- 1 Political scientist Michael Keating has long argued that the UK was a “post-sovereign” polity in wh (...)
- 2 Ailsa Henderson et al., “Political Behaviour in Scotland”, in Michael Keating (ed.), The Oxford Han (...)
- 3 The concept, devised by Karlhein Reif and Hermann Schmitt, was used for the first Holyrood election (...)
1General elections are the main elections in the United Kingdom. However, MPs no longer deal with all Scottish affairs. They handle reserved matters (such as foreign, immigration, economic policies as well as the Constitution), while devolved matters (especially public services, some benefits and some taxes) are dealt with by the Scottish Parliament, based in Edinburgh (Holyrood), as part of a devolution process launched in 1999. Even though the UK Parliament remains the only sovereign body in the UK, the Scottish Parliament votes its own pieces of legislation, without political supervision.1 As Holyrood has gained importance and relevance over policy-making, 2general elections may be regarded as second-order elections in Scotland.3
2Moreover, Scotland has its own political arena. From the late 1950s, it had two dominant parties, Labour and the Scottish National Party (SNP), and never contributed to UK-wide Conservative victories. In the early 1990s, Labour leaders devised the scheme (as part of a Constitutional Convention) which inspired the Scotland Act 1998 enacting devolution, as a means to achieve social democratic aims. The SNP, then a minor party, gained influence and power from 2007 through the Scottish Parliament. It pursued policies initiated under the first Executives led by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. After 2011, with its overall majority of seats, it was allowed by the British Government to hold a lawful referendum on its historical goal, independence. Although independence was rejected by 55 percent of voters, the SNP came ahead in all following elections in Scotland, including elections to the House of Commons from 2015.
- 4 Claude Ake, “A Definition of Political Stability”, Comparative Politics, 7: 2, 1975, p. 281.
3On 4 July 2024, Labour secured an overall majority of seats in the House of Commons after 14 years of Conservative governments, as well as a majority of the 57 Scottish seats (37, compared to 1 after the 2019 election). The SNP collapsed, from 48 seats to 9. Scottish Labour leaders pointed to a realignment which would help them come back to power at the Holyrood election in 2026. Yet this instability might only reflect the normal flow of political exchanges.4
4This paper aims at analysing the election and its outcome, as a result of policies conducted in Scotland within devolved institutions, which shape the image of political parties. It contends that although Labour’s short-term victory results from voters’ volatility, it does not necessarily herald a lasting reconfiguration. The paper will first account for the SNP’s growing political and electoral setbacks, before dealing with the rise of Labour, which both suggested major shifts. The last part, based on the immediate aftermath, is more nuanced, as it questions the meaning for Scottish politics.
5Alex Salmond, MP from 1987, and SNP leader between 1990 and 2014, turned it into a party of government: he consolidated its organisation and he refined its policies to demonstrate that independence was affordable, and that it could be achieved by using devolution as a first step. John Swinney, who briefly replaced him (2000-2004), pursued this strategy. Then Salmond led his party to power in 2007, proved its competence and gained an outright majority in 2011, which paved the way for the 2014 referendum.
- 5 John Curtice, “The Party and the Electorate”, in Gerry Hassan and Simon Barrow (eds), A Nation Chan (...)
6The SNP’s political ascendancy was founded on three pillars: unity, commitments to independence and social-democratic values. These pillars were strengthened after the 2014 referendum as Alex Salmond and his successor Nicola Sturgeon turned the constitutional issue into a key one, increased support for independence and then won over most pro-independence voters.5 In addition, they intertwined the prospect of independence with social democratic policies, without any public dissent within their ranks. The party’s successes in Holyrood elections extended to general elections from 2015. These pillars were shaken from 2022, opening up new perspectives for reconfiguration.
7During the 2019 Parliament, internal divisions came to the fore, on three main grounds.
- 6 In 2020, he was acquitted in Court from most charges (although one was “not proven”); then the Holy (...)
8First, senior members of the party no longer fought together for independence. Salmond, who lost his Westminster seat in 2017, turned against his party. He embarrassed his fellows with his programme on Russia Today, which he only abandoned after the invasion of Ukraine. From 2018, as he was accused of sexual misconduct by Scottish Government employees, he contended that the process was biased and broke with Sturgeon, fuelling tensions in the SNP during investigations.6 In 2021, he quit to create Alba, along with MPs Kenny MacAskill, Neale Hanvey and, in 2023 MSP Ash Regan. The SNP and Sturgeon had new critics, both outside and within the party (Joanna Cherry SNP MP).
9Second, the party lost its reputation for probity. Sturgeon’s husband Peter Murrell, the chief executive (from 2001), was arrested in early 2023, under allegations of embezzlement, which triggered a police inquiry (Operation Branchform). He had also concealed the collapse in party members. She stepped down in February, arguing that she had been in power for too long. He made a similar move the following month.
10Third, the contest for her succession put an end to the party’s official unity on policies. Humza Yousaf, a young MSP (since 2016) who had served as her minister after working for Salmond, was backed by 52.1 percent of party members, against Kate Forbes who held divergent views over economic growth, taxes or morals.
