Skip to navigation – Site map

HomeIssues XXX-3The House of Lords Reform: Labour...

The House of Lords Reform: Labour’s Constitutional Holy Grail?

La réforme de la Chambre des Lords : le Graal constitutionnel du Parti travailliste ?
Aurélien Antoine

Abstracts

At first glance, the Labour Party, given its founding doctrine, could only be resolutely opposed to the House of Lords. However, the experience of government and the specific features of the British Constitution and political culture have led it to adopt more tempered ambitions. This gave rise to a tension between initial intentions and realpolitik, which divided the party. Reforming the aristocratic component of the United Kingdom’s mixed Constitution has been a constant feature of Labour’s manifestos, but it has only resulted in reforms that align with the strategies of the Liberals and Conservatives in gradually evolving the powers and composition of the House of Lords. The 2025 reform definitively ending hereditary peerage serves as yet another illustration of this trend.

Top of page

Full text

Introduction

  • 1 A different conclusion could be drawn with regard to other academic disciplines such as British civ (...)
  • 2 Meg Russell and Mark Sandford, “Why are second chambers so Difficult to Reform?”, Journal of Legisl (...)

1The House of Lords is rarely subject to detailed analysis by legal academics outside of the United Kingdom and the countries which retain the Westminster model. In France, this lack of interest by lawyers1 can be explained by two reasons: on the one hand, the House of Lords is an unelected chamber based on the aristocratic principle which is very exotic from a French republican point of view; on the other hand, there is a misconception about the role of second chambers, which are often considered as powerless institutions in the legislative process or in controlling the executive. Nevertheless, although perfect bicameralism has disappeared in the UK since the mid-20th century, the House of Lords remains an important institution that exerts a profound influence in the lawmaking process and ensures that the government is held accountable. Moreover, the reform of the second chamber in Westminster is one of the most famous illustrations of a phenomenon which is generally seen in other democracies: the difficulty of reforming the upper house.2

  • 3 “The Parliament Acts, the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the second chamber”, Statute Law Revie (...)

2That is why the constitutional literature in the UK reflects a deep interest in this institution, not only to sustain its suppression. Meg Russell, Alexandra Kelso, Peter Dorey, Chris Ballinger (British political scientist) and Dawn Oliver3 (professor of Law) draw attention to the valuable work of the House of Lords. But their conclusions – which the author of this article shares – does not rule out the need for reform.

3Historically, the role of the House of Lords has been a constant subject of debate, even before the contemporary era. The episode of the Interregnum (1649-1660) is particularly instructive, as it shows that questions of representativity and the need for a bicameral system were already being raised (and born in England before serving as a source of inspiration for other countries), even in the absence of a democratic framework. Similarly, it highlights the ambiguous attitude of the executive power towards the institution. The largely aristocratic composition of the House posed a fundamental problem for Cromwell’s regime. In addition, the presence of high-ranking ecclesiastical authorities was seen as incompatible even before the establishment of the Commonwealth. In 1641, the Grand Remonstrance presented to Charles I by the English Parliament explicitly aimed to remove bishops, as they were perceived as corrupt and complicit in the king’s excesses, which would eventually lead to the Civil War. A few months later, the Nineteen Propositions sought, among other things, to limit the executive power to create new peers by subjecting such appointments to parliamentary approval.

  • 4 Cromwell’s Houe of Lords. Politics, Parliament and Constitutional Revolution (1642-1660) (Woodbridg (...)

4These episodes laid the foundation for the supremacy of Parliament and triggered conflicts between the Lords and Commons, with the latter already considering itself more representative of the English political community. On the eve of the Civil War, the Levellers, who played a key role in the revolt against established institutions, advocated for the abolition of the House of Lords. This marked the first significant movement in English history to challenge its very existence. When the monarchy was abolished, the fate of the Lords became a matter of hesitation. However, the institution was ultimately abolished in March 1649.4

  • 5 An Act for the Abolishing the House of Peers, 1649.
  • 6 William G. Bittle, James Nayler, 1618-1660: The Quaker Indicted by Parliament (York, William G. Ses (...)

5The law stemmed more from the circumstances surrounding the execution of Charles I than from any deep-rooted ideological motivations. Jonathan Fitzgibbons, in his work dedicated to this period,5 underlines that several parliamentarians “felt that the judicial role of the upper chamber remained important and that it would be useful to have a body to advise the Commons, if not veto them, in their decisions.” An argument that would regularly be invoked in favour of maintaining a second chamber was already emerging: it was intended to temper the excessive outcomes of the Commons deliberations. In 1657, this rationale underpinned the second written constitution of the Protectorate, the Humble Petition and Advice, which restored a second chamber to counterbalance the Commons, which Cromwell saw as insufficiently compliant and prone to excess in the exercise of its judicial functions – as demonstrated by the Naylor (or Nayler) Case dealing with religious tolerance.6

6Constitutional history, which is so crucial to understanding the diverse and future conceptions of parties on institutional issues, shows that the unicameral experience was far from conclusive and failed to establish a consensual outline for the second chamber. To some extent, this conclusion would endure for centuries to come. The issue gradually became more pressing during the first half of the 19th century, particularly with the extension of voting rights introduced by the Reform Act 1832, a legislation to which the Lords offered strong resistance. Around the same time, Walter Bagehot wrote that:

  • 7 The English Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2001 edition).

“Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a revising and suspending House. It can alter Bills; it can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is not yet thoroughly in earnest – upon which the nation is not yet determined. Their veto is a sort of hypothetical veto. They say, We reject your Bill for this once or these twice, or even these thrice: but if you keep on sending it up, at least we won’t reject it. The House has ceased to be one of latent directors, and has become one of temporary and palpable alterers.”7

7In 1868-1869, during the debates over the Established Church (Ireland) Act 1869, an open conflict arose between the Commons and the Lords. It was at this time that the so-called “mandate doctrine” (or “referendal theory”) began to take shape. This theory was championed by Lord Salisbury, who argued against the straightforward primacy of the Commons over the Lords based solely on stronger electoral legitimacy. Corinne Comstock Weston outlines the key aspects of this doctrine as follows:

  • 8 The House of Lords and Ideological Politics: Lord Salisbury’s Referendal Theory and the Conservativ (...)

“The House of Lords had a duty to refer disputed legislation to the electorate when the House of Commons, in the lords’ judgment, lacked a mandate for the measure in question. That is, the lords’ political barometer was not the commons, as Gladstone contended, but the nation at large. If this proposition prevailed, the lords could freely exercise an independent legislative veto in an age of expanding democracy. Not until the Liberals passed the Parliament Act (1911) were they able to counter the theory effectively.”8

  • 9 In Arthur Leach, “The House of Lords”, The Fortnightly Review vol. XXXII, 1882.

8Salisbury justified his theory by raising this question: “is it the duty of the House of Lords to act as the pale shadow of the House of Commons, and to repeat in a feeble echo all that that House may decide to pass?”9 Beyond his conservatism, which led him to reject the Commons’ monopoly on democratic representation, Lord Salisbury highlighted a key issue in the debate on reforming the upper chamber that would persist for decades: its usefulness would be greatly diminished if it were entirely subordinate to the Commons. His doctrine thus became established as a constitutional convention, supporting the continued strong institutional role of the Lords. As Corinne Comstock Weston further points out, “Lord Salisbury’s definition of the referendal theory in late Victorian England, and the techniques which he adapted to defend it, brought that House a generation of legislative independence.

  • 10 Albert Venn Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (London, J. Murray, 1886).
  • 11 Peter Joyce, Politico’s Guide to UK General Elections. 1832-2001 (London, Politico’s Publ., 2004).

9The Parliament Act of 1911, which remains one of the most famous battles between the two houses in the difficult context of the question of Irish Home rule10, marked the end of the Salisbury convention and paved the way for an unequal bicameralism. The stubborn opposition of the Lords to Lloyd George’s “People’s Budget” was the main factor making it necessary to pass this legislation. The 1910 general election, triggered by the crisis, largely focused on the budget issue. The mantra “Peers versus the People” was championed by the Liberals. The government’s narrow electoral victory had two notable consequences. Since the Liberals remained in power by a short margin (winning the largest number of seats despite receiving only a minority of the votes11) the People’s Budget was finally passed.

10Logically, the second consequence was the adoption of the Parliament Act of 1911, which effectively ended the Lords’ veto power as previously understood under the Salisbury Convention. Under this Act, the upper house could no longer block financial bills certified as such by the Speaker; it could only delay their passage. The final abolition of the Lords’ financial veto (which had already been weakened since the 17th century) meant that they could only postpone the adoption of a financial bill by one month, provided the bill had been sent to the Lords at least a month before the end of the parliamentary session. A second key provision of the Act applied to non-financial bills. The Lords’ veto became temporary: any bill passed by the House of Commons in three successive parliamentary sessions without being altered (and if at least two years had elapsed between the first debate and the third approval) became an Act without the consent of the Lords.

  • 12 Op. cit.
  • 13 The Parliament Act de 1949 does not apply to private bills with limited scope, proposals originatin (...)

