- 1 HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Dev (...)
- 2 During her short spell as prime minister, Liz Truss (after much hesitation) attended the first meet (...)
1The Russian invasion of Ukraine started half-way through the 2019-2024 parliament, in February 2022, and was a major shock to British - and European - foreign policy. As the UK left the European Union, the May and Johnson government had planned to develop an alternative foreign policy based on the idea of a “Global Britain”, articulated in numerous speeches and in the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.1 This involved a focus on Africa and especially China and the Indo-Pacific region more than on Europe, even though NATO and the Atlantic were also mentioned as priorities in the post-Brexit era. Instead, the exogenous shock of the war in Ukraine forced British leaders to move their attention back to their close neighbours. But it also provided Boris Johnson then Rishi Sunak2 with the opportunity to portray Britain as an active and influential player in the Euro-Atlantic scene outside of the European Union and to put Britain forward as the main supporter of Ukraine in Europe. Between 2022 and 2024 the UK provided unilateral (though coordinated with the US and the EU) diplomatic and military support to Ukraine, imposing sanctions on Russia and transferring military equipment worth over £7 billion while training Ukrainian troops in Britain.
- 3 See Pauline Schnapper, “L’impact de la guerre en Irak sur les élections de 2005”, Revue Française d (...)
2Foreign policy seldom features among the main themes debated during general elections in the UK, nor does it weigh heavily on their outcomes. “Bread and butter” issues usually dominate, with exceptions possibly including Iraq in the 2005 election or Brexit in the 2019 election.3 Indeed the response of the Johnson and Sunak governments was not contested by opposition parties or public opinion. Yet the lack of debate on the war in Ukraine in the 2024 election does not entail that British voters and politicians shared exactly the same views as two years before nor that this support should be taken for granted in the future, in a context marked by domestic contestation and economic constraints. This article therefore aims to test the hypothesis of stability in the British consensus on the war in Ukraine by examining the party stances and opinion polls around the general election as well as the decisions taken in the first year of the Starmer government. We argue that the Labour government’s choice to confirm and even improve aid to Ukraine can be accounted for not only by the traditional cross-party consensus on foreign policy in the UK but also by the continuous popular support for this policy and that this stability cannot necessarily be taken for granted in the future.
- 4 Christopher Hill, “Debating Britain’s role in the world: from decolonisation to Brexit”, Internatio (...)
- 5 Peter Magill, Wyn Rees, “UK Defence Policy After Ukraine: Revisiting the Integrated Review”, Surviv (...)
- 6 Benjamin Martill, “Return to Europe? Institutional choice, outsider status, and Britain’s response (...)
- 7 Federico Fabbrini, ‘EU–UK relations after the war in Ukraine: options to re-engage post Brexit’, We (...)
3Empirically, the article is a contribution to the literature on British foreign policy and the UK’s evolving position on the war in Ukraine. Christopher Hill has focused on Britain’s initial response and showed how it expressed support for Ukraine, guaranteed its right to defend its territorial integrity and contributed to prevent the conflict from escalating.4 Peter Magill and Wyn Rees focused on the consequences of the war on the UK’s defence policy and on the priorities listed in the Integrated Review.5 Ben Martill has shown how the war in Ukraine redesigned institutional frameworks and cooperation between the UK and NATO, which weakened the position of external players, notably non-EU member states such as post-Brexit Britain. His article focused on the way such a major crisis made Britain’s exclusion from EU security structures less tenable, leading Britain to pursue creative “outsider” strategies: leading through example, setting up new cooperative frameworks, and engaging via informal channels.6 As for Federico Fabbrini, his contribution focused on institutional developments in Europe after February 2022. According to him, the creation of the European Political Community, the renewal of NATO and of the Council of Europe, or the evolution of the EU’s constitutional framework as well as the process of enlargement to Ukraine, provided the UK with opportunities to reconnect with the EU.7 However, none of the existing studies focuses specifically on the domestic debate on Ukraine and the way it has shaped Britain’s response to the invasion. This article thus aims to fill a gap in the literature by providing a detailed, multi-dimensional examination of British support to Ukraine, which includes military, financial, humanitarian, and diplomatic dimensions, and situates this policy within the framework of neoclassical realism.
