1The socio-ecological transition of the pre-Alpine and Alpine regions in the context of climate change introduces increasing complexities in the transnational use of natural resources. These challenges highlight the need for bilateral and multilateral governance and joint management strategies to prevent conflicts and promote mutually beneficial solutions considering climate adaptation policies related to the sustainable use of water.
2The perspective adopted in this study is that of water grabbing, even though there is no universally agreed definition of the term. According to D’Odorico et al. (2024), Veldwisch and Franco (2012), Metha et al. (2012), Franco et al. (2013), the concept is typically related to socio-environmental phenomena of water appropriation that occurs when water resources are relatively scarce, and their appropriation comes at the expense of the environment, livelihoods, food security, and other critical current and future uses. From a more political perspective, the term refers to situations in which powerful actors are able to seize control of, or reassign to their advantage, water resources and/or water basins at the expense of local users who depend on these resources, or ecosystems that sustain their livelihoods (Franco et al., 2014). Water grabbing, in this perspective, involves the acquisition of decision-making power over water, including the authority to determine how and for what purposes water resources are used, both now and in the future (Franco et al., 2014). The type of values, use, property regimes, and rights are factors that define how water resources are accessed and used in socio-economic activities. Therefore, the interplay between hydrological characteristics, physical pathways of appropriation, and water tenure can produce different socio-hydrological outcomes, often resulting in unequal distributions of benefits and costs between “winners” and “losers” (D’Odorico et al., 2024).
3In particular, this paper elaborates on the concept of water grabbing in the Global North, critically examining how seemingly robust transboundary governance frameworks can hide rooted asymmetries in resource access, management and control in case of climate change. Firstly, grounded in the United Nations’ international water conventions and Sustainable Development Goal 6.5, this paper reviews the factors and power imbalances that facilitate water grabbing even among high‐performing regions using the case study of the Swiss-Italian cross-border watershed of the Lake Maggiore. Secondly, it introduces a preliminary taxonomy of transnational water tension levels as proportionate sense of conflicts associated with water use and their transboundary implications in the pre-Alpine regions, an area where scholarly literature seems scarce. Finally, by focusing on the 2022 drought, this work empirically investigates with a mixed qualitative methodology how hydrological stresses might be related to the concept of water grabbing in this mountainous area.
4The research questions explore whether the observed tensions can be interpreted through the lens of water grabbing, as conceptualised in the first part of the paper with reference to the Alpine region. One of the central questions is whether the concept of water grabbing is applicable to this pre-Alpine context and, if so, under what conditions.
5This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap by examining a case of transboundary tensions in the Global North, specifically in the heart of the European Alps. It also examines the potential policy implications and offers preliminary recommendations.
6Hydropolitical dynamics and hydro-diplomacy have long sought to structure the management of transboundary water resources through legal and institutional frameworks. Among the principal global instruments, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourse Convention) codifies principles aimed at fostering interstate cooperation and promoting the equitable and reasonable utilization of shared watercourses among UN member states (UN, 1997). The significant delay between its adoption in 1997 and its entry into force in 2014 reflects the complexities inherent in international water governance. Another key instrument is the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Water Convention), which was initially limited in scope to Europe and Central Asia but, since 2016, has been opened to all UN member states, thereby enhancing its relevance as a global framework for the sustainable management of transboundary waters (UNECE, 2025). Moreover, the Sustainable development goal (SDG) n. 6 “Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all” foresees in target 6.5 that, by 2030, integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate, should be implemented (UN, 2015). This as a lack of reaching these target threatens those on climate, food, energy, health, life on land and below water, and peace. However, on operational arrangement of transboundary water cooperation - SDG target indicator 6.5.2 “Proportion of transboundary basin area with an operational arrangement for water cooperation” - shows that progresses between 2017 and 2023 have been observed (UNSD, 2025; UN WATER, 2025). Among the 153 countries that share transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers, only 43 have operational arrangements in place, covering 90% or more of their shared water resources. Moreover, over 20 countries currently lack operational arrangements for the management of their transboundary water resources, and since 2020, only approximately 10 new agreements on transboundary water cooperation have been concluded (UN ECOSOC, 2024). The overall score for SDG indicator 6.5.2 has increased as the number of UN Member States reporting progress is raised from 17 to 26 out of a total of 153 (UNECE, 2024). This indicates that, according to a linear forecasting model (Figure 1 – blue line), the target would be achieved only far after 2050, unless a substantial acceleration in undertaken (Figure 1– red line). This indicates that substantial efforts are still required to achieve comprehensive coverage of all transboundary rivers, lakes, and aquifers by 2030, potentially leaving large space to unperceived or perceived water grabbing tensions, disputes, or conflicts.