11This fundamental shift in the institutional order did not completely diminish the influence of Salisbury’s doctrine. His theory “enjoyed an Indian summer of popularity in Conservative ranks in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Lords were confronted with Attlee’s nationalisation programme.”12 It was indeed during this period that the events of the late 19th and early 20th centuries seemed to repeat themselves. A new constitutional convention took shape when Parliament adopted the second Parliament Act in 1949, further restricting the Lords’ veto power, particularly in the context of disputes over nationalisation policies. After two successive rejections by the Lords, the government invoked the Parliament Act 1911 to curb their obstructive power. The peers’ veto on bills was reduced from three sessions over two years to two sessions over one year.13 The text legally reinforced another convention that, by a twist of history, explicitly echoes the one that emerged after 1868. The Salisbury-Addison Convention was entrenched between 1945 and 1951 during Attlee’s Labour government. It established that the Lords, even if they did not predominantly support the Cabinet, could not oppose the second or third reading of a bill that was part of the governing party’s manifesto. Lord Salisbury, Viscount Cranborne, provided a very practical explanation of the amended version of the mandate theory:

  • 14 HL Hansard, 16th August 1945, vol. 137, col. 47.

“Whatever our personal views, we should frankly recognize that these proposals were put before the country at the recent General Election and that the people of this country, with full knowledge of these proposals, returned the Labour Party to power. The Government may, therefore, I think, fairly claim that they have a mandate to introduce these proposals. I believe that it would be constitutionally wrong, when the country has so recently expressed its view, for this House to oppose proposals which have been definitely put before the electorate.”14

12Later, he summarised his thoughts in general terms as follows:

  • 15 HL Hansard, 31st October 1945, vol. 137, cols. 613.

“If the country is behind them, their mandate will be renewed. If the country votes against them, it is clear that their policy is not approved. That is the proper constitutional course ... First, there is the Government: over them comes the authority of Parliament: and over Parliament the authority of the British people. That is the structure of the British Constitution. If the Government are hampered in their work, they can always go back to the sovereign people of this country from which Parliament gets its authority. But what is entirely contrary to the spirit of the Constitution is to attempt to stifle the free decisions of Parliament.”15

13Since then, relations between the two chambers regarding the exercise of legislative power have been governed by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 and the Salisbury/Addison Convention, whose logic ensures that reliance on the two acts establishing unequal bicameralism remains limited. Between 1911 and 1949, political arrangements led to only three applications of the Parliament Act. Since 1949, only four pieces of legislation have been passed without the consent of the Lords: the War Crimes Act 1991, the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, and the Hunting Act 2004.

  • 16 For a complete overview, see M. Purvis, House of Lords Reform: Chronology 1900-2010 (London, House (...)
  • 17 The last significant reform of the composition of the House dates back to 1847 (Bishopric of Manche (...)
  • 18 Hastings B. Lees-Smith, “The Bryce Conference on the Reform of the House of Lords”, Economica n° 6 (...)
  • 19 On all these aspects, see Aurélien Antoine, “La Chambre des Lords” in Philippe Lauvaux, Jean Massot (...)

14The modus vivendi with the House of Commons is efficient in light of its longevity and the rarity of conflicts. However, the House of Lords remains subject to criticism, as evidenced by the growing number of bills and commissions aimed at further reforming it.16 After 1949, criticism no longer primarily played up on the composition.17 Following the failure of the Bryce Commission’s proposals in 191818, the Liberal Party’s belief that reducing the powers of the upper house would be sufficient to address concerns about the Lords’ legitimacy proved short-lived. From the post-1949 period onward, legislative reforms have focused on reshaping the composition of the upper chamber to give it the appearance of an institution more in line with democratic principles.19

  • 20 The Peerage Act 1963 allows hereditary peeresses to be members of the House and allows newly inheri (...)

15Due to the political context, it was the Conservatives who, somewhat paradoxically, carried out the first major reform of the House of Lords membership. The Life Peerages Act 1958 introduced the appointment of life peers by the monarch on advice of the Prime Minister, a practice already in place for Law Lords (Lords of Appeal in Ordinary) under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. The 1958 Act also finally opened the doors of the upper chamber to women, allowing them to sit in the House of Lords for the first time.20 It also introduced diversity including social diversity and put an end to the structural domination of the House by the Conservatives.

  • 21 Chris Ballinger, The House of Lords 1911-2011: A Century of Non-Reform (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 20 (...)

16Following the 1963 Act, the reform movement made no further progress until 1999, largely due to the inability to implement new changes or simply because the issue had lost its momentum in political debates. Nevertheless, it never disappeared entirely, as House of Lords reform has always been considered as an “unfinished business.21 It remained a key point in the Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos, especially from the late 1980s onwards, following the creation of the Liberal Democrats in 1988. The Labour Party’s and the centre-left’s stance on the House of Lords is quite complex. Labour’s doctrinal foundations are inherently incompatible with the existence of an aristocratic chamber. However, as the Labour evolved into a mass party which could lead the country, it had to take into account constitutional traditions and political realities, which revealed a deep reluctance within the political community to embrace radical institutional change. Faced with this reality (and at the risk of contradicting its ideological roots), Labour reluctantly accepted the continued existence of the House of Lords.

17The party’s stance constantly fluctuates between abolishing, reducing its powers, or altering its composition. Much like the Holy Grail sought by the knights of the Round Table, reforming the second chamber is, for Labour, an elusive objective that institutionally mirrors its ambiguities and paradoxes.

  • 22 Peter Dorey, Alexandra Kelso, House of Lords Reform Since 1911 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 20 (...)

18Several fundamental questions about the modalities of reforming the House of Lords arise not only for Labour leaders but also for other parties. At the heart of the matter lies the legitimacy of the Lords, a concept the definition of which remains problematic. Following other scholars,22 we will consider four dimensions of legitimacy to assess that of the second chamber, which challenge both its powers and its composition.

  • 23 Meg Russell, op. cit.

19The first dimension is legal: what is legitimate is that which respects established rules, whether substantial or procedural. The other three dimensions are political-science based. They focus more specifically on an approach to legitimacy within a democratic framework, broken down into “input legitimacy” (by reference to the source of legitimacy), “output legitimacy” (by reference to substantive legitimacy, i.e., the contribution to the common good or the “policy satisfaction” the institution generates), and “throughput legitimacy” (by reference to the procedure followed to reach a decision).23 While the first component seems unsatisfactory at first glance for the House of Lords, which is not democratically composed, the other two call for a more nuanced analysis. The Lords can be perceived as legitimate by public opinion due to their contribution to the common good, stemming from their potential ability to limit the abuses of power of governments supported by a majority in the House of Commons, as well as the rigor of the expertise they are likely to develop by not being subject to electoral contingencies.

  • 24 See 7 December 1976, Handyside v. Royaume-Uni, application n° 5493/72.
  • 25 Elected dictatorship (London, The Richard Dimbleby Lecture, BBC, 1976).
  • 26 See Aurélien Antoine, “La protection parlementaire de la Constitution au Royaume-Uni” in F. Savonit (...)

20The legal concept of a democratic society developed by the European Court of Human Rights24 supports this more elaborate and in-depth approach to legitimacy. It allows for some distancing from a basic understanding of democracy, which views it merely as an electoral process for the transfer of power based on citizen equality, granting unquestionable legitimacy to the majority emerging from elections. A democratic society goes beyond this by addressing one of the paradoxes of the simplistic conception of democracy: the primacy of the majority, which can quickly turn into an “elective dictatorship”, to use the words of Lord Hailsham.25 The legitimacy of public institutions is revealed not only through the process of accessing power but also through other legal criteria, such as the ability to challenge majority decisions, which may lose their legitimacy if they demonstrate an abuse of power. For lawyers, democracy is defined by attachment to the principle of the rule of law and the existence of institutions that protect the fundamental rules and principles of the Constitution. This is, first and foremost, the role of jurisdictions which are tasked with sanctioning errors of law and abuses of power. It is also the role of institutions that mitigate the excesses a majority might commit, whether concerning the balance of powers, deference to rules, or the protection of minorities.26

  • 27 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Propriety and Peerages, Second Report of (...)
  • 28 See Aurélien Antoine, Le Brexit. Une histoire anglaise (Paris, Dalloz, coll. Les sens du droit, 202 (...)

21Due to its acceptance of institutions and its role as a party of government, Labour was compelled to move away from a caricatured view of the House of Lords, incorporating the aforementioned four dimensions of legitimacy into its manifestos. This explains why Labour ultimately became the party that revitalised the second chamber through the 1999 reform (the House of Lords Act 1999), which removed the majority of hereditary peers and introduced new methods for appointing life peers, extinguishing the partisan nature of the assembly, symbolized by the growing group of crossbenchers. Over the years, the chamber’s work has become increasingly objective and hailed for its seriousness, while the defeats inflicted on various governments have increased. Output legitimacy has significantly improved, and throughput legitimacy has been enhanced, particularly following the Cash-for-Honours scandal.27 The chamber’s expertise in constitutional matters and human rights is now hardly disputable, as demonstrated during the Brexit crisis and the debates surrounding the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024.28 Ultimately, Labour ensured the survival of the House of Lords, even though the progress achieved remains insufficient in certain respects. The institution still has an excessive number of members due to its reliance on ministerial appointments, which are often disproportionate  –  particularly on the part of some Conservatives seeking to surreptitiously reestablish a majority in their favor. The appointment process, which remains largely dependent on the Prime Ministers’ discretionary power, continues to undermine the reputation of the House. Despite increasingly stringent ethical rules, the chamber continues to face scandals, which are all the less accepted by public opinion given the contested nature of its composition.

22The House of Lords Reform Act 2014 and the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015, enacted under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, provided an initial response to criticisms of the time by strengthening oversight of peers. Since then, members can be expelled from the chamber for violating standards. The possibility of resignation was also introduced. However, the outcome achieved in 2014-2015 fell far short of the Liberal Democrats’ initial ambitions, as outlined in the 2012 bill proposing comprehensive reform: the number of peers would have been reduced to 450, with 80% elected and 20% appointed. The return of an exclusively Conservative Cabinet in 2015, which became entangled in multiple crises (Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine), put an end to any credible reform initiative.