- 8 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics 51:1 (1998), p. (...)
- 9 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of Internat (...)
- 10 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds), Neoclassical Realism, the State, (...)
- 11 Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, “Winds of change? Neoclassical realism, foreign policy change, and (...)
4Theoretically, this article contributes to the literature on the way neoclassical realism can be used to analyse foreign policy. Neoclassical realism bridges the structural focus of neorealism - the international distribution of capabilities to account for states’ behaviour - with unit-level variables such as domestic politics and perceptions in order to explain foreign policy decisions. According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy decisions can only be explained by analysing “how systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structures.”8 Neoclassical realism thus seeks to theorise the manner in which domestic processes shape foreign policy outcomes.9 Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell and Norrin Ripsman propose an analysis of the causal chain in three parts: threat assessment, strategic adjustment, and resource mobilisation. Domestic institutions are pivotal in determining who speaks with authority on foreign threats. Furthermore, domestic bargains shape whether a state balances, bandwagons, or buck-passes. The capacity of governments to mobilise resources, whether through taxation, public support, or institutional coordination, ultimately sets real-world limits on strategy.10 One of the strengths of neoclassical realism thus lies in its ability to unpack the rationale behind why states faced with similar structural challenges make divergent choices. Martill and Sus’s comparative study of European responses to the Russia-Ukraine War makes this vividly clear. It would be insufficient to merely observe a shared increase in threat assessment; the critical insight resides in the manner in which domestic publics, political actors, and elites interpret, deliberate, and operationalise that pressure.11 They analyse the constraints imposed by the international environment - here the invasion of Ukraine and the threat to European security - but insist national leaders cannot freely choose to direct resources to foreign policy and defence. Instead, domestic power dynamics and public opinion need to be taken into account. Neoclassical realism therefore requires an analysis of the domestic context in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented.
5In the first section, we present the apparent consensus present in the general election manifestos and the lack of debate about the war in Ukraine during the general election campaign. We then analyse the elements of continuity in policy towards Ukraine between the previous Conservative governments and the first few months of the Labour government under Keir Starmer in 2024-2025. Finally, we qualify this consensus by examining Nigel Farage’s ambiguous rhetoric on Ukraine and more broadly the possible limits to voters’ consent linked to the cost of support for Ukraine and the UK’s limited resources, thereby confirming that a purely realist approach would fail to understand the limits to British engagement.
- 12 “Clear Plan, Bold Action, Secure Future”, Conservative Party Manifesto 2024. https://public.conserv (...)
- 13 National Audit Office, “Investigation into military support for Ukraine”, Ministry of Defence, HC23 (...)
6Support for Ukraine was not a contentious issue during the 2024 general election, as illustrated in the manifestos published by the main UK parties. Unsurprisingly, the Conservative party - still in power then - boasted that it had “led the world in support of Ukraine” and repeated its commitment to guarantee “Ukraine the support it needs for the long haul, assuring current levels of support for as long as they are required”, including by using immobilised Russian assets.12 It made no reference to any financial or diplomatic limit to this effort nor to the strains on the British military that donations of equipment to Ukraine might involve. This was in line with Boris Johnson’s high-profile support for the Ukrainian war effort following the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, symbolised by his trips to Kyiv and the scope of the UK’s provision of military aid to Ukraine. With £8.5 billion, Britain was by Spring 2024 the third largest provider after the US and Germany.13
7The words used by the Labour party were very similar. Only one paragraph was devoted to the war in Ukraine in the manifesto, but the elements of continuity with the incumbent government were obvious, both at the diplomatic and military levels:
“With Labour, the UK’s military, financial, diplomatic and political support for Ukraine will remain steadfast. Labour will support efforts to hold Putin’s Russia to account for its illegal war, backing calls for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression. We will work with our allies to enable the seizure and repurposing of frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine. And we will play a leading role in providing Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership”.14
- 15 Heather Stuart, “Jeremy Corbyn urges west to stop arming Ukraine”, The Guardian, 2 August 2022. htt (...)
