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Lost in Transition? The “Special Relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States in a Year of Electoral Uncertainties

La « relation spéciale » entre le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis pendant une année d’incertitudes électorales
Sylvain Gaillaud

Abstracts

In 2021, the British Integrated Review described the United States as the United Kingdom’s most important strategic ally. However, the political instability caused by Brexit hindered the restoration of the transatlantic trust, already eroded during the first Trump administration. The prospect of Trump’s return to power threatened the relational reset implemented by the Starmer government with the Biden administration. After a year of electoral uncertainties, this paper assesses the current state of the UK-US special relationship. The US presidential campaign which followed the UK general election indeed tested the political relationship between the Labour Prime Minister and the Republican nominee then President-elect, requiring from Starmer a courting strategy towards Trump. The policy implemented by the new US administration has also affected the intelligence, defence, and nuclear pillars of the relationship, compelling once again the UK to “pay the price” of the alliance with the US.

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Introduction

  • 1 UK Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2021), (...)
  • 2 Alex Danchev, “On Specialness”, International Affairs 72:4, 1996, pp. 737-750.
  • 3 Jorgen Rasmussen, James McCormick, “British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relation (...)
  • 4 John Dumbrell, Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (London: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 131 (...)
  • 5 John Dumbrell, “The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature”, The British J (...)
  • 6 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill and the wartime Anglo-American alliance, 1935–1945: towards a (...)

1The 2021 British Integrated Review described the United States as the United Kingdom’s “most important strategic ally.”1 It thus reaffirmed the “special relationship” that existed between the UK and the US during the Cold War, based on shared language, history, and vision of the world. Scholars have extensively discussed the myths and realities of the so-called UK-US “special relationship”. Historian Alex Danchev categorised it into three schools: the evangelical school, which is concerned with cultural values and personal identities; the functional school, which highlights various pillars of cooperation (intelligence, defence, nuclear); and the terminal school, which discusses the longevity of the relationship.2 Political scientists Jorgen Rasmussen and James McCormick argued that the special nature of the relationship cannot be limited to the personality compatibility of leaders, because they remain in power only for a short time.3 Historian John Dumbrell attributed instead the longevity of the relationship to “habits of cooperation, bureaucratic contact and (especially) defence and intelligence personnel interviewing.”4 Even so, the balance of power between the two partners is notoriously unequal: the relationship appears to be spoken of “largely in British accents5, and, according to historian David Reynolds, “a tradition invented as a tool of diplomacy6 to preserve the UK influence in the US.

  • 7 Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference, (...)
  • 8 See for instance Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American relations”, Journal of Transatlant (...)
  • 9 David Lammy, Britain Reconnected. A Foreign Policy for Security and Prosperity at Home (London: The (...)
  • 10 “Britain’s man in the US says Trump is ‘inept’”, The Mail on Sunday, 6 July 2019, https://www.daily (...)
  • 11 “The End of the Special Relationship?”, The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2019, https://www.wsj.com/ (...)
  • 12 Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations”, p. 287.
  • 13 William Wallace, Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the special relationship”, International Affair (...)

2The 2016 referendum unsettled transatlantic trust. President Donald Trump first predicted a great post-Brexit relationship between “a strong and independent UK” and the US.7 However, he had a difficult relationship with Prime Minister Theresa May and condemned the poor handling of Brexit.8 According to then Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy, the political chaos that followed the referendum became a cause for great concern in the US.9 Moreover, during the tenure of Sir Kim Darroch at the British Embassy in Washington, the bilateral relationship hit a record low. Some of Sir Kim’s cables to the FCO, overtly critical of the US administration, leaked in the press, causing embarrassment in London and anger in Washington.10 Reynolds went as far as to consider this as “the end of the special relationship.”11 However, internationalist Steve Marsh opposed that “past precedents indicate that Anglo-American relations are very capable of enduring periods of poor President-Prime Minister relations.”12 Indeed, according to internationalists William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, the relationship embeds “specific security arrangements which have persisted, largely unquestioned, through the ups and downs of political relations at the top.”13

  • 14 Change, The Labour Party Manifesto (London: The Labour Party, 2024), p. 117.
  • 15 Ruike Xu, Wyn Rees, “American and the Special Relationship: the impact of the Trump administration (...)
  • 16 Keith Dowding and Richard Kimber, “The Meaning and Use of ‘Political Stability’”, European Journal (...)

