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The “Re:Imagine India”1 Project: Ambitions and Limits of British Cultural Diplomacy in India

Le projet « Re:Imagine India » : ambitions et limites de la diplomatie culturelle britannique en Inde
Emily Harris

Abstracts

This article analyses one of the United Kingdom’s most recent cultural diplomacy programmes, the 2015 “Re:Imagine India” project. It firstly explains the context, then shows the programme’s strengths and argues that this project is a prime example of the way that Britain is trying to develop its soft power in order to grow its influence in India. Thirdly, it delves into the project’s “informally imperialist” rhetoric, which seems to persist behind the narrative of soft power. It concludes by studying the claim put forward by scholars like Oliver Turner, according to whom the concept of “Global Britain” and the interest in soft power, especially in the Commonwealth, are evidence of Britain’s identity crisis in the early 21st century.

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Introduction

  • 1 The spelling of the programme’s title differs in the documentation, with occurrences of ‘Reimagine (...)
  • 2 Emmer Coyle, Mona Lotten and John Dubber, “India Matters: How Stronger Educational and Cultural Tie (...)

1In 2015, the British Council published a report entitled “India Matters”2, which urged the United Kingdom to develop its soft power in the Indo-Pacific region. The report displayed an omnipresent sense of urgency, highlighting the importance of increasing its influence in all fields. The UK seemed to want to re-establish its global influence, especially in the Commonwealth, to palliate the loss of Europe, and to ensure that it remained a key player in the new world order in which India is entrenching its position as a major power – economically, culturally and politically.

  • 3 This article is a revised and updated version of some initial research carried out at the ENS Lyon (...)
  • 4 Arts Council England, “Reimagine India Applicant Guidance”, 2015, https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/si (...)

2Launched in 2015, the “Re:Imagine India” project took place in two different phases – in 2015 and in 2016 – and was led in partnership with the National Lottery.3 It aimed to fund British projects taking place in India, Indian projects taking place in the UK, and bilateral productions with Indo-British teams travelling between the two countries. During each phase, the Arts Council and the British Council awarded National Lottery funds to what they considered the best Indo-British art projects. The purpose was to “create new work and to build sustainable networks and partnerships between artists and cultural leaders in both countries, as well as to develop an intercultural dialogue and strengthen cultural relations based on this exchange of ideas, knowledge, work and artistic practice”.4 This programme enabled dozens of artistic organisations to bring their visions to life, from the visual to the combined arts, to dance, literature, and musical performances.

  • 5 See Manavi Kapur, “The Crown’s Escape from History, as Seen from the British Empire’s Former Coloni (...)
  • 6 Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Introduction to International Relations”, Lecture given at the University of (...)
  • 7 Ibid.

3This interest in India and in developing “Global Britain” cannot, however, be understood as an isolated pursuit, disconnected from the UK’s imperial past. The past decade has shown the divide created by the legacy of the British Empire. In popular culture, voices have risen to urge the UK to address its imperial past. In 2018, the Windrush scandal broke out when it emerged that Commonwealth citizens, and sometimes British citizens of colour, people were being wrongly detained, denied legal rights, and in at least 83 cases, wrongly deported from the UK by the Home Office under the Conservative government’s “hostile environment policy”. TV series like The Crown, Beecham House, or The Singapore Grip have also been criticised for their “valorisation”5 of the role of historical figures like Lord Mountbatten, their “absolute silence”6 over the violence of the British in India, and for offering “a benign view of the role of Empire and colonisation”7. Such reflections on the legacy of imperialism also echo the Cape Town-born #RhodesMustFall movement of 2015 and Bristol’s 2020 anti-racist protests that led to the removal of the statue of slave-trader Edward Colston.

  • 8 See Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Defends Lack of Apology for British Massacre at Amritsar”, The Gu (...)
  • 9 Oliver Dowden, “Letter from Culture Secretary to DCMS Arm’s Length Bodies on contested heritage”, 2 (...)

4And yet, it seems that the Conservative governments’ foreign policy has instead centred around a sense of nostalgia for the British Empire. One example of this has been the unwillingness to apologise for imperial violence. David Cameron’s speech in Amritsar back in 2013, when he stopped short of an apology for the 1919 massacre and argued it was wrong to “reach back” into history to “seek out things you can apologise for”,8 is one illustration of this. Similarly, calls have been made by Conservative politicians to remember, as Britons, what to be proud of in British history – as illustrated by the open letter written by Oliver Dowden following the Bristol protests.9

  • 10 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, D (...)

5With this sense of persistent colonial hierarchies and power dynamics still embedded in political discourse and, as will be demonstrated, in cultural diplomacy, this article reflects on the overlap between soft power and informal imperialism as manifested in one specific project of the UK’s cultural diplomacy arsenal: the “Re:Imagine India” project. Studying this programme allows for a deep dive into the concept of “Global Britain” and how the UK is adapting to the fact that the “geopolitical and economic centre of gravity [is moving] eastward towards the Indo-Pacific”.10 The “Re:Imagine India” project is therefore a useful case study to analyse the extent to which the UK is promoting diversity and intercultural dialogue or, on the contrary, building on an “informally imperialist” narrative, at a time when it is criticised for wanting to establish “Empire 2.0”.

6In order to do this, this article focuses on the successes and the limitations of “Re:Imagine India” as a cultural diplomacy programme launched by an ex-colonial power in an ex-colony. It aims to determine how successful this initiative is as a diplomatic project aimed at fostering bilateral understanding and at promoting a modern, positive vision of the UK, away from its imperial history.

7This article first presents Britain’s revival of interest for cultural diplomacy and soft power in the past few years, as well as the links to “informal imperialism”. It then delves into the core of the “Re:Imagine India” programme, studying the narrative at play and evaluating it based on three main criteria: the fostering of intercultural dialogue, the promotion of diversity, and the ability to address the UK’s imperial past. It establishes the programme’s successes on the first two criteria, before highlighting its main limitation: a persisting, “informally imperialist” narrative – which, however, does not seem to have prevented India from reaping the cultural and political benefits of bicultural exchanges. The article ultimately concludes that the UK’s persisting imperialist narrative and aspirations are symptoms of a deep identity crisis – one that had been simmering for years and was brought to boiling point by Brexit.

The UK’s recent revival of interest in cultural diplomacy and soft power

8Today’s United Kingdom is still a major power on the world scene. Economically, it is one of the strongest nations in the world – in 2022, it ranked 6th on the World Bank’s index of the largest Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in the world.11 Culturally, it also remains a significant power, ranking second in Brand Finance’s 2022 and 2023 Soft Power Index – leading Europe, and ahead of the 2021 leader Germany.12 However, the UK faces increasing competition, in all fields. In the past decade, two main changes have caused its influence to wane, creating shifts in its international strategy.