  • 29 Labour Party, A New Britain: Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy Report of the Commis (...)

23Labour’s electoral victory in 2024, after 14 years of Conservative-dominated governments that had been rather destabilising for the institutions, inevitably reignited a constitutional reform agenda that extended beyond the sole issue of the House of Lords. The report of the party’s commission on the future of the United Kingdom, chaired by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown,29 was arguably one of the most ambitious since the reflections of the late 1990s, which led to the 1999 and 2005 reforms (Constitutional Reform Act, which abolished the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and established the United Kingdom Supreme Court as of 1 October 2009). The initial proposal conceived a significant transformation of the House of Lords toward an elected chamber, but within the renewed context of territorial politics profoundly altered by devolution.

24The fate of the 2022 report on bicameralism once again demonstrates that the party remains trapped by its original contradictions (just like the conservatives, who struggle to overcome their preference for the status quo). The House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) 2024 Act merely puts an end to the reform initiated in 1999, which was initially intended to completely abolish hereditary peerage. This minimalist legislation has understandably sparked disappointment, even though it may only represent a step toward deeper transformation. The House of Lords deserves a profound and reasonable reform, which can take into account a strong constitutional culture inherited from the past, the constitutional conventions and the “genius” of the British Constitution. This supposes not to directly “transplant” foreign parliamentary solutions and not to forget the pitfalls of the democratic process (demagogy, short-termism, lack of common sense, for instance) which need institutions to moderate them. From this point of view, judges (to ensure the strengthening of the rule of law) and second chambers (as a “watchdog” against the demagogic excesses of the lower house and the government) stand on the frontline. Given that bicameralism is not contested and that the powers of the Lords have appeared for several decades to be reasonably diminished, the composition of the second chamber remains the Gordian knot of any reform aimed at increasing its legitimacy. The problem with the Labour Party is that it has difficulties finding a third and moderate way between radical changes and immobilism, as history has shown. The 2022-2024 sequence is enlightening in this respect and was, once again, dominated by a cautious pragmatism.

The Labour Party’s historical ambivalence regarding House of Lords reform

25The issue of Lords reform is one of the most divisive topics for the Labour Party in the constitutional arena. Since the party’s inception, the difficulty of forging a coherent doctrine on this matter has been evident, even though the party’s ideological foundation suggested it would have fewer qualms than the Conservatives and Liberals in revolutionising the second chamber. The ongoing debate about its powers and composition remains striking, whether during the 1900-1949 period, marked by a lack of clear doctrine, or the subsequent era characterised by the misfortunes that befell reform initiatives.

An elusive doctrine of House of Lords reform

  • 30 Quoted by Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso (op. cit.) which included manifestos compiled by Frederic (...)

26The first approach, seemingly the most logical, was abolition. Beatrice and Sidney Webb who were involved in the founding of the Labour Party, advocated its complete and outright abolition. During the January 1910 general election campaign, Labour’s position was clear: “THE LORDS MUST GO.30 The simplicity of this proposition was easy to understand: the election of a Labour majority in the Commons, backed by the working class, would have carried an undeniable mandate to abolish an institution that almost exclusively represented the aristocracy, disregarding the principle of equality that was gradually becoming central to Britain’s nascent democracy.

27However, as Labour’s path to power began to be a reality, the simple conviction of abolition was disrupted by three factors. The first was circumstantial. The early governments led by Labour’s Ramsay MacDonald (in 1924 and 1929-1935) did not hold an absolute majority in the Commons and were overshadowed by the Tories, particularly during the National Government from 1931 to 1935. Politically, the Cabinet had little incentive to antagonise the upper house further, especially at the risk of heightening opposition (including potential Tory proposals advocating for the restoration of equal bicameralism) and facing systematic obstruction under the framework of the 1911 Parliament Act. Moreover, MacDonald, along with others in the Labour Party, was a moderate. He did not align with the socialist faction of the party and prioritised ensuring the stability of the economy. Finally, his political strategy required safeguarding the support of the dwindling Liberal electorate, who might have otherwise been tempted to shift their votes to Labour candidates.

  • 31 Philip Williamson, “The Labour Party and the House of Lords, 1918-1931”, Parliamentary History vol. (...)
  • 32 Op. cit.

28Secondly, from a more structural perspective that echoed the debates of the Interregnum in the 17th century, the support for unicameralism that would have resulted from the abolition of the Lords was not unanimously shared within the Labour Party. By 1918, it became evident that the Labour grassroots supported unicameralism, a stance less clearly shared by the party leadership.31 In the early 1920s, various suggestions emerged, ranging from a chamber composed of individuals who had rendered services to the nation to the introduction of an elective process.32 As in the 19th-century debates, emphasis was placed on the need to make the House of Lords a revising chamber of the legislative business of the Commons, without granting it any veto (including a suspensory one). The Labour Party sought to go beyond the provisions of the 1911 Parliament Act and was not inclined toward the approach ultimately taken in 1949.

  • 33 Op. cit.

29Finally, Philip Williamson aptly notes that “despite the Labour leadership’s radical democratic notions, it was just as strongly parliamentarian and constitutionalist”.33 The political and constitutional culture of parties (including a certain attachment to the doctrine of the mandate) is a key element to understanding the absence of radical reform of the second chamber, despite announced plans for institutional revolution. This factor similarly explains the incomplete nature of the 1999 reform and the cautious approach of the 2024-2025 reform. On the Lords’ side, their concern for preserving their existence under Labour administrations led them to adopt a moderate stance toward leaders such as MacDonald and, later, Tony Blair. Pragmatism prevailed on both sides, fostering a mutual strategy of restraint: on the one hand, to safeguard the institution, and on the other, to ensure the implementation of government policies.

  • 34 See Chris Ballinger, op. cit.
  • 35 See Aurélien Antoine, op. cit. ; Marie Padilla, “Boris Johnson, le Project Homer et la désignation (...)

30The influence of such considerations led Labour, from its earliest years in power, to appoint hereditary peers, albeit with significant reluctance. While not yet fully accepted, the upper house began to be tolerated. Between 1925 and 1927, a Conservative reform proposal emerged to address a shifting political landscape. However, beneath the surface of proposals for a partial evolution of the chamber’s composition – through the granting of a life peerage – lay a deeper intention: to restore legislative powers reduced in 1911 in order to counter potential future legislation deemed overly “socialist.” Not fooled, Labour was outraged by the conclusions of the Cave Committee34 and doubled down by once again supporting the abolition of hereditary peerage. Tory manoeuvres of that era bear striking similarities to more recent actions by Prime ministers who exploited their positions to manipulate the House for political purposes, disregarding institutional principles. The scandals involving the appointment of several peers by Tony Blair in the 2000s, or the attempts by Tory leaders between 2016 and 2024 to re-establish a right-wing majority in the Lords, are two clear examples of such practices.35

  • 36 Hastings Lees-Smith, Second chambers in theory & practice (Legare Street Press, 1923 reed. 2021).
  • 37 Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

31In the spring of 1931, Labour began to delve more deeply into reforming the House of Lords under the guidance of Hastings Lees-Smith, well known for his academic works on bicameralism.36 The focus was no longer on the outright abolition of bicameralism but rather on rethinking what a second chamber should look like. Lacking consensus on the composition of the House, those involved in the debate resolved to support yet another restriction of the Lords’ powers. Meanwhile, the commission established in November 1933 by the National Government to address, among other things, the future of the Lords, ultimately failed, with MacDonald concluding that the issue held little interest in the public opinion.37 Labour’s return to the Opposition led to a decline in the number of Labour peers, which dwindled to just 12, and the idea of abolishing the second chamber resurfaced once again.

32It would ultimately take until 1945 for the Labour Party to appoint new peers. When it returned to power with an absolute majority in the House of Commons, the memory of internal divisions regarding the composition of the second chamber, along with the single objective of implementing its program after a devastating conflict for the country, justified maintaining the Lords’ veto constituency.

33Although the terms of the debate for the Labour Party were clarified, internal divisions remained far from resolved. Bicameralism seemed to be accepted, and the House of Lords was expected to stick to its role as a legislative reviser, a position largely supported by the Parliament Acts and the Salisbury/Addison Convention. However, the question of composition remained unresolved.

The misfortunes of proposals to reform the composition of the House of Lords

  • 38 Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso, op. cit.

34After 1949, the reformist momentum within the Labour Party took shape in a sinewy, fluctuating manner. Despite the limitation on the use of the Lords’ veto in 1949, the Attlee government lacked a profound constitutional vision for a country in the midst of reconstruction. More fundamentally, Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso emphasise that, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the most senior Labour parliamentarians “were simply not really interested in constitutional questions, largely because they deemed these secondary to the pursuit of 'socialist' economic policies and social reform.38 The distinct, and often radically opposing views on several constitutional issues within the Labour Party (including, beyond the House of Lords, the Monarchy, which did not enjoy unanimous support) led to a reluctance to go beyond a logic that had already prevailed in 1911 for the Liberals.