3The Labour victory at the June 2024 UK general election helped to restore stability in the bilateral relationship. The Labour party manifesto had presented the US as “an indispensable ally.14 However, the prospect of another Trump administration after the November 2024 US presidential election threatened this relational reset. The memory of Trump’s disruptive diplomacy, as well as his political stances, renewed concerns about a destabilisation of the bilateral relationship. Indeed, political scientists Ruike Xu and Wyn Rees argued in 2022 that the first Trump administration had damaged the “special relationship” by weakening its common sentiments and institutional underpinnings.15 After a year of electoral uncertainties, this paper assesses the current state of the US-UK “special relationship”. It seeks to verify whether the Starmer-Trump relationship has so far passed political scientists Keith Dowding and Richard Kimber’s test of stability: adapting to change without breaking down.16 It shows how the relationship has been tested by the Americans and how the British have worked to preserve it. The first part deals with the turmoil that has unsettled the political relationship between the UK and the US over the past year, and how the new Labour Government dealt with the challenges of Donald Trump’s entourage, presidential campaign and return to power. The second part evaluates the extent to which the policy of the new US administration could threaten the main pillars of the relationship (intelligence, defence, nuclear), and how the UK is working to keep the “special relationship” afloat.

Political relationship in turmoil

Forgive—and forget?

  • 17 “Bidenism Is Gasping in America. It’s Having a Moment in Britain”, Politico, 24 May 2024, https://w (...)
  • 18 “Inside Labour’s foreign policy: the key issues facing Keir Starmer”, The Times, 27 June 2024, http (...)
  • 19 Victoria Honeyman, “George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and John Major: A Tale of Two Relationships”, i (...)

4The Trump-Starmer relationship began on a difficult basis. The Labour Party under Starmer has kept close connections with the US Democratic Party. Sir Keir’s campaign drew some inspiration from Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential race: Matt Bennett and Josh Freed, of the American centrist think tank Third Way, advised Labour on electoral strategies the year before the election.17 A former student at Harvard and a personal friend of Barack Obama, Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy tried—unsuccessfully—to secure a meeting between the Labour party candidate and President Biden before the election.18 Transatlantic connections between political parties usually do not prove to be a liability. A wrong bet on George H. W. Bush did not prevent Prime Minister John Major from collaborating with President Bill Clinton in the 1990s, even if the UK-US relationship was then notoriously lukewarm.19

  • 20 Lammy’s Twitter account, 26 September 2017; 23 April 2019. “Lammy refuses to say he was wrong to ca (...)
  • 21 “Labour’s foreign policy will be realistic about us as a nation, not nostalgic about what we used t (...)
  • 22 Change, p. 117.

5However, four months before the US presidential election, Starmer’s pick for Foreign Secretary proved controversial. During the first Trump administration, Lammy, then a backbencher, famously described Trump as a “racist Ku Klux Klan and Nazi sympathiser,” “deluded, dishonest, xenophobic, narcissistic” and “not a friend of Britain.” When nominated at the FCDO, he refused to apologise for his words.20 As soon as Trump secured the Republican nomination, the Labour strategists nevertheless deployed considerable efforts to soften the tensions. Lammy reaffirmed that a Starmer government “should not fail to recognise that the US will remain the UK’s most essential ally, whoever occupies the White House.”21 He thus confirmed what the Labour party manifesto had already suggested: “Our special relationship […] transcends whatever political parties and individuals are in office.”22

  • 23 Ben Judah, A “Washington Strategy” for British Diplomacy (London: Policy Exchange, 2021).
  • 24 “Inside UK Labour’s push for a US special relationship—even with Trump”, Politico, 2 June 2024, htt (...)

6British journalist Ben Judah was hired to reach the Trumpian Republicans. A former fellow at the Hudson Institute and the Atlantic Council, with extensive networks in the US, Judah published four years ago a report calling for a new “Washington strategy” for British diplomacy.23 Lammy met Trump campaign adviser Chris LaCivita, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien. He talked to prominent Republican members of Congress. He reached likely members of a second Trump administration, including Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon adviser, and Ohio Senator J.D. Vance, who became Trump’s running mate.24

  • 25 “Labour’s Keir Starmer: I’ll make it work if Donald Trump wins”, Politico, 28 September 2023, https (...)
  • 26 “How Keir Starmer was quick to court Donald Trump with a 10-minute call”, The Times, 15 July 2024, (...)