9First, on a macro, international level, the shift of the world’s centre of power to Asia – also commonly called the ‘Eastward drift of power’, the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, and the ‘Asian century’ – is arguably one of the 21st century’s most important changes in the international balance of power. According to the United Nations Population Division, India and China represent respectively about 17.76% and 17.72% of the world population.13 Both of these states’ GDPs are projected to top the United States’ by 2050. India is now the world’s largest democracy in the world, and although it is a flawed one – caste, gender and religious discriminations still somewhat prevail, as does corruption – Freedom House gives it a global freedom score of 66.14 India’s economic and political power is also undeniable – part of the Quadrilateral Alliance alongside Japan, Australia, and the USA, India is one of the most powerful states in the Indo-Pacific.

  • 15 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 17.
  • 16 White House, “FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, 11 February 2022, https://ww (...)

10This shift of power to Asia has prompted some Western states to develop tactics to prevent their own influence from waning. This point appears salient in some of the latest official documentation. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s 2021 Integrated Review, which spelt out Boris Johnson’s goals for Britain’s future, thus underlines the need to “adapt to a changing international environment”, namely to “geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, such as China’s increasing international assertiveness and the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific”.15 Similar trends have taken place across the Atlantic, as illustrated by the Biden administration’s Fact Sheet of February 2022 entitled “The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”.16

  • 17 UKIERI promotes over 1,000 partnerships and enables over 25,000 exchanges of academics, researchers (...)
  • 18 See Emer Coyle, “India and the UK: A 2050 Vision”, London, British Council, November 2015, https:// (...)

11In the case of the UK, the focus is especially on India – not least because of the countries’ shared history, which the UK seems to see as an opportunity. The British Council’s 2015 “India Matters” report emphasised the importance of fostering diplomatic ties with India through bilateral educational and cultural programmes, mentioning the outreach of the UK-India Education & Research Initiative (UKIERI),17 which is the largest bilateral government-to-government partnership programme in education in India. Another British Council report, dated November 2015, “India and the UK – a 2050 vision”, similarly argued that strong diplomatic ties with India were a real “opportunity”18 for the UK, and underlined the need to develop a better understanding of India in British schools and at higher-education level. India’s recent leaps in economic, cultural and demographic terms leave little time for hesitation.

  • 19 See, for example, Theresa May, Speech at Lancaster House, London, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov. (...)
  • 20 See Anand Menon, “Brexit: An Analysis of Current Events”, online conference at the University of Ox (...)
  • 21 See Theresa May in Oliver Turner, “Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire”, The Political Quart (...)
  • 22 Ibid.
  • 23 See for instance Adrien Rodd, “British Diplomatic Re-Engagement in the Pacific: More Than Just Word (...)

12Secondly, on a more micro, national and regional level, the other major change in British politics was the 2016 vote in favour of leaving the European Union, which triggered some major changes in the country’s way of conducting diplomacy and foreign policy. As argued by Anand Menon, a leading scholar on European affairs and post-Brexit UK politics, successive governments have been desperate to sign trade deals with non-EU countries19 in order to display the UK’s ability to thrive without the European Union, away from the common charge that Brexit may cause the country to become insular.20 Another major policy put forward after Brexit has been “Global Britain”. Coined in October 2016 by the then Prime Minister Theresa May, this concept has been defined as “an ambitious vision for Britain after Brexit”,21 in which the UK’s newly acquired independence from the EU would enable it to promote free trade, peace and prosperity, and to protect the interests of itself and others.22 “Global Britain” encompasses three types of diplomacy: economic, environmental23 and that which is the focus of this article, cultural diplomacy.

  • 24 Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, Ho (...)
  • 25 See H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 5.
  • 26 Ibid., p. 9.

13This is linked to a broader desire to expand the UK’s soft power abroad. The 2014 report of the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World,24 or the Government’s 2021 Global Britain in a competitive age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, expressed Britain’s ambition to remain a “soft power superpower”,25 and its desire “to deepen [its] diplomatic and prosperity links with allies and partners worldwide”.26 These diplomatic ambitions, linked to changing balances of power worldwide, have led to calls to engage more actively with the Commonwealth – hence a surge of abundant documentation on soft power.

  • 27 See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, Public Affairs, 2004)
  • 28 Ibid., p. ii.
  • 29 See for instance Emma Bell, “Soft Power and corporate imperialism: maintaining British influence”, (...)

14Originally coined in his famous Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics,27 “soft power” is defined by Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When [a country’s] policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, [its] soft power is enhanced”28 – as opposed to “hard power”, which is economic and military, and rests on threats (“sticks”) and inducements (“carrots”). Hard power influences behaviour through command, coercion and the use of force, as well as sanctions and bribes, with governmental tactics resting on coercive diplomacy, war and military alliances. “Smart power”, finally, is the optimal balance between both. Nye’s theory remains relevant today, as shown by the way recent scholarship has continued to draw from it. Emma Bell’s work on soft power and commercial diplomacy, for instance, provides a good example.29 Bell shows that soft power can be derived from different vectors of influence, including, and increasingly, commercial diplomacy, which is a way for a country to exercise and gain influence worldwide through large companies, but also from cultural diplomacy.

15Various actors and channels operate within the sphere of cultural diplomacy. While the actors of diplomacy stricto sensu are fairly evident – the diplomatic corps, ambassadors, consulates – the same cannot be said about cultural diplomacy, whose actors can either be directly linked to the government (i.e. Prime Ministers, diplomats and civil servants), or indirectly linked to it (i.e. the British Council, the Arts Council, or museums and other cultural bodies). This strikes a difference with soft power, which, broadly speaking, is the influence reaped from any source, be it a governmental policy, a diplomatic programme, or the attraction created from corporate products and private companies. British soft power is thus the influence derived not only from the diplomatic arsenal, but also from brands like Harrods, Land Rover and Dairy Milk.

  • 30 As opposed to “club diplomacy”, which was the work of a happy few, “network diplomacy” increasingly (...)
  • 31 Patricia M. Goff, “Cultural Diplomacy” in ibid., p. 419.
  • 32 Ibid., p. 420.
  • 33 Ibid.

