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From Hope to Disarray: The Parliamentary Conservative Party’s Road to Defeat in the 2024 General Election

De l’espoir au chaos : la course du Parti conservateur à la défaite lors des élections générales de 2024
Luca Augé

Abstracts

Compared to previous UK legislatures, the 2019-2024 Parliament started as a promisingly stable environment for the governing Conservative Party. It had a large majority with opposition parties sitting in reduced numbers, its parliamentary party was relatively united and it was led by the charismatic Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Five years later, the situation looked much less stable. The Conservative Party saw three successive Leaders and Prime Ministers, weathered a series of scandals and experienced a crushing defeat in the 2024 General Election. This switch from a promising future to a more sobering present especially impacted Conservative MPs with a fifth of the 2019 cohort not standing for election again in 2024. This article analyses the intra-party dynamics of the parliamentary Conservative Party during the 2019-2024 Parliament. It draws on first-hand interviews conducted with a representative sample of 31 sitting Conservative MPs to illustrate internal perspectives on the state of the party. The article sheds light on the evolution of the Conservative Party throughout the 2019-2024 Parliament and attempts to provide explanations about the 2024 General election defeat.

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Introduction

1The 2019 General Election in the United Kingdom produced a remarkable result for the Conservative Party. It won 365 out of 650 seats and around 44% of votes, which represented its highest number of seats won since 1987 and highest share of votes received since 19791. After months of deadlock due to Brexit, a sense of optimism arose within the parliamentary Conservative Party. The then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, was even reportedly preparing for a decade in power.2 Five years later, the 2024 General Election crushed all these hopes, ending 14 years of Conservative government with the party receiving the worst result in its history. Within five years, the Conservative Party went from a position of parliamentary dominance enjoying considerable political ambition to a state of disarray and dramatically diminished strength.

  • 3 Chris Byrne, Nick Randall and Kevin Theakston, “Evaluating British Prime Ministerial Performance: D (...)

2Since the party’s return to office in 2010, Conservative MPs have experienced various phases of political instability. The party frequently divided itself and the 2019 General Election opened an era of stability with a realignment around a more homogenous group of MPs.3 This did not prevent the parliamentary Conservative Party from twice using an internal election to change the leader from Boris Johnson and Liz Truss to Rishi Sunak. Major events, economic shocks and political scandals additionally created challenges for MPs, making the 2019-2024 period essential in understanding the disintegration of the parliamentary Conservative Party.

3This article will focus on the parliamentary Conservative Party in the period from 2019 to 2024. It will contribute to the literature on the Conservative Party and the understanding of intra-party dynamics by analysing personal reflections by Conservative MPs. The article will attempt to provide a link between the evolution of the parliamentary Conservative Party in the 2019-2024 Parliament and the 2024 General Election defeat. It draws on original data from 31 first hand interviews conducted with Conservative MPs elected at the 2019 General Election, who all sat throughout the 2019-2024 Parliament. The article starts with a theoretical section that grounds the findings in the wider literature on the parliamentary Conservative Party. It continues with a methodological section detailing the process underpinning the selection and collection of the interviews. The main part of the article is a comprehensive analytical section divided into three parts, examining the initial sense of hope among MPs, the subsequent increase in structural tensions and the intra-personal divisions of the parliamentary Conservative Party.

Literature on the parliamentary Conservative Party

  • 4 Richard Rose, “Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain”, Political Studies 12:1, 1964; Robert J (...)
  • 5 Timothy Heppell and Michael Hill, “The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An Analysis (...)

4Due to their centrality within the political system, parliamentary parties have long been an object of study in the literature. Earlier works by Richard Rose, Robert Jackson, Dick Leonard and Valentine Hermann detail the experiences of MPs within their respective parliamentary parties.4 They explained the various degrees of cooperation or divisions between MPs and the cumulative impact on the party as a whole. This structural focus has since been complemented by a differentiated approach of MPs’ motives. In the case of the Conservative Party, scholars have written about the individual influence of MPs and have taken a special interest in leadership elections. Timothy Heppell in several co-authored articles showed the interdependent relationship between personal voting motivations within the parliamentary Conservative Party and an electoral outcome with consequences for the wider party.5 Single Conservative MPs have a cumulative influence over the parliamentary Conservative Party that directly impacts the path of the wider Conservative Party, giving MPs a unique type of political agency.

  • 6 Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker, “A Loveless Marriage: The Conservatives and the European People’ (...)
  • 7 Meg Russell and Lisa James, The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit (Oxford, Oxford University Press, (...)
  • 8 Joseph Ward and Bradley Ward, “From Brexit to COVID-19: The Johnson Government, Executive Centralis (...)