35In most cases, the return to power of the Labour Party was accompanied by a serious reform project. This was the case in 1969 under the Wilson government with the Parliament (No. 2) Bill, whose failure to pass led to the issue of House of Lords reform being omitted from the 1974 manifesto.39 At the end of the 1960s, the bill was framed within a context where the United Kingdom was beginning to experience economic decline, which reflected institutions seen as the most archaic. Parliament was deemed inefficient, burdened by complex procedures that favoured what was seen as the excessive dominance of the government.40 The criticism initially targeted the House of Commons but also rekindled doubts about the usefulness of the House of Lords. The Labour programs of 1964 and 1966 questioned both the composition and the remaining veto power. The 1966 manifesto was more ambitious and made reform an imperative41, influenced by an influential figure within the party, Richard Crossman. A proponent of the theory of parliamentary decline, Crossman served as a Cabinet minister under Wilson from 1966 to 1970.42 In his view, the renewal of Parliament required a major evolution of both houses. More specifically, he believed that a more useful House of Lords would benefit the quality of the legislative work of the Commons. History would prove him right, particularly in light of the contribution of Parliament to legislative business since 1999.43

36The strategy to successfully carry out the reform remained, for its part, ordinary: first, to impose a further limitation on the legislative powers of the House of Lords, and then to consider a profound evolution of its composition. The plan was structured to make the consent of the Lords to a bill even more explicit, extending to secondary legislation (law created by ministers under powers given to them by an Act of Parliament):

  • 44 Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

“A government bill would receive the Royal Assent three months after being sent to the Lords, whether or not it had been passed through the upper house; bills introduced in the House of Lords should be passed by the upper house within three months; House of Commons’ amendments should not be subject to the agreement of the Lords; and delegated powers should be subject to affirmation only by the House of Commons. The proposed bill therefore dealt only with the formal powers of the House of Lords – reform of the composition of the House – and therefore the questions of the Conservative predominance and the backwoodsmen would follow at a later date.”44

37The bill resulted from an inter-party conference to ensure its success. The White Paper outlined the following objectives, which ultimately included provisions indirectly related to composition:

“ - A distinction be drawn between "voting" and "non-voting" peers, with only Life Peers being entitled to vote, although both categories would be entitled to participate in debates, and table questions or motions, in the House of Lords.

- "Voting peers" would be required to play a full, active and regular role in the work of the House of Lords, including attending at least one third of its sittings each year.

- There would be about 230 of these "voting peers", with the governing party enjoying a small majority over Opposition peers but not a majority overall in the reformed House because of the number of Crossbenchers who would be appointed.

- "Voting peers" would be remunerated, with the rate to be determined by an independent body.

  • 45 Cmnd 3799, 1968, § 28-9. See Janet Morgan, The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-1970 ( (...)

- The House of Lords’ power of delay would be reduced to six months. However, legislation subjected to such delay could be "carried over" into a new parliamentary session, meaning that if a new session started before the Bill had reached the statute book, due to their Lordships invoking this six-month veto, then the government would no longer be required to introduce the Bill de novo in the following parliamentary session; the delayed Bill would automatically come into effect once the six-month delay had expired.”45

38The initial caution and methodological ecumenism were not enough to reduce to silence the dissenting voices within the government, the party, and the Opposition. The failure of the Parliament (No. 2) Bill at the committee stage in the House of Commons was nothing short of a political trauma: the reform of the House of Lords now increasingly appeared as a cursed object that contaminated those who tried to tackle it. It is impossible not to see in the 1968-1969 episode a form of irrationality among the Labour Party, with its more left-wing factions refusing to support Crossman’s ambition to revitalise Parliament through the reform of the upper house. Reforming the Lords became akin to squaring the circle: making it more efficient and legitimate could challenge the authority and primacy of the House of Commons. This brought the debate over the composition of the House of Lords back to the forefront: if it was to become a rival to the Commons, then it would need strong legitimacy. But then, what would be the point of maintaining two chambers whose members were both elected by the citizens? As technical and complex as this issue was, it reflected the Labour Party’s inability to construct a stable constitutional doctrine for parliamentary democracy, its powers and checks and balances, and, more technically, for bicameralism. With the devolution project of 1979, Labour’s vacillation on the fate of the Lords’ peers confirmed the party’s failure, while in power, to carry out a significant institutional reform.

  • 46 Brooke Commission. See Chris Ballinger, op. cit.
  • 47 Nicholas Baldwin, “The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1974-79”, Journal of Legislative St (...)
  • 48 Godfrey Le May, The Victorian Constitution: Conventions, Usages and Contingencies (London, Gerald D (...)
  • 49 For the 1979-1994 period, see Peter Dorey, “1949, 1969, 1999: The Labour Party and House of Lords R (...)

39After a brief period in opposition between 1970 and 1974 (during which the Tories also unsuccessfully reflected on the future of the upper house),46 the return of Labour to power did not spark new efforts at reform, even though the Lords obstructed the passage of several bills (such as the Trade Union and Labour Relations Bill 1975, the Dock Work Regulation Bill 1975, and the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill 1976). Calls for abolition resurfaced at the party conference in 1977,47 culminating in the 1979 manifesto with a proposal to remove their legislative veto. After the elections, abolition became the Labour Party’s official stance (1983 manifesto), although no bill was introduced in that regard. The heavy defeat in 1987 forced a reassessment, leading to a less radical position that would foreshadow the developments of the 1990s. The idea of abolishing the Lords was no longer on the agenda; instead, the second chamber was envisioned as a sort of guardian of fundamental rights and freedoms, in line with an older view that the Lords should be “the ultimate guardians of the Constitution.”48 More contemporaneously, this role was seen as a counter to Margaret Thatcher's repressive policies. Tony Blair’s rise to the leadership of the Labour Party in 1994 marked the resurgence of the “two-stage reform” strategy,49 which would become a reality in 1997-1999 with the success of New Labour.

  • 50 See bibliography below.
  • 51 Lord Hewart (R v Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259) quoted by the European Cou (...)
  • 52 See Aurélien Antoine, “Les enjeux de la création d’une Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni”, Revue internat (...)
  • 53 Meg Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived, op. cit.

40Widely analysed on and extensively documented,50 the reforms of 1999 and 2005 are undoubtedly the most significant transformations since the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 (resulting in the sidelining of 667 peers). The growing influence of life peers justified the final abolition of hereditary peerages. The particular status of the Law Lords and the requirements of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which emphasised the need for objective impartiality (i.e. “justice must not only be done: it must also be seen to be done”),51 necessitated their “exfiltration” through the creation of the UK Supreme Court.52 This first step was intended to be followed by a second phase, which would culminate in the emergence of a second chamber entirely made up of elected members. A quarter of a century later, despite undeniably positive aspects, such as the independence gained from political parties – resulting in the quality of analysis and legal functions carried out by working peers53 – the House of Lords still appears as iconoclastic. Indeed, it epitomizes the lack of consensus on the contours of what an entirely elected second chamber should look like. To avoid the fate of the 1969 reform project, which led to hours of debates to no evail, Tony Blair’s government conceded the retention of 92 hereditary peers and refrained from addressing the representation of the Anglican Church. While the selection process for life peers has been more satisfactory on the eve of the 2024 bill’s introduction, it is still far from optimal. Scandals have followed since 2005 (the Cash-for-Honours scandal under Tony Blair, accusations of cronyism under David Cameron, attempts by Boris Johnson to restore a Conservative majority, and the general tendency of both major parties to reward donors and close associates, particularly those who have funded election campaigns).

  • 54 The House of Lords itself addressed the issue in 2017 (Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the (...)
  • 55 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm 4534, 2000, 220 p.
  • 56 Meg Russell and Richard Cornes, “The Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords: A House for (...)

41Since 1999, criticisms have continued to arise against an oversized chamber54 that struggled – and still struggles – to reflect significant constitutional changes, such as devolution. The proposals of the Wakeham Commission in 200055 had a rather unfortunate destiny, despite being regarded by several experts as “timid”.56 These proposals included a limitation on the number of peers to 550, abolishing all hereditary peers, removing the executive’s power to appoint members, electing between 60 and 195 regional peers based on proportional representation, and expanding the representation of religious authorities beyond Anglicanism.

  • 57 See Alice Lilly, Emanuela Marku, and Joshua Jakupi, “Houe of Lords” Institute for Government, 17 Oc (...)

42After 2005, the Labour government, poisoned by the Iraq War and scandals, once again fell into its old habits by failing to push through new legislation (2003, 2007, 2008)57and by not supporting proposals put forward by the Lib Dems in 2010 (the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012). The last pieces of legislation passed before the 2024 victory introduced useful although cosmetic changes aimed at improving standards within the chamber (the House of Lords Reform Act 2014 and the House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Act 2015). The return to power of the Labour Party, in the context of a deep rejection of Tory governments plagued by scandals, was expected to trigger an institutional reform push encompassing the House of Lords.

The 2024-2025 reform: hallmark of Labour’s cautious pragmatism

  • 58 Labour party, A New Britain: Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy Report of the Commis (...)

43The Tories’ complicated relationship with institutions safeguarding the constitutional arrangements of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms between 2016 and 2024 could only lead to a wave of reforms from the Labour Party. This process was initiated in 2022 following the conclusions of the Brown Commission.58 However, despite its historical significance, the ambition to move beyond the complete abolition of hereditary peerages faced several hurdles. The House of Lords, while not decisive, served as a useful check on the Conservatives’ abuse of power. This was evident in the debates, amendments, and reports published on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024.