7In Europe and North America, progresses toward SDG target 6.5.2 have been modest. The proportion of relevant transboundary water cooperation arrangements increased from 33% in 2017 to 45% in 2023. However, when this trend is extrapolated using a linear forecasting model (Figure 2 – blue line), the target is not projected to be met two decades beyond the 2030 Agenda deadline. Therefore, this projection reveals a significant misalignment between current implementation trajectories and the timeline set by international commitments, underscoring the need to intensify policy efforts, institutional coordination, and diplomatic engagement if SDG 6.5.2 is to be realistically achieved.
- 1 The blue line is the trend based on a plain linear model and the red line on a polynomial model mat (...)
Figure 1 – Forecasting models for the SDG target 6.5.2 indicator for at Global level (a) and, Forecasted trends of the SDG target 6.5.2 indicator for Europe and North America (b)1.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on UNECE (2024) data
8The United Nations World Water Development Report highlights that there are 286 international rivers and 592 transboundary aquifers shared by 153 countries (UNESCO, 2019). Moreover, according to the Water Conflict Chronology, between 2000 and 2009, 94 conflicts in which water played an important role were recorded. This number rose to 263 documented cases during the period from 2010 to 2018 (UNESCO, 2019; Pacific Institute, 2025).
9In these publications, categories of conflicts are classified in threefold ways: (a) “Trigger” if water is the root cause of conflict, i.e., if there is a dispute over the control of water or water systems or where economic or physical access to water, or scarcity of water, triggers violence; (b) “Weapon” when water resources, or water systems themselves, are used as a tool in a violent conflict; (c) “Casualty” if water is an intentional or incidental target of violence (ibidem). From this global perspective, items are included in the chronological list when there is violence (injuries or deaths) or threats of violence (including verbal threats, military maneuvers, and shows of force).
10Water conflict, a major driver of geopolitical tensions, is particularly localised in the Global South, which accounts for approximately 90% of the cases documented in the Water Conflict Chronology database (Pacific Institute, 2025). However, it also emerges in regions of the Global North. Nevertheless, existing literature on hydropolitics and water grabbing primarily focuses on major river basins in Asia, the Middle East, South America, and the Mediterranean region (Swyngedouw, 1997; Shiva, 2002; Woodhouse and Zeitoun, 2008; Boelens et al., 2014; Krasna, 2019; Prieto Lòpez et al., 2021; Hayat et al., 2022; Ravaioli, 2024; D’Orrico et al., 2024; Azizi and Leandro, 2025) while considerably less scholarly attention has been devoted to Alpine and Pre-Alpine area (Bompan and Iannelli, 2018; Füreder et al., 2018; Boccaletti, 2023).
11These dynamics may be attributed to the fact that most countries of the Global North have adopted the UN and UNECE conventions, and among the 44 countries that have nearly achieved the SDG 6 target, the majority are located in the Global North, particularly within Europe, where the EU Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), for example, addresses this issue in consideranda (23) stating that “Common principles are needed in order to coordinate Member States' efforts to improve the protection of Community waters in terms of quantity and quality, to promote sustainable water use, to contribute to the control of transboundary water problems, to protect aquatic ecosystems, and terrestrial ecosystems and wetlands directly depending on them, and to safeguard and develop the potential uses of Community waters”. (European Commission, 2000) As a result, instead of open conflicts or the weaponization of water resources (Du Bois King, 2015), disputes tend to manifest as lower intensity, slow-burn’ issues that could be addressed as “tensions”. The legal consequences of these typically do not require the invocation of special powers or external intervention; rather, they often demand that the parties involved exhaust local remedies and seek resolution through the balancing of soft power mechanisms (Woodhouse and Zeitoun, 2008). Consequently, from a Global North perspective, “conflicts” assume a milder form that remain significant subjects of investigation from a geographical standpoint as it might undermine local communities and ecosystems, rather entire nations, and impact on livelihoods, socio-economic activities and natural equilibria (Franco et al., 2012, Franco et al., 2013).
12As discussed in the previous paragraph, there is an absence of a systematic framework capable of capturing the degrees and manifestations of transboundary water grabbing dynamics in Global North constrains comparative analysis and impedes the early identification of potential emerging risks, particularly in regions typically regarded as institutionally resilient. This limitation reduces the effectiveness of timely diplomatic engagement, collaborative prevention efforts, adaptation planning, and integrated management strategies.
