1Vijay Krishnarayan was born in London and studied town and country planning at Oxford Polytechnic, where he became involved in the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the 1980s. He joined the Commonwealth Foundation after a decade in the Caribbean (notably Belize, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago), first working as a Voluntary Service Overseas volunteer and then for the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (as its Managing Partner), focusing on the joint promotion of human development and environmental conservation. He returned to the United Kingdom and served as Deputy Director of the Commonwealth Foundation (the Commonwealth’s agency for civil society) between 2006 and 2012. He was appointed as the Foundation’s Director General in 2012 and held this office until 2019. He now works as a consultant with a focus on participatory governance, promoting inclusive engagement for a fairer world.
2The interview was conducted in October 2023 and March 2024.
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- 1 Interview with Vijay Krishnarayan by Sue Onslow, 14 May 2013, Commonwealth History Project, https:/ (...)
3Mélanie Torrent and Lauriane Simony (hereafter MT-LS). Many thanks for agreeing to share your thoughts about the United Kingdom’s soft power in Asia, and your experience of working with UK and Asian partners over the course of your career, particularly during your years at the Commonwealth Foundation. If we may, we would first like to return to your years as a student in the UK, when you became involved in the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). You have recounted your experience in other interviews.1 But for the purposes of this special issue, we were wondering whether in your eyes, the AAM and CND had an impact on creating awareness of transnational connections, “people-to-people links”, and trans-Commonwealth connections, including with Asia? Was the Commonwealth a palpable actor, or at least a visible or useful network for mobilization?
Vijay Krishnarayan (hereafter VK): Asia did not figure in our deliberations as youth activists on these issues. Students from the Asian diaspora were drawn to both AA [Anti-Apartheid] and CND. With regard to AA, we worked with the youth organisations of the liberation movements (ANC [African National Congress] and SWAPO [South West Africa People’s Organisation]). I was drawn to the peace movement in part because of my Hindu upbringing. I was drawn to the AA because of the prominent role played in the ANC by Indian activists.
We did not see the Commonwealth as a partner – more as an opportunity to advance our campaigns, for example in support of an economic and cultural boycott. Funny story. I never got to meet Madiba [Nelson Mandela]. On his first visit to London, I received an invitation to the reception that he was attending at the RCS [Royal Commonwealth Society]. I got within about 100 metres of the entrance to the building. It was pandemonium and I didn’t get any closer. That was the first time I had really made the connection between the Commonwealth as a thing and our campaigns in the 1980s.
- 2 Stuart Mole, The Commonwealth, South Africa and Apartheid (London, Routledge, 2023).
MT and LS: One of the strengths of the Commonwealth is its ability to work behind the scenes, in routine diplomacy as well as in crises. In the case of apartheid, several activists, diplomats and scholars have shown that it played a not insignificant part, as a multilateral organisation – Stuart Mole, for instance, in his recent book2 – even though action by the Commonwealth Secretariat was also limited by a number of factors. It is interesting that as a committed activist, you only became fully aware of a Commonwealth connection after the official end of apartheid. Were you aware of Commonwealth action in other areas of international life in the 1980s, or was it simply not very much in the public eye, or at least not in the public eye as an agent for change?
- 3 Editors’ note: Shridath (known as “Sonny”) Ramphal was the second Secretary General of the Commonwe (...)
VK: I can see now that we were pursuing parallel tracks in the campaign against apartheid. My role as an activist in the UK was to support the liberation movements in this country. This meant demonstrating, organising boycotts, and coalescing a broad movement that would bring pressure to bear within the political system in this country. The Commonwealth would have been working in different ways and at a different level, but our paths did not cross. My only awareness of the Commonwealth was superficial and of course I identified with Sonny Ramphal3 as an Indo-Caribbean person.