16Scholars of soft power have historically tended to focus on its commercial aspect and have given less attention to cultural diplomacy, reflecting an equally uneven commitment on the part of governments. And yet, cultural diplomacy remains an essential tool of influence, especially in the age of (over)information, globalisation, and network diplomacy.30 It is difficult to come across an uncontested definition of cultural diplomacy, as it is very contingent, and ad hoc. However, it is broadly agreed that the concept springs from two premises, as recalled by the Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy:– one, that “good relations can take root in the fertile ground of understanding and respect”;31 two, that art, language and education are among the most significant entry points into a culture, and yet possess a universal aspect which grants them the ability to transcend political polarisation.32 More precisely, the existing spectrum of definitions goes from that of Walter Laqueur or Milton C. Cummings, who defined cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding”,33 to more political definitions like that of Simon Mark which is the one this article adopts. For Mark, cultural diplomacy is

  • 34 Ibid.

a diplomatic practice of governments, carried out in support of a government’s foreign policy goals, or its diplomacy (or both), usually involving directly or indirectly the government’s foreign ministry, involving a wide range of manifestations of the culture of the state which the government represents, targeted at a wider population, as well as elites.34

  • 35 Ibid., p. 421.

17Ultimately, its goal, beyond fostering mutual understanding, is to tell a story about its state – a positive one, sometimes to offset the negative, stereotypical image it may have abroad.35

  • 36 Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), p. 13.
  • 37 Ibid., p. 9.
  • 38 See Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, “Introduction” in Martin Thomas and Richard Toye (eds), Rhetori (...)
  • 39 Ibid., p. 13.

18But diplomacy and soft power cannot be understood in a vacuum. Inasmuch as the UK has an imperial history that still casts a shadow over the present, one final notion is essential to understand the “Re:Imagine India” project: “informal empire”. Coined by Edward Said, this concept refers to the processes of imperialism that linger beyond the economic and political, by “the authority of recognizable cultural formations, by continuing consolidation within education, literature and the visual and musical arts”.36 Contrary to direct colonialism, which has largely ended, “informal empire” is then what “lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices”.37 Echoing Edward Said’s conceptualisation, David Spurr’s work on imperial rhetoric proves particularly useful to study the narrative at play behind the project. More recently, Martin Thomas and Richard Toye have drawn attention to the importance of rhetoric – “public forms of communication with a persuasive or symbolic purpose’, including “written and visual rhetorics as well as spoken ones”38 – as “a social phenomenon”.39 This means, amongst other things, that access to linguistic resources of persuasion is connected with social, economic and political hierarchies.

  • 40 See for example Alice Byrne, “The British Council in India, 1945-1955: Preserving ‘old relationship (...)
  • 41 See for instance David Olusoga, “Britain can’t be reborn while we’re still lost in fantasies about (...)

19Recent literature has also emerged on these points of tension between diplomacy and imperialism both in the UK and in France. As mentioned, Emma Bell’s work on soft power and commercial diplomacy is one illustration, as is Alice Byrne’s work on the British Council,40 which recalls the different facets of British cultural diplomacy, from cultural propaganda in the Second World War to the emergence of the first cultural exchanges within the Commonwealth. David Olusoga, in his articles on the UK’s plans for post-Brexit trade within the Commonwealth, also puts forward the argument that these trading relationships are infused by a nostalgic desire for global influence and wealth that is evocative of a “neo-colonial fantasy”.41 This framework and the different points of overlap between soft power, cultural diplomacy and “informal imperialism” are essential to understand British cultural diplomacy – and especially the programmes linked to India.

  • 42 British Council, “Transnational Education. A Guide for Creating Partnerships in India” (New Delhi, (...)

20Since 2015, India and the UK have collaborated on a number of artistic and cultural projects. The year 2016 was promoted as the “UK-India year of Education, Research and Innovation” by the then Prime Ministers David Cameron and Narendra Modi, with a focus on transnational education.42 The year 2017, which marked the 50th anniversary of Indian independence and was labelled the “UK-India year of Culture”, was quite remarkable in that respect. The Victoria & Albert Museum hosted an exhibition on Lockwood Kipling and his ties to Punjabi arts; the British Library’s famous 1225 edition of the Magna Carta travelled to India, while its large St Pancras space also hosted the famous Jaipur literature festival for the first time.23 While these initiatives are all timely and interesting topics of study, this article now turns its focus to a longer-term, better documented project in the history of UK-India bilateral programmes: the “Re:Imagine India” programme.

The “Re:Imagine India” project: promoting diversity and intercultural dialogue

  • 43 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, p. 8.
  • 44 Ibid., p. 2.

21“Re:Imagine India” was born at a time of reflection on the importance of India in the UK’s diplomatic strategy. The project was launched in 2015, the year the aforementioned “India Matters” report was published by the British Council as a guide for Britain’s next diplomatic projects. “Re:Imagine India” aimed to award cultural projects which showcased British art and supported the Indo-British relationship. Projects could take place in England or India but they all had to rely on a partnership between an Indian and an English arts or cultural institution.43 Some focused on one aspect of Indian culture or on a historical event or moment of the Indo-British relationship (e.g. Partition). Applicants were all artistic organisations, which worked singly, in partnership or as part of a consortium.44

22The selection process took place in two rounds. Round 1 (2015) awarded twenty-two cultural projects from theatre to dance, music and photography. Round 2 (2016) selected seventeen applicants – most of whom had already received funding in round 1. Awards exceeded the original budget, with round 1 providing a total of £535,578, and round 2 £1,324,783 (that is, £370,361 more than the £954,422 originally announced as the budget for the second round).

  • 45 Ibid.
  • 46 Ibid., p. 10.

23The Applicant Guidance clearly explains what the goals of the project are. It underlines the project’s aim to “promot[e] international creative collaborations”, “showcas[e] the best of art and culture from England and India”, “[connect] artists from England and India with diasporic communities in England”, as well as “[build] skills and [leave] a legacy”.45 It also promotes the use of digital connections and technological breakthroughs, specifically encouraging “projects which make innovative and imaginative use of digital technology, either in artistic or networking/learning outcomes”.46 This reflects the UK’s interest in being a leading power in technology and innovation, but it was also, more broadly, a way to appeal to younger generations, who tend to be the target audience of cultural diplomacy, as they are tomorrow’s potential leaders, clients and policymakers. “Re:Imagine India” was launched the year the “India Matters” report was published – and it seems to have been a response to it. Indeed, the “Re:Imagine India” project states that it aims to reach three specific goals, which are set out clearly in the “India Matters” report.

  • 47 Ibid., p. 8.
  • 48 Ibid.
  • 49 Ibid., p. 52.
  • 50 Coyle et al., “India Matters”, p. 53.
  • 51 Ibid.