7Starmer deployed the same efforts towards the Republican nominee. As leader of the opposition, he had suggested that a Trump victory would not be the “desired outcome.25 He then used the UK Embassy in Washington contacts in the Republican Party to become the first world leader to talk to Trump just after he survived an assassination attempt in July 2024. As a reward, Trump hosted Starmer at a two-hour dinner in New York in September. The Republican nominee paid tribute to a “very nice” and “very popular” Prime Minister.26 By securing alternative lines of communication in case a Starmer-Trump relationship misfired at the top, then courting the Republican candidate in a few weeks’ time, the Labour strategists thus paved the way to a settled relationship in the event of a Trump victory.

A campaign of mutual interferences

  • 27 Musk’s X account, 4 & 7 August 2024.
  • 28 Musk’s X account, 24 November 2024; 29 December 2024.

8The stabilisation process derailed first during the summer. While publicly endorsing Trump, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk began a digital feud against the Starmer government, using his social media platform X to criticise Labour policy. When far-right, anti-immigration protests and riots shook the UK, Musk claimed that Britain was facing a “civil war” over immigration. He blamed Starmer for a “two-tier policing,” cracking down harder on far-right groups than counter-protesters from ethnic minorities. This episode rooted a profound antagonism between Musk, who deplored that Britain had “turn[ed] into a police state,” and the Labour government, who blamed hate speech online for the inflammatory situation.27 As part of the government’s offensive against hate speech, the 2023 Online Safety empowers the UK communications watchdog with the ability to protect people against undesirable online contents. In reaction, Musk shared an online petition calling for another general election in the fall.28

  • 29 Patel’s LinkedIn account, 16 October 2024.

9Meanwhile, a suspected British inference in the American presidential campaign reignited tensions between the Trump team and the Starmer government. Sofia Patek, a senior Labour Party operative, published on LinkedIn a post reading: “I have nearly 100 Labour Party staff (current and former) going to the U.S. in the next few weeks heading to North Carolina, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. I have 10 spots available for anyone available to head to the battleground state of North Carolina – we will sort your housing.” An email contact was suggested at labourforkamala@gmail.com.29 The post was quickly deleted. Trump’s legal team filed a formal complaint to the Federal Election Commission. US election laws indeed ban foreign nationals from donating money to US election campaigns but allows individuals to “participate in campaign activities as an uncompensated volunteer.” Labour answered that staffers campaigning for Harris were paying for their own costs.

  • 30 “Trump Accuses U.K. Party of Election Meddling, Despite Links to Its Rivals”, The New York Times, 2 (...)
  • 31 “Why Labour’s involvement in US election is so damaging”, The Times, 23 October 2024, https://www.t (...)

10The formal complaint cited meetings between Labour members and advisers to Kamala Harris, the Democrat candidate, leading to “generously borrowed language and themes from prominent Labour Party officials.” Jonathan Ashworth, a former Labour Member of Parliament, Morgan McSweeney, Starmer’s chief of staff, and Matthew Doyle, Starmer’s communications adviser, confirmed afterwards that they had spoken with Harris’s entourage at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.30 Twenty former or current Labour officials and MPs attended the event. Some of them briefed the Harris campaign team on the lessons learned from Labour’s victory. Doyle and McSweeney nevertheless insisted that they did not, though the latter’s trip was funded by the party, suggesting he was present on official business.31 By creating a climate of mistrust, these reciprocal intrusions into the other one’s political business unsettled the recently eased political relationship.

Strengthening a personal relationship

11These tensions carried a heavy weight during the transition period. Starmer made sure to be one of the first world leaders to speak to Trump on the night of his election. During a five-minute phone call, both men “fondly” recalled their previous meeting.32 Starmer’s press release praised a “historic election victory” and reaffirmed his will that “the UK-US special relationship [would] continue to prosper on both sides of the Atlantic for years to come.”33 However, when the Prime Minister and the President-elect spoke again on the phone before Christmas, the result was disappointing. Both men conventionally agreed to strengthen the “close and historic relation between the UK and the US.” Starmer expressed his interest in a trip to Washington in the wake of the inauguration. But Trump, inconsistently, answered by mentioning his appreciation of the “modern” beard of the Prince of Wales, his golf course in Scotland, and Starmer’s “beautiful” wife, naming her the Prime Minister’s “greatest asset.”34

12Downing Street implemented a charm offensive to extend the special political relationship with the new White House. The Prime Minister was willing to meet the President before the end of January ahead of other European leaders. Downing Street has touted the prospect of an invitation to Parliament if Trump was to visit the UK.35 Given Trump’s weakness for the Windsors, discussions have also taken place about senior members of the Royal Family embarking on a tour of the US, possibly to coincide with the celebrations for the country’s 250th anniversary of independence.36 With no success: during their first phone call after the inauguration, both men agreed vaguely to “meet soon.”37

  • 38 “Peter Mandelson picked by Starmer as UK’s ambassador to US”, The Times, 19 December 2024, https:// (...)
  • 39 “Britain to Name Peter Mandelson as Ambassador to the U.S.”, The New York Times, 19 December 2024, (...)