- 7 He was about to be voted down as the Greens intended to back the unionists’ motion of no confidence (...)
- 8 Andrew Marr, “The SNP had Learnt a Painful Lesson: many Scots are still Socially Conservative”, New (...)
11Policy disputes were further fuelled by the agreement with the Greens, another pro-independence party. From 2016, when the SNP lost its overall majority, Sturgeon relied on their backing as Holyrood was polarised between unionist and pro-independence parties. After the 2021 election, she negotiated a partnership, and their 2 co-leaders (Patrick Harvie and Lorna Slater) entered her Government. Their priorities (climate change and protection of minorities) aroused unease within the SNP, especially from Forbes. Yousaf unilaterally ended this alliance in late March 2024, before being forced to resign.7 But the SNP responded rapidly, by electing John Swinney, a former MP, MSP, party leader, minister for Finance under Salmond and Sturgeon. This trusted figure appointed Forbes as his deputy, in an attempt to bring the two sides together.8
12SNP leaders were thus involved in petty party politics, like their rivals, instead of being publicly united behind one leader, pursuing social democratic aims. Worse, they no longer had any strategy over independence, their ultimate goal.
- 9 Identities were shaped by the 2014 referendum in a centre-left and multicultural nation, Maria Sobo (...)
13The 2014 referendum was supposed to settle the independence issue. Yet, on 23 June 2016, two-thirds of voters in Scotland rejected Brexit in the referendum on continuing membership of the EU, thus triggering another shift. This result further proved that Scotland had its own political cleavages.9 It also reflected changing circumstances compared to 2014, when a majority of Scottish voters had voted in favour of remaining in a UK which was part of the EU. The SNP Manifesto for the Holyrood election, published before the Brexit referendum, pledged that in such a context, it would demand another independence referendum, should the SNP retain its electoral mandate to call for one.
14Sturgeon reignited this claim at every decisive step in the Brexit process, achieved without consultation of her Government: the triggering of Article 50 in early 2017 with a commitment to severe all links with the EU‒whereas Sturgeon, backed by most MSPs, wanted to remain in the single market, and the Withdrawal agreements for Great Britain, with protocols for Northern Ireland, (and not for Scotland) in 2019. The First Minister was also dissatisfied with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (late 2020) which mostly dealt with goods, and excluded services, and people. According to Sturgeon, Scotland was being taken out of the EU against its will and its interests. Yet Prime Ministers turned down her requests for self-determination between two unions, arguing that the 2014 outcome had been conclusive.
15Sturgeon tried to protect devolution with a Continuity Bill to keep pace with EU legislation in devolved matters (2021). But this was undermined by 2 UK Acts, creating an UK internal market based on non-discrimination for goods and services circulating within the UK (2020) and abolishing some retained EU regulations (2023). There might be divergent standards in the UK, but Scottish authorities would not be allowed to restrict access.
16Sturgeon remained under pressure within her party. In 2020, her Government drafted a legislative framework for referenda held in Scotland, which could be used as soon as it gained leave to hold a second one on independence. In June 2022, she disclosed two other options. Her Lord Advocate asked the Supreme Court whether the Scottish Government was allowed to hold a consultative referendum. The October ruling confirmed that the matter was reserved. Sturgeon then argued that the next General Election would be a referendum on independence. This satisfied no one, but remained the party’s position. The October 2023 conference clarified the type of victory, i.e. a majority of seats.
17SNP leaders knew that there was no real appetite for a second referendum. Public opinion had not shifted decisively since 2014 (table 1). A proportion of people close to 50% was prepared to vote for independence, which was both simulating and insufficient to trigger a poll. Economic forecasts were less optimistic than in 2014.
Table 1: Voting intentions for a second referendum on Scotland’s independence (YouGov)
Note: without those who are undecided.
Source : http://www.whatscotlandthinks.org, consulted 23 November 2024.
- 10 SNP and Alba MPs held debates underlining the sovereignty of the people of Scotland, HC, Hansard, 1 (...)
- 11 SP, OR, 30 May 2023.
18SNP leaders kept blaming Westminster for refusing a lawful referendum while undermining devolution.10 Indeed, they regretted the lack of consultation over Brexit at ministerial level (joint ministerial committees were scarce) and at legislative level (legislative consent motions‒LCMs‒, voted down at Holyrood, were ignored).11 They were disappointed when the Supreme Court ruled in January 2017 that LCMs were mere political conventions that were not legally binding, and would not prevent the British Parliament from overruling the Scottish Parliament. SNP and Green leaders also deplored unprecedented judicial actions which tended to replace pre-legislative discussions‒the first Continuity Bill was submitted to the Supreme Court and had to be amended accordingly at Holyrood.
19Beyond these disputes, the SNP no longer had any credible strategy for independence. Furthermore, after 17 years in power, its leaders were held accountable for their social and economic achievements.
- 12 The Scotland Act 1998 was amended by an eponymous Act, based on the recommendations of the multi-pa (...)