- 16 David Lammy, “What is Labour’s Foreign Policy”, Chatham House, 24 January 2023. https://chathamhous (...)
8The stability implied in this commitment should not be understated. It bore the mark of Keir Starmer, who was keen to distance his party from the pacifist and anti-NATO stance of his predecessor, Jeremy Corbyn. Indeed, Corbyn, then suspended from the party and sitting as an independent MP, had opposed arming Ukraine in August 2022, as in his view this was only going to prolong the conflict.15 Under Starmer, Labour’s foreign policy instead returned to the Atlanticist tradition of Labour which previous leaders, from Attlee to Blair, had pursued. David Lammy, then Shadow Foreign Secretary, had already insisted in early 2023 that Labour supported the Conservative government policy on Ukraine, adding that “Britain is united on this. Whoever’s in Government, the UK will stand with Ukraine for the long haul.”16 The manifesto only confirmed this stance.
9Smaller parties, though devoting little space to Ukraine in their manifestos and in the campaign, shared the two main parties’ solidarity with Ukraine in the war against Russia. Thus the Liberal Democrats mentioned in the general election manifesto the need to seize Russian frozen assets “so that we can stand with Ukraine even if US support wavers”, in a rare reference to a possible Trump re-election in November.17 More surprising maybe, considering their pacifist tradition, the Green party also pledged stability in their support for Ukraine “as it resists Russian invasion” in their manifesto. The nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales shared this wide consensus. The Scottish National Party manifesto pledged to:
“do everything in our power to see the restoration of peace and ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty, democracy, independence and territorial integrity is maintained. We will continue to back military support from the United Kingdom to Ukraine and will press the UK government to ensure the sanctions regime against Russia is effective.”
10Similarly Plaid Cymru simply stated that it “believes that Ukraine’s national sovereignty and the right of Ukrainians to live in peace must be upheld. We believe that Ukraine has a right to defend itself against attack and invasion.”18
11At first sight therefore, the British response to the war in Ukraine fits well with a purely realist framework, where the state reacts to an external threat with a unity of purpose. Ukraine was barely mentioned and clearly not a salient issue in the campaign, but in so far as they touched on it, the leaders of most mainstream parties supported both the unilateral and multilateral conduits - through NATO mostly, but also by cooperating with the EU - by which the support for Ukraine was organised between 2022 and 2024. In the general election campaign, they renewed their commitment to the country in the long term.
12The only exception to this pattern was Reform UK, which did not mention it once in its “Contract with you”, only committing to an increase in defence spending to 6% of GDP within six years (against 2.3% at the time).19 Indeed, as we will see below in the third part, Nigel Farage’s ambiguous statements about Russia and Ukraine before and after the general election illustrated an exception to this widespread consensus, which did not harm his party electorally.
13After July 2024, Keir Starmer’s government insisted on continuous support to Ukraine. Luke Pollard, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defence declared:
- 20 Luke Pollard, Ukraine: Guided Weapons, Answer to a written question, UIN 129, 25 July 2024. https:/ (...)
“We continue to provide military aid to support Ukraine’s clear right of self-defence against Russia’s illegal attacks in accordance with international humanitarian law. We are clear that equipment provided by the UK is intended for the defence of Ukraine”.20
- 21 David Lammy, “The Case for Progressive Realism,” Foreign Affairs, 17 April 2024. https://www.foreig (...)
- 22 David Lammy, “Labour’s foreign policy will be realistic about us as a nation, not nostalgic about w (...)