13In an effort to strengthen the political relationship, Starmer selected Lord Peter Mandelson as the next UK ambassador to the US. A Labour veteran, Mandelson held several high-profile roles during Tony Blair’s and Gordon Brown’s governments and kept extensive contacts in the US. Even Nigel Farage, leader of Reform UK, and a long-time admirer of the US President, agrees that he “is a very clever man” who would be “respected” by Trump’s team.38 Still, his past criticism of the trade policies of the first Trump administration have not been unnoticed. In a 2018 article, he referred to Trump as “a bully and a mercantilist who thinks the US will gain in trade only when others are losing.”39

  • 40 “How Keir Starmer charmed Trump with a letter from King Charles”, The Times, 27 February 2025, http (...)

14The success of the British charm offensive proved debatable. Starmer finally visited Washington in late February 2025, following President Emmanuel Macron of France. The Prime Minister produced a letter from King Charles III inviting Trump to visit the UK for the second time, purposefully enhancing that “This has never happened before. This is unprecedented.” Both men added that they got along “famously” and that the bilateral relationship was “tremendous.”40 The stabilisation process of the Trump-Starmer link finally confirmed the importance of personalities in the “special relationship,” as well as the power balance between the partners. Its effects upon the institutional underpinnings of the relationship are yet to be assessed.

Bilateral cooperation under strain

Intelligence sharing: a test of trust

  • 41 Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-Fir (...)
  • 42 See in the first place Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Coopera (...)

15Laurence Martin and John Garnet noted that the power of inertia should not be understated in the relationship, as institutionalised deep-seated forms of cooperation develop their own logic, interests, and drive to self-preservation.41 Ever since World War 2, intelligence sharing has been a core component of the special relationship. A 1946 agreement established US-UK cooperation in signals intelligence (SIGINT), afterwards open to Canada, then Australia and New Zealand, to form the Five Eyes network. Permanent liaison officers have been posted by each partner to the other’s intelligence agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency in the US; the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, and the Government Communications Headquarters in the UK).42

  • 43 Change, p. 117.
  • 44 “Trump could threaten to withhold intelligence from UK, security sources warn”, The Independent, 7 (...)
  • 45 Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London, H (...)

16The Labour manifesto highlighted the importance of working with the US on the basis of shared values and common interests on defence and intelligence.43 However, Trump’s election raised concerns in the UK intelligence community. During his first term in office, he threatened to limit US-UK intelligence sharing after Britain awarded 5G contracts to Chinese firm Huawei. At the July 2024 NATO summit, his advisors suggested that intelligence sharing could be reduced as part of a broader plan to scale back US investment in the alliance.44 Still, political tensions usually do not impede cooperation on the ground: when in 1973, frustrated by the UK’s lack of support for Israel during the Kippur War, Henry Kissinger told the NSA to stop sharing SIGINT with the GCHQ, the NSA did not comply.45

  • 46 David V. Gioe, “How America’s Allies Boost U.S. Intelligence”, Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2025, h (...)
  • 47 House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, Corrected oral evidence: The UK’s fut (...)

17The recent disruption in the American intelligence community nevertheless worried the British. Tulsi Gabbard, the new Director of National Intelligence, has kept controversial contacts with Assad’s regime in Syria and the Russian Government. The FBI is now run by political loyalists Kash Patel and Dan Bongino with little experience of national security affairs. The dismissal of officers who do not embrace the MAGA cause also deprived the US intelligence community of professionals with the required judgment, temperament and integrity unknown of the newcomers.46 According to Sir Nigel Sheinwald, a former British Ambassador to the US, the preference for loyalty over competence could place some bottom-up strains on professional relationships, based until now on a high degree of professionalism.47

18In the end, the consequences of the political turmoil upon intelligence cooperation could be uneven. The SIGINT relationship would be the most resilient, because of its entanglement: American equipment is manned by the British, and the other way around; American officers are working at the GCHQ and British ones are working at the NSA. US and UK agencies are also mutually dependent: 80% of the intelligence shared by the CIA and the MI6 are provided by the Americans, but Britain still has important assets that are essential to America, such as overseas military and intelligence facilities, used to monitor communications in strategic regions of the world.48 However, the current crisis may hinder the liaison work and highlight the danger of an excessive reliance over US intelligence.