MT and LS: Were some of the major issues in Asia of importance in your day-to-day work and commitments? The role of Communist China, for instance, the UK’s continuing colonial administration of Hong Kong, the tensions between India and Pakistan, and the changing political scene in India, during Indira Gandhi’s years as Prime Minister and after her assassination in 1984…
VK: My family retained a strong interest in the politics of India. When the state of emergency was declared in 1975, I was 12 but I remember the distress it caused in our household and the discussions on nationalism that it sparked. I do not recall the Commonwealth ever featuring in Indo-Caribbean diaspora discussions in the UK about the situation at that time.
MT and LS: Returning to the importance of internationalism for bodies like the AAM and CND, would you say that the Labour Party played a role in fostering internationalism, particularly among younger members? What place did Asia, and Asian activists have in this internationalism?
VK: Most of the solidarity work within the organised student networks of AA and CND was with counterparts in Scandinavia. I was a member of the Labour Party at that time, which meant that I was working (through the National Organisation of Labour Students) with youth movements affiliated to political parties affiliated to the Socialist International.
MT and LS: Asia does, of course, cover multiple realities, and maps – political, diplomatic and mental maps. What conceptions of Asia have you seen matter in people-to-people diplomacy, and within the Commonwealth Foundation in particular?
VK: People-to-people connections have been strong, whereas conventional diplomacy has had its limitations. Inter-state tensions have been institutionalised but people-to-people links have maintained a sense of regional and sub-regional cooperation. In South Asia people have come together around particular issues (e.g., microfinance or gender equality). The Commonwealth Foundation has been able to support these links, but they have been ad hoc. This contrasts with other Commonwealth regions such as the Pacific or the Caribbean, where civil society networks have coalesced around regional processes (e.g., PIFS [Pacific Island Forum Secretariat]).
MT and LS: Do you remember when the programmes on microfinance or gender equality started? Did they involve bodies across all Commonwealth member states in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka)? Was anything ever undertaken with Malaysia and Singapore?
VK: I recall the Foundation’s interest in supporting microfinance initiatives in the 1990s when I was working in the Caribbean – there were exchange programmes that fostered learning exchanges with colleagues from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The Foundation’s activities in Southeast Asia (and Sri Lanka) focused on developing centres in-country, where professionals could come together. You could relate this to the Foundation’s early role in supporting Commonwealth accredited associations.
MT and LS: To what extent would you say that the Commonwealth acts, or could act, as a connector or divide in relations between the various “Asias”, South and Southeast Asia particularly?
VK: The Commonwealth has provided a space where colleagues from the region can come together – often informally and in the wings of ministerial processes. There may also be informal dialogue between states in the region, for example on the subject of a theme for a CHOGM or candidate for SG [Secretary-General]. On the people-to-people links, the Commonwealth Foundation will support in-region processes (for example in the context of preparations for a ministerial meeting). Commonwealth accredited organisations can sometimes be organised (e.g., through Chapters or Branches) in terms of Commonwealth regions, and this will provide space for colleagues to come together within “Asia”.
MT and LS: Do you see more appetite in international institutions, including the Commonwealth, for stronger civil society regional networks in South Asia and Southeast Asia in the future? And if so, do you think specific issues should be prioritised?
VK: If there are to be more civil society networks, I think these will evolve around issues or themes (e.g., health, environment, gender equality). They will also take advantage of institutional openings as these arise or where these are invited (e.g., under an Asia-Pacific banner). These networks and movements will be much more responsive and dynamic than they were 20 or even 10 years ago because of the power of social media to mobilise thought and opinion across borders.
MT and LS: With the internet transforming activism and campaigns, how agile has the Commonwealth been in using this to its advantage and to the advantage of the citizens of its member countries? How instrumental has diplomacy been in bridging (or trying to bridge) the digital divide, and addressing some of the problems that come with the rise of digital communications (including media freedom…)?
- 4 Editors’ note: The Indian Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 2010 is a means to regulate fore (...)
VK: In common with every Commonwealth region, relations between Asian governments and Asian civil society are often tense when it comes to activism and campaigns. There is a good deal of scepticism on the part of governments towards civil society and its relationship with international organisations and bilateral agencies (e.g., various versions across the region of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010).4
The Commonwealth respects the sovereign right of countries to legislate but at the same time seeks to espouse (certain) freedoms. Where there are limits to what the intergovernmental Commonwealth can do or say, other manifestations of the Commonwealth can take up the running by developing and advocating what could be described as Commonwealth norms. This has been seen to good effect in relation to the Commonwealth principles on freedom of expression and the role of the media in good governance.