24Firstly, a better understanding of India and Indian culture. The emphasis placed by “Re:Imagine India”’s on “intercultural dialogue”47 and the “exchange of ideas, knowledge, work and artistic practice”48 follows the report’s key point that in order “to ensure that it doesn’t lose out to other countries[,] the UK must act quickly and purposefully to deepen its relationship with India. […] Improving UK understanding of India and its priorities is key to this”.49 Secondly, “Re:Imagine India” provides financial support to organisations in the Indian arts sector, in clear line with the report’s encouragement for the UK to “form collaborations with the Indian arts sector to enable it to flourish and create a less challenging environment”.50 Finally, the “Re:Imagine India” programme seems a timely response to the call for the UK to “build on investment in institutional and individual collaborations in the arts, including an expansion of Arts Council England’s Reimagine funding stream”.51 This is precisely what “Re:Imagine India” does, as it provides institutional funding to artistic projects through the collaboration of the Arts Council, the British Council and the National Lottery.

25These three points echo the first two criteria mentioned earlier in this article: intercultural dialogue and diversity. And in this respect, the programme has undoubtedly fulfilled what it set out to do.

26The programme first succeeds in making its “creative case for diversity”. The application guidance defines this as

  • 52 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, p. 4.

the multitude of ethnicities, faiths and socioeconomic classes […]. [Our] concept of diversity includes disabled people, older people and people of all sexual orientations. Our arts-driven concept of diversity as opportunity represents a shift in perspective, from regarding diversity as a prescriptive aspect of equality legislation to understanding its creative potential.52

27The artistic diversity of the funded schemes is quite remarkable. In both rounds, “Re:Imagine India” funded a dizzying variety of projects, from musical performances (including both classical and more contemporary music styles), to dance shows, theatre and plays, and performative arts. Many of the musical projects included traditional forms of Indian music combined to modern, and techno music, such as the Punjabtronix project and its ambitious 2017 performances, which gave all its meaning to their motto: “Technology meets Tradition”.53 Combining traditional Punjabi dhol drums, stringed instruments, double flute algoza, live electronic music and vocals, Punjabtronix was a “cutting edge experience of technology and British electronic music connecting with the raw energetic DNA of Punjab – culminating in an exciting new musical and visual experience”.54 “Re:Imagine India” also funded classical music projects, such as a collaboration between the London Philharmonic Orchestra and Darbar Arts (the UK’s leading classical Indian music promoter).55 The fund also selected a wide variety of dance projects, like 2Faced Dance’s adventurous and contemporary performance “Outlands”, which included performances in Mumbai and Bangalore in partnership with three Indian organisations: Sumeet Nagdev Dance Arts in Mumbai, Attakkalari Centre for Movement Arts in Bangalore, and Darpana Academy of Performing Arts in Ahmedabad. “Re:Imagine India” also funded projects blending art forms, such as Akademi’s The Troth project, a theatre-dance performance celebrating the centenary of the first Hindi short story, Indian cinema and the commemoration of World War I. Funding also went to visual arts projects (AV Festival), combined arts performances (Kinetika People), and literature projects like Writers Centre Norwich (WCN), where WCN writers from England’s first UNESCO City of Literature travelled to vibrant Kolkata, East India’s educational and cultural centre, to form ties and create partnerships during a five-day research and development trip.56 Finally, the performative arts were also awarded funding, with projects such as an immersive participatory performance for audiences of forty 13 to 16 year-olds led by Deborah Pakkar-Hull for the Blah theatres, bridging what was identified as a gap in the range of artistic projects traditionally funded by British and Indian institutions.

  • 57 Sean Keenan, “Urban(e) Legends: Prodigal Theatre & The Urban Playground Team: Fourth Wall on the St (...)
  • 58 Ibid.
  • 59 As one participant noted, the terms “‘disabled’ and D/deaf’ are quite regular and standard here [in (...)

28This artistic variety also finds an echo in the great diversity of communities involved in the “Re:Imagine India” programme, which is another way of meeting its commitment to diversity. Some of the funded projects gave a voice to economically and geographically disadvantaged communities in both the UK and India. One example of this is the dance project led by the Prodigal Theatre Company in South-East England in partnership with Chennai’s Parkour Circle, an Indian organisation for street dance and parkour, which was awarded £15,000 in round 2. Together, they set up workshops and street dance performances in rural villages in the state of Tamil Nadu. In an interview given to Trebuchet magazine, some of the English dancers who took part in these performances said that they had “seventy-eight members of a Dalit community in a rural village join [them] for a workshop. The youngest was four, the oldest was ninety-five. All joined in”.57 One dancer went on to add: “I’m writing this to you whilst sitting on the plane back to Chennai, and as part of our tour we’ll be taking the full show back to that community – we know it’s going to be a special one”.58 Here, the artistic performance delivered by the parkour performers and street dancers helped transcend economic and cultural differences, an effective way to involve underprivileged communities in an intercultural project. Several projects funded by “Re:Imagine India” also promoted the inclusion of disabled artists and participants, such as the project led by the London-based Graeae Theatre Company with Chennai, a performance led by D/deaf and disabled performers from Tamil Nadu on the theme of the legend of the Sun Goddess Aruna and Prometheus.59

  • 60 See Creative Black Country, “Girl Gaze: Journeys Through the Punjab & The Black Country”, 21 Februa (...)
  • 61 Ibid.
  • 62 Ibid.
  • 63 Parminder Dosanjh quoted in Creative Black Country, “Girl Gaze”.
  • 64 Ibid.

29Another focus was women, including in the UK. Creative Black Country, a project selected in both rounds, received £50,000 to carry out its vision focused on the Punjabi diasporic community in Wolverhampton. As the people behind Creative Black Country note, Wolverhampton is a city which has one of the largest Punjabi diasporas outside of India, one that, since its emergence in the 1940s, has contributed to giving “a unique identity to the area”60 and to “redefining the cultural, economic and social landscape.”61 This is what inspired the name of the organisation – “Creative Black Country” (CBC) – based on the community’s immense cultural contributions to the region. Their visual arts project for “Re:Imagine India” was based on a partnership with the UK’s Multistory and the Nazar Foundation of New Delhi. It “commission[ed] four female photographers to create compelling stories about women’s lives and their cultural roots in the Punjab”62 and “stimulate new conversations”63 – in short, to “reimagine India in the 21st century”.64 The project connected English and Indian communities and gave a platform to female photographers, who shared meaningful stories about their lives as women, and more precisely as women from an ethnic minority. The project enabled them to honour the cultural wealth of an effervescent area where England meets Punjab, and to produce a micro-history whose authenticity is a much-needed change from the clichéd, romanticised view of India conveyed in some of the Bollywood productions.

30This great variety in the types of artistic projects funded and the communities involved suggests that the “Creative case for diversity” the programme set out to make was not an abstract theoretical concept, and that it found concrete materialisation. Analysing cultural diplomacy from a post-colonial perspective, investing in diversity seems a modern strategy to attract younger generations through vibrant, multicultural initiatives while addressing what has lacked in the past. However, a study of the narrative supporting “Re:Imagine India” suggests that British cultural diplomacy still bears traces of informal imperialism.

