hickson, Robert Page and Ben Williams, ‘Strangled at birth: the One Nation ideology of Theresa May’ Journal of Political Ideologies 25:3 (2020) p. 338.

22 Ibid., pp. 338-339.

23 Ibid., p. 338.

24 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), p. vii.

25 Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler defected to the Social Democratic Party in March 1981 during a debate on the budget.

26 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1997), p. 346.

27 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 71.

28 Austin Robinson, ‘Reviewed Work: The Middle Way. by Harold MacMillan’, The Economic Journal, 48:191, (1938) pp. 551–554; Lloyd G. Reynolds, ‘Reviewed Work: The Middle Way: A Study of the Problem of Economic and Social Progress in a Free and Democratic Society by Harold Macmillan’, Journal of Political Economy 47:5 (1939), pp. 722–723.

29 Robert Walsha, ‘One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism’, 1950–2002. Contemporary British History, 17:2 (2003), p. 99.

30 Ibid., p. 107; David Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics. (New York and London, Continuum, 2010), p. 17.

31 Dean Blackburn, ‘Reassessing Britain’s Post-war Consensus’, British Politics 13:2 (2018), pp. 195-214.

32 Ben Pimlott, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Is the ‘postwar consensus’ a myth? Contemporary Record 2:6 (1989), p. 14

33 James Prior, A Balance of Power, (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1986), pp. 133-134.

34 Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent, (Second Edition, London, Sphere Books Ltd, 1985).

35 Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma (London, Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1992), p. 30.

36 Ibid., pp. 42-44.

37 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile, (London, Futura Publications, 1989), p. 228.

38 Ian Gilmour, ‘How Major is destroying Disraeli’s legacy’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1996, p. 18. Gilmour’s identified four constants in One Nation Conservatism (1) partnership with Europe; (2) “the importance of the social services”; (3) concern for the wellbeing of the entire country and (4) a continuing view that neoliberal economic doctrine is alien to one nation conservatism.

39 Robin Harris, The Conservatives: A History (London, Bantam Press, 2011), pp. 373-375.

40 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1997), p. 255.

41 David Willetts, ‘The New Conservatism? 1945–1951’ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds.), Recovering Power, The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867, (London, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005) p. 170.

42 Ibid., p. 171.

43 Timothy Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 35.

45 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 79.

46 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 34.

47 Thomas Lindsay and Michael Harrington, The Conservative Party, 1918 – 1979, (Second Edition, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), p. 151.

48 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1980), p. 109.

49 Gilmour, Ian and Garnett, Mark, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 33.

50 Richard. Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 133.

51 Phillip Norton, The Conservative Party, (London, Pretence Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf,1996), p. 46.

52 Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics. The End of Consensus? (Second Edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 190.

53 Damian Gren, ‘One Nation’ in Kevin Hickson (ed.) The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Since 1945, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) p. 216.

54 Reginald Maulding, Memoirs, (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), p. 44.

55 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, pp. 3-5.

56 Ibid., pp. 6-9.

57 Ibid., pp. 10-27.

58 Ibid., pp. 28-34.

59 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 135.

60 Ibid., p. 135.

61 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1977), pp. 132-140.

62 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 146.

63 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, p. 3.

64 John Barnes, ‘Ideology and Factions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 331.

65 Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1977), p. 236.

66 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 85.

67 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, p. 10.

68 Ibid., p. 4.

69 David Roberts, ‘Tory Paternalism and Social Reform in Early Victorian England’, The American Historical Review, 63:2 (1958), pp. 323-337; William H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, Vol. 2: The Ideological Heritage, (New York, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1983), pp. 196-205.

70 Peter Dorey, ‘A new direction or another false dawn? David Cameron and the crisis of British Conservatism’, British Politics 2:2 (2007), p. 139.

71 Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Conservatism, Global Discourse 5:1 (2015), p. 75.

72 Ibid.

73 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, pp. 15-16.

74 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power since 1783, (London, Fontana Press, 1996), p. 331.

75 Quoted in Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Conservatism, Global Discourse 5:1 (2015), p. 73.

76 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29, Forward from the Industrial Charter, David Eccles MP, 1948.

77 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, p. 17.

78 Ibid., p. 36.

79 Ibid., p. 14.

80 Ibid., p. 15.

81 Ibid., p. 24.

82 Ibid., p. 39.

83 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951–1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), p. 408.

84 Ibid., p. 428.

85 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, p. 21.

86 Ibid., p. 28.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., p. 29.

89 Ibid., p. 39.

90 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy, (New York: Longman Group Ltd, 1980), p. 109.

91 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, pp. 31-32.

92 Ibid., p. 40.

93 Ibid., p. 33.

94 Ibid., p. 40.

95 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951–1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), pp. 408-436.

96 Thatcher, Margaret, The Path to Power, (London, HarperCollins 2011), pp. 109-110.

97 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 80.

98 Timothy Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 17.

99 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Research Department 2/7/29 The Conservative Industrial Charter Attacked, Sir Waldron Smithers, July 1947.