5The Conservative Party’s return to government in 2010 led to a renewed interest in the political role of MPs. Internal divisions on Europe became a focal point following the successful push by Eurosceptics for a hardline policy on Europe and a referendum on membership of the European Union (EU).6 The activities of this powerful minority were structured internally by MPs as Meg Russell and Lisa James analyse in their comprehensive book. They give a precise account of the extent of the influence individuals exerted on the Conservative government during the Brexit debates.7 During the 2019-2024 Parliament, MPs became more homogenous and the literature tended to focus on external rather than internal events. Most publications looked into the completion of Brexit or at the management of the Covid-19 pandemic.8 More detailed research remained to be conducted in order to account for the intra-party transformations that took place in the 2019-2024 Parliament.

  • 9 Jeffrey M. Berry, “Validity and Reliability Issues In Elite Interviewing”, Political Science & Poli (...)
  • 10 Emma Crewe, The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work (London, Bloomsbury, 2015); Emma P (...)
  • 11 Philip Cowley, “How to Get Information Out of Members of Parliament (Without Being Told Off by the (...)

6Elite interviews are considered a useful tool to understand the perspectives of key political actors. Researchers showed the valuable insights that interviews provide into the political work of MPs by talking directly to them.9 Interviews allow for the collection of unmediated data sources, which are helpful in identifying specific factors that might not have been possible through quantitative sources. The literature on MPs and Conservative MPs in British politics features several recent publications relying on interviews.10 Each time the interviewed MPs are either named or quoted directly and structure the produced analysis. Philip Cowley writes about the difficulties and strategic choices that researchers need to make in order to contact MPs.11 This article builds on these publications to discuss the evolution of the Conservative Party during the 2019-2024 Parliament by using interviews with MPs. The findings will help to highlight the individual role of Conservative MPs and understand the wider dynamics underpinning the intra-party development of the Conservative Party during that time.

Methodology

7This article looks at the evolution of the parliamentary Conservative Party during the 2019-2024 Parliament. It sheds light on intra-party dynamics before the 2024 General Election defeat and focuses on Conservative MPs as key actors. For this purpose, this article relies on the following research question: to what extent did the shifting attitudes within the parliamentary Conservative Party from 2019 to 2024 contribute to the 2024 General Election defeat? The analysis starts with the initial sense of hope after the 2019 General Election victory. It continues with the increase in tensions and ends with the lack of unity at an interpersonal level throughout the 2019-2024 Parliament. This article uses 31 first-hand interviews conducted with Conservative MPs elected to the House of Commons in 2019. The interviews were conducted between May 2023 and May 2024 in-person at Portcullis House in London as well as remotely via Zoom. Interviews were semi-structured, lasting 40 minutes on average. The interviewees filled out consent forms agreeing to be named with four interviewees specifically requesting anonymity. All 31 interviewees agreed to be recorded. The full list is available below:

Table 1: List of interviewed Conservative MPs from the 2019-2024 Parliament

Name

Election year

Position during the 2019-2024 Parliament

Anonymous

Anonymous

Backbencher

Anonymous

Anonymous

Backbencher

Anonymous

Anonymous

Anonymous (Environment, Food & Rural Affairs) and other senior positions

Anonymous

Anonymous

Anonymous (Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy)

Harriett Baldwin

Bob Blackman

2010

2010

Treasury Select Committee Chair

Backbench and Executive Secretary to the 1922 Committee

Crispin Blunt

1997

Backbencher

Robert Buckland

2010

Secretary of State for Justice and Secretary of State for Wales

Conor Burns

2010

Minister for Trade Policy and Minister for Northern Ireland

Greg Clark

2005

Science, Innovation & Technology Select Committee Chair and Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities

James Daly

Philip Davies

2019

2005

PPS (Work & Pensions) and Deputy Chair of the Conservative Party

Backbencher

Ben Everitt

2019

Backbencher and PPS (Levelling Up, Housing & Communities)

Roger Gale

Peter Gibson

1983

2019

Backbencher and Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons

PPS (International Trade) and PPS (Cabinet Office)

Jo Gideon

2019

PPS (Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy)

Damian Green

1997

Backbencher

Stephen Hammond

2005

Backbencher

Gordon Henderson

2010

Backbencher

Kevin Hollinrake

2015

PPS (Cabinet Office), Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Minister (Business & Trade)