“Re:Imagine India”: the persistence of an imperial narrative?

31This article set out to analyse the “Re:Imagine India” programme by using three criteria: the promotion of intercultural dialogue, the fostering of diversity, and the expression of a productive, modern narrative away from the UK’s imperial past. Despite its successes at promoting intercultural dialogues and diversity in the art projects that were funded and the people who were involved, “Re:Imagine India” displays one major shortcoming: its narrative.

32Indeed, as a closer study of the project shows, drawing on David Spurr’s study of imperial rhetoric, the programme relied heavily on what this work argues is a rhetoric of “informal imperialism”. Two specific points stand out: celebrating British “excellence”, and presenting the UK as the standard India should strive to reach.

  • 65 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, pp. 4-5.

33From the start, “Re:Imagine India” emphasises the “shared history” or “common ties” which bring the UK and India closer. And yet, beyond this sense of closeness, what is simultaneously put forward is the inherent difference between both countries – the UK’s special place as a centre for excellence. The fund’s Applicant Guidance, as well as the documentation provided by the British Council, make it clear that applicants should celebrate Indian art, but that they should aim to promote Britain as a “centre for cultural excellence”, through projects that demonstrate that “excellence is thriving and celebrated in the arts, museums and libraries”.65 Applicants are encouraged to focus on goals 1 and 3 (out of five overall goals):

Goal 1: Talent and artistic excellence are thriving and celebrated. England is regarded as a pre-eminent centre for artistic excellence. Demonstrating England’s status as a world centre for cultural excellence, more artists, arts organisations and museums based in England are exporting their work internationally and visitors cite the arts and culture as the reason they visited England. […]

Goal 3: The arts are sustainable, resilient and innovative Collaborative and networked, the arts are known for resilience, innovation and their contribution to the nation’s reputation and prosperity.

34“Re:Imagine India”, therefore, seems to only fund projects which support a cosmogony that places the UK at the top – something omnipresent in the UK’s diplomatic tactics as a whole – and will bolster Britain’s soft power, by promoting a positive picture of the country and by driving new visitors to the UK. This goal is explicitly presented as the programme’s number one objective. As a soft power initiative, “Re:Imagine India”’s foremost aspiration is to support the expansion of British influence on India and on the international scene. The goal is quite obviously to reap the economic advantages of attracting new short-term and long-term visitors to the UK, and to appear under a more favourable light on the international scene.

  • 66 A cross-party group of Members of the House of Commons and House of Lords who have an interest in s (...)
  • 67 British Council All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), “Influence and the Integrated Review: Opportu (...)
  • 68 Ibid., p. 8.
  • 69 Ibid., p. 4.
  • 70 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 3.
  • 71 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xv.

35The wording of the Applicant Guidance finds an echo in the report of the British Council All Parliamentary Group (APPG) of 2020. Entitled “Influence and the Integrated Review”,66 it reiterated the country’s worldwide “position of pre-eminence”67 and the fact that it has “some of the greatest museums, galleries, libraries and theatres in the world”.68 The UK has a “place at the leading edge”69 and “few nations are better placed to navigate the challenges ahead”.70 The programme was infused with a narrative where the preponderance of British art, history, economy, power, and institutions dominates, drawing a line between an “us” and a “them”. This finds a strong conceptual echo with one of Said’s definitions of culture as what is commonly referred to as “high culture”, “a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought” – in this sense, culture is presented as a “source of identity and a rather combative one as we see in recent ‘returns’ to culture and tradition”.71

  • 72 Coyle et al., “India Matters”, p. 33.

36By explicitly giving priority to projects that support the idea of England as “a pre-eminent centre for artistic excellence”, the programme presents the UK as a standard. And the “India Matters” report, which was arguably the framework behind “Re:Imagine India”, highlights the fact that there is a “lack of capacity within Indian arts organisations” and that Indian organisations’ networking is too informal and do not have enough social media presence.72 The emphasis is thus placed on a “lack” – of capacity, of social media presence – associated with India, as opposed to the UK’s “excellence”.

37Finally, the report states that there have been instances where

UK organisations have embarked on a collaborative project in India [which] has resulted in UK organisations heavily depending on their Indian partner organisations’ advice on audience engagement, which may not be wholly accurate or comprehensive. There is therefore an opportunity for UK and Indian organisations to work collaboratively to learn more about audiences in India to the benefit of the Indian arts sector and scope for UK organisations to engage more meaningfully with audiences in India.

38The general framework underlying this quote partly stems from the UK’s historically imperial narrative that presents the country as a centre for excellence compared to its Indian counterparts. This then feeds the narrative that justifies the need to “help” the promotion of bilateral projects, which apparently helps fund the arts on the Indian side. This rhetoric is one characteristic of “informal imperialism” inasmuch as it presents the UK as a technically superior “beacon” for other countries, and a standard that ex-colonies should strive to reach.

39It is important, however, to underline that the present author did not have access to the conversations between the British Government and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR)73, which may have proved enlightening to qualify this argument or put it in perspective. In fact, while the “India Matters” report does promote the UK’s own technical and cultural apparatus, it also values collaborating with Indian counterparts, which implies an underlying sense of equality, and finding ways to be as relevant as possible to local audiences, which the “Re:Imagine India” programme sets out to do. In doing so, the programme also acknowledges the importance of Indian cultural ‘brokers’ for the UK in India. This emphasis on cooperation and finding ways to create links and understanding between the two countries is a running thread in the entire project as well as in the British Council’s aspirations on the international scene more broadly – as displayed by one of the Council’s leading mottos, ‘we support peace and prosperity by building connections, understanding and trust between people in the UK and countries worldwide.’74 This also echoes the crucial role of other British institutions and their representatives operating in India, not the least of which are universities.

  • 75 Sohaila Kapur, “Untold Truth: Role of Indian Soldiers in World War I”, The Week, 22 January, 2018, (...)
  • 76 Ibid.
  • 77 See “India@UK2017 Year of Culture Festival Report”, ICCR, 2017, p. 2, https://www.nehrucentre.org.u (...)
  • 78 Ibid.