44As Labour’s de facto ally in many respects, the Lords did not deserve to be “mistreated” in the wake of the July 2024 election. Keir Starmer therefore adopted a policy of incremental change: concluding the reform began in 1999 and committing to more ambitious changes at a later stage, focusing solely on the composition of the chamber – as the issue of its prerogatives had become the subject of broad consensus among the leaders of the two main parties. At the time of writing, only the first phase, which poses little difficulty, has been initiated. Historical precedents cast doubt on the success of the second phase, particularly as the Brown Commission’s recommendations appear rather unrealistic.

The unrealistic recommendations of the Brown Commission

45Not exclusively focused on institutional reform, the commission led by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown laid the groundwork for Labour’s electoral proposals for the election held on 4 July 2024.

  • 59 Op. cit. See recommendations 4 (perequation) and 5 (social and economic rights).
  • 60 By “Eliminating foreign money from UK politics ; Banning the vast majority of second jobs for MPs; (...)
  • 61 Recommandations 2 and 3 of the report.

46The constitutional proposals are numerous and directly tied, as in the late 1960s, to the decline of the United Kingdom. For the Brown Commission: “Constitutions establish the framework of government in a country but they also serve social and economic objectives setting out the purpose and direction of a country and the values and principles recognised by the people and the institutions of government.59 Among the ambitions pursued by the commission, restoring trust between government and citizens is crucial.60 Achieving this requires changes to the standards of conduct for ministers, MPs and Lords, as well as a deep restructuring of the devolution of power from London to local authorities, with the aim of fostering greater proximity between decision-making and the people it affects. Reviving devolution is a key focus, including a specific framework for England, based on an extension of the elected Metro Mayors already introduced over the previous decade.61

  • 62 Equally mainstream would be the emergence of a role overseeing appointments by supervising the duti (...)
  • 63 See Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords. Lessons from Overseas (Oxford, OUP, 2000).

47Local and devolution reform is fundamental to the proposals for the House of Lords, which is envisioned as becoming an “assembly of nations and regions” (Recommendation 37), tasked with a clear role concerning the future and projects related to territorial organisation. This idea is not particularly original compared to practices in other bicameral parliamentary democracies, whether in a unitary State like France, a regional state like Spain, or a federal State like Germany.62 Moreover, it addresses a longstanding demand regarding the UK’s second chamber.63 Such a transformation seems entirely justified to improve relations between London and devolved authorities and to tackle the almost limited representation of Celtic nations among peers.

48As of early 2025, there were no peers from the Scottish National Party (the leading party in Scotland and the third largest in the House of Commons from 2015 to 2024), and only three lords were members of the Plaid Cymru. Among Northern Irish political forces, the Democratic Unionist Party was overrepresented, with six lords compared to its political weight, both in Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole (the party has only five MPs in the Commons).

49Chapter 11 of the report, dedicated to the second chamber, goes further and presents the party leadership with proposals based on the classic premise that “the House of Lords in its present form is indefensible in principle”, while clearly outlining what should or should not fall within its remit:

“It should have no role in the forming or sustaining governments. That, as today, must fall to the House of Commons.

Similarly, it should have no responsibility for decisions about public spending or taxation, including National Insurance.

It should not, in general, be able to reject legislation but should be able to propose amendments.

These limitations on its powers must be set out clearly in the statute, which creates the new Chamber so that there is no ambiguity about the relationship between it and the House of Commons.

But it can have a new role, complementary to, and not in competition with, the House of Commons. It should discharge four broad functions:

1. Constructive scrutiny of legislation and government policy, as the House of Lords at its best does today.

2. Bringing together the voices of the different nations and regions of the UK at the centre of government.

3. Monitoring adherence to standards in public life.

4. Most significant of all, exercising new but precisely drawn powers to safeguard the constitution of the United Kingdom and the distribution of power within it.”

50The Brown Report endorses the continuation of bicameralism and, in doing so, aligns with the faction within Labour that supports the status of the House of Lords as a “revising chamber”, aiming to eliminate any risk of a “competing chamber” with the Commons. This trajectory, in fact, has been the direction of the Lords since the creation of Life Peers in 1958, but according to the report, this role should now be fully embraced. From this perspective, the commission’s recommendations are far from revolutionary. However, it ventures into risky territory with radical changes whose legal implications are insufficiently considered.

51Formally, the proposed renaming of the second chamber to “Assembly of the Nations and Regions” is not necessarily relevant in light of the other recommendations and suggests that its remit and representation would be purely territorial. Yet, the report is notably ambitious regarding the responsibilities of the new assembly, to the extent that it could, in our view, trigger a constitutional revolution. To understand this, one must examine the approach taken by the commission.

52First and foremost, the commission acknowledges that the House of Lords performs satisfactory legislative work: it improves the quality of legislation and serves as an effective guardian of fundamental constitutional rules and principles:

“House of Lords does nevertheless discharge an important constitutional function. Its scrutiny of legislation can be more thorough and effective than the Commons, leading to changes of approach or amendments, sometimes against the will of the government. The work of its committees is often of very high quality, largely because of the experience and expertise of their members (for example the work of the Constitution Committee, established after the recommendations of the Wakeham Report of 2001). This is because many Peers demonstrate a highly commendable and often lifelong commitment to public service (…).

The appointment of crossbench peers brings a level of expertise and knowledge that might otherwise be lacking (something which the public, if asked, values). Whatever changes are made should not lose the benefits which House of Lords scrutiny of legislation and government action brings.”

53This paragraph builds on the lessons of several previous unsuccessful attempts and the conclusions of experts such as Meg Russell. As for the second paragraph, it demonstrates that the House of Lords extends its expertise far beyond territorial issues, to the extent that the Brown Commission considers that the second chamber’s powers should allow it to “protect the constitutional distribution of power between Parliament at Westminster and the three devolved legislatures, where convention, even though recognised in statute, has failed to offer sufficient protection. To this end, it is proposed that, despite the principle of eliminating the veto power, one exception should remain:

“The House of Lords can still reject a bill to extend the term of a Parliament, so that a government cannot simply keep voting itself into office by postponing a general election. Paradoxically enough, therefore, the unelected House of Lords acts as a safeguard for democracy in the United Kingdom. We recommend that the new chamber retains this power, and that the power should be extended in one area only – to legislation relating to certain other constitutional statutes, which we refer to here as protected constitutional statutes.

The second chamber would have an explicit power to reject legislation, which related to a narrow list of defined constitutional statutes. The effect of this would be a form of what is called “entrenchment”, which is to say making a particular statutory provision more difficult to amend the ordinary law.”

  • 64 See Lucien Jaume, “Sieyès et le sens du jury constitutionnaire : une réinterprétation”, Droits vol. (...)
  • 65 See Aurélien Antoine, Droit constitutionnel britannique, op. cit.

54The idea put forth by the Brown Commission holds particular resonance for a French lawyer, as it is reminiscent of the Revolutionary Era plans championed by Abbé Sieyès for an assembly tasked with constitutional oversight of laws.64 From a comparative and historical perspective, therefore, the 2022 report is far from eccentric. However, for the United Kingdom, it implies a significant constitutional change. As the included recommendation indicates, the unprecedented powers proposed would require determining which texts qualify as constitutional in nature. Under several precedents, certain Acts of Parliament have already been ascribed this quality, although lawyers (both judges and academics) remain divided on the real consequences of such judicial recognition for the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.65 For other legislation, the Commission envisions another, equally significant innovation:

“(…) the second chamber, through its presiding officer, if it contemplates using its safeguarding power, first be required to refer the question to court, most likely directly to the Supreme Court, for an authoritative judgement on whether the constitutional protection powers are engaged.”

55In short, the Brown Commission suggests the establishment of a constitutional review mechanism shared between one of the chambers of Parliament and the Supreme Court. The report attempts to dispel doubts about the impact of such a proposal on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty by asserting that, since one of the assemblies would control the new compliance mechanism between Acts deemed constitutional and those not benefiting from this “label”, sovereignty would remain intact.

  • 66 Déc. n° 71-44 DC du 16 juillet 1971, Loi complétant les dispositions des articles 5 et 7 de la loi (...)
  • 67 Loi constitutionnelle n° 74-904 du 29 octobre 1974 portant révision de l’article 61 de la Constitut (...)

56Much to the chagrin of our British friends, it must be acknowledged that their legal culture prevents them from fully grasping the intra-institutional dynamics that have allowed constitutional review to flourish in other democracies. The members of the Commission, who – true to British comparative tendencies – focused on English-speaking states, could have usefully drawn insights from France’s constitutional experience, even if “comparison is not reason”. The French Constitutional Council, established under the Fifth Republic, was originally tasked only with safeguarding the executive’s normative power against the hegemonic inclination of Parliament. Starting in 1971, however, the Council transformed into a wholly different institution, initially through case law66 and later through reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law by expanding its jurisdiction.67

57The ability of jurisdictions to expand their control over the powers of the executive and legislative branches via case law is a typical institutional phenomenon well understood by legal scholars. Yet this dynamic appears to have been underestimated by the Brown Commission, despite its likely awareness of the US legal precedent set by Marbury v. Madison (1803). Consequently, the question is not so much whether this institutional tendency is positive or negative but rather whether, first, it is realistic and, second, whether it addresses the most pressing issue concerning the House of Lords. To both questions, we offer a negative response.

58The experience of previous reforms of the House of Lords warrants caution, especially given that far less ambitious recommendations have failed in the past. The approach of altering the powers of the peers to trigger an unprecedented upheaval in the centuries-old legal and constitutional order of the United Kingdom is highly risky. To achieve such an outcome, a far-reaching deliberation would be necessary, likely within the framework of a constitutional convention involving all parties, devolved authorities and citizens. As in the past, however, the emergence of a consensus seems vastly unlikely, and the current context is not conducive to such an agreement.