Defence strategy: a test of involvement

  • 49 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025. Making Britain Safer: secure at home, stron (...)
  • 50 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984 (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. xvii.
  • 51 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 82.
  • 52 Joint Leaders statement to mark the third anniversary of AUKUS, UK Government, 17 September 2024, h (...)

19The 2025 Strategic Defence Review describes the US as “the UK’s closest defence and security ally.49 British historian John Baylis highlighted the exceptional degree of intimacy and informality which was developed during World War 2.50 The defence relationship carried on afterwards, with British forces fighting alongside and in conjunction with their American counterparts in the first Gulf War, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The UK currently keeps around 900 military personnel and civil servants across 30 US states, ensuring its readiness to operate with the US from Day 1 of major operations. The US also bases over 10,000 forces at six RAF sites across the UK, providing US forces with access to Europe.51 The Starmer government reaffirmed the second pillar of the 2021 AUKUS agreement, which focuses on the development of interoperability between the UK, US and Australian armed forces.52

  • 53 Sir Robin Renwick, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War (London: Macmillan, 1 (...)
  • 54 House of Lords, Corrected oral evidence, p. 7.
  • 55 “UK under dual pressure to increase defence spending now”, The Times, 5 June 2025, https://www.thet (...)

20By complaining about the low levels of European defence spending, Trump reaffirms aloud a long-standing American feeling. Former British Ambassador to the US Sir Robin Renwick famously warned that “the price of consultation has always been presence and participation.”53 Sir Peter Westmacott, who succeeded him twenty years later, recalls the widespread impression in Washington that, notwithstanding their loyalty, the British forces are not what the Americans would like them to be.54 US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker asked in June 2025 the UK and all other member states to spend at least 5 percent of GDP on defence and security “starting now.” The numbers are currently 2.3%, and Starmer has promised to lift that to 2.5% by 2027. Sir Richard Barrons, who co-authored the Strategic Defence Review, suggested instead that the Labour government should spend 2.5% on defence now, to face the prospects of a war against Russia and a disengaged America.55 Starmer will soon be confronted with a crucial financial choice between his domestic and international agendas.

  • 56 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 73.
  • 57 “Make or break — Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with US teeters on edge”, The Times, 19 January 2 (...)
  • 58 “Trump allies urge President to block Starmer’s Chagos deal over Iran spying fears”, The Daily Tele (...)

21In this context, the 2025 Strategic Defence Review recommends that the UK should maximise the relationship’s potential by leveraging the UK’s niche capabilities and overseas bases.56 After three years of negotiations and six months of dispute, the UK and Mauritius finally signed in May 2025 an agreement on the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, thereby handed over to Mauritius. The UK keeps the right to exercise authority over the joint UK-US Diego Garcia military base. Mauritius allows the US and UK to access, maintain, and invest in the base for an initial 99-year period, and it will not allow other powers to use the outer islands around Diego Garcia without agreement with the UK. The initial deal had indeed raised concerns in the US, compelling Jonathan Powell, the UK National Security Advisor, to hold talks in Washington.57 US Secretary of State Mark Rubio, a China hawk, expressed concerns that the treaty would enable Beijing to gain malign influence and valuable intelligence. Some Republicans had also feared that the deal would make it easier for Iran to spy on the US military.58

Nuclear deterrence: a test of dependence

  • 59 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 98.
  • 60 John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdepende (...)
  • 61 Marion Messmer, Olivia O’Sullivan, “The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support–but there are n (...)

22The UK pivotal role in Western nuclear defence strategy also contributes to its influence in the US. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review promotes “a minimum, credible, independent UK nuclear deterrent, assigned to the defence of NATO.”59 Its links with the US deterrent is nevertheless binding. A 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) allows the US and the UK to exchange nuclear materials, technology, and information.60 The UK’s nuclear deterrent is currently based on the Trident weapons system. The UK purchases the missiles from the US. The Trident missiles rely on the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin for maintenance. Missiles have to return to the US for scheduled maintenance every few years. The UK also purchases the aeroshells required for producing nuclear warheads from the US. The Trident II D5 missile, deployed aboard the Vanguard class submarine, is held in a communal pool with the US, situated at the Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia.61

  • 62 Claire Mills, Amendments to the UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement (London: House of Commons Library, 2 (...)