14The government’s support to Ukraine was thus presented as being a just cause – defending the country against an illegal attack – and a legal obligation, based on international law. This approach can be analysed as the first example of the doctrine Labour claimed would be guiding their approach to foreign affairs: ‘progressive realism.’21 According to then shadow foreign secretary David Lammy, “supporting Ukraine is not only a moral imperative, but a strategic necessity”. According to him, progressive realism aimed to bring together Ernest Bevin’s realism and Robin Cook’s ‘ethical dimension.’22 A few months later, Keir Starmer confirmed that:
- 23 Keir Starmer, statement, HC Deb, vol. 757, col. 371-373, 21 November 2024.
“The UK’s support for Ukraine is always for self-defence, and it is proportionate, co-ordinated and agile. It is a response to Russia’s own actions, and it is in accordance with international law. Under article 51 of the UN charter, Ukraine has a clear right of self-defence against Russia’s illegal attacks”.23
15Following on from the support given by the Conservatives, assistance to Ukraine included military aid, financial assistance, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic initiatives. This comprehensive approach was consistent with Britain’s commitment to Ukraine’s full sovereignty and regional stability. One of the Labour government’s earliest and most striking actions was to reaffirm and expand the UK’s military support to Ukraine.
- 24 Keir Starmer, “UK to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes”, Press release, 10 July 2024. http (...)
- 25 “UK support to Ukraine: factsheet”, gov.uk, 30 April 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publicatio (...)
- 26 Luke Pollard, Ukraine: Military Aid, Written Question, House of Commons, UIN 993, 30 July 2024. htt (...)
16The government confirmed the UK’s commitment to allocating £3 billion annually in military support until 2030-31 at least.24 This long-term support is particularly significant as it represents a significant shift in Britain’s strategic planning, reflecting the UK’s acknowledgement of the potentially enduring nature of the conflict. The aid package included critical missiles, air defence systems, artillery vehicles and weapons, as well as advanced battlefield technologies such as drones and electronic warfare tools.25 A cornerstone of Britain’s military aid to Ukraine was the Defence Industrial Support Treaty signed on 19 July 2024, which enabled Ukrainian procurement of UK-made defence equipment through £3.5 billion in guaranteed loans.26 This not only contributed to strengthening Ukraine’s ability to procure essential military capabilities, but also to fostering industrial collaboration between the two countries’ defence sectors.
- 27 Ministry of Defence, “UK to extend training programme for Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel througho (...)
17Besides, Operation Interflex, the UK-led military training initiative, continued to scale up under Labour. By September 2024, more than 45,000 Ukrainian troops had received training from British and allied forces. The number had reached 54,000 personnel by April 2025. The training not only tackled basic infantry training, it also included training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter jets as well as teaching battlefield medicine to Ukrainian medics, and supporting military chaplains.27 With training set to continue throughout 2025, the programme constituted one of the most impactful forms of indirect military assistance in the war.
- 28 Dan Bloom and Noah Keate, “UK’s Starmer says Ukraine support is ‘self-defense’ after Storm Shadows (...)
18Furthermore, in autumn 2024, the UK authorised Ukraine to use British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russian territory. This constituted a substantial policy shift, which was nonetheless consistent with similar decisions made by the USA and France. The decision aimed to reinforce Ukraine’s defensive capabilities in the face of intensifying Russian offensives and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks. Keir Starmer insisted the UK’s support to Ukraine continued to be “proportionate, coordinated and agile” and a legal response to Russia’s actions. On the contrary, Russia insisted Britain could be considered to be “directly involved” in the war.28 The decision thus highlighted the UK’s commitment to supporting Ukraine while navigating the risks of further escalation.
- 29 Rachel Reeves, Statement, House of Commons, 22 October 2024. https://questions-statements.parliamen (...)
- 30 John Healey, quoted in Jonathan Beale, “UK to boost Ukraine funding using £2bn from Russian assets” (...)
- 31 “‘The shadow fleet’: a call to action”, Blenheim Palace, 18 July 2024. https://assets.publishing.se (...)
- 32 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “UK announces largest sanctions package against Russi (...)
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation, “Introducing OTSI”, 11 October 2024. https://otsi.blog.go (...)