20Sturgeon came to power with ambitions to be ahead of the rest of the UK, and she gained additional powers from 2016 over taxes and benefits.12 Eradicating child poverty was a statutory goal, although it was abandoned at UK level. Policies included comprehensive benefits for children, free school meals gradually extended to most primary classes. Closing the attainment gap was another goal: while tuition fees had been repealed by Salmond, schools benefited from additional funding. Public services remained under public provision. Income tax was more progressive than in Great Britain (with additional brackets and rates). However, by 2022, SNP governments had missed most of their targets. Child poverty was lower than in the rest of Britain (24 and 31 percent), but remained very high locally. The attainment gap between deprived and wealthy areas lowered but then stalled, while Scottish students faced caps in the number of places and increasing debt. NHS waiting lists were still long (1 in 6 Scots). Sturgeon was held accountable.
- 13 Individuals on low incomes had to pay a higher proportion of their incomes than wealthier taxpayers
- 14 The son of Winnie Ewing, the first SNP MP, denounced the growing intolerance, fuelled by the Greens (...)
- 15 Members who voiced dissent were dismissed, while Robin Harper, their first MSP in 1999, resigned.
21Scottish Greens backed redistributive policies. While they denounced every deviation, such as the freeze in the council tax, a regressive tax,13 in October 2023, they voted all budgets after 2016. But they also pursued their own agenda. On green issues, there was a consensus at Holyrood over the net zero target for 2045–five years ahead of the UK. But divisions appeared over the means to achieve it. British Governments granted new licences to exploit oil and gas in the North Sea. Under Green pressure, Sturgeon argued in favour of a presumption against new licences and set up a fund to support the transition to renewables in the North-East. Green ministers devised plans to promote public transport (free bus travel for young people, abolition of peak train fares) and active travel, at the expense of new road-building, heating pumps (supposed to replace gas boilers, wood and peat), and to protect coastal areas from exploitation. They were also keen on promoting the rights of minorities. A Bill was passed to grant the right to free gender determination, from the age of 16, without medical advice, which was bitterly resented by feminists like Joanna Cherry MP. Criticisms also came from MSPs Kate Forbes and Fergus Ewing who defended rural areas, conservative morals, low taxes and oil extraction.14 Some plans had to be shelved, which was merely tolerated by Green leaders. Yet in March 2024, they were incensed by the ditching of intermediate targets towards net zero, and the suspension of puberty blockers, which led to the collapse of the agreement. They would not admit dissent in their ranks.15
- 16 This was regarded as a veto by the SNP and Labour, HC, Hansard, 17 June 2023.
- 17 SP, OR, 14 December 2023.
22Meanwhile, both parties blamed Westminster for some of their difficulties. They denounced austerity policies (more than half of the Scottish budget depended on a British block grant based on the Barnett formula), the COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit, and, later, the cost-of-living crisis. They also castigated their limited levers‒the main benefit, universal credit, and most taxes were handled at Westminster. They blamed Alistair Jack, the Scottish Secretary, for blocking Scottish bills which infringed on reserved matters. The Bill on gender determination was not subjected to Royal Assent.16 Other matters were brought before the Supreme Court, such as the incorporation into Scots Law of the UN Convention on Rights of the Child, which had to be reconsidered at Holyrood before being passed in 2023.17 The Scottish Government also contended that it had to abandon deposit return schemes as the British Government would not allow an exception in the UK internal market. Before 2016, such quarrels would have been settled in private talks.
23The SNP no longer seemed to be united around single aims and policies, its competence was questioned, while its probity was also at stake. As the 2024 General Election was called in this unfavourable context, change was expected. Meanwhile, Labour took advantage of these failures.
- 18 Ailsa Henderson et al., “Scottish Labour as a Case Study in Party Failure: Evidence from the 2016 U (...)
24Scottish Labour suffered from the 2014 and the 2016 referenda. It was no longer the party of constitutional change in Scotland (it had campaigned against independence) and it was not defined by its European credentials either (after campaigning against Brexit, it endorsed the UK outcome). The SNP could still rely on those who had voted for independence and against Brexit, while the Scottish Conservatives were favoured by unionist voters and by those who had voted for Brexit (the party campaigned for the EU, before backing decisions made by Conservative Prime Ministers).18 Scottish Labour only had one MP, Ian Murray, in 2015 and in 2019. At Holyrood, Labour became the third-largest party (behind the Conservatives), with a new leader from 2021, Anas Sarwar, a former MP.
25In the months preceding the 2024 General Election, Scottish Labour was buoyed by the gradual weakening of its main rivals (as constitutional issues no longer seemed to matter), and by the momentum for the British party. It then won a majority of seats.
26Scottish Labour took advantage of the decline of the SNP and the Scottish Conservatives, as well as their new rivals.
- 19 This account is based on articles published daily in The Herald, the Scotsman, the National and the (...)
- 20 Alexander Brown, “How are SNP Candidates Financing”, The Scotsman, 6 June 2024, p. 1.
27According to all opinion polls held from late 2023, the SNP was heading for defeat, fuelled by tactical voting. John Swinney tried to limit damages.19 Given the lack of major donations, he encouraged each member to attract a few others and to collect small donations, in order to make up for the £800,000 deficit.20 He led the campaign along with Stephen Flynn, the group leader in the House of Commons, while Sturgeon was in the background as she was blamed for the reversal in the SNP’s fortunes. By the end of the campaign, he acknowledged that many local contests were tight and he warned against contributing to unionist votes, hoping to capitalise on being the underdog.