13To this end, we propose a six-level taxonomy of transnational water grabbing tensions, ranging from mild, conjunctural disputes to open conflict and strategic weaponization of water resources, reconnecting to the water conflict database. This framework builds on the Water Conflict Chronology (Pacific Institute, 2025), starting from the more critical typologies. On the other hand, in less critical cases, it introduces a significant innovation by adapting the analysis to the specific conditions of Global North regions. Moreover, as summarized in Table 1, the framework integrates qualitative indicators for each typology, thereby offering a conceptual and operational tool for analysing cases across diverse contexts and assess gravity.
Table 1 – Typologies of Cross-border/Transboundary Water Grabbing in the Global North
|
Typology of water grabbing
|
Level
|
Description
|
Qualitative indicators
|
|
Type A
|
Mild
|
Temporary tensions among stakeholders over water distribution priorities, usually triggered by a minor, one-time conjunctural crisis.
|
Local news reports cover water scarcity as an isolated event.
Stakeholders acknowledge the issue in interviews but without structured follow-up.
Scientific or technical project address indirectly the issue.
Perception of unfair distribution appears only at the community level.
No official records, policies, or bilateral notes produced.
Tensions subside quickly once the immediate crisis ends.
|
|
Type B
|
Latent
|
Structural tensions between water users recur over time but remain officially unaddressed, despite requiring cooperative planning and policies.
|
Complaints or grievances circulate informally among local actors.
Community groups or NGOs may raise concerns, but they remain absent in formal agendas.
Repeated seasonal shortages or recurring drought episodes reported locally.
Policy frameworks remain silent on transboundary issues.
Underlying mistrust detected in stakeholder interviews.
|
|
Type C
|
Open
|
Persistent tensions between regions competing for limited resources, openly discussed in media and requiring diplomatic engagement.
|
National or regional newspapers report the issue regularly.
Politicians reference water disputes in speeches or campaigns.
Cross-border meetings or summits explicitly address water management.
Civil society groups mobilize or lobby for recognition of the problem.
Water scarcity begins to affect agricultural output or local economies measurably.
|
|
Type D
|
Heightened
|
Tensions significantly affect negotiations over transboundary water rights.
|
Diplomatic negotiations delayed or suspended due to water disputes.
Water allocation dominates bilateral/multilateral talks.
Formal protests, memoranda, or diplomatic notes exchanged.
Trade or joint infrastructure projects slowed or halted.
Growing perception of inequity voiced at both political and public levels.
|
|
Type E
|
Critical
|
Tensions hinder international cooperation on water access, escalating into open disputes.
|
Breakdown of institutional frameworks for cooperation.
Withdrawal from joint commissions or basin-wide agreements.
Public accusations exchanged between governments.
High-profile disputes covered in international media.
Water insecurity begins to influence economic activities or livelihood strategies.
|
|
Type F
|
Conflict
|
Open conflict, with unilateral water management strategies maximizing benefits for the dominant power, explicit weaponization of water resources.
|
Large-scale infrastructure (e.g., dams, diversions) built unilaterally to control flows.
Explicit threats to restrict or cut water supply.
International condemnation or sanctions related to water control.
Evidence of “hydro-hegemony” where one actor dictates access.
Armed clashes, blockades, or war-like actions involving water.
Humanitarian crises (displacement, famine, public health impacts) linked to lack of water access.
|
Source: Authors’ elaboration
14This six-level taxonomy outlined in Table 1 aims at highlighting that water grabbing in the Global North should not be conceived as a binary phenomenon, either absent or present, but rather as a continuum of tensions varying in scope, visibility, and severity. By distinguishing between mild, latent, open, heightened, critical, and conflictual stages, the framework highlights how localized grievances can gradually evolve into structured diplomatic disputes, and in extreme cases, into overt geopolitical conflicts. This underscores the importance of early detection: the presence of latent or open tensions may serve as critical warning signals of escalating dispute over water resources and, therefore, plan a response to avoid escalation.