MT and LS: Media freedom is prominent in the current work of both the institutional Commonwealth and in a number of civil society organisations and research units, as evidenced, for example, by the Freedom of Expression and Digital Rights programme established at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Is this something that the Commonwealth Foundation was also involved in, during your time there?
VK: In the early 2000s at the Foundation, there was a recognition that freedom of expression was not absolute– but needed to be contextualised. At the same time there was support for the work of Commonwealth accredited organisations, including the Commonwealth Journalists’ Association in recognition of the role of a plural press in what was referred to at the time as “Good Governance”. The Foundation went to establish “Commonwealth Writers” as a sub-brand and this saw some collaboration with organisations such as PEN International. The Foundation’s work in support of creative expression also enabled us to make space for discussions about LGBTQI+ issues for example – which formed part of our thinking on making certain issues visible in a Commonwealth setting.
MT and LS: Looking at soft power as a means of influence also involves assessing the importance of music and sport in some of the major Commonwealth work of the 1970s and 1980s (particularly in relation to South Africa). Anti-Apartheid concerts and sporting boycotts generated support, particularly (but not solely) among the younger generations. Has there been a degree of disaffection from such means of soft power?
VK: The 1970s and 1980s saw a heightened awareness of culture as a means of advocacy. As people’s awareness of the structural issues underpinning global challenges has grown so has their scepticism at the chances of a concert (for example) to effect change. At the same time campaigners are increasingly recognising that they need to work harder at reaching people that they have not addressed hitherto.
Soft power still affords the means to shape attitudes and behaviours – perhaps more than ever (as levels of public confidence in institutions continue to degrade). The Commonwealth is keenly aware of this – not just through the Commonwealth Games but through some of its programmes (for example the Commonwealth Secretariat’s programme on Sport for Development and Peace).
MT and LS: Could you tell us more about the programme on Sport for Development and Peace? Also, there has been growing scepticism about the relevance of the Commonwealth Games for mismanagement, but also for the very principle of spending money on large events that could more usefully be used for other projects, of more direct benefit to the population. Back in 2010, the Delhi Games came under fierce criticism from several quarters, in India and abroad. Has this had an impact on Commonwealth thinking, within the Secretariat (as far as you know) and the Foundation? Would you say that the focus of the Commonwealth, or at least its strategy, will have to change in its efforts to deliver on the UN Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda?
- 5 Editors’ note: CABOS is the Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport. For more on its work and on the Sp (...)
VK: I don’t think it can be said that the inter-governmental Commonwealth’s programming has been influenced by public discourse regarding the management of the Commonwealth Games. The Sport for Development programme was significant and there was input from CABOS5 – but this was a parallel track to the Commonwealth Games. One could say that the Games established a place to stand for the Commonwealth in relation to sport, but the Sport for Development programme took that a step further in making an explicit connection with peace and the SDGs.
MT and LS: Is it fair to say that scientific cooperation and university exchanges, particularly under the auspices of the Association of Commonwealth Universities, is a key vector of people-to-people connections, within Asia, and between Asia and the rest of the Commonwealth?
VK: I think this is true and a regional analysis of the 30,000 plus people that have benefited from the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan would substantiate this. I think there is a caveat to this based on my hypothesis that higher education in Asia (inasmuch as it is possible to generalise) is dominated by STEM [science, technology, engineering and mathematics] programmes and that humanities faculties are in retreat.
MT and LS: Would you say that the possibility for regional or Commonwealth exchanges are limited by the ratio of science / humanities places in given countries?
VK: I don’t think there is any evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that STEM-based links are less enduring than humanities-based ones. I would say that there seem to be more platforms for exchange in the fields of law and language (for example) than there are for science or maths.
- 6 See House of Lords, Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in (...)