40With this in mind, it is also enlightening to turn to the reception of the programme in India and its uses by Indian commentators and experts. In an interview given to India’s The Week, artist collective Akademi presents the Troth, which was part of the “Re:Imagine India” programme. The performance, which told the story of the contribution and human cost of Indian soldiers during World War I, benefitted from the Arts Council and British Council funding, as well support from the British Army and the ICCR. Akademi seemed particularly satisfied with the scope of the performance, which created ‘an Indian narrative in a Western contemporary dance language’,75 and thought that the performances ‘fitted in perfectly with the celebrations of the India-UK Year of Culture (2017) and the re-imagine India project, of which it was a part. It is rooted in the most recent academic research and in-depth cultural exchanges between the two countries.’76 The ICCR’s report on the UK-India Year of Culture gives similar feedback. It recalls festival highlights in an extensive and laudatory document, presenting the different performances and events that took place from May to November, and mentioning associate events like “Re:Imagine India”’s the Troth. The foreword by the High Commissioner of India, Y. K. Sinha, emphasises how the year-long programme in 2017 ‘saw an unprecedented level of cultural exchanges, showcasing artistic, cultural and literary traditions in both countries and was a fitting celebration of the symbolic ties that bind India and the UK’77, highlighting how these events, which took place during the 70th anniversary of India’s independence, helped celebrate the ‘rich and multi-faceted ties between the UK and India’78. The report emphasises the multicultural aspect of the programme and links it to India’s ‘essence’, defined as its diversity. These reactions are evidence that India has made good use, culturally and diplomatically, of bicultural initiatives like “Re:Imagine India” or the 2017 Year of Culture, a result which is to be separated from the narrative the UK weaves into these initiatives.

  • 79 Ibid., p. 5.

41On the UK side, these echoes of the past which are palpable in cultural initiatives can be heard even more loudly in political discourse. In the report Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the then PM Boris Johnson presented his view for the UK in 2030, as a “beacon” of democratic sovereignty, a “magnet for international innovation and talent”, “renowned” for its leadership and “at the forefront” of global regulation on technology. This is yet another demonstration of the UK placing itself at the pinnacle of economic and artistic development, and advertising this difference with India as an argument to justify what is in fact informal imperialism and the reproduction of a historical colonial hierarchy – the idea that the UK has a “huge potential advantage over other countries when it comes to assisting in and benefiting from India’s rise as a world power”.79

42This type of narrative is thus common to both cultural and political discourse, albeit to different degrees. The rhetoric used by Boris Johnson and the Conservative discourse on British influence directly stem from and aim to emulate the UK’s imperial past. Reports like these show little nuance in the Conservative narrative, contrary to the rhetoric used in cultural programmes. Institutions like the Arts Council and British Council contain far less of the excessive and radical character of political discourse. Cultural institutions benefit from an independence from the political sphere that naturally gives them more leeway; they adopt a more subtle narrative, even when it also stems from the UK’s imperial framework and attempts to use these old “ties” to build new ones. A double movement underpins this rhetoric: a sense of closeness is emphasised – “historical ties” and the promotion of “the best of art” from both countries – but so too is the UK’s difference, lying in its “excellence” compared, at least implicitly, to India’s allegedly lower levels of it.

43This rhetorical paradox of closeness and shared history and yet of inherent difference between two countries is something that David Spurr associates with one of the key characteristics of imperial rhetoric. In his The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration, David Spurr dives into what he considers the twelve categories in colonisers’ rhetoric of power: surveillance, appropriation, aestheticisation, classification, debasement, negation, affirmation, idealisation, insubstantialisation, naturalisation, eroticisation, and finally, resistance. Spurr states that the double dynamic of emphasising both closeness and difference is one of the ways in which the imperial power colonises the colonised. He states that

  • 80 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial (...)

for the colonizer as for the writer, it becomes a question of establishing authority through the demarcation of identity and difference. Members of a colonizing class will insist on their radical difference from the colonized as a way of legitimizing their own position in the colonial community. But at the same time they will insist, paradoxically, on the colonized people’s essential identity with them—both as preparation for the domestication of the colonized and as a moral and philosophical precondition for the civilizing mission.80

  • 81 According to Welling and Mycock, “advocates of the Anglosphere appear to blend imperial nostalgia w (...)
  • 82 See Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce, Shadows of Empire: the Anglosphere in British Politics (Cambridg (...)

44This double dynamic is similar to the process at stake in “Re:Imagine India”. Although these are different matters, this article suggests that the imperial rhetoric sometimes present in the political field can find an echo in cultural diplomacy and its discourse as well. This point can be understood in relation to the “Anglosphere”, which was put forward by Eurosceptic politicians as an alternative to Europe. This alternative group made up of “core states” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US), it was argued, was united by a common language, and the “civilizational” heritage of values and democracy which provided a fruitful opportunity for political and ideological ties. In his India & the Anglosphere – Race, Identity, Hierarchy in International Relation, Alexander Davis emphasises how political elites perpetrating this ideal are rather bound by the idea of the cultural superiority of the “Anglosphere”. Scholars studying this narrative also point out its supporters’ eagerness to assume that India, often referred to as a “natural ally”, will simply join the “core states” and become a key partner in their foreign policy – thus completely overlooking the response India and Indians may have to these countries’ antiquated, imperialist vision of the world.81 Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce’s Shadows of Empire also provides valuable further insight into this narrative.82

45The omnipresence of this discourse can thus be seen as a sign of the persistence of the narrative of “informal empire” in the UK, which is palpable in programmes like “Re:Imagine India”, although to a lesser extent than the heavily connoted political discourse that has characterised the UK’s recent Conservative governments. Of course, contrary to the colonial times Spurr writes about, the effect of this rhetoric today may be nuanced by a variety of social and economic factors, such as India’s rising importance and place on the world scene, demonstrations and popular movements against the everlasting narrative of Empire. In any case, the UK’s rhetoric on bicultural and soft power initiatives has not inhibited India from making the most of these connections and reaping the diplomatic benefits they could offer.

  • 83 Thomas and Toye, “Introduction”, p. 17.
  • 84 Ibid.

46Nonetheless, in terms of the language used, one is struck by the ‘continuities between empire and post-empire’, and between ‘imperial rhetorics’ and the ‘rhetorics of humanitarianism and interventionism that are widely considered to have replaced them’.83 In the case of the Reimagine India project, references to ‘Global Britain’ and ‘historical ties’ as well as the discourse of ‘help’ and ‘assistance’ are far from benign, and need to be placed in their historical context to be understood. As Martin Thomas and Richard Toye have put it: ‘Empire may be over, but its rhetorical legacy is still being perpetuated – sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not.’84

Conclusion: The British identity crisis

47In the past decade, the UK’s revival of interest for soft power has kept increasing because of macro and micro changes in the balance of power on the national and international scene. India has come to occupy a special position in British diplomacy. In this light, cultural diplomacy programmes like “Re:Imagine India” provide good examples to study the strengths of the UK’s soft power and its successes at stimulating intercultural dialogue; but they also reveal its weaknesses and the imperial narratives that persist under the banner of soft power – reactionary narratives that both reflect and create the limits of British influence.