19In addition to military support, the Labour government committed considerable financial resources to support the Ukrainian economy. In autumn 2024, the UK contributed £2.26 billion to the G7’s Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans to Ukraine scheme.29 The ERA Loans initiative notably consisted in using windfall profits generated from immobilised Russian sovereign assets held in Europe and North America in an effort to make Russia pay for the damage caused in Ukraine, “turning the proceeds of Putin’s own corrupt regime against him, by putting it into the hands of Ukraine.”30 Besides, the Starmer government intensified sanctions against Russia, and particularly targeted Russia’s “shadow fleet” (a network of vessels used to evade Western sanctions and transport oil and other restricted goods). In July 2024, the UK led a call to action at the European Political Community summit, which resulted in over 40 countries endorsing efforts to tackle this fleet.31 As of February 2025, the UK had imposed sanctions on 133 oil tankers, the highest number among European nations, which effectively disrupted Russia’s energy revenue streams.32 In addition to maritime sanctions, the UK has expanded its focus to include Russia’s military-industrial complex. In February 2025, the UK launched a new sanctions package targeting individuals and entities that supply Western-sanctioned goods to Russia’s military. This included the first use of expanded designation powers, akin to secondary powers. An example of this is the sanctioning of OJSC Keremet Bank, which is based in Kyrgyzstan, for providing financial services to Russia.33 The UK also took measures to reinforce its sanctions enforcement mechanisms with the creation of the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) in October 2024.34
- 35 British Embassy Kyiv, “Ukraine Donor Platform confirms support for Ukraine's recovery and reconstru (...)
20The UK also maintained a strong fiscal support programme for Ukraine through the World Bank. Labour confirmed the UK’s guarantee of over £4.1 billion in multilateral loans to sustain Ukraine’s economic stability and support public services, plus a further £977 million in bilateral support.35 This assistance was critical in helping Ukraine maintain public services in the face of ongoing attacks on its territory and economy, thereby contributing to limiting the humanitarian and refugee crises. These efforts reflected the Labour government’s understanding of the importance of economic resilience in Ukraine’s broader struggle and the need to set the conditions for the country’s reconstruction after the war.
- 36 Prime Minister, “Prime Minister announces new sanctions and £35 million of emergency support for Uk (...)
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “New UK support for Ukraine drives forward 100 Year P (...)
- 39 “UK support to Ukraine: factsheet”, gov.uk, 30 April 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publicatio (...)
21The humanitarian aspect of the UK’s support under Labour was both practical and symbolic. The government announced at least £120 million in humanitarian aid through the 2024-25 fiscal year, with a particular emphasis on supporting the most vulnerable during winter, as well as on the provision of medical supplies and food assistance. This funding brought the UK’s total humanitarian assistance since 2022 to over £477 million. A large part of aid was coordinated through UN agencies and NGOs so as to ensure that it is delivered to those most in need in conflict zones and among displaced populations.36 The provision of support to energy infrastructure also became a key aspect of the UK’s aid strategy, particularly as Russia continued its targeted strikes on Ukraine’s power grid. The UK committed over £400 million to support Ukraine’s energy resilience. This included an £84 million contribution to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund. In December 2024, the Prime Minister further committed £20 million to support emergency energy needs,37 and £33 million to the Innovate Ukraine Green Energy Competition, the second round of which was launched in February 2025.38 Besides, another significant initiative supported by the British government was the effort to ensure the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. The UK cooperated with Ukrainian authorities and international regulators to help monitor and safeguard the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and other high-risk sites. This was crucial in ensuring civilian protection and preventing ecological disaster.39
- 40 United Kingdom and Ukraine, One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement, 16 January 2025. https://assets (...)
- 41 United Kingdom and Ukraine, “UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership Declaration”, gov.uk, 17 January 2025. (...)
- 42 Keir Starmer, Chair’s Statement: Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, London, 2 March 2025. https://www.gov. (...)
- 43 Ministry of Defence, “Coalition of the Willing: Joint UK-France statement following 10 April meetin (...)