Daniel Kawczynski

2005

Backbencher

Andrew Lewer

Karl McCartney

2017

2019

PPS (Home Office)

PPS (Transport)

Nigel Mills

2010

Backbencher

Caroline Nokes

2010

Women and Equalities Committee Chair

John Penrose

2005

Backbencher and UK Anti-Corruption Champion

Rob Roberts

2019

Backbencher

Paul Scully

2015

Minister (London) and Minister (Business & Trade)

David Simmonds

Matt Warman

2019

2015

Backbencher

Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Minister (Digital, Culture, Media & Sport)

Craig Whittaker

2010

Backbencher and Deputy Chief Whip

8The 31 interviewees were selected for the similarity of their sociological profile with that of the wider parliamentary Conservative Party of all 365 MPs. Three variables were used to create these profiles. The first variable is gender; the second one is the year of the first election to determine the seniority of each MP; the third variable is the region or nation in which the respective constituencies are located to account for geographic representation. The House of Commons Library report on the 2019 General Election and the personal profiles on the UK Parliament website were used to access the background information for each MP.12 Figure 1 shows the variables for the 31 interviewees and Figure 2 for the entire cohort of 365 Conservative MPs.

Figure 1: Variables for the 31 interviewees

Figure 1: Variables for the 31 interviewees

Figure 2: Variables for the 365 MPs

Figure 2: Variables for the 365 MPs

9Comparing both groups, the 31 interviewed Conservative MPs are similar to the parliamentary Conservative Party of 365 MPs in terms of gender, the year of the first election and the region or nation in which the constituencies are based. The sociological similarity enables the data to be used in a representative manner and make conclusions about the entire parliamentary Conservative Party. Interviews remain individual statements made during a face-to-face meeting with interpersonal dynamics possibly influencing the data. The article takes these ethical concerns into account by cross-checking the quotes and focusing on views expressed by multiple interviewees to ensure the validity of the findings.

The 2019-2024 Parliament as a glimmer of hope

  • 13 Luke Cooper and Christabel Cooper, ““Get Brexit Done”: The New Political Divides of England and Wal (...)

10The start of the 2019-2024 Parliament marked the beginning of a hopeful period for the Conservative Party. Following a minority government in the previous legislature, the 2019 General Election resulted in a large victory for the party with 365 MPs elected. Several Northern English constituencies, that had been Labour for decades in the commonly ‘Red Wall’, elected Conservative candidates for the first time.13 Lee Rowley and James Daly recalled their sense of optimism that the 2019 victory was the start of a wider realignment. The Conservative Party had a new voting coalition and MPs were ready to deliver for them.

“What 2019 showed us was that the new natural centre right majority in this country looks more like what [the electoral coalition of] 2019 looks like.” (Lee Rowley MP)

“[The 2019 victory] was about taking the opportunity of representing perhaps voters who had never, prior to the Brexit vote, backed the Conservative Party.” (James Daly MP)

  • 14 Will Jennings, Lawrence McKay and Gerry Stoker, “The Politics of Levelling Up”, The Political Quart (...)

11The Levelling Up agenda became a symbol of the party’s desire to focus on the Red Wall with an ambitious plan to invest in the regeneration of deprived areas. The parliamentary Conservative Party enthusiastically supported it and pilot projects were rapidly implemented.14 The veteran Damian Green from South England supported the agenda based on his One Nation Conservatism credentials. Peter Gibson, elected in 2019 for a Northern seat, welcomed the arrival of funds in areas like his constituency. A consensus emerged within the parliamentary Conservative Party from senior Southern to newer Northern MPs, allowing for the agenda to become a political reality.

“I'm a One Nation Conservative, therefore I think that the whole nation should benefit from Conservative policies. I was genuinely excited about the whole Levelling Up agenda.” (Damian Green MP)

“We've seen significant investments through the Levelling Up agenda of restoring towns in the North and putting investment into places that have been for many, many years from the governments of all sorts forgotten about, left behind.” (Peter Gibson MP)

  • 15 Joris Larik, “Brexit, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, and Global Treaty (Re-)Negotiations”, America (...)

12Another element of consensus following the 2019 victory was on the need to complete Brexit. The end of the UK’s membership in January 2021 meant that some policy competences previously in Brussels returned to Westminster, including the ability to negotiate trade deals. The Johnson government immediately made use of the competence by pursuing negotiation with countries around the world, mostly to sign deals replicating existing EU arrangements.15 MPs like Conor Burns, Minister for Trade Policy from 2019 to 2020 and in 2022, mentioned the pride of contributing to an independent trade policy as promised in the 2016 referendum. The parliamentary Conservative Party celebrated the different bilateral trade deals signed in the 2019-2024 Parliament as an achievement made possible by the completion of Brexit.