- 21 Scottish Greens, Vote like our Future Depends on it, Edinburgh, 2024, p. 6. Former MSP Robin Harper (...)
- 22 The paper’s columnists were often more enthusiastic for minor parties than for the SNP, Lesley Ridd (...)
28As for other pro-independence parties, Alba fielded 19 candidates, including experimented campaigners (i.e. its two outgoing MPs, as well as former MPs Salmond, Corri Wilson and George Kerevan) and backed Angus MacNeil, a former SNP MP standing as an independent. It reckoned that it could win over new voters. Conversely, with a number of candidates (44) twice as high as in 2019, the Greens tried to appeal to disaffected SNP voters. They were proud of their achievements in power21 but remained resentful. They felt disadvantaged in the broadcasting media, compared to Reform UK. Yet, The National, a daily newspaper created in 2014, backed independence.22
- 23 It remained the first Manifesto pledge, Scottish National Party, A Future Made in Scotland (Edinbur (...)
- 24 Alba, Yes to Scottish Independence (Edinburgh, 2024), p. 9.
29Pro-independence parties diverged on some key issues. Swinney downplayed independence, even removing the word from ballot papers.23 Only Alba still focused on it, prepared to seek the support of the international community should Scotland’s claim be ignored.24The SNP had to respond both to Alba which likened oil to coal, abandoned under Margaret Thatcher, and to the Greens who were keen on phasing it out. As for public finance, the SNP feared the consequences of cuts at UK level (with an estimate of 18 billion pounds) as Starmer refused to raise the main taxes. The party promised a guarantee for the NHS. Only the Greens called for higher taxes on the wealthy to improve public services.
- 25 SP, OR, 25 April 2023.
30As for the Scottish Conservatives, unlike his predecessor Ruth Davidson who had taken part in the Holyrood consensus over EU membership and many socio-economic issues (like child poverty), party leader Douglas Ross (MSP and MP) voted against the Scottish Government on most issues. His MSPs denounced the SNP for being subservient to the “hard left” embodied by the Greens. They stuck to the UK line on reserved matters, including immigration policies targeting asylum seekers, standing out in Scottish politics.25 Their defence of new oil licences, likely to protect jobs, was popular in their North East constituencies though. They remained attractive for those with conservative views like Lisa Cameron SNP MP, who joined their ranks.
- 26 Lilly Brookes, “Douglas Ross to Quit”, The Guardian, 11 June 2024, p. 4.
31In 2024, the Conservatives were expected to retain their six seats, thanks to local issues. Yet Ross announced he was standing down, before changing his mind in early June. He decided to stand in Aberdeenshire North and East Moray (part of his former constituency) at the expense of the outgoing MP, David Duguid who was in hospital. The party was not immune from sleaze either, for Ross had claimed expenses when working as a football referee, while Alistair Jack had bet on the date of the election. Ross lost control of his campaign as the media focused on his behaviour and on the contest to succeed him amongst MSPs. 26
- 27 Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, Focused on Your Priorities (Edinburgh, 2024), p. 2.
32In rural areas, the LibDems were traditional rivals. At Holyrood, under Alex Cole-Hamilton from 2021, they pressed the Scottish Government in favour of public services, especially health, rural areas, and local authorities. They sided with the Conservatives or with Labour, and rejected all budgets after 2016. In 2024, they contended that Scotland would be a vital part of their party’s recovery at UK level. They put emphasis on rural areas (including transport), like the Conservatives.27
33Reform UK was a new threat. UKIP, Nigel Farage’s previous party, had only gained one MEP in Scotland in 2014, and had negligible shares of the votes. Nevertheless, Reform UK fielded candidates in every constituency, without showing any interest in Scotland: most of them were absent and there was no Scottish Manifesto. Farage only appeared on photos, while Richard Tice paid a short visit. Ross warned against voting for this party, which would benefit the SNP locally.
34Scottish Labour took advantage of this changing political arena. In the second half of 2023, as SNP’s divisions came to the fore, it recovered ground in opinion polls (table 2). This trend was confirmed in the by-election held in Rutherglen and Hamilton West on 5 October to replace an SNP MP (Margaret Ferrier) subjected to the recall procedure for failing to comply with restrictions during the lockdown. Labour’s vote soared by 24.1 percent and Michael Shanks was elected. In addition, in 2024, Scottish Labour was part of a momentum in favour of Labour in Great Britain as a whole.
Table 2: Voting intentions for elections to the House of Commons (2020-2024) (Panelbase)
Source : http://www.whatscotlandthinks.org, consulted 23 November 2024.
35Opinion polls pointed to a victory for the Labour Party. Although Scottish Labour benefited from the upward trend, Keir Starmer’s cautious pledges were not helpful.
- 28 SP, OR, 31 January 2023.
- 29 Sanctions were also lambasted by both parties, SP, OR, 1 March 2016.