15While the impact of climate change on transboundary integrated water management in the Alpine region is increasingly acknowledged in scientific literature, for instance, as highlighted by a local institutional actor “the issue persist in several points in alpine areas and is increasingly visible also in Alpine pastures, where herders face mounting difficulties in maintaining livestock due to the lack of water sources” (Interview 8).this issue is predominantly addressed within the disciplines of environmental science, hydrology, water management modeling, and climate change studies (Krasna, 2019; Füreder et al., 2019; EEA, 2024) and lately including the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning (Sarkar and Jha, 2025). However, these works often adopt a technocratic, positivist, or environmentally focused perspective, frequently overlooking or simplifying the socio-economic and (geo)political geography dimensions of the issue. Some studies focus primarily on climate-induced shifts in mountain hydrological regimes projecting, for instance, the disappearance of Alpine glaciers by the end of this century (Vanham, 2014; Cook et al. 2023; UN WATER, 2025) while others address drought phenomena (Alpine Convention, 2018; Berger et al., 2019). Other body of work relates to European cooperation projects and initiatives conducted under the framework of the Alpine Convention, the European Alpine Macro-Region (EUSALP), and various Interreg cross-border and transnational programmes (Füreder et al., 2019; Waterwise, 2025; AlpWaterScarce, 2025; Repubblica e Cantone Ticino, 2024). In these contexts the narrative frames water management as technical, rational, neutral, or normative.
16A more critical narrative, in which the term “water grabbing” is generally recalled, views water management as political, conflictual, and potentially unjust, is very rare in Alpine area research literature, but left by authors to Global South situations. As a result, the broader governance implications of hydrological cross border regimes remain underexplored in the Alpine area, and the issue of conflicts or tensions over transboundary water use is typically addressed through diplomatic and conciliatory language, rarely framed in terms of hydropolitics and with the use of the term “water grabbing”. Recalled by Shiva (2002), already in 1995, the Vice President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, stated that if the wars of the twentieth century were fought over oil, the wars of the twenty-first century will be fought over water. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, it was during this period that major UN conventions governing the use of transboundary water resources were adopted and ratified by the Alpine countries leading to a low rate of conflicts as highlighted in the previous paragraph.
17We focus our analysis on the case of Lake Maggiore and the 2022 drought for several reasons. First, the area is clearly situated within the Global North, making it relevant within the scope of the paper. Second, a preliminary desk-based assessment revealed promising grounds for further investigation as the event received some media coverage, which, according to the criteria outlined in Table 1, suggests that the issue of water grabbing may have been positioned within “latent” and “open”.
18The empirical investigation was carried out in three complementary phases. First, media sources were systematically examined, including newspapers, video reportages, and online content from both past and recent periods. A total of 28 desk sources were identified and analysed, with a balanced distribution: 14 from the Swiss Canton Ticino side and 14 from the Italian region Lombardy side. This provided insight into how drought episodes, cross-border tensions, and technical or political solutions have been framed over time at the local, regional and national level. Second, the study reviewed grey literature such as technical reports, meteorological bulletins, scientific dossiers, and policy or legal documents produced by Italian and Swiss institutions. This body of material, composed of 20 documents, offered evidence on monitoring practices, governance strategies, and institutional approaches to water regulation. Third, eight semi-structured interviews were conducted out of 20 institutional key informants contacted in Italy and Switzerland during 2024 and 2025. In particular the interviewees cover various institutional levels – from local to cantonal/provincial, regional to transnational – and include both technical experts with operational functions and officials with political and institutional roles. All interviews were carried out in the native language of participants and explored broad themes including perceptions of drought events, technical and organizational challenges in water management, emerging cross-border tensions, the role of data sharing, and possible technical and political solutions.
19The peculiarity of water use and watershed management in the Ticino and Lombardy regions have been identified as a valuable case study for further elaboration and empirical validation of the proposed framework. For instance, hydropower energy plays a particularly crucial role, as over half of Switzerland’s electricity is generated from hydraulic sources (FDFA, 2022). In the Canton Ticino, water represents the primary renewable energy source, ranking the region third in Switzerland for hydroelectric production (UFE, 2025). Similarly, in Lombardy, water is vital for domestic, industrial, agricultural, environmental, and recreational purposes. In response to the growing electricity demand, both Ticino and Lombardy have been expanding their small- and large-scale hydroelectric infrastructure. The Lombard-Ticinese waters examined in this case study are part of a hydrological system that includes Lake Maggiore (also known as Lago Verbano), which also extends into the Piedmont Region, and Lake Lugano (or Lago Ceresio), as well as various watercourses that either mark or cross the international border between Italy and Switzerland.