  • 85 John Darwin, “British Decolonization since 1945: a Pattern or a Puzzle?”, Journal of Imperial and C (...)
  • 86 Turner, “Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire”, p. 5.

48Overall, the persistence of this rhetoric in cultural diplomacy can be seen as evidence of a British identity crisis. Historian John Darwin has talked about the “anesthetizing rhetoric” that accompanied the loss of empire, suggesting that in the 1950s and 1960s the Commonwealth was presented as a “painkiller”.85 More recently, Oliver Turner sees it as an “empire in contemporary form”, embodying promises of “imperial levels of international control and prestige”,86 echoing the way the narrative of “Global Britain” has been put forward by the recent Conservative governments to soothe the loss of Europe. However, these projections of an antiquated vision have no material reality, which makes for a weak backdrop for what could be an effective cultural diplomacy.

49At a time where Western competitors are looking to enhance their own soft power in India, the UK faces increasing competition. France’s recent cultural diplomacy programme “Bonjour India”, which hosted its fifth edition in 2023, is just one example of the many initiatives taking place. In order to maintain its position as a global power, it seems that the UK will have to change its rhetoric in order to avoid being seen by India – and others – as a power of the past, and if it is to benefit from soft power diplomacy. The next years will be decisive in showing how Indo-British relations evolve and just how “global” Britain becomes.

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Notes

1 The spelling of the programme’s title differs in the documentation, with occurrences of ‘Reimagine India’ (see the programme’s ‘Applicant Guidance’) and ‘Re-Imagine India’ (see articles by some of the participants like Creative Black Country’s ‘Girl Gaze: Journeys Through the Punjab & The Black Country’). Most posters advertising the programme however seem to use ‘Re:Imagine India’. In this spelling, the colon can be seen as holding a symbolic meaning, serving to represent a threshold, as a colon usually precedes an explanation, an answer, or an injunction. It tends to place the emphasis on a sense of expectation and action, contrary to the hyphen, which can primarily serve as a symbol for a link or a relationship. This choice also places the emphasis on the verb ‘imagine’, in an injunction to the two countries, but also perhaps to the spectator, inviting them to turn to the future - more so than the verb ‘reimagine’, whose focus is slightly more veered to the past. Except in titles and quotes in which another one was used, the present article will thus adopt the spelling ‘Re:Imagine India’ to refer to the programme.

2 Emmer Coyle, Mona Lotten and John Dubber, “India Matters: How Stronger Educational and Cultural Ties Can Help to Unlock the Full Potential of the UK-India Relationship”, London, British Council, 2015, https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/_india_matters.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2023

3 This article is a revised and updated version of some initial research carried out at the ENS Lyon and the University of Oxford in 2020-2021 on the « Re:Imagine India » project.

4 Arts Council England, “Reimagine India Applicant Guidance”, 2015, https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-file/Reimagine_Applicant_Guidance_Jan_2016.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2023.

5 See Manavi Kapur, “The Crown’s Escape from History, as Seen from the British Empire’s Former Colonies”, Quartz, 27 November 2020.

6 Sudhir Hazareesingh, “Introduction to International Relations”, Lecture given at the University of Oxford, October 2020.

7 Ibid.

8 See Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Defends Lack of Apology for British Massacre at Amritsar”, The Guardian, 20 February 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/feb/20/david-cameron-amritsar-massacre-india Last consulted 3 February 2023.

9 Oliver Dowden, “Letter from Culture Secretary to DCMS Arm’s Length Bodies on contested heritage”, 22 September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-from-culture-secretary-on-hm-government-position-on-contested-heritage Last consulted 3 February 2023.

10 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (London, Cabinet Office, 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60644e4bd3bf7f0c91eababd/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2023.

11 See World Bank 2022 GDP ranking, https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/GDP.pdf (Last updated 21 December 2023, last consulted 3 February 2024).

12 See Brand Finance 2022 Soft Power Index, https://static.brandirectory.com/reports/brand-finance-soft-power-index-2022.pdf, and 2023 Soft Power Index, https://static.brandirectory.com/reports/brand-finance-soft-power-index-2023-digital.pdf Last consulted 4 February 2024.

13 Sara Hertog, Patrick Gerland and John Wilmoth, “India overtakes China as the world’s most populous country’, Policy Brief 153, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, April 2023, https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2023_policy-brief-153.pdf Last consulted 4 February 2024.

14 See “Countries and Territories”, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores Last consulted 3 February 2024. By comparison, the UK ranks 93; France, 89.

15 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 17.

16 White House, “FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, 11 February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/ Last consulted 3 February 2023.

17 UKIERI promotes over 1,000 partnerships and enables over 25,000 exchanges of academics, researchers, staff and students. See Coyle et al., “India Matters: How Stronger Educational and Cultural Ties Can Help to Unlock the Full Potential of the UK-India Relationship”, London, British Council, 2015, p. 46, https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/_india_matters.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2023.

18 See Emer Coyle, “India and the UK: A 2050 Vision”, London, British Council, November 2015, https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-policy-insight/insight-articles/india-and-uk-2050-vision Last consulted 3 February 2023.

19 See, for example, Theresa May, Speech at Lancaster House, London, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech Last consulted 3 February 2024.

20 See Anand Menon, “Brexit: An Analysis of Current Events”, online conference at the University of Oxford, autumn 2020.

21 See Theresa May in Oliver Turner, “Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire”, The Political Quarterly 90:4 (2019), p. 727.

22 Ibid.

23 See for instance Adrien Rodd, “British Diplomatic Re-Engagement in the Pacific: More Than Just Words?’, Contemporary British History 37:4 (2023), pp. 605-632.

24 Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World, House of Lords, Report of Session 2013-14 (London, The Stationery Office, 2014), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldsoftpower/150/150.pdf.

25 See H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 5.

26 Ibid., p. 9.

27 See Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, Public Affairs, 2004).

28 Ibid., p. ii.

29 See for instance Emma Bell, “Soft Power and corporate imperialism: maintaining British influence”, Race and Class 57:4, 2016, pp. 75-86.

30 As opposed to “club diplomacy”, which was the work of a happy few, “network diplomacy” increasingly relies on a variety of actors, directly and indirectly linked to the government. See Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, “Introduction: The Challenges of 21st-Century Diplomacy” in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 23.

31 Patricia M. Goff, “Cultural Diplomacy” in ibid., p. 419.

32 Ibid., p. 420.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 421.

36 Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), p. 13.

37 Ibid., p. 9.

38 See Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, “Introduction” in Martin Thomas and Richard Toye (eds), Rhetorics of empire. Languages of colonial conflict after 1900 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2017), p.17.