MT and LS: As the main funder of Commonwealth work, the UK remains one of the key players of the organisation – even if decisions are taken on the basis on consensus by all member countries. It means that the Commonwealth features as an asset in British analyses of soft power (as shown in the House of Lords report on the subject in 2014).6 To what extent are the British actors of soft power (the British Council, the BBC…) fit for purpose? For the Foundation and for Commonwealth civil society organisations, is cooperation with these British institutions particularly valuable? How does their importance in Asia compare with other areas of the Commonwealth? And for Asia, how does their importance compare with other actors, Asian or not?
VK: I have always drawn a distinction between British soft power and the Commonwealth’s soft power. We worked very hard to maintain that distinction and resist a British hegemony. This meant keeping collaboration between the Commonwealth Foundation and the British Council to a minimum (less so with the BBC as it is more widely understood as a global brand – but still carefully). The fact that British soft power often neglected the Commonwealth in South and Southeast Asia at the expense of a focus on China was actually helpful in this regard.
MT and LS: How do you explain such neglect? Is it overconfidence in Britain’s ability to have an influence in South and Southeast Asia, despite complex – and violent – past relations? Is it a question of resources?
VK: I think it is primarily about the prevailing foreign policy position of the UK government.
MT and LS: Since 2009, have perceptions of British power and soft power shifted in any major areas where the Commonwealth Foundation has been active in Asia?
VK: There has been an increase in scepticism regarding bi-lateral programmes across the board in Asia. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010 was a clear manifestation of that. Among all of that Britain has fared better than other OECD countries. The Foundation was of course exempted from the FCRA-type restrictions because of the multilateral nature of the funding (i.e., some of the funds the Foundation disburses is from the Government of Bangladesh/ India/ Pakistan/ Sri Lanka).
MT and LS: How important is Commonwealth membership to civil society organisations in Asia? Within Commonwealth dynamics, what place does the UK have?
VK: The Commonwealth continues to be viewed by civil society in the region as an opportunity (scholarships) and a platform (advocacy) with an awareness of its limitations and shortcomings. The Commonwealth is still seen as “the British Commonwealth” and as such its currency will rise and fall with perceptions of Britain.
MT and LS: To what extent are soft power and many of the Commonwealth’s objectives dependent on addressing the memory, legacy and impact of such a past?
VK: I think this is linked to the role of the British Monarch as the Head of the Commonwealth. My impression is that King Charles is more willing than any of his predecessors to address the question of colonial legacy. The pace at which this happens is dependent on the position of the British government.
MT and LS: More broadly, given the contemporary questions of reparative justice, the question of (missed) apologies, particularly after Cameron’s visit to Amritsar in 2013, what role should or could the UK play with regard to its former colonies in Asia?
VK: See my previous answer. The Commonwealth must have a role in facilitating dialogue on the issue of colonial legacy but would need to be asked to do so by a member state. Arguably a process convened by the British government would not be as wide ranging or credible as it needs to be.
MT and LS: In this respect, do you think the Conservative concept of Global Britain post-Brexit has had much traction in Commonwealth Asia? In its more restrictive sense, Global Britain is primarily predicated not on the Commonwealth but on an Anglosphere of the United States and the former white dominions which does not include India (or South Africa). Has Britain lost soft power in recent years, even though the premiership of Rishi Sunak has been used to give media coverage to strong Anglo-Indian high-level connections?
VK: I do think Britain’s soft power capital has depreciated. A lack of investment in the BBC’s World Service, and the British Council have not helped. Many of the country’s universities are experiencing a period of contraction in an increasingly competitive global market. In terms of bi-lateral relations with India, I do not think that a Sunak premiership has resulted in any deepening of relations. The Indian Prime Minister [Narendra Modi] last visited the UK on a bilateral visit in 2015 when David Cameron was the UK’s Prime Minister, and this was prior to the referendum.
MT and LS: Has the merger of DFID into the FCO back in 2020 had any tangible impact? Have Commonwealth civil society organisations based in Asia paid much attention to it?