100 Harold Macmillan speech at Church House, Westminster, 14 June 1947, quoted in Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 306.

101 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 33.

102 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power, (London, HarperCollins 2011), p. 49.

103 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951–1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), p. 412.

104 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Right Road for Britain, The Conservative Party’s Statement of Policy, 1949, p. 23.

105 Peter Dorey, British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality (London, I.B. Tauris, 2010).

106 in Peter Dorey and Mark Garnett, ‘The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Conservatism, Global Discourse 5:1 (2015), p. 72.

107 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 303.

108 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), pp. 146-147.

109 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 303; Butler, Richard. Austen, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), p. 147.

110 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951–1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), p. 414.

111 Ben Pimlott, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Is the ‘postwar consensus’ a myth? Contemporary Record 2:6 (1989); Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, Rev. ed. (London, Pimlico, 1994); David Dutton, British Politics since 1945: The rise, fall and rebirth of consensus (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997).

112 Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, (London, Macmillan and Co, 1969), p. 304.

113 Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 26.

114 Richard Austen Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1971), pp. 158-160.

115 D.R. Thorpe, Supermac, The Life of Harold Macmillan, (London, Chatto & Windus, 2010), p. 286.

116 Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 29.

117 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power since 1783, (London, Fontana Press, 1996), p. 328.

118 Richard Hayton, ‘The demise of the One Nation tradition’, Global Discourse 5:1 (2014), pp. 92–95.

119 John Turner, ‘1951-1964’, in Anthony Seldon, (ed.) How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power since 1783, (London, Fontana Press, 1996), p. 320.

120 Chris Cooper, ‘Little local difficulties revisited: Peter Thorneycroft, the 1958 treasury resignations and the origins of Thatcherism’, Contemporary British History 25:2 (2011) pp. 227-250.

121 Robert .M Page, ‘‘Progressive’ Turns in Post-1945 Conservative Social Policy’, Political Studies Review 12:1, (2014) p. 20.

122 Conservative and Unionist Central Office, The Industrial Charter, A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy, 1947, p. 4.

123 Ibid.

124 Conservative Party Archives, ACP (54), Advisory Committee on Policy, 19th meeting, 18 June 1954

125 Ian Macleod and Angus Maude (eds), One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems (London, Conservative Political Centre, 1950), p. 9.

126 Robert .M Page, ‘‘Progressive’ Turns in Post-1945 Conservative Social Policy’, Political Studies Review 12:1, (2014) pp. 17-28

127 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010), p. 128

128 Ian Gilmour, ‘How Major is destroying Disraeli’s legacy’, The Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1996, p. 18.

129 Paul Bridgen, ‘The one nation idea and state welfare: The conservatives and pensions in the 1950s’, Contemporary British History 14:3 (2000), p. 84.

130 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010), p. 129

131 Michael Hilll, Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, (Aldeshot, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1993), pp. 51-53.

132 Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod (Tonbridge, Andre Deutsch, 1973), p. 93.

133 Rudolph Klein, The New Politics of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention, (Sixth Edition, Abingdon: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd, 2010), p. 41.

134 Michael Hill, Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, (Aldeshot, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1993), p. 59.

135 Hugh Bochel, ‘One Nation Conservatism and social policy, 1951–64’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 18:2 (2010), p. 130.

136 Andrew J Taylor, ‘The Party and The Trade Unions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 517.

137 Ben Rosamond, ‘Contemporary Conservatism and Trade Unionism’ in Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith (eds.) Contemporary British Conservatism, (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p. 188.

138 Quoted in Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-64 (Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 7.

139 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945 (London, Fourth Estate, 1997), pp. 82-83.

140 Andrew J Taylor, ‘The Party and The Trade Unions’ in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 519.

141 Peter Dorey, ‘‘Don’t intervene, don’t get involved’: the Conservative Party’s voluntarist approach to industrial relations and trade unionism, 1951–1964’, Contemporary British History 32:3 (2018), p. 423.

142 Ibid., p. 427.

143 John Ramsden, ‘A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners?’ How Far Did the British Conservative Party Really Change after 1945?’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 37 (1987), p. 60.

144 Conservative Party Archives, Conservative Central Office 4/2/83 Woolton to Hutchinson, 1949.

Top of page

References

Electronic reference

Josh Williams, An Assessment of the Significance of the 1947 Industrial Charter in Shaping One Nation ConservatismRevue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXVIII-1 | 2023, Online since 03 February 2023, connection on 08 June 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/10338; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.10338

Top of page

About the author

Josh Williams

Josh Williams is second year PhD candidate in the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University. Josh’s research investigates the history and decline of One Nation Conservatism. Josh holds a BA in Politics (2007-2010) and a MA in Public Policy (2010-2011) from Swansea University. Josh’s research interests include British conservatism, British liberalism, devolution and housing and social welfare policy in the United Kingdom.

Top of page

Copyright

CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.

Top of page
Search OpenEdition Search

You will be redirected to OpenEdition Search