“The UK has an independent trade policy, for the first time in 50 years, and we could enter into free trade agreements with other countries on a bilateral basis from them. The Department for International Trade consequently was an extremely busy place to be so I spent a lot of time out of the country.” (Conor Burns MP)

  • 16 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, ““A Sea of Troubles”: Brexit and the Fisheries Question”, Marine (...)

13After Brexit, policy competences on agriculture and fisheries also returned to Westminster. Both areas had become associated with the Brexit campaign, giving them a symbolic dimension that continued throughout the 2019-2024 Parliament.16 An anonymous MP that used to oppose Brexit and became in charge of reforming these sectors enthusiastically explained having changed her mind about Brexit. Craig Whittaker similarly mentioned the post-Brexit changes for fisheries to justify his support for leaving the EU. The satisfaction of formerly anti-Brexit MPs with the post-Brexit agriculture and fisheries policies represented another tangible achievement delivered by the parliamentary Conservative Party.

“In agriculture and fisheries, there was a real move to be more environmentally friendly. [...] We are genuinely leading the world on cutting carbon emissions. [...] Weirdly as a Remainer, I was then in charge of the really good bits of Brexit freedom, if you like.” (Anonymous)

“The deal that was struck for [fisheries], it's getting better and better. The quotas are getting larger. They're starting to see some of the benefits from it.” (Craig Whittaker MP)

  • 17 Simon Usherwood, “UK-EU Relations After the Windsor Framework”, Political Insight 14:2, 2023.

14By 2023, the deal that finalised the Brexit process in 2021 had caused trade frictions in Northern Ireland and Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak negotiated the Windsor Agreement with the EU. The deal represented a more pragmatic management of the relationship with Brussels.17 Some Europhiles like Stephen Hammond hoped to make the Windsor Agreement the start of closer UK-EU relations. For the few MPs in favour of cooperation with Brussels, the 2019-2024 Parliament offered some hope to see a new approach emerge within the parliamentary Conservative Party.

“[Post-Windsor, we have to be] more positive in our ambition in things that are not economic related and are things that both the EU and the UK could do individually, which would improve the overall relationship.” (Stephen Hammond MP)

15On the other side of the argument, Eurosceptics shared the hope created by Brexit to pursue more personal political dreams. Daniel Kawczynski wanted the UK to induce other European countries to leave the EU, while Crispin Blunt envisioned a new type of state at the crossroads between Canada and Singapore. These hopes indicated a feeling of endless possibilities within the Conservative Party.

“We have to destroy [the EU] from the outside [and] we need to start to now build alliances to ensure that this debate takes place in all of the other European countries.” (Daniel Kawczynski MP)

“The animating idea of Brexit [for me] would be Canapore. It would be the values of Canada, the moral position in the world of Canada, and the entrepreneurial, administrative and far- sightedness status of Singapore.” (Crispin Blunt MP)

16The 2019-2024 Parliament started in politically favourable terms for the Conservative Party. MPs enthusiastically implemented policies focusing on the constituencies it had won at the 2019 General Election like the Levelling Up agenda. They participated in shaping the post-Brexit policies for trade, agriculture and fisheries. Some even dreamt of a new future for the UK from closer relations to the EU to more peculiar dreams. MPs found themselves in a state of hope that made them believe in their collective capacity to govern and influence the future path of the UK. The diversity of hopes in this initial stage showed a lack of common ideals, which predicted the tensions that would gradually appear within the parliamentary Conservative Party.

The parliamentary Conservative Party on a slippery slope

  • 18 Gemma Williams, Selina Rajan, and Jonathan Cylus, ‘Covid-19 in the United Kingdom: How Austerity an (...)

17The start of the 2019-2024 Parliament was disrupted by major global events. In early 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the UK and the Johnson government reacted by imposing social distancing measures that some MPs rejected on libertarian grounds.18 The 80-seat majority and the support from opposition parties meant that the government could disregard the critical voices. For MPs like Karl McCartney and Philip Davies, who voted several times against Covid-19 measures, the government’s pandemic response was ineffective and even economically harmful. The difference in opinions resulted in a break amongst MPs between a supportive majority and a critical minority, causing the first intra-party divisions in the parliamentary Party during this parliament.