59More fundamentally, the systematic critique of the institutional system, coupled with the suggestion that it must be regularly modified to address the shortcomings of political actors, is not always justified. In this case, the balance of powers between the two chambers in the legislative process and in the oversight of public policies by the House of Lords has many merits, which hardly support the need for the systemic revolution proposed by the Brown Commission. Somewhat paradoxically, it is on the issue of composition – arguably the topic with the broadest consensus among the political parties – that the report is most brief:

“The second chamber should certainly be elected in a different electoral cycle from the House of Commons, so that elections for the Commons and the new second chamber do not coincide. The precise method of election to be used is a matter for further consideration.”

  • 68 See Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford, Hart publishing, 2009).

60The contrast is striking between the propositions linked to the prerogatives of the House – a subject that had largely ceased to be contentious, to the extent that the Jay doctrine of the “transitional House” was being questioned in favour of arguments supporting the completion of the 1999-2005 reform68 – and the lack of substantive reflection on its composition.

61To conclude with this report, it must be acknowledged that while it remains intellectually stimulating for academics, it was unlikely to be fully incorporated into the Labour manifesto presented to voters in 2024. By focusing on powers that have been less contested in recent years and remaining vague on the issue of composition, which lies at the heart of criticisms, it was disappointing. The direction chosen by Keir Starmer’s government is equally underwhelming.

The too-limited scope of the 2024 House of Lord reform

62The House of Lords is the first topic of constitutional reform addressed in the Labour Party's manifesto. As in the Brown report, the merits of the work carried out by peers are acknowledged. The plan based on a two-step hackneyed strategy is put forward. In the first stage, and immediately, the abolition of the remaining hereditary peers and their voting rights is urged. A retirement age set at 80 years is also introduced. New measures are intended to strengthen oversight of peers, particularly concerning their active involvement in the chamber’s business. The appointment procedure must “ensure the quality of new appointments and will seek to improve the national and regional balance of the second chamber.” It is only in the second stage that the modernisation of the upper house will involve its replacement “with an alternative second chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations.

  • 69 Toby Helm and Michael Savage, “Labour ditches radical reforms as it prepares ‘bombproof’ election m (...)
  • 70 See Meg Russell, “Parliamentary reform in the 2024 party manifestos”, The Constitution Unit, 19 Jun (...)

63These proposals have inevitably disappointed those who had hoped for the sweeping reforms promised in the Brown report.69 However, those familiar with the history of the House of Lords were not surprised by the manifesto’s modest ambitions. On the other hand, the idea of introducing an age limit has been strongly criticised, as this measure would have the effect of removing an almost excessively large number of peers and sidelining prominent figures whose contributions could still prove significant, such as Lady Hale, the former law lord and president of the UK Supreme Court.70 Moreover, by deferring a more profound transformation of the institution to broad consultations, the programme remains highly vague.

  • 71 Prime minister Office, The King’s Speech 2024, 17 July 2024, 104 p.
  • 72 Lisa James, “Who are the last hereditary peers?”, The Constitution Unit, 11 September 2024, https:/ (...)

64Once in power, the Labour Party announced its reform project through the King’s Speech in the following terms: “Measures to modernise the constitution will be introduced, including House of Lords reform to remove the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the Lords. The explanatory note accompanying the speech focuses on this objective, originally initiated in 1999, and drops the proposal to introduce a retirement age.71 From the wording, the purpose of the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill is simply to complete what was initiated in 1999. The bill was finally introduced in Parliament on 5 September 2024. The remaining 88 hereditary peers,72 deemed “outdated and indefensible”, were removed in a particularly short piece of legislation. The government, therefore, settled for the bare minimum. Yet, it seems that a more satisfying path could have been taken, without resorting to the unrealistic recommendations of the Brown commission. While adhering to the two-step strategy, it would not have been unreasonable to address the modalities for appointing life peers and limiting their numbers. Admittedly, the removal of nearly 100 hereditary peers reduces the total number of members from around 800 to just over 700. However, this is still far too many. As for the more complex issue of membership conditions for a second chamber, it warrants the establishment of a new commission. Such a commission should focus its work on the following points: setting a fixed number of peers (between 600 and 700, aligning with the size of the House of Commons); expanding religious representation beyond members of the Anglican Church; preserving the power of the House of Lords Appointment Commission to make nominations for membership of the House of Lords to the independent cross benches (whose proposals are, in principle, always validated by the Executive); retaining the Prime Minister’s nomination rights while introducing a mechanism allowing devolved authorities to propose a number of peers proportional to the population of each nation; ensuring that politically motivated appointments do not result in the chamber being composed of more than 50% of party political members; granting the commission veto power over party political nominations, extending beyond standards and propriety, to broader considerations. Such measures would have allowed for a more balanced and representative reform of the House of Lords, while also addressing its pressing issues.

  • 73 See Peter Dorey, Alexandra Kelso, op. cit.

65Any other discussion of a more extensive reform of the House of Lords seems to us both unrealistic given the government’s highly constrained agenda and, indeed, undesirable. This is particularly true regarding the introduction of a partially or fully elective system: democracy and its proper functioning require institutions that counterbalance the excesses inherent in such processes without, of course, replacing them. In this regard, the British institutional system, while far from achieving some unattainable perfection or “full legitimacy” (a status from which no institution truly benefits),73 seems to us balanced and respectful of the advantages provided by mixed constitutions. The safeguards of a democratic society are effective only if there are counter-powers endowed with technical legitimacy (or expertise) and committed to procedures ensuring the rule of law. The judiciary alone is insufficient, as it intervenes only when a legal dispute is initiated by an institutional actor or a citizen. It is essential that a parliamentary institution also endorses this function within the legislative process, reconnecting with the historical evolution of Parliament as the guardian of the Constitution against the abuses of power of the Government and the often-subordinate lower house. That’s the reason why bicameralism is more relevant than ever in an era marked by the resurgence of trends often described as populist within Executives.

66This legal and constitutional perspective is difficult for the Labour Party to fully embrace, as it runs counter to the party’s founding dogma and its detachment from the socio-economic concerns that shaped its emergence. The constitutional ambitions of the Starmer ministry have instead been directed toward curbing the maladministration of the English Conservative elite. The initial propositions adopted in the institutional field primarily aimed to reintroduce greater ethics, a stronger sense of public interest, and decentralisation into decision-making processes. The Hereditary Peers Act was accompanied by other developments, such as the creation of a Council of Nations and Regions,74 a substantial rewriting of the Ministerial Code75, and the creation of an Integrity and Ethics Commission.76

  • 77 J. Langmead, “Was Keir Starmer’s freebie wardrobe really worth the hassle?”, The Times, 22 Septembe (...)

67However, these innovations did not generate significant enthusiasm, with the Prime Minister himself facing minor controversies just weeks after taking office.77 While these did not approach the gravity of the scandals involving several Conservative MPs or lords between 2016 and 2024, they illustrate that institutional reform can never completely eliminate the misconduct of those in power. These challenges highlight the inherent limits of constitutional rules and their dependence on how political leaders closely abide by them.

Conclusion

  • 78 Peter Dorey, The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional Conservatism ( (...)

68More than a quarter-century after the 1999 reform, Peter Dorey described the Labour Party’s approach to constitutional reform as A History of Constitutional Conservatism.78 Nothing could be truer after this paper analysing the various changes affecting the House of Lords. Each time the Labour Party has been in a strong political position to pursue realistic reform – such as in 2024 after the collapse of the Tories – it has struggled to find the right equilibrium between radical change and inertia. When Labour appeared close to achieving this balance, as in 1969, internal divisions within the party derailed hopes for a beneficial change to the institutional system as a whole.

69After nearly two centuries of debates and legislative evolution, should we deplore this outcome? Political analysts will likely criticise the gap between rhetoric and achievements, as well as the disparity between Labour’s original doctrine and its record in government. Constitutional law experts, however, might argue that long-term reform is less risky, more respectful of legal certainty, and a better guarantee of body politic acceptance. The House of Lords has evolved slowly but steadily, improving itself in alignment with the requirements of a democratic society. This gradual evolution seems entirely consistent with the true nature of the British Constitution – an unwritten framework based on highly adaptable centuries-old conventions.

Top of page

Bibliography

Antoine, Aurélien, “Les enjeux de la création d’une Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni”, Revue internationale de droit comparé n° 2 (2008), pp. 283-291.

Antoine, Aurélien, “La Chambre des Lords” in Philippe Lauvaux, Jean Massot (ed.), L’État présent du bicamérisme en Europe (Paris, Société de Législation Comparée, coll. Colloques, 2017), pp. 19-36.

Antoine, Aurélien, “La protection parlementaire de la Constitution au Royaume-Uni” in F. Savonitto (dir.), La protection parlementaire de la Constitution (Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2018), pp. 73-82.

Antoine, Aurélien, Droit constitutionnel britannique (Issy-les-Moulineaux, Lextenso-LGDJ, 3e éd., 2023).

Ballinger, Chris, The House of Lords 1911–2011: A Century of Non-Reform (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012).

Baldwin, Nicholas, “The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1974-79”, Journal of Legislative Studies vol. 1: 2 (1995), pp. 218-242.

Baldwin, Nicholas, “The House of Lords – Into the Future?”, The Journal of Legislative Studies vol. 13: 2 (2007), pp. 197-209.