39 Ibid., p. 13.

40 See for example Alice Byrne, “The British Council in India, 1945-1955: Preserving ‘old relationships under new forms’” in Laurent Dornel and Michael Parsons (eds), Fins d’empires / Ends of Empires, Pau, Presses de l’Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour, 2016, pp. 119-135; and “The British Council and British cultural diplomacy 1934-1959: a new form of diplomacy”, Contemporary British History 37:4, 2023, pp. 489-504.

41 See for instance David Olusoga, “Britain can’t be reborn while we’re still lost in fantasies about the past”, The Guardian, 2 June 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/02/britain-cant-be-reborn-while-while-were-still-lost-fantasies-about-past Last consulted 03 February 2023.

42 British Council, “Transnational Education. A Guide for Creating Partnerships in India” (New Delhi, British Council, 2015), https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/tne_report_for_web.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2024.

43 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, p. 8.

44 Ibid., p. 2.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 8.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 52.

50 Coyle et al., “India Matters”, p. 53.

51 Ibid.

52 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, p. 4.

53 See Asian Arts Agency, “Punjabtronix – July 2017”, https://asianartsagency.co.uk/what-we-do/touring/punjabtronix-july-2017/ Last consulted 3 February 2024.

54 Ibid.

55 See Charity Search : Philarmonia Financial Statement, 2016. https://register-of-charities.charitycommission.gov.uk/charity-search?p_p_id=uk_gov_ccew_onereg_charitydetails_web_portlet_CharityDetailsPortlet&p_p_lifecycle=2&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&p_p_resource_id=%2Faccounts-resource&p_p_cacheability=cacheLevelPage&_uk_gov_ccew_onereg_charitydetails_web_portlet_CharityDetailsPortlet_objectiveId=A8119289&_uk_gov_ccew_onereg_charitydetails_web_portlet_CharityDetailsPortlet_priv_r_p_mvcRenderCommandName=%2Faccounts-and-annual-returns&_uk_gov_ccew_onereg_charitydetails_web_portlet_CharityDetailsPortlet_priv_r_p_organisationNumber=250277 Last consulted 16 February 2024.

56 National Centre for Writing, “Re-Imagine India”, 20 February 2016, https://nationalcentreforwriting.org.uk/article/re-imagine-india/ Last consulted 3 February 2024.

57 Sean Keenan, “Urban(e) Legends: Prodigal Theatre & The Urban Playground Team: Fourth Wall on the Street? Not Our Style at All”, Trebuchet, 16 January 2017, https://www.trebuchet-magazine.com/street-theatre/ Last consulted 3 February 2024.

58 Ibid.

59 As one participant noted, the terms “‘disabled’ and D/deaf’ are quite regular and standard here [in England] but in India some found these those words offensive and preferred ‘Differently Abled’ and ‘Hard of hearing’. […] my feeling was that we need to respect the culture we’re going into as well as explaining why we’re using the language we are. It did get me thinking about whether the language we’re using is progressive as well as how confusing it must be for anyone who is coming to the idea of self-identification, whether disabled or not. Language evolves as do ideas.” British Council and Disability Arts International, “Graeae: Aruna and the Raging Sun”, Disability Arts Online, 24 April 2018, https://www.disabilityartsinternational.org/resources/aruna-and-the-raging-sun/ Last consulted 3 February 2024.

60 See Creative Black Country, “Girl Gaze: Journeys Through the Punjab & The Black Country”, 21 February 2018, https://www.creativeblackcountry.co.uk/blog/2018/8/23/girl-gaze-journeys-through-the-punjab-the-black-country Last consulted 3 February 2024.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Parminder Dosanjh quoted in Creative Black Country, “Girl Gaze”.

64 Ibid.

65 Arts Council England, “Applicant Guidance”, pp. 4-5.

66 A cross-party group of Members of the House of Commons and House of Lords who have an interest in soft power and cultural diplomacy, and the work of the British Council.

67 British Council All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), “Influence and the Integrated Review: Opportunities for Britain’s Global Vision”, October 2020, p. 5, https://appg.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/influence_and_the_integrated_review.pdf Last consulted 3 February 2024.

68 Ibid., p. 8.

69 Ibid., p. 4.

70 H.M. Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p. 3.

71 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. xv.

72 Coyle et al., “India Matters”, p. 33.

73 The headquarters of the Indian Center for Cultural Relations are in London. See the Nehru Center at the ICCR Website, https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.iccr.gov.in/indianculturalcenter/nehru-centre-london-united-kingdom Last consulted 18 February 2024.

74 See British Council Website, “About Us”: https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us . Last consulted 18 February 2024.

75 Sohaila Kapur, “Untold Truth: Role of Indian Soldiers in World War I”, The Week, 22 January, 2018, https://www.theweek.in/webworld/features/society/the-untold-truth-indian-soldiers-in-world-war-1.html Last consulted 18 February 2024.

76 Ibid.

77 See “India@UK2017 Year of Culture Festival Report”, ICCR, 2017, p. 2, https://www.nehrucentre.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/India%20@%20UK%202017%20report%20lo%20res%2022.10.18.pdf Last consulted 18 February 2024

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., p. 5.

80 David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration (Durham, Duke University Press, 1993), p. 7.

81 According to Welling and Mycock, “advocates of the Anglosphere appear to blend imperial nostalgia with historical myopia in their projection of an overly positive and largely uncritical view of the legacies of the British colonial past”; Ben Wellings and Andrew Mycock (eds), The Anglosphere: Continuity, Dissonance and Location (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019).

82 See Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce, Shadows of Empire: the Anglosphere in British Politics (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2018).

83 Thomas and Toye, “Introduction”, p. 17.

84 Ibid.

85 John Darwin, “British Decolonization since 1945: a Pattern or a Puzzle?”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12:2, p. 187-209.

86 Turner, “Global Britain and the Narrative of Empire”, p. 5.

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References

Electronic reference

Emily Harris, “The “Re:Imagine India” Project: Ambitions and Limits of British Cultural Diplomacy in India”Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIX-1 | 2024, Online since 29 March 2024, connection on 09 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/11703; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.11703

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About the author

Emily Harris

Emily Harris est élève de l’École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, où elle a obtenu un Master d'études anglophones. Ses recherches ont porté sur la diplomatie culturelle, le soft power et le néo-impérialisme. Elle a depuis poursuivi son intérêt pour la diplomatie grâce à des expériences professionnelles dans les services culturels de l’Ambassade de France aux États-Unis, et au Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères à Paris. Elle termine actuellement un master en gouvernance internationale et diplomatie à Sciences Po Paris.

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