23In a volatile international security environment, amendments to the MDA were published in July 2024, thereby perpetuating a cycle of UK dependence on the US. A first amendment makes the provisions on naval nuclear propulsion cooperation reciprocal and allows the UK to transfer technology to, and share information with, the US. Another one removes the expiry provisions and allows for the MDA to remain in force on an “enduring basis,” negating the need to renew certain provisions of the agreement every ten years. A last amendment adds new final provisions to the agreement that will ensure that information, material, or equipment shared or transferred under the MDA will continue to be protected should the agreement be terminated by either party in the future.62

  • 63 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 102.
  • 64 “US support to maintain UK’s nuclear arsenal is in doubt, experts say”, The Guardian, 8 March 2025, (...)

24To strengthen nuclear deterrence against the China and Russia threats, the UK plans to invest £15 billion in nuclear warheads and buy up to twelve attack submarines, developed under the AUKUS partnership. Given the dependence of its arsenal upon the missile technology and maintenance of an unstable ally, the reliability of UK deterrence nevertheless raises questions. Former UK Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who initiated France-UK nuclear cooperation, recently warned that Europe could be defenceless if American reliability ever came into question. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review suggests to begin discussions with NATO on the potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK participation in the Alliance’s nuclear mission.63 Other scenarios include the development of a domestic industrial capability for producing submarine-launched ballistic missiles to replace Trident, a lengthy and expensive endeavour; technical collaboration with France; or the provision of nuclear capabilities to NATO, with the UK and France receiving in exchange financial compensation.64

Conclusion

25After a year of electoral uncertainties which raised concerns upon the permanence of a “special relationship,” we can assess that the Starmer government finally managed to settle an alliance so far affected by the unsettling behaviour of its American part.

26The UK-US relationship indeed managed to adapt to the challenge of two elections without breaking down, thus passing Dowding and Kimber’s test of stability. Past controversies did not prevent Labourites from engaging with Trumpian Republicans. Reciprocal partisan transatlantic shows of support did not prevent the current UK Prime Minister and US President from vowing for a new chapter of the “special relationship.” The political reset of the alliance enabled the UK to benefit from preferential treatment in the current US trade war, even if its terms are yet to be negotiated.

27There are nevertheless challenges ahead. Trump’s singular statecraft and disruptive diplomacy will certainly try his British partners’ patience. The turmoil in the American intelligence community erodes the trust which is essential to liaison work. The changing patterns in the US foreign policy will compel the Starmer government to balance its economic, strategic, and diplomatic agendas. They also show the danger of the UK being too dependent on the US security umbrella.

  • 65 Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations”, p. 287-288.
  • 66 John Dumbrell, “The US-UK 'Special Relationship' in a world twice transformed”, Cambridge Review of (...)

28By passing Dowding and Kimber’s test of stability, the “special relationship” once again confirms the continual willingness of the British foreign policymaking elite to “pay the price” of staying close to Washington.65 The way the UK government under Starmer has undertaken to cope with an unstable US administration under Trump is thus no exception in the long story of a strained and uneven partnership. As long as British interests are judged best served by siding with the US, even with a long spoon, the “special relationship” will keep showing “a protean ability to survive.”66

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Notes

1 UK Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2021), p. 60.

2 Alex Danchev, “On Specialness”, International Affairs 72:4, 1996, pp. 737-750.

3 Jorgen Rasmussen, James McCormick, “British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship”, Political Science Quarterly 108:3, 2013, p. 516.

4 John Dumbrell, Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (London: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 131-132.

5 John Dumbrell, “The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, 2009, p. 65.

6 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill and the wartime Anglo-American alliance, 1935–1945: towards a new synthesis”, in Hedley Bull and William Roger Louis (eds.), The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American relations since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 85-86.

7 Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom in Joint Press Conference, 13 July 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-may-united-kingdom-joint-press-conference/ consulted 27 June 2025.

8 See for instance Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American relations”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 16:3, 2018, pp. 272-294 and Graham K. Wilson, “Brexit, Trump and the special relationship”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:3, 2017, pp. 543-557.

9 David Lammy, Britain Reconnected. A Foreign Policy for Security and Prosperity at Home (London: The Fabian Society, 2023), p. 33.