“People who were like rabbits in headlights when COVID hit. [...] Nobody thought ‘actually we need to get people who can act and make decisions and do stuff and get things done’.” (Karl McCartney MP)

“[Covid lockdowns] will go down as the worst piece of public policy in history to be perfectly honest, bankrupting the country.” (Philip Davies MP)

18At an organisational level, the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted the House of Commons agenda with debate time becoming solely about public health measures. The interviewees agreed on the negative political impact as important issues became secondary and made it more difficult to focus on the demands of the 2019 Conservative electorate in new areas. In practice, the parliamentary Conservative Party found itself limited in its capacity to implement policies and secure its political position.

“In practice, Covid coming along so soon after the election blew out the water on a whole set of those issues.” (Matt Warman MP)

“Had the pandemic not come along, we would have had a real immediate opportunity to consolidate in [Red Wall] areas.” (Anonymous)

19The doubt over the party’s policy-making capacity continued after the EU exit. Many promises were made for the post-Brexit period and some interviewees felt that the government had failed to deliver on them. Rob Roberts believed Brexit was pursued for nationalistic reasons with a negative impact on the daily life of British citizens. David Simmonds criticised the British scheme replacing EU regional funds, which he saw as less efficient. Both MPs had voted against Brexit in 2016 and showed that the EU exit remained a divisive factor inside the party that could be criticised using practical examples.

“Brexit has made no difference in the lives of the ordinary person on the street. The country's government got so caught up in these nationalist kinds of rhetoric.” (Rob Roberts MP)

“[The new UK Shared Prosperity Fund] is kind of quite similar to the [EU] Structural Funds, but it's a lot less money instead of a lot more, which is what was promised, and it's quite bureaucratic and people are frustrated about it.” (David Simmonds MP)

  • 19 Geoffrey Dudley and Andrew Gamble, “Brexit and UK Policy-Making: An Overview”, Journal of European (...)

20The right wing of the parliamentary Conservative Party echoed the criticisms of the government’s implementation of Brexit. Eurosceptic MPs considered post-Brexit policies to not go far enough and partially elected Liz Truss to change this.19 Two interviewees staunch right-wing Truss supporters echoed the need to have a wider post-Brexit realignment of British politics. Andrew Lewer admitted that Westminster had become more bureaucratic than and an anonymous MP called for a culture shift in government to fully use the opportunity created by Brexit. Like-minded MPs considered that the rest of the parliamentary Conservative Party was not embracing the potential of Brexit and were ready to pursue radical policies as shown during the short-lived Premiership of Truss.

“I and many others believed that Britain was being held back by over regulation and process emanating from the EU. It's become increasingly apparent that Britain is being held back by regulations and processes that come from the UK.” (Andrew Lewer MP)

“It's going to take time for a culture shift [...]. We are in a really difficult time here where we've got a now completely independent country, which we need to actually start governing properly.” (Anonymous)

21In addition to the major events, tensions emerged between senior MPs and MPs elected for the first time in 2019. The government’s focus on new areas like the Red Wall led to a sensation of neglect by the traditional Southern English Conservative areas. Caroline Nokes, first elected in 2010 for a Southern constituency, spoke about the change in rhetoric that seemed to antagonise traditional Conservative voters. Jo Gideon, a 2019 Red Wall MP, confirmed the tensions hinting at some kind of political resentment between both groups. The decision to prioritise Northern over Southern constituencies undermined the cohesion of the parliamentary Conservative Party by the impression of a two-speed political focus.

“That [2019] election victory has come at a huge price, because the tone of politics that has prevailed in the Red Wall alienates voters in the Southeast and the Southwest.” (Caroline Nokes MP)

“Colleagues from Southern seats felt a certain level of… Resentment is maybe a bit of a strong word, but you know the government didn't particularly care as much about the traditional Blue Wall.” (Jo Gideon MP)

22Many senior MPs considered the group of individuals first elected in 2019 - who represented a third of the parliamentary Conservative Party (as shown in Figure 2) to be unfit for the role of MP. The sexual or financial scandals that rocked the 2019-2024 parliamentary Conservative Party were seen as a confirmation, even if MPs elected before 2019 were also involved.20 Nigel Mills believed that the rushed vetting process of Conservative candidates explained the scandalous profile of some MPs. For Bob Blackman, it was more the lack of intergenerational training between senior and newer MPs caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Robert Buckland talked about the influence of social media on the new MPs to show their lack of skills. The impression existed that the generation elected in 2019 was incompetent and politically unskilled.