20The main tributaries of Lake Maggiore are the Ticino, Maggia, and Toce rivers. Its sole outflow is the Ticino River, which exits the lake at Sesto Calende (Autorità di Bacino del Po, 2018). Regarding Lake Maggiore, the proportion of lake surface area relative to the entire catchment area is quite small (3%), resulting in limited water retention capacity. Consequently, during periods of persistent rainfall or intense storms, the lake level rises rapidly, occasionally exceeding flood thresholds (UFAM, 2020). Since 1943, the Miorina regulation dam, located at Sesto Calende, has been in operation. Constructed to serve agricultural and industrial interests—including irrigation, artisanal activities, and hydroelectric production—the dam consists of 120 individual metal gates, which can be raised or lowered independently to finely regulate the water level of Lake Maggiore (Ibidem). The governance of the Miorina dam is coordinated by the Ticino Consortium, a non-economic public body established in 1928. The Consortium is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the dam, as well as for managing the use of the regulating infrastructure of Lake Maggiore, with the objective of preventing excessively high or low water levels (Autorità di Bacino del Po, 2018; UFAM, 2020). Specifically, when the water level reaches the lower limit of the regulation band, the outflow must not exceed the combined inflow from the tributaries; conversely, when the upper limit of the regulation band is reached, the dam must be fully opened (UFAM, 2020). The regulation of the lake level follows a multi-objective, multi-purpose logic, serving multiple functions: irrigating 7,000 agricultural enterprises; supplying water for five hydroelectric power plants located downstream of the dam (within Italian territory); enabling lake navigation; and supporting the operation of tourism facilities upstream of the regulatory infrastructure. However, “the current regulatory framework still relies on decrees from the late 1930s and 1940s, lacking a modern bilateral agreement capable of addressing contemporary challenges such as drought, changing hydropower regimes, and climate extremes” (Interview 4). To illustrate the geography of hotspots, a map is provided below identifying the areas involved (Figure 2). In particular, the key locations at the center of the local tensions are the Miorina dam at Sesto Calende; several major Ticinese hydroelectric basins, situated near the tributaries of Lake Maggiore; and the areas surrounding the Lake Maggiore, which are affected by rising lake levels during flood events.
Image 1 – Golasecca - Diga della miorina Lago Maggiore - Ticino
Source: Andrea Albini. Online: https://web.archive.org/web/20161102034201/http://www.panoramio.com/photo/128936593
Figure 2 – Sites of tension on Italian-Swiss watersheds. Legend: Red dots indicate the Miorina dam located in Sesto Calende; orange dots mark the boundaries of Lake Maggiore; green dots represent the locations of selected major hydroelectric power plants in Ticino that generate significant energy from water sources ultimately flowing into the lake
Source: Zanchi, 2024 elaborated on map available from the official geoportal map.geo.admin.ch
21In 2022, the Ticino and Lombardy regions experienced severe water scarcity and drought conditions. In Canton Ticino, the year was marked by significant hydrological deficits, with total outflow volumes ranging between 25% and 50% of the long-term average (Ufficio di statistica, 2022d). A similar pattern of drought and deficit was recorded in Lombardy. For the Lombardy region, the estimated total annual rainfall for 2022 was 751 mm, representing a 36% decrease compared to the average of the preceding fifteen years, corresponding to a rainfall deficit of over 10 billion cubic meters of missing water (Legambiente Lombardia, 2023). This figure represents the lowest value recorded by Regional Agency for Environmental Protection (ARPA) since measurements began (Legambiente Lombardia, 2023). Throughout 2022 no significant meteorological events occurred that could replenish the lake’s water reserves confirming this year Lake Maggiore recorded historic minimum levels, as illustrated in the following graph (Figure 3). Consequently, for almost the entire irrigation season, outflows from the lake remained well below the levels required by the various users of the Ticino Consortium. For instance, “the agricultural sector was among the most affected — in Piedmont, rice and maize crops suffered extensive damage, and major irrigation consortia had to activate ‘rescue wells’ or use water already allocated for the following year” (Interview 6). And “The too low water level compromised the beaches and, consequently, the local tourism economy” (Interview 5).
Figure 3 – Time series of the average yearly water level of Lake Maggiore from 1999 to 2023 in meters (plain line) and the linear trend (dotted line). The data reveals significant interannual variability, with 2022 marking one of the lowest levels ever recorded. The pronounced minimum in 2022 reflects drought conditions worsened by reduced precipitation and the absence of hydrological recharge events
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Osservatorio Ambientale della Svizzera Italiana data, 2025.
22The analysis of the wording of the headlines from Ticino’s statistical bulletins for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2022 conveyed severity of the situation: “Trimestre da record: fiumi e laghi in secca” [Record-breaking quarter: rivers and lakes running dry] (Ufficio di statistica, 2022a); “Record scaccia record: prosegue e si intensifica la carenza idrica” [Record after record: water scarcity continues and intensifies] (Ufficio di statistica, 2022b); “Ancora carenza idrica, con locali eventi alluvionali ad agosto e settembre” [Persistent water shortages, with localized flood events in August and September] (Ufficio di statistica, 2022c); “Anno di record negativi per deflussi e livelli lacuali” [A year of negative records for river flows and lake levels] (Ufficio di statistica, 2022d).