10 “Britain’s man in the US says Trump is ‘inept’”, The Mail on Sunday, 6 July 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7220335/Britains-man-says-Trump-inept-Cables-ambassador-say-dysfunctional.html consulted 27 June 2025.

11 “The End of the Special Relationship?”, The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-the-special-relationship-11563544911 consulted 27 June 2025.

12 Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations”, p. 287.

13 William Wallace, Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the special relationship”, International Affairs 85:2, 2009, p. 263.

14 Change, The Labour Party Manifesto (London: The Labour Party, 2024), p. 117.

15 Ruike Xu, Wyn Rees, “American and the Special Relationship: the impact of the Trump administration on relation with the UK”, British Politics 17:1, 2022, pp. 62-80.

16 Keith Dowding and Richard Kimber, “The Meaning and Use of ‘Political Stability’”, European Journal of Political Research 11:3, 1983, pp. 229-243.

17 “Bidenism Is Gasping in America. It’s Having a Moment in Britain”, Politico, 24 May 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/05/24/britain-labour-biden-centrist-00159727 consulted 27 June 2025.

18 “Inside Labour’s foreign policy: the key issues facing Keir Starmer”, The Times, 27 June 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/labour-foreign-policy-keir-starmer-government-xld8h9fwd consulted 27 June 2025.

19 Victoria Honeyman, “George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and John Major: A Tale of Two Relationships”, in Michael Patrick Cullinane and Martin Farr (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Presidents and Prime Ministers From Cleveland and Salisbury to Trump and Johnson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), pp. 297-318.

20 Lammy’s Twitter account, 26 September 2017; 23 April 2019. “Lammy refuses to say he was wrong to call Trump ‘neo-Nazi-sympathising sociopath’”, The Telegraph, 18 July 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/07/18/david-lammy-foreign-secretary-donald-trump-sociopath/ consulted 27 June 2025.

21 “Labour’s foreign policy will be realistic about us as a nation, not nostalgic about what we used to be”, The Guardian, 17 April 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/17/labours-foreign-policy-realistic-not-nostalgic-progressive-realism consulted 27 June 2025.

22 Change, p. 117.

23 Ben Judah, A “Washington Strategy” for British Diplomacy (London: Policy Exchange, 2021).

24 “Inside UK Labour’s push for a US special relationship—even with Trump”, Politico, 2 June 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-elections-labour-keir-starmer-relationship-us-elections-donald-trump/ consulted 27 June 2025.

25 “Labour’s Keir Starmer: I’ll make it work if Donald Trump wins”, Politico, 28 September 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-labour-keir-starmer-make-it-work-if-us-donald-trump-wins/ consulted 27 June 2025.

26 “How Keir Starmer was quick to court Donald Trump with a 10-minute call”, The Times, 15 July 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/how-keir-starmer-was-quick-to-court-donald-trump-with-a-10-minute-call-c53vz6pf5 consulted 27 June 2025.

27 Musk’s X account, 4 & 7 August 2024.

28 Musk’s X account, 24 November 2024; 29 December 2024.

29 Patel’s LinkedIn account, 16 October 2024.

30 “Trump Accuses U.K. Party of Election Meddling, Despite Links to Its Rivals”, The New York Times, 23 October 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/23/world/europe/uk-labour-party-trump.html consulted 27 June 2025.

31 “Why Labour’s involvement in US election is so damaging”, The Times, 23 October 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/labour-us-election-trump-starmer-meddling-jhvhpf3j7 consulted 27 June 2025.

32 “How Starmer will deal with Trump over trade, tariffs and Ukraine”, The Times, 8 November 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/how-starmer-will-deal-with-trump-over-trade-tariffs-and-ukraine-59tv99smc consulted 27 June 2025.

33 PM call with President-elect Trump, UK Government, 6 November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-elect-trump-6-november-2024 consulted 27 June 2025.

34 “Revealed: What Trump really said to Keir Starmer”, The Times, 3 January 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/donald-trump-said-to-keir-starmer-j8zszj00h consulted 27 June 2025.

35 “What a Trump presidency means for the UK”, The Times, 7 November 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/trump-harris-presidency-uk-snss6cgjv consulted 27 June 2025.

36 “Trump’s tariffs threaten UK defence budget, Treasury warned”, The Times, 20 January 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/trumps-tariffs-threaten-uk-defence-budget-treasury-warned-5m2x0qbjv consulted 27 June 2025.

37 PM call with President Trump, UK Government, 26 January 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-trump-of-the-united-states-26-january-2025 consulted 27 June 2025.