36In spite of the division of political life following the 2014 referendum between pro-independence and pro-Union parties, Labour MSPs voted with the SNP against UK Conservatives’ policies, when it came to defending Scotland’s position in the EU single market, its autonomy within the UK against recentralisation, for example as for workers’ rights.28 They backed SNP’s welfare legislation, both the mitigation of the impact of UK reforms like the “bedroom tax” (full compensation) or the creation of the Scottish child payment granted to every child in families on low incomes. This contrasted with the two-child cap in the family supplement to the (UK) universal credit, which both parties wanted to repeal.29 Scottish Labour was in favour of progressive taxation. It supported the promotion of individual rights, based on international conventions, against attacks from Conservatives in England.
- 30 His MSPs, like Monica Lennon, clearly stated their opposition, SP, OR, 23 April 2024.
- 31 Scottish Liberal Democrats, For a Fair Deal, (Edinburgh, 2024), p. 93.
37However, in the run-up to the UK General Election, Sarwar had to comply with the UK party line. He thus shelved his own, distinctive policies, on the two-child cap30 and on taxes (he criticised the creation of a sixth income tax bracket in Scotland). He made no pledges related to the EU, beyond improving relationships in specific fields, while pro-independence parties still underlined the importance of joining the EU or the EFTA. The LibDems merely pledged a new partnership.31 Sarwar made no commitment regarding immigration either, as his leader advocated cuts, while the SNP called for devolution.
- 32 Scottish Labour Party, Change (Glasgow, 2024), p. 63. Unite was Labour’s biggest backer, Martin Wil (...)
38He could put forward Keir Starmer’s programme including the creation of GB Energy, a publicly-owned company based in Scotland, to support the transition to renewables. But oil remained divisive. Labour leaders had to face trade unions, especially Unite, for refusing to grant licences to exploit new oil and gas fields, and for failing to prevent the collapse of the Grangemouth refinery. 32
- 33 Commission on the UK’s Future, A New Britain. Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy (Lo (...)
39Starmer’s willingness to work with the Scottish Government was another asset. Yet Labour failed to endorse a new vision of unionism, as promoted by Gordon Brown,33 beyond a mere strengthening of LCMs, and additional funds through the Scottish Office (fuelling suspicion of bypassing the Scottish Government).
40Sarwar knew that he could win in Scotland, provided his party was clearly identified as a means to get rid of the “Tories”, with full support from the Daily Record, the Scottish daily newspaper with the highest circulation. During the campaign, as the gap between Labour and the SNP narrowed, he increasingly focused on some of its former strongholds in Glasgow. He was accompanied by senior Labour figures: Starmer as well as Rachel Reeves and Angela Rayner.
41Scottish Labour, ahead during the campaign, redrew the electoral map on polling day.
42Like in the rest of the UK, Labour’s victory was widely expected and turnout dropped by 8.4 percent to 59.2 percent. In addition, school holidays had already started in Scotland.
43Scottish Labour doubled its share since 2019 to 35.3 percent, or 852,000 votes. Their seats surged from 1 to 37 (table 3) out of 57 (the redistribution had led to the abolition of two seats), which accounted for 63 percent. Leaving aside the over-representation due to the first-past-the-post electoral system, they did gain ground across the country with 60 percent of its candidates securing more than 40 percent of the vote (only 1 in 2019, table 4). They recovered more than half of unionist votes cast in 2014 at the expense of the Conservatives (YouGov), as well as some of their voters who had defected to the SNP after 2014.
Table 3: 2024 General Election results in Scotland
|
Votes
|
Share (%)
|
|
Seats
|
|
|
2024
|
2024
|
Variation 2019-2024
|
2024 (57)
|
Variation 2019-2024 (-2)
|
|
Turnout
|
2,414,810
|
59.2
|
-8.4
|
|
|
|
Conservatives
|
307,344
|
12.7
|
-12.4
|
5
|
-1
|
|
Labour
|
851,897
|
35.3
|
+16.7
|
37
|
+36
|
|
Liberal Democrats
|
234,228
|
9.7
|
+0.2
|
6
|
+2
|
|
SNP
|
724,758
|
30
|
-15
|
9
|
-39
|
|
Greens
|
92,685
|
3.8
|
+2.8
|
0
|
0
|
|
Alba
|
11,784
|
0.5
|
+0.5
|
0
|
0
|
|
Reform UK
|
167,979
|
7
|
+7
|
0
|
0
|
Source: House of Commons, http://https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10009/, consulted 7 July 2024.
Table 4: Territorial distribution of voting shares
|
Percentages
|
0-9.99 (<5)
|
10-19.99
|
20-29.99
|
30-39.99
|
40-49.99
|
50-59.99
|
|
Conservatives
|
36 (16)
|
9
|
5
|
6
|
1
|
0
|
|
Labour
|
3 (0)
|
10
|
4
|
6
|
30
|
4
|
|
Liberal Democrats
|
48 (30)
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
|
SNP
|
0
|
3
|
21
|
31
|
2
|
0
|
|
Greens
|
40 (32)
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Alba
|
19 (19)
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Reform UK
|
56 (10)
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Note: number of candidates whose share of the vote is in a given bracket.