- 44 Ministry of Defence and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “UK continues to step up for (...)
22Lastly, in terms of diplomacy, the Labour government anchored the UK’s continuous support to Ukraine in a long-term alliance. In January 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a landmark 100 Year Partnership covering issues ranging from security to economic cooperation.40 The agreement encompasses support for post-war reconstruction, political modernisation and reform guidance, and educational and scientific exchange programmes.41 Two months later, in March 2025, the UK hosted the London Summit on Ukraine which brought together international leaders who agreed on a joint declaration encompassing four primary objectives. These objectives included long-term military support to Ukraine and further sanctions on Russia, conditions for a peace agreement, support for Ukraine’s defence capabilities to deter future invasions, and the development of a “coalition of the willing” to guarantee Ukraine’s security after any peace agreement.42 The UK, jointly with France, then took the lead in the effort to build the “coalition of the willing”.43 Besides, the UK also intensified its support for Ukraine’s effort in seeking justice for war crimes committed by Russia and provided a further £4.5m in December 2024, designed to aid Ukraine’s “documentation, investigation and prosecution of war crimes”.44 This effort is part of the UK’s broader objective to ensure that Russian military and political leaders are held accountable for violations of international law.
23After assuming power in July 2024, the Labour government thus confirmed and even reinforced the UK’s role as a critical ally of Ukraine. Decisions made in the first few months after the general election not only intensified military and economic support, but also laid the groundwork for a long-lasting strategic partnership. The government combined defence assistance, financial aid, humanitarian relief and diplomatic leadership to confirm the UK’s role as one of the main supporters of Ukraine’s sovereignty and post-war recovery. As the war continued into its fourth year, the consistent support of the Labour party signaled that the UK continued to see Ukraine’s victory and reconstruction to be a vital issue for European security as a whole.
24The party consensus about Ukraine, conspicuous since 2022, should be qualified for several reasons, including some emerging signs of doubts about the outcome of the war among British public opinion and the rise of Reform UK. Together with the reelection of Donald Trump in the US, they point to a more fragile consensus than may be apparent at first sight and a possible challenge to the UK’s present policy in Ukraine.
- 45 “British public opinion about the conflict in Ukraine, three years on”, ipsos.com, 23 February 2025 (...)
- 46 Matthew Smith, “Where does Western Europe stand on Ukraine, Donald Trump and national defence?”, yo (...)
- 47 Jon Henley and Luke Harding, “Support for Ukraine ‘until it wins’ falls sharply in western Europe, (...)
- 48 Michele Consolini, “Support for Ukraine still high among EU citizens but some fall off apparent amo (...)
- 49 Jon Henley and Luke Harding, “Support for Ukraine ‘until it wins’ falls sharply in western Europe, (...)
25First, British public opinion on the war in Ukraine has remained broadly supportive over time, even if signs of fatigue and increasing scepticism appeared. While a majority has continued to express support for military assistance to Ukraine in 2024 and 2025, concerns regarding the duration of the war, its economic implications, and the role played by such external actors as the USA nuanced public sentiment. As of early 2025, over half of Britons (approximately 53%) expressed support for the UK government’s provision of economic, humanitarian and defensive military assistance to Ukraine. The level of support has remained relatively stable since November 2024, though it declined from a peak of 68% in February 2023.45 The British public’s primary concerns regarding the conflict pertain to its impact on Ukrainian civilians (77%), the UK economy (71%) and national security (67%). These concerns have remained consistent since August 2023, which suggests that the public has continued to engage with the war’s broader implications, even if only a small majority (52%) were open to deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine in case a peace agreement were found.46 Nevertheless, the level of support for Ukraine in the UK is comparable to that found in Nordic and central and eastern European countries where a significant majority believe their countries are not providing enough assistance to Ukraine. For instance, 66% of Danes and 63% of Swedes think that overall support is insufficient.47 And in spite of a recent decline, central and eastern European nations have demonstrated consistent strategic alignment and historical solidarity with Ukraine.48 In contrast, in southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and France, support for military aid is weaker among the population where there is a stronger preference for a negotiated peace settlement, even at the cost of territorial concessions.49 These regional differences reflect differing threat perceptions, economic priorities, and political cultures. The UK’s firmer support to Ukraine places it closer to the northern and eastern flank of Europe’s response to the war.