38 “Peter Mandelson picked by Starmer as UK’s ambassador to US”, The Times, 19 December 2024, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/lord-mandelson-ambassador-us-keir-starmer-trump-t3c59sffj consulted 27 June 2025.

39 “Britain to Name Peter Mandelson as Ambassador to the U.S.”, The New York Times, 19 December 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/19/world/europe/uk-peter-mandelson-us-ambassador.html consulted 27 June 2025.

40 “How Keir Starmer charmed Trump with a letter from King Charles”, The Times, 27 February 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/starmer-trump-highlights-key-moments-9g80cc77d consulted 27 June 2025.

41 Laurence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-First Century (London, Pinter/RIIA), 1997, p. 106.

42 See in the first place Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

43 Change, p. 117.

44 “Trump could threaten to withhold intelligence from UK, security sources warn”, The Independent, 7 November 2024, https://inews.co.uk/news/trump-threaten-withhold-intelligence-uk-security-3368958 consulted 27 June 2025.

45 Richard Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London, HarperPress, 2010), pp. 289-291.

46 David V. Gioe, “How America’s Allies Boost U.S. Intelligence”, Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-americas-allies-boost-us-intelligence consulted 27 June 2025.

47 House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, Corrected oral evidence: The UK’s future relationship with the US, 5 March 2025, p. 10.

48 “Can Britain live without American intelligence?”, Politico, 7 April 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-us-intelligence-relationship-strain-allies-ukraine-app/ consulted 27 June 2025.

49 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025. Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad (London: Crown, 2025), p. 73.

50 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984 (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. xvii.

51 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 82.

52 Joint Leaders statement to mark the third anniversary of AUKUS, UK Government, 17 September 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-leaders-statement-to-mark-the-third-anniversary-of-aukus consulted 27 June 2025.

53 Sir Robin Renwick, Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 394.

54 House of Lords, Corrected oral evidence, p. 7.

55 “UK under dual pressure to increase defence spending now”, The Times, 5 June 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/uk-under-dual-pressure-to-increase-defence-spending-now-0pf8jxftd consulted 27 June 2025.

56 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 73.

57 “Make or break — Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with US teeters on edge”, The Times, 19 January 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/world/us-world/article/make-or-break-britains-special-relationship-with-us-teeters-on-edge-28vvmjhkr consulted 27 June 2025.

58 “Trump allies urge President to block Starmer’s Chagos deal over Iran spying fears”, The Daily Telegraph, 25 January 2025, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/01/25/trump-allies-urge-block-starmer-chagos-deal-iran-spying/ consulted 27 June 2025.

59 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 98.

60 John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31:3, 2008, pp. 425-466.

61 Marion Messmer, Olivia O’Sullivan, “The UK’s nuclear deterrent relies on US support–but there are no other easy alternatives”, Chatham House, 16 April 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/uks-nuclear-deterrent-relies-us-support-there-are-no-other-easy-alternatives consulted 27 June 2025.

62 Claire Mills, Amendments to the UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement (London: House of Commons Library, 2024), p. 18.

63 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025, p. 102.

64 “US support to maintain UK’s nuclear arsenal is in doubt, experts say”, The Guardian, 8 March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/08/us-support-uk-nuclear-arsenal-in-doubt-trident-france consulted 27 June 2025.

65 Steve Marsh, “The US, BREXIT and Anglo-American Relations”, p. 287-288.

66 John Dumbrell, “The US-UK 'Special Relationship' in a world twice transformed”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17:3, 2004, pp. 438-439, 449.

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References

Electronic reference

Sylvain Gaillaud, “Lost in Transition? The “Special Relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States in a Year of Electoral Uncertainties”Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXX-3 | 2025, Online since 15 September 2025, connection on 16 December 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/14700; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/14qko

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About the author

Sylvain Gaillaud

Sylvain Gaillaud is an associate member of UMR SIRICE at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. He wrote a PhD dissertation about the “special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States during the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1970s-1980s). His research interests include the UK-US “special relationship”, transatlantic foreign policy and intelligence communities, and UK and US policies toward Iran.

Sylvain Gaillaud est membre partenaire de l’UMR SIRICE (université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne). Il est l’auteur d’une thèse sur les « relations spéciales » entre le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis à l’épreuve de la Révolution islamique en Iran (années 1970-années 1980). Ses recherches portent sur la notion de « relation spéciale », les communautés transatlantiques de politique étrangère et du renseignement et la politique iranienne du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis.

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The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.

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