VK: The merger was seen coming following the examples set by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The merger may have had the effect of boosting advocacy organisations (which will have been working with High Commissions on particular issues) at the expense of development organisations (which will have been funded through DfID offices).
MT and LS: More broadly, perhaps, has the UK’s departure from the EU changed dynamics for Commonwealth civil society organisations in Asia?
VK: I don’t think so. My impression is that the UK didn’t present itself in South Asia as European prior to Brexit.
MT and LS: Some UK-based organisations are focused on boosting trade relations between Asia and Europe, including the UK (Asia House, for instance). To what extent does this complement Commonwealth ambitions after Brexit?
VK: Commonwealth ambitions are hard to define because of the diversity of outlook among the various organisations that comprise the institution as a whole. Some organisations such as the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council are certainly more prominent post-Brexit – although there is little evidence that they explicitly make this connection. The CWEIC [Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council] does refer to the Commonwealth Advantage – the concept developed by the Secretariat’s Trade Programme to describe the reduced transaction costs that come from trade between Commonwealth countries (this doesn’t make explicit reference to the UK).
MT and LS: Is the UK’s participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and ASEAN, of which it is a dialogue partner, an added advantage for the Commonwealth at large? And for Commonwealth countries in Asia?
VK: There is the potential for this to be the case. However there is little evidence of the Commonwealth featuring in British foreign policy. As one might expect – the Commonwealth doesn’t explicitly act on the basis of the bi-lateral affiliations of its members.
- 7 Joanna Bennett, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Zoë Ware, An Uncommon Association, A Wealth of Potentia (...)
MT and LS: In a survey of Commonwealth citizens back in 2009-2010,7 the Royal Commonwealth Society found that Indians and Malaysians were some of the least aware of what the Commonwealth was and what benefits it could give. Has there been a chance since then, from the perspective of the Foundation?
VK: This is difficult to quantify. From a Foundation perspective, there were usually comparatively fewer numbers of grant applications from Asia (as compared with Africa). The Commonwealth does not actively promote itself (in this regard it is perhaps quintessentially British) – this means that awareness of the Commonwealth depends on the extent to which it touches people’s lives. In practice this is seen through scholarships or participation in events and activities.
Another variable in this is the extent to which King Charles is visible in Asia (and the extent to which he explicitly references the Commonwealth when he is in the region).
I do not think that awareness of the Commonwealth has increased in Asia as a result of Brexit (rather – it is more likely that awareness of the Commonwealth in Britain has grown since Brexit).
MT and LS: If more engagement by King Charles in Asia was to promote awareness of the Commonwealth in ways beneficial to the organisation, would it be conditional on certain commitments being taken or issues being raised by the British monarch?
VK: That would be speculation.
- 8 Vijay Krishnarayan, The Contribution of Commonwealth-Accredited Organisations to Advancing the Comm (...)
MT and LS: In 2021, India was the third country (after the UK and Australia) where Commonwealth-accredited organisations were the most active (the fifth being Pakistan, as shown in your recent report).8 To what extent does this signal a major interest in Commonwealth work that is not directly dependent on, or does not simply revolve around the UK?
VK: If awareness in the Commonwealth is to grow it will be as a result of the work and activities of Commonwealth-accredited organisations rather than those of the intergovernmental Commonwealth organisations. Commonwealth-accredited organisations do have decentralised structures that include an on-the-ground presence in India or Pakistan and this must be a factor in engendering interest and participation in Commonwealth badged activities.
MT and LS: Are there any specific examples that you remember, particularly in India and Pakistan?
VK: The figures were not supported by actual examples. The data came from reports filed by Commonwealth-accredited organisations as part of their annual returns sent to the Commonwealth Secretariat. There is an indication of activity but little insight as to the kind of projects pr programmes.
MT and LS: Returning to individual governments, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, did not attend the CHOGM in Rwanda in 2023; there were earlier tensions at the time of the 2013 CHOGM in Sri Lanka, and relations between India and Canada are at a low point. What risks, if any, are presented by India’s distance? Is India likely to disengage from the Commonwealth, and what risks or opportunities would this present for citizens and member states?