Bittle, William G., James Nayler, 1618-1660: The Quaker Indicted by Parliament (York, William G. Sessions Ltd., 1986).

Bochel, Hugh and Defty, Andrew, “A More Representative Chamber: Representation and the House of Lords”, Journal of Legislative Studies vol. 18: 1 (2012), pp. 82-91.

Bogdanor, Vernon, The New British Constitution (Oxford, Hart publishing, 2009).

Charlot, Monica, “L’impossible réforme de la Chambre des Lords”, Revue française de Science Politique n° 19-4 (1969), pp. 793-806.

Cousson, Anne, “Reinventing the House of Lords for the XXIst century”, Revue LISA vol. 20-54 (2022).

Dicey, Albert Venn, England’s Case Against Home Rule (London, J. Murray, 1886).

Dorey, Peter, The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional Conservatism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2008).

Dorey, Peter, “1949, 1969, 1999: The Labour Party and House of Lords Reform”, Parliamentary Affairs vol. 59/4 (2006), pp. 599-620.

Dorey, Peter, and Kelso, Alexandra, House of Lords Reform Since 1911 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Elliards, Xander, “Labour ditch pledge to abolish Lords despite huge popular support”, 9 February 2024, https://www.thenational.scot/news/24108792.labour-ditch-pledge-abolish-lords-despite-huge-popular-support/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Fitzzgibbons, Jonathan, Cromwell’s Houe of Lords. Politics, Parliament and Constitutional Revolution (1642-1660) (Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2018).

Gibson, Élisabeth, La Chambre des Lords ou l’exception britannique, Thèse Bordeaux IV, 2003, dir. Élyette Benjamin-Labarthe.

Gordon, Michael, “Creating an Integrity and Ethics Commission in the UK: The Case for Reform and Challenges for Implementation”, U.K. Const. L. Blog, 22 June 2023, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org consulted 8 January 2025.

Gordon, Michael, “Labour’s Ministerial Code and Political Standards Reform”, U.K. Const. L. Blog, 5 December 2024, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Guislin, Jean-Marc, (ed.), La Chambre haute. Hier en France, aujourd’hui en Europe (Villeneuve d’Ascq, Éd. du Septentrion, 2012).

Helm, Toby and Savage, Michael, “Labour ditches radical reforms as it prepares "bombproof" election manifesto”, The Guardian, 3 February 2024.

HM Government, The House of Lords: Reform, Cm 7027, February 2007.

HM Government, Ministerial Code, November 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/672b46f5f03408fa7966d1d4/November_2024_-_Ministerial_Code.pdf consulted 8 January 2025.

House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Propriety and Peerages, Second Report of Session 2007-08, HC 153, 18 December 2007.

James, Lisa, “Who are the last hereditary peers?”, The Constitution Unit, 11 September 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/09/11/who-are-the-last-hereditary-peers/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Jaume, Lucien, “Sieyès et le sens du jury constitutionnaire : une réinterprétation”, Droits vol. 36 (2002), pp. 115-134.

Labour Party, A New Agenda for Democracy: Labour’s Proposal for Constitutional Reform, 1993.

Labour Party, A New Britain: Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy Report of the Commission on the UK’s Future, 2022.

Lees-Smith, Hastings B., “The Bryce Conference on the Reform of the House of Lords”, Economica 6 (Oct., 1922), pp. 220-227.

Lord Hailsham, Elected dictatorship (London, The Richard Dimbleby Lecture, BBC, 1976).

Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, Report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, House of Lords, 2017.

Morgan, Janet, The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-70 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975).

Oliver, Dawn, “The Parliament Acts, the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the Second Chamber”, Statute Law Review vol. 33: 1, (2012), pp. 1-6.

Prime minister Office, The King’s Speech 2024, 17 July 2024.

Purvis, Matthew, House of Lords Reform: Chronology 1900-2010 (London, House of Lords Library, 2011).

Ridell, Peter, “The unanswered questions posed by Labour’s plan for a new Ethics and Integrity Commission”, The Constitution Unit, 1 July 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/07/01/the-unanswered-questions-posed-by-labours-plan-for-a-new-ethics-and-integrity-commission/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm 4534, 2000.

Russell, Meg, Reforming the House of Lords. Lessons from Overseas (Oxford, OUP, 2000).

Russell, Meg and Cornes, Richard, “The Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords: A House for the Future?”, The Modern Law Review vol. 64: 1 (2001), pp. 82-99.

Russell, Meg and Sandford, Mark, “Why are second chambers so Difficult to Reform?” Journal of Legislative Studies n° 8 (2002), pp. 79-89.

Russell, Meg, “A Stronger second chamber? Assessing the Impact of House of Lords Reform in 1999 and the Lessons for Bicameralism”, Political Studies vol. 58 (2010), pp. 866–885.

Russell, Meg, The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived (Oxford, OUP, 2013).

Russell, Meg, “Elected second chambers and Their Powers”, Political Quarterly vol. 83: 1 (2012), pp. 117-129.

Russell, Meg, House of Lords reform: navigating the obstacles (London, Institute for Government, 2023).

Russell, Meg, “Parliamentary reform in the 2024 party manifestos”, The Constitution Unit, 19 June 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/06/19/parliamentary-reform-in-the-2024-party-manifestos/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Stride, Greg , “Will the Council of the Nations and Regions improve central-local relations?”, Local Government Information Unit, 22 October 2024, https://lgiu.org/blog-article/will-the-council-of-the-nations-and-regions-improve-central-local-relations/ consulted 8 January 2025.

Tierney, Stephen, “The Labour Government and Reform of the House of Lords”, European Public Law vol. 6: 4 (2000), pp. 506-516.

Walter Scott, Frederick, British Election Manifestos 1900-70 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1975).

Williamson, Philip, “The Labour Party and the House of Lords, 1918–1931” Parliamentary History vo. 10 (1991), pp. 317-341.

Top of page

Notes

1 A different conclusion could be drawn with regard to other academic disciplines such as British civilization or political science (Monica Charlot, “L’impossible réforme de la Chambre des Lords”, Revue française de Science Politique n° 19-4, 1969; Élisabeth Gibson, La Chambre des Lords ou l’exception britannique, Thèse Bordeaux IV, 2003, dir. Élyette Benjamin-Labarthe; Jean-Marc Guislin (ed.), La Chambre haute. Hier en France, aujourd’hui en Europe (Villeneuve d’Ascq, Éd. du Septentrion, 2012); Anne Cousson, “Reinventing the House of Lords for the XXIst century”, Revue LISA, vol. 20-54, 2022).

2 Meg Russell and Mark Sandford, “Why are second chambers so Difficult to Reform?”, Journal of Legislative Studies vol. 8, 2002.

3 “The Parliament Acts, the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the second chamber”, Statute Law Review vol. 33/1, 2012.

4 Cromwell’s Houe of Lords. Politics, Parliament and Constitutional Revolution (1642-1660) (Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2018).

5 An Act for the Abolishing the House of Peers, 1649.

6 William G. Bittle, James Nayler, 1618-1660: The Quaker Indicted by Parliament (York, William G. Sessions Ltd., 1986).

7 The English Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2001 edition).

8 The House of Lords and Ideological Politics: Lord Salisbury’s Referendal Theory and the Conservative Party, 1846-1922 (Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society Press, 1995).

9 In Arthur Leach, “The House of Lords”, The Fortnightly Review vol. XXXII, 1882.

10 Albert Venn Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule (London, J. Murray, 1886).

11 Peter Joyce, Politico’s Guide to UK General Elections. 1832-2001 (London, Politico’s Publ., 2004).

12 Op. cit.

13 The Parliament Act de 1949 does not apply to private bills with limited scope, proposals originating in the House of Lords, delegated legislation, or bills aimed at extending the length of a parliamentary term beyond five years. While these blocking mechanisms are rarely used, they continue to provoke waves of criticism and debate.

14 HL Hansard, 16th August 1945, vol. 137, col. 47.

15 HL Hansard, 31st October 1945, vol. 137, cols. 613.

16 For a complete overview, see M. Purvis, House of Lords Reform: Chronology 1900-2010 (London, House of Lords Library, 2011); and House of Lords Library, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/lln-2011-025/ [8 January 2025].

17 The last significant reform of the composition of the House dates back to 1847 (Bishopric of Manchester Act and subsequent acts), when the number of clerics was reduced to 26, reflecting the broader movement of secularization in British society and the State; and in 1876 with the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 which introduced (practising) professional judges in the House as Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.

18 Hastings B. Lees-Smith, “The Bryce Conference on the Reform of the House of Lords”, Economica n° 6 (1922), pp. 220-227.

19 On all these aspects, see Aurélien Antoine, “La Chambre des Lords” in Philippe Lauvaux, Jean Massot (eds.), L’État présent du bicamérisme en Europe (Paris, Société de Législation Comparée, coll. Colloques, 2017).

20 The Peerage Act 1963 allows hereditary peeresses to be members of the House and allows newly inherited hereditary peerages to be disclaimed. The first woman who became a life peeress was Baroness Wootton. She is recognized for sponsoring the bill to abolish the death penalty in 1965.

21 Chris Ballinger, The House of Lords 1911-2011: A Century of Non-Reform (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012).

22 Peter Dorey, Alexandra Kelso, House of Lords Reform Since 1911 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Meg Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived (Oxford, OUP, 2013).