Source: author’s calculations.
- 34 There were only 43 SNP MPs as three had left the party since 2019 and one had to resign; 9 were sta (...)
44SNP votes plummeted from over 1.2 million (30 percent) to about 725,000 (15 percent). They only retained 9 MPs.34 Only 2 candidates exceeded 40 percent of the vote (compared to 50 in 2019). The SNP held on to rural areas in the North East in particular, but it yielded seats in major cities. Its MPs could no longer rely on personal votes, nor on pro-independence areas like Glasgow (although Dundee was an exception). The party lost one-third of those who had voted Yes in 2014 and those who had backed them in 2019. Some of these votes benefited other pro-independence parties. While Alba failed to keep any deposit (its two MPs were thus defeated), the Greens soared from 28,000 to 92,700, making inroads into SNP votes, especially amongst young people. They recovered 12 deposits and exceeded 10 percent in 4 urban SNP seats, won by Labour, with a majority that was lower than the Greens’ share.
45Although the Conservatives’ share of the vote was reduced by half (to 12.7), they only lost 1 MP thanks to their strongholds (North East and South of Scotland). Some of their voters turned to Reform UK which secured 7 percent (compared to 0.2 percent at the 2021 Holyrood election), losing only 10 deposits (fewer than the Conservatives). The hard right scored 6.9 percent in Ross’s seat, contributing to the SNP’s victory with an 8-point gap. Locally, the LibDems also took advantage of Tories’ weaknesses as they gained 2 additional MPs (from the SNP), mostly in their rural targets. Yet they forfeited over half of deposits (table 4).
46Coefficient correlations at constituency levels confirmed competition between Reform UK and the Conservatives, and between the SNP and Alba (table 5). As for socio-economic data, votes for Labour, the SNP, and to a lesser extent, for the Greens and Alba increased with unemployment and child poverty rates (table 6). Reform UK and the Greens had divergent correlations with proportions of individuals born in the UK.
Table 5: Some political correlation coefficients between general elections results in 2019 and 2024
|
2024
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019
|
|
|
|
|
Con
|
Lab
|
LD
|
SNP
|
Greens
|
Alba
|
Reform
|
Con
|
Lab
|
LD
|
SNP
|
|
Turnout
|
0.27
|
-0.42
|
0.47
|
-0.5
|
ns
|
-0.44
|
-0.4
|
0.35
|
-0.5
|
0.49
|
-0.51
|
|
Conservatives
|
|
-0.56
|
ns
|
ns
|
-0.4
|
ns
|
0.38
|
0.9
|
-0.64
|
Ns
|
ns
|
|
Labour
|
|
|
-0.68
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
-0.43
|
0.82
|
-0.61
|
0.25
|
|
Liberal Democrats
|
|
|
|
-0.43
|
ns
|
ns
|
-0.2
|
ns
|
-0.46
|
0.96
|
-0.45
|
|
SNP
|
|
|
|
|
ns
|
0.4
|
0.3
|
ns
|
ns
|
-0.5
|
0.79
|
|
Greens
|
|
|
|
|
|
-0.2
|
-0.6
|
-0.54
|
0.47
|
ns
|
ns
|
|
Alba
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.35
|
ns
|
ns
|
ns
|
0.23
|
|
Reform
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.31
|
-0.22
|
-0.23
|
0.23
|
Source: author’s calculations, based on 2024 parliamentary constituencies (with results for the 2019 poll estimated by political scientists Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher for associated broadcasting media).
Table 6: Some correlation coefficients between 2024 results and socio-economic data
|
Unemployment
|
Child poverty
|
Born in the UK
|
|
Turnout
|
-0.8
|
-0.8
|
ns
|
|
Conservatives
|
-0.29
|
-0.26
|
ns
|
|
Labour
|
0.45
|
0.37
|
ns
|
|
Liberal Democrats
|
-0.47
|
-0.41
|
ns
|
|
SNP
|
0.45
|
0.29
|
ns
|
|
Greens
|
0.29
|
0.3
|
-0.68
|
|
Alba
|
0.34
|
0.27
|
ns
|
|
Reform
|
ns
|
ns
|
0.33
|
Note: unemployment (claimant count, August 2024); relative child poverty (income below 60 percent of the median income, after housing costs, 2022-2023); born in the UK (2021 census).
Source: author’s calculations.
47However, this election victory, magnified by the electoral system, could result from protest against 17 years of SNP-led governments, without necessarily upsetting the whole political arena in Scotland.
48Scottish Labour’s landslide has turned it into Scotland’s voice in the House of Commons. Yet this result did not necessarily pave the way for a corresponding realignment at the next Holyrood election.
- 35 David Leask, “Privately-educated MPs the Real Winners in Labour Landslide”, The Herald, 14 July 202 (...)
- 36 35 percent were women and only one had a minority ethnic background.
49Scotland had new voices at Westminster, which was a major shift. There were 37 Labour MPs out of 57 Scottish MPs, and they accounted for 13.5 percent of their parliamentary group. Labour recovered its strongholds, with middle-class MPs–some were keen on underlining their working-class backgrounds during their maiden speeches but only one had a working-class job. Almost all had attended University (mostly in Scotland)–and two-thirds were political professionals.35 A rising proportion (one in five) had private education.36 Those were new trends for Scottish politicians.