- 2 The Regio Insubrica Working Community promotes cross-border cooperation in the Italian-Swiss Pre-Al (...)
- 3 A State Councillor in Ticino is a member of the Government of the Canton of Ticino, a collegial bod (...)
23In response to the extreme drought conditions of 2022, Italian authorities formally requested increased water discharges from hydroelectric reservoirs located in Canton Ticino. An emergency meeting of the Italo-Swiss Regio Insubrica working group2 was convened on June 21, 2022, involving senior political representatives from Canton Ticino, Lombardy, Piedmont, and local jurisdictions, to address the unfolding crisis (RSI, 2022). During the meeting, the Secretary General of the Po River District Basin Authority, Meuccio Berselli, appealed to the Swiss Confederation to support Lake Maggiore water levels through coordinated management of Alpine reservoirs. At the time, the lake capacity had declined to approximately 20%, endangering not only the lake ecosystem but also downstream users along the Po River. However, the State Councillor of Ticino3, Norman Gobbi, indicated that the expectations of increased turbine discharge from hydroelectric facilities were unrealistic. He emphasized that energy production operates according to domestic demand, and that drought-induced low water levels and snowmelt deficiencies had severely limited reservoir capacities (RSI, 2022). Exacerbating the situation was Switzerland’s heightened focus on energy security following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in early 2022, as highlighted “After the war in Ukraine, energy security became a national (swiss) concern. Hydropower reservoirs were managed more conservatively to ensure electricity supply for the winter months” (Interview 1).
24In parallel, the mandatory emptying of the Verzasca dam—one of Ticino’s major reservoirs—for maintenance purposes further reduced available water reserves, causing additional strain on hydroelectric production systems. As recalled “there was also the issue of the Verzasca dam being emptied: that year, around 90 million cubic meters of water had to be released for maintenance works. Consequently, the dam could not be used for hydropower generation, creating an energy shortage that had to be compensated by other hydroelectric plants and alternative energy sources” (Interview 1). By mid-2022, reservoirs in Ticino were operating at merely 25% of their capacity, compared to historical averages of approximately 70% (Novaga, 2022). Nevertheless, data from the Adda River basin in Italy show a differentiated pattern: while Swiss reservoirs reached 80% of capacity, the Italian ones remained critically low at around 30% (Legambiente Lombardia, 2023). Another structural vulnerability pertains to Italy aging water infrastructure. Systematic underinvestment has left Italian dams, with an average age exceeding sixty years, prone to sediment accumulation, leading to a significant reduction in storage capacities (Boccaletti, 2023). In Lombardy, non-revenue water losses—defined as the gap between volumes injected into distribution networks and volumes effectively delivered to end users—averaged 20%, with peaks of 30–40% (De Gironimo and Venturelli, 2016; ARPA Lombardia). The root cause lies in chronic underfunding, with replacement and modernization costs perceived as prohibitively high, thus exacerbating water scarcity (Boccaletti, 2023).
25In addition to these immediate tensions, a longstanding structural divergence was identified regarding water level expectations between Italian and Swiss stakeholders (i.e. public and private actors) bordering Lake Maggiore. Stakeholders from the Po Valley advocate for higher summer water levels to support irrigation needs, whereas lakeside municipalities prefer maintaining lower levels to ensure sufficient flood retention capacity in case of extreme precipitation events (UFAM, 2020). Historical precedents, notably the flood events of 1993, 2000, and 2013, demonstrate that when Lake Maggiore exceeds its artificially regulated thresholds due to natural events, considerable damage is inflicted upon surrounding territories on both sides of the border.
26Cooperation between the two regions has occurred only implicitly, i.e. within the framework of the Interreg Italy–Switzerland cross-border cooperation programmes implemented over successive programming periods. Nonetheless, the tensions that arose in 2022 indicate that this cooperative framework is not enough (Jorio, 2023).
27Recalling the conceptual framework and indicators outlined in Table 1, the data analysis conducted in this research, based on the sources described in the methodology, can be summarised as shown in Table 2, when applied to the studied empirical case of Lake Maggiore.