“When you win seats that you weren't expecting to win in a snap election [like in 2019], you don't have the chance to do the full vetting you normally do. The vast majority of them have been very good, but few have fallen by the wayside in some quite horrible place.” (Nigel Mills MP)

“COVID struck, and we went into lockdown. All those new colleagues didn't get the benefits of the assistance from, shall we say, more experienced colleagues.” (Bob Blackman MP)

“We have a new factor, namely the in-box of direct social media, which can really unduly influence or overwhelm MPs who perhaps are not as used to having to deal with it.” (Robert Buckland MP)

23Major events took place from 2019 to 2024, which reverberated through the parliamentary Conservative Party. The management of the Covid-19 pandemic was opposed by a minority of MPs that the leadership could disregard thanks to the 80-seat majority. Brexit continued to cause tensions with formerly anti-Brexit MPs criticising the impact of its completion and pro-Brexit MPs demanding more radical reforms of the British government. Tensions between senior and newer MPs grew due to a perceived favouritism in favour of Red Wall MPs and lack of competence in the 2019 intake. By the time of the 2024 General Election was called, intra-party divisions had become structural and caused the disintegration of the parliamentary Conservative Party.

Personal distrust and collective disunion

24The parliamentarians elected in 2019 were all individuals with their own opinions and perspectives that pledged to work together as part of the parliamentary Conservative Party. An interpersonal cooperation was required to make a team out of the 365 MPs. The 2024 General Election defeat indicated that the demise of the party had an undeniable human dimension. For a majority of interviewees, a fruitful interpersonal dynamic failed to materialise and negatively impacted cross-party cooperation. Harriett Baldwin regretted that MPs did not become a united group like in previous Parliaments. Paul Scully even mentioned that the communication between MPs was sometimes disrespectful and offensive. The absence of internal cohesion impacted the party’s political standing and legislative output. MPs failed to come together, which considerably weakened the parliamentary Conservative Party.

“We did not gather as a party. We did not become one team in the way that we had in 2010, in 2015, even in 2017.” (Harriett Baldwin MP)

“There were people that were just apparently downright rude saying things that couldn't be unsaid.” (Paul Scully MP)

25The 80-seat majority allowed the leadership elected in 2019 complicated the emergence of a coherent group. The leadership often disregarded critical voices that created factions linked to issues from the Covid-19 pandemic management to net zero policies and Levelling Up.21 Gordon Henderson accepted the rise in factionalism as a consequence of the large majority and Kevin Hollinrake recalled that factionalism has been on the surge since the party’s return to office in 2010. Intra-party divisions grew during the 2019-2024 Parliament with the failure of successive leaders to respond to them, which further undermined the cohesion of the parliamentary Conservative Party.

“You want to get a consensus of ideas through and you can't always do that if you've got a big majority. You can't keep everybody happy, that's the thing.” (Gordon Henderson MP)

“Boris had to struggle with [factionalism]. So did Liz Truss. So did Theresa May. David Cameron recognised that would be a problem. Rishi Sunak struggles with that to some extent as well. It's a big challenge to keep all those different visions of the future aligned.” (Kevin Hollinrake MP)

  • 22 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party after Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation (Cambridge, Polity Press, (...)

26The absence of cohesion led to internal questions over the party’s purpose and identity. Conservative Prime Ministers since 2010 reacted by pursuing more right-wing policies with the support of most MPs.22 Veteran members of the liberal wing like Greg Clark and Roger Gale were concerned about the implications of a radicalisation by the party. The shift to the right weakened the ideological unity of the parliamentary Conservative Party and left more centrist ideas to be invested by opposition parties.

“It's become a... I was going to say Eurosceptic party, but stronger than that. [...] Obviously it has major implications.” (Greg Clark MP)

“There's a hard right of the party, which was elected in 2019, that is trying to drag the party to the right.” (Roger Gale MP)

27The election calling in May 2024 made MPs reflect on the party’s position before the imminent campaign. All interviewed MPs recognised the difficulties faced during the 2019-2024 Parliament and accepted that an electoral victory was improbable. John Penrose explained that the Conservative Party still needed to complete the realignment towards voters beyond its traditional heartlands. Ben Everitt added that MPs were running out of time with the election coming before the achievement of promised reforms. The lucidity of the parliamentary Conservative Party meant that it prepared itself without much enthusiasm and hope for the 2024 General Election.