- 37 Douglas Alexander was the minister for Trade. Catherine Smith, former leader John Smith’s daughter, (...)
50Only a few MPs were experimented, like Douglas Alexander (former MP and minister), Patricia Ferguson (former MSP) or Blair MacDougall (director of the Better Together campaign in 2014). Two joined the Government with strategic portfolios for Scotland, Ian Murray as Scottish Secretary and Michael Shanks as minister for Energy.37
51The SNP was no longer the third-largest party and was deprived of privileges, such as places on parliamentary committees. There was only one left, on the Scottish Affairs committee. Flynn was thus an ordinary member of the committee he used to chair. The SNP, which already experienced financial difficulties when Peter Murrell resigned, also lost public funding (its “Short money” amounted to 1.3 billion pounds in 2023-2024). MPs who had led fierce campaigns against Conservative policies were not returned, like Alison Thewliss (child poverty) or Hannah Bardell (asylum seekers).
- 38 Andrew Learmonth, “Blackford Denies Peerage Meeting”, The Herald, 29 April 2024, p. 4.
52The SNP did not attempt to recover some influence at Westminster through the House of Lords. Party policy prevented its leaders from putting candidates forward. In early 2024, outgoing MP Ian Blackford’s reported interest in the upper House generated an outcry, and he had to deny this claim.38
53The remaining MPs were still determined to point to Labour’s failures on social issues, from the very first day. On 23 July 2024, they laid down an early-day motion on the two-child cap, in order to force a vote proving that all Scottish Labour MPs complied with their party’s whip. Then on 29 July, they took immediate advantage of Starmer’s intention to turn a universal benefit (winter fuel payment) into a means-tested tone. SNP MPs claimed that Labour was pushing children and pensioners into poverty, contrasting these moves with decisions made by the Scottish Government.
54Then after the summer break, they seized every opportunity to denounce Scottish Labour MPs’ alignment with the Prime Minister, which put Scottish interests at risk, especially as a consequence of Brexit. Scottish Labour MPs backed new restrictions on immigration, while their SNP rivals advocated a Scottish visa which would encourage applications for Scotland in order to reverse the population decline. The former would not support the latter either when they contended that damages to exports to the EU could not be compensated for by the free trade agreements signed by the Labour Government.
55Scottish Conservative MPs, who were returned, were also experimented. They repeatedly criticized both Labour and the SNP for acting against Scottish interests, especially as far as fossil fuels were concerned. They maintained their positions as defenders of existing resources and jobs in Scotland.
56But Scottish MPs’s speeches, which dealt with reserved matters, constantly referred to policies led in Scotland by the Scottish Government. They were already trying to frame the debate for the following election to the Scottish Parliament.
57Scottish leaders used the General Election results to draw conclusions for the future election to the Scottish Parliament in 2026. There were growing opportunities for a realignment.
- 39 Stuart McDonald, “SNP Faces Defeat in 2026 Holyrood Election unless We Change Quickly”, The Scotsma (...)
- 40 He remained an outstanding figure, Fraser Nelson, “Alex Salmond Dies”, Sunday Telegraph, 13 October (...)
58John Swinney and Kate Forbes admitted the scale of their defeat (the former privately expected to retain 20 MPs) and set out to rebuild trust. Outgoing MPs, who were standing down (Joanna Cherry, Mhairi Black) or who were beaten (Stewart McDonald), reckoned that the SNP relied on illusions, comparing Scotland with England, without paying attention to growing local discontent.39 The SNP no longer attracted protest votes, it was part of the establishment, and was accountable for its failures. Harsh criticisms were directed at leaders, both Sturgeon for governing with a few individuals (although popular support had peaked under her leadership) and Yousaf for his lack of programme. Further accusations were voiced when Salmond passed away against SNP leaders who had supposedly betrayed him.40
59The SNP faced ambitious rivals, the other pro-independence parties. The Greens felt buoyed by election results, and intended to focus on their core policies, which were no longer priorities under Swinney. However, their co-leader, Patrick Harvie, announced that he was standing down, which opened up an internal campaign in a party still divided between conflicting priorities. Alex Salmond also hoped to gain ground at the expense of the SNP, but his sudden death in October raised questions about Alba’s future. The campaign for his succession split the party, between Ash Regan and Kenny McAskill who won the contest. Alba called for a Convention of pro-independence parties and movement, but the SNP and the Greens were not enthusiastic.
- 41 Over the summer, 8 MSPs backed Tom Tugenhadt in the UK leadership contest as he seemed more centris (...)
60Reform UK aimed at ten seats, and held its first Scottish conference in late November. They had almost as many members as the Scottish Conservatives and were very close in terms of voting intentions. A majority of their votes were likely to come from the Conservatives, and they aimed at reigniting a political right in Scotland. In response, the Scottish Conservatives elected Russell Findlay as their new leader. Even though many of his colleagues wanted to distance themselves from the UK Conservative Party, especially led by Kemi Badenoch,41 Findlay pursued a strategy, supposedly based on “common sense”, and clearly stood apart from the “left-wing” consensus at Holyrood.