23 Meg Russell, op. cit.

24 See 7 December 1976, Handyside v. Royaume-Uni, application n° 5493/72.

25 Elected dictatorship (London, The Richard Dimbleby Lecture, BBC, 1976).

26 See Aurélien Antoine, “La protection parlementaire de la Constitution au Royaume-Uni” in F. Savonitto (dir.), La protection parlementaire de la Constitution (Bordeaux, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2018).

27 House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee, Propriety and Peerages, Second Report of Session 2007-08, HC 153, 18 December 2007.

28 See Aurélien Antoine, Le Brexit. Une histoire anglaise (Paris, Dalloz, coll. Les sens du droit, 2020). Regarding the Safety of Rwanda Act, the Lords did not invoke the Salisbury-Addison Convention, as the 2019 Conservative manifesto made no mention of it. The proximity of the elections and the Conservatives’ anticipated defeat led Labour peers to allow the bill to pass, albeit not without sharp criticism from the Chamber, so as not to be prevented from carrying out future bill through the lords. See Hannah White, “Rishi Sunak should not disregard Lords scrutiny of his Rwanda bill”, Institute for Government, 7 March 2024, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/rishi-sunak-disregard-lords-scrutiny-rwanda-bill [8 January 2025]). One of Keir Starmer's first decisions was to announce that he would not apply the Safety of Rwanda Act.

29 Labour Party, A New Britain: Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy Report of the Commission on the UK’s Future, December 2022.

30 Quoted by Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso (op. cit.) which included manifestos compiled by Frederick Walter Scott, British Election Manifestos 1900-70 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1975). See http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1910/jan/1910-jan-labour-manifesto.shtml [8 January 2025].

31 Philip Williamson, “The Labour Party and the House of Lords, 1918-1931”, Parliamentary History vol. 10, 1991.

32 Op. cit.

33 Op. cit.

34 See Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

35 See Aurélien Antoine, op. cit. ; Marie Padilla, “Boris Johnson, le Project Homer et la désignation des nouveaux membres de la Chambre des Lords: un dernier Cheval de Troie lancé à l’assaut du parlementarisme britannique”, JP Blog, 16 September 2022, https://blog.juspoliticum.com/2022/09/16/boris-johnson-le-project-homer-et-la-designation-des-nouveaux-membres-de-la-chambre-des-lords-un-dernier-cheval-de-troie-lance-a-lassaut-du-parlementarisme-britannique-par-marie-padill/ [8 January 2025].

36 Hastings Lees-Smith, Second chambers in theory & practice (Legare Street Press, 1923 reed. 2021).

37 Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

38 Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso, op. cit.

39 http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/feb/1974-feb-labour-manifesto.shtml [8 January 2025].

40 Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso, op. cit.

41 Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

42 Peter Dorey and Alexandra Kelso, op. cit

43 See Meg Russell, “A Stronger second chamber? Assessing the Impact of House of Lords Reform in 1999 and the Lessons for Bicameralism”, Political Studies vol. 58, 2010.

44 Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

45 Cmnd 3799, 1968, § 28-9. See Janet Morgan, The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-1970 (Oxford, OUP, 1975); Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964-1970 (London, Penguin, 1990). Quoted by Peter Dorey, “1949, 1969, 1999: The Labour Party and House of Lords Reform”, Parliamentary Affairs vol. 59:4, 2006.

46 Brooke Commission. See Chris Ballinger, op. cit.

47 Nicholas Baldwin, “The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1974-79”, Journal of Legislative Studies vol. 1: 2, 1995.

48 Godfrey Le May, The Victorian Constitution: Conventions, Usages and Contingencies (London, Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 1979).

49 For the 1979-1994 period, see Peter Dorey, “1949, 1969, 1999: The Labour Party and House of Lords Reform”, op. cit.

50 See bibliography below.

51 Lord Hewart (R v Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259) quoted by the European Court of Human Rights in Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, application no. 7819/77).

52 See Aurélien Antoine, “Les enjeux de la création d’une Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni”, Revue internationale de droit comparé n° 2, 2008.

53 Meg Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords: Westminster Bicameralism Revived, op. cit.

54 The House of Lords itself addressed the issue in 2017 (Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, Report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House, House of Lords, 1st report, 2017; 5th report, 2023).

55 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future, Cm 4534, 2000, 220 p.

56 Meg Russell and Richard Cornes, “The Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords: A House for the Future?”, The Modern Law Review vol. 64: 1, 2001.

57 See Alice Lilly, Emanuela Marku, and Joshua Jakupi, “Houe of Lords” Institute for Government, 17 October 2023, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/lln-2011-025/ [8 January 2025]: in 2003, “the government held a series of indicative votes in parliament on a range of options, from a fully elected to a fully appointed Lords (…). Further cross-party talks took place, and a further white paper was published in 2008, but progress was halted by the 2010 general election which saw a change in government.” In the meantime, a white paper was published in 2007 (HM Government, The House of Lords: Reform, Cm 7027, February 2007).

58 Labour party, A New Britain: Renewing our Democracy and Rebuilding our Economy Report of the Commission on the UK’s Future, 2022.

59 Op. cit. See recommendations 4 (perequation) and 5 (social and economic rights).

60 By “Eliminating foreign money from UK politics ; Banning the vast majority of second jobs for MPs; A new Independent Integrity and Ethics Commission, with the power to investigate breaches of a new, stronger code of conduct; A powerful new body to ensure all appointments in public life are made on merit; Juries of ordinary citizens to determine whether rules have been broken; A new UK wide anti-corruption Commissioner” (Chapter 10, op. cit.).

61 Recommandations 2 and 3 of the report.

62 Equally mainstream would be the emergence of a role overseeing appointments by supervising the duties of a new Integrity and Ethics Commission. See Michael Gordon, “Creating an Integrity and Ethics Commission in the UK: The Case for Reform and Challenges for Implementation”, U.K. Const. L. Blog, 22 June 2023, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org [8 January 2025]; Peter Ridell, “The unanswered questions posed by Labour’s plan for a new Ethics and Integrity Commission”, The Constitution Unit, 1 July 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/07/01/the-unanswered-questions-posed-by-labours-plan-for-a-new-ethics-and-integrity-commission/ [8 January 2025].

63 See Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords. Lessons from Overseas (Oxford, OUP, 2000).

64 See Lucien Jaume, “Sieyès et le sens du jury constitutionnaire : une réinterprétation”, Droits vol. 36, 2002.

65 See Aurélien Antoine, Droit constitutionnel britannique, op. cit.

66 Déc. n° 71-44 DC du 16 juillet 1971, Loi complétant les dispositions des articles 5 et 7 de la loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association.

67 Loi constitutionnelle n° 74-904 du 29 octobre 1974 portant révision de l’article 61 de la Constitution étendant la saisine du Conseil constitutionnel à 60 députés ou 60 sénateurs; Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République, article 29, prévoyant la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité.

68 See Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford, Hart publishing, 2009).

69 Toby Helm and Michael Savage, “Labour ditches radical reforms as it prepares ‘bombproof’ election manifesto”, The Guardian, 3 February 2024 ; Xander Elliards, “Labour ditch pledge to abolish Lords despite huge popular support”, 9 February 2024, https://www.thenational.scot/news/24108792.labour-ditch-pledge-abolish-lords-despite-huge-popular-support/ [8 January 2025].

70 See Meg Russell, “Parliamentary reform in the 2024 party manifestos”, The Constitution Unit, 19 June 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/06/19/parliamentary-reform-in-the-2024-party-manifestos/ [8 January 2025].

71 Prime minister Office, The King’s Speech 2024, 17 July 2024, 104 p.

72 Lisa James, “Who are the last hereditary peers?”, The Constitution Unit, 11 September 2024, https://constitution-unit.com/2024/09/11/who-are-the-last-hereditary-peers/ [8 January 2025].

73 See Peter Dorey, Alexandra Kelso, op. cit.

74 See Greg Stride, “Will the Council of the Nations and Regions improve central-local relations?”, Local Government Information Unit, 22 October 2024, https://lgiu.org/blog-article/will-the-council-of-the-nations-and-regions-improve-central-local-relations/ [8 January 2025].

75 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/672b46f5f03408fa7966d1d4/November_2024_-_Ministerial_Code.pdf [8 January 2025]; See Michael Gordon, “Labour’s Ministerial Code and Political Standards Reform”, U.K. Const. L. Blog, 5 December 2024, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [8 January 2025].

76 See Michael Gordon, “Creating an Integrity and Ethics Commission in the UK: The Case for Reform and Challenges for Implementation”, op. cit.

77 J. Langmead, “Was Keir Starmer’s freebie wardrobe really worth the hassle?”, The Times, 22 September 2024.

78 Peter Dorey, The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional Conservatism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2008).

Top of page

References

Electronic reference

Aurélien Antoine, “The House of Lords Reform: Labour’s Constitutional Holy Grail?”Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXX-3 | 2025, Online since 15 September 2025, connection on 15 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/14399; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/14qkh

Top of page

About the author

Aurélien Antoine

Aurélien Antoine is professor of public law at Jean Monnet University in Saint-Etienne. He is a member of  CERCRID (Saint-Etienne) and  CERSA (Paris Assas). He has held the Chair in Comparative Public Law and Politics at Jean Monnet University in Saint-Etienne since 2023. Most of his research focuses on British Public Law. His publications include Droit Constitutionnel Britannique (LGDJ, 2016, 2018) and  Le Brexit. Une histoire anglaise (Dalloz, 2020). Since 2017, he has been the Head of the Brexit Observatory: Post-Brexit UK and EU Research Group.

By this author

Top of page

Copyright

CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.

Top of page
Search OpenEdition Search

You will be redirected to OpenEdition Search