Table 2 – Data analysis
|
Typology
|
Level
|
Qualitiative indicators
|
Score
|
Typologies of empirical data sources that yield positive results
|
|
Type A
|
Mild
|
- Local news reports cover water scarcity as an isolated event.
|
Yes
|
News (73%), Video (100%)
|
|
|
- Stakeholders acknowledge the issue in interviews but without structured follow-up.
|
Yes
|
Interviews (100%), News (81%), Video (100%)
|
|
|
- Scientific or technical project address indirectly the issue.
|
Yes
|
Reports (94%)
|
|
|
- Perception of unfair distribution appears at the community level.
|
Yes
|
Interviews (100%)
|
|
|
- No official records, policies,
or bilateral notes produced.
|
Yes
|
Official documents, Reports
(Officially reported 0%)
|
|
|
- Tensions subside quickly once the immediate crisis ends.
|
Yes
|
Interviews (75%)
|
|
Type B
|
Latent
|
- Complaints or grievances circulate
informally among local actors.
|
Yes
|
Interviews (75%)
|
|
|
- Community groups or NGOs may raise concerns, but they remain absent in formal agendas.
|
Yes
|
News, Interviews, Reports
(formal participatory governance initiatives 0%)
|
|
|
- Repeated seasonal shortages or
recurring drought episodes reported locally.
|
No
|
News(18%), Reports (29%)
|
|
|
- Policy frameworks remain
silent on transboundary issues.
|
Yes
|
Official documents; Reports
(Officially reported 0%)
|
|
|
- Underlying mistrust detected in
stakeholder interviews.
|
No
|
Interviews (13%)
|
Source: Authors’ elaboration on field data collected
28Recalling the definitions of water grabbing (Franco et al., 2014; D’Odarico et al., 2024), the framework presented in paragraph 2.3 and the data analysis presented in table 2, these reflect the political decision power of the actors involved to assume control over resources. Moreover, these highlight the existence (or lack) of a will to acquire decision-making power over the management objectives for regulating the lake water level; the existence of an evident and explicit, or implicit, economic advantage for either Italy or Switzerland; the dichotomy of the phenomenon being extraordinary or ordinary; the dichotomy of the phenomenon being internal or external to the policies of both countries and to the mechanisms of cross-border and transboundary agreements on water management.
- 4 In Switzerland, in 2023 essentially stable from 2018, the proportion of transboundary river and lak (...)
29Although both Italy and Switzerland have adopted the UN and UNECE conventions and have reported indicators related to the SDG 6.5 targets for basins, rivers, and lakes, with achievements above 90%4, what we describe about Lake Maggiore shows that the agreement does not preclude the rise of tensions, whether explicit or implicit.
30The causes of tension in the case under study here can primarily be traced back to environmental factors (drought) and technical issues related to domestic energy policy (maintenance of the Verzasca dam), which intersected with political issues at both regional and foreign policy levels. In this case study of the year 2022, the water grabbing phenomenon can be considered extraordinary and not recurrent, although conflictual situations, could become more frequent due to climate change, thus potentially transforming into ordinary occurrence.
31As Switzerland is located upstream, this provides it a potential power position in the regulation process, which can either be codified and shared through explicit bilateral agreements, managed through common cross-border strategies, or left to the international regulatory framework pending events, with emergency or ex-post solutions.
32In the case analyzed, the Interview 1 and Interview 2 responses were given within the framework of the Regio Insubrica, thus within the context of a cross-border working community. In addition, the sources analyzed show that, in emergency situations such as the one of 2022, Switzerland chose to assert its power position tied to its more favorable location by prioritizing its own needs over those of Italy. Swiss authorities decided to maintain the fullness of their hydroelectric reservoirs rather than facilitate water supply for Italian agriculture, highlighting the latent tensions with level Lombardy. Overall, Ticino authorities seemed to express its dominant position due to an upstream place providing an ex ante geographical advantage and a higher control on technical infrastructures. In addition, a slightly stronger planning and infrastructure system seems to have also facilitated this process.
33Therefore, it seems plausible to affirm that the cross-border tension over the use of the Lake Maggiore water basin can be classified as water grabbing, and, according to table 1 taxonomy, it can be ranged into type A (mild) and partially type B (latent).
34The extraordinary circumstances of the year, the high pro capita water consumption in both countries, the water loss in the Italian distribution networks, and the lack of concrete action from both sides in considering long-term solutions to prevent similar issues in future droughts all contribute to this assessment. Similarly, next to hydrological related causes, the socio-political response shows a certain degree of tension at local level in both Swiss and Italian regions.