VK: Every country will determine how participation in a multi-lateral institution best suits its sovereign interests. Political leadership that is populist and nationalist in any country will challenge multilateralism. The future of any country’s continued engagement with the Commonwealth depends on the gap between rhetoric and realpolitik. At present (and looking immediately ahead) this favours continued engagement – but this cannot be taken for granted.
In other contexts, a country might choose to focus on regional rather than global structures and institutions. In an Asian context, this is not straightforward, and I think this makes global forums quite important for countries in the region.
MT and LS: How have Commonwealth civil society organisations in Asia perceived or interpreted China’s role in Asia and, more broadly, in multilateral forums? What impact has the current Hong Kong question had on relations and work of civil society organisations?
VK: I cannot think of a context where China’s role in Asia has been welcomed by civil society in the region. There is concern about the ownership of national assets, indebtedness, and the nature of China’s development programmes (which do generally not feature support for civil society). I have not come across any discussion of the Hong Kong question among Commonwealth countries.
MT and LS: Is it fair to say that the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), based in New Delhi, has been influentiel in fostering Commonwealth connections in Asia, and between Asia and the wider Commonwealth?
VK: CHRI is often named when rebuffing the assertion that the Commonwealth is too London focused. It has blazed a trail in setting up an office in India and I am surprised that others have not followed. It is a focused organisation, and it cannot be expected to fly the flag for the Commonwealth as a whole (even if it wanted to) but it does invoke Commonwealth principles and values. In this regard it is a visible advocate for the Commonwealth as an institution associated with civil and political rights.
MT and LS: Is the recent expansion of Commonwealth membership in Africa, rather than Asia, likely to have any impact and consequences for the Asian Commonwealth, and for Commonwealth civil society organisations based in Asia? Is it likely to lead to renewed engagement with politics in other parts of the Commonwealth, including at the UN or in regional organisations?
VK: I cannot see any immediate consequences of an expanded African Commonwealth in Asia (apart from being used as evidence that the Commonwealth remains relevant). It does signal the Commonwealth’s willingness to expand and in turn this may bring interest (in the longer term) from other countries in the region (e.g., Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Vietnam).
- 9 Editors’ note: Gabon and Togo joined the Commonwealth in 2022. Following the coup in Gabon in 2023, (...)
Civil society organisations did not feature in the membership discussions in relation to Togo and Gabon9 – these were initiated and led by governments. Similarly, there is little evidence that civil society organisations in non-Commonwealth countries in Asia are pressing or are even considering the benefits of Commonwealth membership.
MT and LS: Myanmar never joined the Commonwealth. What difference would it make if it did?
- 10 Editors’ note: In 2002, Zimbabwe was found to be in breach of the Commonwealth Harare Principles of (...)
VK: I would like to think that there would have been greater credence given to democratic processes and that national institutions would have been stronger in support of those. In reality – I imagine that Myanmar would have spent a lot of time suspended and perhaps would have eventually left – à la Zimbabwe.10
MT and LS: Going back to resilience and sustainability, is there a comparative advantage of Commonwealth connections for countries in Asia, and conversely, do Asian members of the Commonwealth give leverage to action on climate change in global forums?
VK: The Commonwealth narrative on climate change has focused on small states. Maldives has played a leading role in this, but this agenda has left little scope for countries such as Bangladesh to feature as part of the Commonwealth case.
Tensions between state and civil society in each of the region’s countries have prevented the development of soft power to achieve policy outcomes on climate change. This is a missed opportunity as some of the most respected climate change voices are from civil society in the region (e.g., the International Centre for Climate Change and Development).
MT and LS: Finally, returning to conceptions of Asia and to your earlier comments on region-building and regional cooperation, do you believe that “Commonwealth Asia” exists as a diplomatic space? And what advice would you give to those seeking to build people-to-people link in the current climate of international relations?
VK: I do not believe that Commonwealth Asia exists as a diplomatic space and there is little evidence that this is being engendered.