“We now need to morph to say actually the Tory party at its best needs to accommodate people who are a bit less Southern, metropolitan and a bit more socially traditional, socially conservative small c.” (John Penrose MP)

“We're now in that position where we're trying to do all the hard stuff that the country needs doing, but with running out of road before a general election.” (Ben Everitt MP)

28By the end of the 2019-2024 Parliament, the parliamentary Conservative Party had gradually reached a state of profound divisions. MPs did not see themselves as a united group and some even personally distrusted each other. The large majority led to the creation of factions that fuelled intra-party divisions. The leadership’s radicalisation polarised the party by undermining its ideological unity. MPs were divided to a point that made adequate preparations for the looming electoral campaign difficult. By the time of the 2024 General Election, the parliamentary Conservative Party had steered itself in a precarious situation that left it weak and unprepared.

Conclusion

29The 2019-2024 Parliament was a transformative period for the parliamentary Conservative Party. Within five years, it went from producing a large victory at the 2019 General Election to its worst electoral defeat at the 2024 General Election. Conservative MPs found themselves at the forefront of this evolution as much as they accompanied the change in environment. They started in a hopeful environment that seemingly made everything possible such as implementing the Levelling Up agenda and using new policy-making competences. These achievements made the Conservative Party hopeful about its political future without being able to prevent the rise in intra-party tensions. The Covid-19 pandemic and the completion of Brexit revealed diverging opinions, which resulted in MPs of the same view recognising each other and opposing the rest of the party. Tensions equally erupted between senior MPs and MPs first elected in 2019. The focus on the newly elected constituencies fuelled resentments by representatives of traditional Conservative heartlands in the South. Senior MPs also tended to regard their new colleagues as unfit to be MP due to a lack of competence and skills. The structural tensions were complemented by difficulties of the leadership to foster unity at an intrapersonal level. With an 80-seat majority, the leadership disregarded more easily critical voices and MPs responded by organising themselves in factions to increase their leverage. The leadership decided to pursue a radicalisation towards the right in the hope of focusing on a common denominator, which complicated the ideological unity of the party. By the time of the 2024 General Election, the parliamentary Conservative Party was reaching an impasse. MPs were divided, hopeless and unprepared for the looming electoral campaign. Opposition parties benefited from the situation and made considerable gains at the expense of the Conservative Party that received the worst electoral result in its history.

30The 31 interviewed MPs offered a valuable insight into the intra-party dynamics at play within the 2019-2024 parliamentary Conservative Party. They provided explanations that highlighted the growing divisions amongst MPs and the party’s descent into political instability. Conservative MPs failed to prevent the conditions that contributed to the 2024 General Election defeat without bearing the full responsibility. Ultimately, the disintegration of the parliamentary Conservative was a leadership problem. Three successive Conservative Premierships characterised by political scandals, economic mismanagement and short-sighted political manoeuvres created a detrimental legacy. Johnson, Truss and Sunak were unable to competently identify and prevent the party’s demise. The absence of effective leadership spilled over into the parliamentary party that became fragmented and eventually spread to the entire Conservative Party. As shown since the 2024 General Election, the leadership problem persists with a powerless leader presiding over a continuously weak party. The Conservative Party experienced a decline in the 2019-2024 Parliament and seemingly will remain on this path until a leader is able to impose its authority on the whole party from MPs to members.

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Notes

1 House of Commons Library, 28 January 2020 https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8749/ consulted 6 June 2025.

2 The Times, 11 September 2021 https://www.thetimes.com/article/boris-johnson-eyes-decade-in-power-5p8hfd72p consulted 6 June 2025.

3 Chris Byrne, Nick Randall and Kevin Theakston, “Evaluating British Prime Ministerial Performance: David Cameron’s Premiership in Political Time”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:1, 2017; Chris Byrne, Nick Randall and Kevin Theakston, “Theresa May’s Disjunctive Premiership: Choice and Constraint in Political Time”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23:4, 2021; Agnès Alexandre‐Collier, “From Rebellion to Extinction: Where Have All the Tory Remainer MPs Gone?”, The Political Quarterly 91:1, 2020.

4 Richard Rose, “Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain”, Political Studies 12:1, 1964; Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties (London, Macmillan, 1968); Dick Leonard and Valentine Herman, The Backbencher and Parliament (London, Macmillan, 1972); Philip Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons’ Division Lobbies, 1945-1974 (London, Macmillan, 1975).

5 Timothy Heppell and Michael Hill, “The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians”, British Politics 3:1, 2008; Timothy Heppell and Michael Hill, “The Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians in the Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001”, Politics 30:1, 2010; David Jeffery et al., “The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2016: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians”, Parliamentary Affairs 71:2, 2018; David Jeffery, Timothy Heppell and Andrew Roe-Crines, “The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2019: An Analysis of the Voting Motivations of Conservative Parliamentarians”, Parliamentary Affairs 75:1, 2022.