35Concerning the generalisation of the empirical case, i.e whether a taxonomy of water grabbing can be applied to the Alpine region, the analysis of the Switzerland–Italy case highlights the complexity of managing water resources in transboundary areas, particularly in the context of increasingly frequent climate-related crises (Interview 8). In particular, the findings, supported by interviews and the empirical application, suggest that the six-step taxonomy proposed in Table 1 can be effectively employed and operationalised to analyse water-related issues in the Pre-alpine and Alpine region.
36Furthermore, this framework shows potential for broader applicability at the Global North, extending beyond the scope of the Water Conflict Chronology and its tripartite classification of cases (Pacific Institute, 2025), as discussed in Section 2.2. Transboundary water conflicts in the Global North are generally less severe than those in the Global South, they nonetheless persist albeit in more nuanced and less overt forms, therefore a finer taxonomy is more appropriate to prevent or early detect the phenomenon.
37The conceptual framework and empirical analysis presented in this study have led to the development of a six-step taxonomy for identifying transnational water grabbing tensions in the pre-Alpine Swiss-Italian region (Table 1), with potential applicability across the Global North. A key insight emerging from this research is the significant risk posed by the failure to detect mild or latent forms of water grabbing in the absence of an appropriate conceptual framework. These less visible dynamics may escape institutional attention, thereby undermining early intervention efforts and long-term governance strategies. Such oversight may result in reduced attention from stakeholders and public authorities, unless a crisis reaches an acute stage. In these scenarios, the most vulnerable actors are likely to be disproportionately affected, often unaware of the underlying power asymmetries in access to resources, technical capacity, and infrastructure. If not counterbalanced by proactive adaptation planning, early crisis detection, robust cross-border institutional cooperation, joint financial mechanisms, and inclusive participatory approaches, these asymmetries may create or perpetuate inequities and hinder effective transboundary water governance against international principles.
38In particular, interviews highlighted the need for concrete solutions to avoid the recurrence of such tensions. Proposed measures included financial mechanisms “to support alternative energy solutions” (Interview 1). Technical improvements were cited: “it would be advisable to upgrade the Miorina dam and modernize irrigation networks, which currently lose 30–40% of potable water” (Interview 2) and for improved efficiency in water use, as “around 38–39% of potable water is dispersed along the network” (Interview 6). Other actors emphasized preparedness through “a meteorological early-warning system specific for Lake Maggiore” (Interview 3), and the revision of outdated frameworks since “Lake Maggiore’s regulation is still based on rules from the 1930s and 1940s” (Interview 4). At the governance level, calls were made for more inclusiveness by highlighting that“the multiplicity of actors with fragmented competences exacerbates the lack of coordination” (Interview 5).
39Climate change potential trends highlights the need for a revamp of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to enhance governance and develop stronger policies in joint integrated water management strategies to prevent drawbacks of mild and latent water crisis such as cases that can occur in the pre-Alpine area. Risks of water grabbing can be significantly reduced by promoting mutually beneficial solutions, through more robust transboundary governance frameworks within climate adaptation policies related to the sustainable use of water, the creation of shared data collection and cross-border bilateral decision boards. Moreover, the introduction of explicit regulatory mechanisms governing the various stakeholders involved in water use should be developed from a win–win perspective, incorporating participatory approaches to ensure that a broad range of viewpoints is considered from both side of the watershed.
40Peak crises, such as the one experienced in 2022, underscore the urgent need for long-term policy and political measures aimed at strengthening transboundary water governance and resilience. For instance, in the Lombardy-Ticino case, among the key strategies that could mitigate future conflicts, policies aimed at reducing smart pro capita water consumption, especially for agriculture and industry, and improving the efficiency of Italian water distribution networks through targeted investments for modernization and maintenance should be considered. Among other policies, the key informant of Interview 2 also suggested potential solutions linked to a cross-border exchange or compensation mechanism in cases where the less dominant area requests higher water discharges towards the geographically advantaged one.
41While targeted policies and cross-border agreements can help mitigate immediate water conflicts, these case-specific strategies underscore the need for a systematic monitoring framework to anticipate, evaluate, and manage transboundary water risks more effectively. In this perspective, this study highlights the need for research to further test and refines the proposed indicators in other Alpine areas, with the aim of developing a robust monitoring framework capable of capturing the determinants of transnational water grabbing risks. These determinants may include power asymmetries, institutional cooperation, technical capacity, infrastructure and adaptation readiness, multilevel and cross-border policy alignment, and participatory governance approaches.
42However, already the application of the taxonomy framework developed and presented in this paper enhance early detection and may support more effective, equitable, and sustainable cross border and transboundary water governance.