61Anas Sarwar anticipated a victory in 2026, even though he was not considered as more capable than Swinney (Norstat polls), while the support of former Yes Voters remained conditional. After Starmer’s first one hundred days in power, widely regarded as disappointing, opinion polls pointed to a fall in voting intentions for Scottish Labour, closing the gap with the SNP (Survation polls). Starmer underlined the improvement in intergovernmental relationships, as well as UK reforms which met SNP demands, like the New Deal for workers, but he rejected calls for further devolution. As for welfare policies, he claimed his overall confidence in Starmer’s choices, but he pledged an extension of eligibility to winter fuel payment in Scotland. The UK government turned out to be a liability for him.
- 42 The SNP had 62 MSPs (out of 129), as Regan had joined Alba, while John Mason was suspended and sat (...)
- 43 SP, OR, 4 September 2024.
- 44 SP, OR, 2 October 2024.
- 45 Under the Barnett formula, the Scottish Government receives a fixed share of every increase in Engl (...)
- 46 HC, OR, 30 October 2024.
62In late 2024, the vote of the budget was a defining moment. In his Parliament of minorities,42 John Swinney had to secure majority backing for this bill, while all parties still played politics. His Programme for Government was based on child poverty, economic growth, net zero and public services.43 Labour initially focused on shortcomings in devolved public services, like housing,44 underlining the misuse of substantial “Barnett consequentials”.45 The SNP downplayed these amounts,46 while pointing to constraints on public employers due to UK rise in National Insurance.
- 47 Yet the goal remains on the agenda. Stephen Noon, former chief strategist of the Yes campaign, and (...)
63The Budget Bill published on 4 December took into account economic and political constraints. Tax rises were ruled out, for income tax, though not for the local council tax. As the Greens submitted costly demands (more free provisions, taxes on wealth, greener policies), Swinney promised a few pilot schemes. He tried to secure unionist support, by dropping funding for an independence strategy.47 After making concessions to entice the LibDems (public services, local authorities), he pledged a universal fuel payment (as it was being devolved) and a mitigation of the two-child cap (which remained reserved) in 2026. As a result, Sarwar announced that his group would abstain, rather than vote down the budget, for the first time since 2014, thus reducing opportunities for reconfigurations.
- 48 SP, OR, 30 October 2024.
64The Scottish Conservatives were increasingly isolated. Not only did they vote against the budget, but they questioned free provision of some services, and they opposed individuals, especially asylum seekers (who would benefit from free bus travel), and pensioners (whose fuel payments were at risk).48 The Conservatives were thus apart from flagship policies, pursued by successive Scottish governments since 1999, i.e. the “social contract”, inclusiveness, and EU (re-)integration.
65Scottish politics, which used to be very stable with one dominant party, Labour and then the SNP, became unstable in the months leading to the 2024 election, as a result of unprecedented turmoil within the SNP. Scottish Labour did win a landslide victory, exceeding expectations, fuelled by the British momentum and by SNP setbacks. Debates were based on devolved policies, especially public services (supposedly irrelevant in a British election), but also on reserved matters which had a specific Scottish dimension (social benefits, oil, immigration, the EU to some extent). This did not mean that Scottish Labour’s arguments had widespread backing, nor that it would recover its former position, especially since it was only five percentage points ahead of the SNP on polling day.
66The SNP was a minor voice at Westminster with very few MPs. However, these MPs were experimented and intended to challenge Labour’s left-wing credentials as well as the attention paid to Scottish concerns. They contended that Keir Starmer was not willing to promote policies introduced or advocated by leading Labour figures, like Keir Hardie or Clement Attlee, contrasting the Prime Minister’s caution with policies conducted in Scotland.
- 49 The word was coined by Johann Lamont when she resigned as Scottish party leader in late 2014.
67The campaign for the 2026 Holyrood election was thus on the way. Even though the outcome in Scotland was in line with that in Great Britain in 2024, Scottish Labour could not count on a realignment of voters. Battles would be fierce, first against them. Not only was Scottish Labour castigated as a mere branch office of the UK party,49 but UK leaders would have to prove that they could reset the relationships with the Scottish Government. Battles would also take place within the SNP (some former MPs being willing to stand, at the expense of sitting MSPs), and within the independence movement (the Greens were stronger after being in government).
- 50 Leon Hurwitz, “Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability”, Comparative Politics, 5:3, 1973, p. (...)
68Some features of Scotland’s political system, such as the stability in party competition,50 were shaken, as voters were more volatile. But it was not shattered yet. One could even argue that the SNP dominance was an exception in Scottish politics since the electoral map was close to that of general elections prior to 2014.
69However, discontent with Westminster politics, the main reason for voting for independence in 2014, could challenge the system. By late 2024, Labour, the new incumbents, did not seem to stand up for Scottish interests, which could benefit the SNP once again appearing as the outsiders. The growing popularity of Reform UK could also dent the unionist vote, fuel demand for independence or even give rise to new alliances beyond the constitutional divide.