6 Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker, “A Loveless Marriage: The Conservatives and the European People’s Party”, Parliamentary Affairs 61:1, 2008; Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, “The Cambusters: The Conservative European Union Referendum Rebellion of October 2011”, The Political Quarterly 83:2, 2012; Peter Dorey, “Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party’s Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s”, Politics and Governance 5:2, 2017.

7 Meg Russell and Lisa James, The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023).

8 Joseph Ward and Bradley Ward, “From Brexit to COVID-19: The Johnson Government, Executive Centralisation and Authoritarian Populism”, Political Studies, 71:4, 2021; David Richards et al., “Crisis and State Transformation: Covid-19, Levelling Up and the UK’s Incoherent State” 16:1, 2023.

9 Jeffrey M. Berry, “Validity and Reliability Issues In Elite Interviewing”, Political Science & Politics 35:4, 2002; Brian C. Rathbun, ‘Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities’, in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).

10 Emma Crewe, The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work (London, Bloomsbury, 2015); Emma Peplow and Priscila Pivatto, The Political Lives of Postwar British MPs: An Oral History of Parliament (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2020); Joshua Myers and Hilde Coffé, “The Impact of a STEM Background on MPs’ Legislative Behaviour”, British Politics 17:2, 2022.

11 Philip Cowley, “How to Get Information Out of Members of Parliament (Without Being Told Off by the Speaker)”, Political Studies Review 20:2, 2022.

12 House of Commons Library, 28 January 2020 https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8749/ consulted 6 June 2025; UK Parliament, https://members.parliament.uk/members/Commons consulted 12 October 2024.

13 Luke Cooper and Christabel Cooper, ““Get Brexit Done”: The New Political Divides of England and Wales at the 2019 Election”, Political Quarterly 91:4, 2020.

14 Will Jennings, Lawrence McKay and Gerry Stoker, “The Politics of Levelling Up”, The Political Quarterly 92:2, 2021.

15 Joris Larik, “Brexit, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, and Global Treaty (Re-)Negotiations”, American Journal of International Law 114:3, 2020; Maria J. Garcia, “Post-Brexit Trade Policy in the UK: Placebo Policy-Making?”, Journal of European Public Policy 30:11, 2023.

16 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, ““A Sea of Troubles”: Brexit and the Fisheries Question”, Marine Policy 90, 2018.

17 Simon Usherwood, “UK-EU Relations After the Windsor Framework”, Political Insight 14:2, 2023.

18 Gemma Williams, Selina Rajan, and Jonathan Cylus, ‘Covid-19 in the United Kingdom: How Austerity and a Loss of State Capacity Undermined the Crisis Response’ in Scott L. Greer et al. (eds), Coronavirus Politics: The Comparative Politics and Policy of COVID-19 (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2021); Tim Bale, ‘The United Kingdom: The Pandemic and the Tale of Two Populist Parties’ in Nils Ringe and Lucio Rennó (eds), Populists and the Pandemic (London, Routledge, 2022).

19 Geoffrey Dudley and Andrew Gamble, “Brexit and UK Policy-Making: An Overview”, Journal of European Public Policy 30:11, 2023.

20 The Guardian, 1 July 2022 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/01/scandal-timeline-tory-sleaze-boris-johnson consulted 6 June 2025; Sky News, 19 April 2024 https://news.sky.com/story/all-the-tory-mps-who-have-been-suspended-since-rishi-sunak-became-prime-minister-13117813 consulted 6 June 2025.

21 The Guardian, 8 January 2022 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jan/08/what-are-the-different-conservative-factions consulted 6 June 2025.

22 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party after Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023).

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List of illustrations

Title Figure 1: Variables for the 31 interviewees
URL http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/docannexe/image/14232/img-1.png
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Title Figure 2: Variables for the 365 MPs
URL http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/docannexe/image/14232/img-2.png
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References

Electronic reference

Luca Augé, “From Hope to Disarray: The Parliamentary Conservative Party’s Road to Defeat in the 2024 General Election”Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXX-3 | 2025, Online since 15 September 2025, connection on 15 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/14232; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/14qkd

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About the author

Luca Augé

Centre for Research on the English-Speaking World, Université Sorbonne Nouvelle
Maison de la Recherche, 4 rue des Irlandais, 75005 Paris, France

Luca Augé is a PhD Student at Université Sorbonne Nouvelle

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