- 50 “British public opinion about the conflict in Ukraine, three years on”, ipsos.com, 23 February 2025 (...)
- 51 Patrick Wintour and Rowena Mason, “Nigel Farage's relationship with Russian media comes under scrut (...)
- 52 Peter Walker, “Nigel Farage claims Russia was provoked into Ukraine war”, The Guardian, 21 June 202 (...)
- 53 Noah Keate, “Nigel Farage: Ukraine can’t win”, Politico, 21 November 2024. https://www.politico.eu/ (...)
- 54 Ben Quinn, “Keir Starmer accuses Reform UK of ‘fawning over Putin’”, The Guardian, 3 April 2025. ht (...)
- 55 “Support for Farage’s Reform UK party drops after Ukraine comments”, Euractiv.com, 28 June 2024. ht (...)
26Besides, support for Ukraine transcends traditional political divisions in the UK but nuances exist among different voter groups. For example, while 50% of 2024 Reform UK voters believe that the UK has provided the appropriate level of support to Ukraine, 35% think that too much has been given.50 The leader of Reform UK, Nigel Farage, has adopted a critical stance on the UK’s support to Ukraine, even if the party’s 2024 manifesto did not include any reference to Ukraine. Farage’s approach is consistent with his absence of criticism of Russian democracy when he was a regular guest on Russia Today (later known as RT), a Russian state-controlled news channel.51 In June 2024, Farage said it was the EU and NATO ‘s eastwards expansion which “provoked” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. James Cleverly, the then home secretary, pointed out Farage’s statement echoed ‘Putin’s vile justification for the brutal invasion of Ukraine.’52 In November 2024, Reform UK’s leader confirmed he believed “Ukraine can’t win” and he criticised the military aid delivered to Ukraine, instead supporting President-elect Donald Trump’s idea of a peace settlement: “Is the use of American and British long-range missiles going to help him in that process or make it more difficult?”53 In April 2025, during the local elections campaign, Keir Starmer accused Farage of “fawning over Putin”, which was part of a broader political strategy to leverage public support against Reform UK.54 Although comments on Farage’s personal bonds to Russia and Putin led to a decline in support for the party in the polls ahead of the general election,55 Reform UK’s popularity and relative electoral successes in the general election and rise in opinion polls (reaching over 30% and overtaking both Labour and the Conservative party in Spring 2025) show that parts of the electorate either share Farage’s views or are not deterred by them.
- 56 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “Weimar+ Statement by Germany, France, Poland, Italy, (...)
27Second, Britain’s foreign policy consensus was further challenged by the reelection of Donald Trump as President of the USA and what it entails for transatlantic relations, particularly concerning Ukraine, and the future of US involvement in the security of the European continent. The Labour government has taken a proactive stance in response to Trump’s approach to Ukraine. Trump’s exclusion of European and Ukrainian leaders from peace negotiations with Russia led the UK to seek deeper cooperation with European partners, for example through the Weimar+ alliance. The original Weimar Triangle, which includes France, Germany, and Poland, was widened in February 2025 to include Italy, the UK, Spain as well as the European External Action Service and the European Commission. Together, they insisted any peace agreement must involve Ukraine and protect European security interests.56
- 57 Josh Self, “From Starmer to Farage: what responses to Trump’s attack on Zelenskyy reveal”, politics (...)
- 58 George Allison, “Former defence ministers warn ‘a new reality faces Europe’”, UKDJ, 13 February 202 (...)
28The Conservative Party, led by Kemi Badenoch since November 2024, reasserted its steadfast commitment to NATO as the cornerstone of Britain’s and European security. However, Badenoch’s initial silence on Trump’s negotiations with Russia drew criticism. She later affirmed support for Ukraine and emphasised the importance of standing against Putin’s aggression.57 Other major figures in the Conservative Party, such as former Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, called for the UK to assume greater leadership in European security so as to fill in the gap left by a retreating US.58 Nevertheless, Badenoch’s hesitance might have to do with the pressure exerted by Reform UK on the Conservative Party as she feared losing votes and seats to Reform in the May 2025 local elections - which is indeed what happened.
29Once again, the main dissenting voice came from Nigel Farage’s populist party. Farage has been a vocal supporter of Donald Trump; he appeared at his election rallies and visited his residence in Mar-a-Lago. His support included backing the US President’s promise to negotiate a peace settlement.59 Yet, in March 2025, Farage distanced himself from Trump’s approach to ceasefire talks, declaring that Russia was “getting far too much”.60 This turnaround can be explained by the fact that Trump proved to be much more unpopular in the UK than what Farage expected. Therefore, showing some distance was a way for him to reach out to those voters who might be worried by Reform’s lenient attitude towards Trump and Russia.
- 61 Niamh Foley, Louisa Brooke-Holland, Claire Mills, UK Defence Spending (London, House of Commons Lib (...)
- 62 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Spending Review 2025, CP 1336 (June 2025). <https://assets.publishin (...)
30Finally, tensions about spending choices may rise in the future. In its first year in power, the Starmer government pledged to increase defence spending in general (including for Ukraine) while also investing in infrastructure, nuclear energy and housing in the UK.61 With limited economic growth, the government faces difficulties in meeting public demands for spending on public services including health, education and the police.62
31As a conclusion, the UK’s support for Ukraine since July 2024 has been shaped by domestic political debates, public opinion, and significant external developments. While the Labour government has reinforced its commitment to Ukraine, opposition parties have expressed varying degrees of support and concern. Public opinion remains cautiously supportive, with apprehensions regarding the implication of increased defence spending and the role of the USA under President Trump.
32Despite foreign policy traditionally playing a limited role in general elections, the UK’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has emerged as a rare case of cross-party consensus, with both the Conservative and Labour governments maintaining strong and continuous support for Ukraine. This enduring consensus, underpinned by a blend of strategic interest and moral obligation, highlights the relevance of neo-classical realism to account for Britain’s foreign policy choices and shows that they are neither dictated solely by external threats nor detached from domestic constraints and political calculations.
33The Labour government not only upheld but expanded the scope of the UK’s support for Ukraine through military aid, economic assistance, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic initiatives. The articulation of a ‘progressive realism’ doctrine has enabled the government to present its policy as both ethically sound and strategically necessary. Nevertheless, the durability of the consensus remains brittle. While public opinion is, in general, supportive, there are signs of fatigue, particularly in the context of economic strains and uncertainties around the future of US support under Donald Trump’s second presidency. The rise of populist voices, most notably Nigel Farage and Reform UK who by 2025 had overtaken the Conservative party in opinion polls, introduces a strain of dissent that questions the cost and scope of the UK’s engagement. Farage’s ambiguous rhetoric and electoral success suggest that segments of the electorate are either sympathetic to more isolationist stances or willing to overlook foreign policy issues in favour of domestic concerns. With Reform UK riding high in polling intentions, this adds an element of uncertainty as to the UK’s continuous support to Ukraine in the long run and more generally its international commitments.
34Furthermore, Trump’s decision to exclude European allies from peace negotiations constituted a shift in transatlantic dynamics and led the UK to intensify its coordination with European partners outside the EU framework. This development raises critical questions about the future of British foreign policy autonomy and its leadership role in European security.
35In sum, while the UK’s support for Ukraine has thus far been resilient and relatively unanimous, its stability depends on evolving domestic alignments, economic capacities, and international developments. Stable support is thus not guaranteed, and understanding its potential erosion is key to anticipating possible future shifts in the UK’s foreign policy trajectory.