Introduction

2The post-socialist land reforms of the 1990s in the former Soviet republics, and the administrative reform of local government and land privatisation in mountain regions in particular, had a significant impact on land ownership and land management and hence on mountain landscapes. The manner and pace of these reforms depend primarily on the nature of political transition, as well as the degree of centralisation and economic liberalisation. For example, in terms of local government reforms and the privatisation of land, Kyrgyzstan is rather developed, while neighbouring Uzbekistan retains a significant measure of state control over the land and its use (Wegren, 2014; Gunya, 2010; Shigaeva et al., 2016). For the Caucasus, the situation is as follows: Liberal land reforms are rather advanced in Georgia and Armenia, whereas Azerbaijan and Russia maintain a significant measure of state control over access to land. However, the analysis of political factors does not fully explain the changes in land ownership and management that have emerged in post-socialist mountain regions. Further relevant factors include the geographic setting and the attitude of local communities. The latter can be quite conservative, i.e. against significant changes, or quite liberal and thus open to land reforms (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Gunya, 2013; Ismailov, 2001; Giovarelli, Bledsoe, 2001; Lerman, Sedik, 2010).

3The division of power between the state and local authorities is key to understanding how access to land is regulated. Local self-governance in rural areas in Russia occurs at two levels: the level of a village (or group of neighbouring villages) and the level of a rural district. As shown below, the district municipal authority also regulates access to municipal land at the level of a settlement and collects taxes from land leasing.

4This study aims to explain the diversity of land ownership that has emerged at the local level in the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation as a result of land reforms. It is impossible to provide a comprehensive review in one paper, and therefore this study focuses on the relationships most relevant to the changes in land ownership: the state (represented by the central power and its federal subjects, the republics), the local communities (representing collective land users) and private land users. It is discussed where and in which situations the state remains the primary landowner and where, in which situations and why local communities or private users have taken the lead to manage the land. The findings of this study are based on investigations in various regions in the Caucasus and specifically in 18 key villages in the North Caucasus republics.

Methodology

5The Caucasus has an abundance of natural and cultural resources. During the Soviet era, when the state exercised a monopoly over natural resources, it made little sense to analyse actors, the differences in their competencies and their role in land use. During the Soviet era, one famous publication (Gerasimov et al., 1980) even compared the Caucasus to the Alps. It focused on the natural settings and recreational economy but provided no discussion of the social processes. By contrast, the present study pays attention to distinctions between the ways in which the territory is used – the result of different actors and institutional rules. This methodological approach has been poorly developed in Russian geography because human geography was poorly developed during the Soviet period.

6Two perspectives are applied in this study to address the changes in land ownership and land management in the post-Soviet period: 1) decentralisation of power, e.g. transfer of power from the central state to local level municipalities; 2) liberalisation of economy and privatisation of land.

7Decentralisation of power: Land reforms primarily entail the decentralisation of the state’s rights over the land in favour of other actors: local communities, collectives and businesses. However, the processes of decentralisation cannot be reduced simply to the emergence of new formal laws. When it comes to land redistribution, informal rules and power relations may play an even more important role. These informal rules can differ in degree from official ones (Koehler, Zürcher, 2004). Therefore, research must focus on studying the formal and informal rules and institutions involved. In our study, the principles of an institution-centred approach (North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994; Koehler, 2013) are adopted first. Such an approach accounts for key resources, actors and institutions. Second, an inductive approach is used to identify the unwritten laws, informal institutions and micro-politics of power that reinforce, bypass or undermine the official rules regulating social relations (Koehler, 2015; Koehler, Gunya, 2014). It is only possible to track the processes of decentralisation when both formal and informal institutions at the local level are considered. In particular, decentralisation may lead to a decline in local livelihoods. For example, in the 1990s, a lack of finances at the level of local governments led to the destruction of infrastructure and the closing of schools and first-aid posts in Russia’s rural areas, including regions in the North Caucasus (Gunya, 2004). The introduction of new rules may even exclude local communities from decision making over land ownership (Mamonova, 2015).

8Privatisation of land: A few years ago, there was a general consensus that land privatisation would result in more efficient agricultural practices in mountain regions. However, recent studies have shown that the privatisation of pastures has significantly hampered the seasonal migration of livestock (Robinson et al., 2010) and has led to ecological degradation as a result of inequitable access to and use of land (Gunya, 2014). Numerous examples from developing countries (e.g. Matias et al., 2013) have shown that the social consequences of privatisation may undermine the expected economic benefits. Unilateral administrative decisions conducted for the benefit of the economy and associated with the change of land status have resulted in opposition from local communities and clans and have even increased tensions (Hall et al., 2015).

9In mountain regions, land resources hold value for multiple reasons. First, they are often the homeland of ethnic minorities. Land reforms at the local level raise the issue of land rights; this is particularly true in mountain areas where ethnic groups have maintained priority rights. When the re-evaluation of land rights becomes possible, land ownership may change, and the redistribution of land is carried out by powerful individuals, groups or institutional bodies.

10Furthermore, in mountain regions, land is often a common-pool resource or a private good (e.g. Wymann et al., 2013), and land is often held under a mix of communal and private property arrangements. The transformation of state or common lands into private property is not an instantaneous process (Gregory, Hong, 2009). Lindner (2008) understands land privatisation as a creeping process of negotiations between state actors, collectives and individuals that have different roadmaps in mind. Furthermore, it should be noted that the categories “public” and “collective” are quite weak in reality (Lindner, 2008): In the Caucasus, land reforms accompanied by the decentralisation of power and land privatisation are still at the initial stage (see below). It is therefore necessary to apply terms developed in other regions of the world very carefully, as their adaptation must accompany empirical findings.

Study area and data

11The data collected during fieldwork over the past 15 to 20 years in various Caucasian regions is used to explain the diversity in land ownership; it includes interviews with residents of various settlements and statistics on land use. Moreover, 18 key villages located in the North Caucasus republics of Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan have been studied in great detail with frequent observations regarding ongoing changes (Fig. 1, Table 1). Here, the examination includes surveys on key resources, local self-governance and relationships with the state, among others (Gunya et al., 2016). Furthermore, land use before 1990 and at present have been mapped in certain key villages. Key settlements have been chosen in such a way that they represent the relevant regions of the North Caucasus, including different geographic features, such as mountains and plains. These key villages are home to various ethnic groups.

Table 1. Characteristics of the key villages studied

Number on the map (Fig. 1)	Village, republic	Geographic position; ethnic makeup	Main changes (1990–2015)
			Land ownership	Land use
1	Kurush, Dagestan	High mountains; Avars	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
2	Sharo, Dagestan	Middle mountains; Laks	from collective farm to municipality and private	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use, most of land is not in use
3	Kenhi, Chechnya	Middle mountains, Avars	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
4	Novoterskoe, Chechnya	Plain; Chechens, Russians	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) to most of land is not in use
5	Ekaghevo, Ingushetia	Foothills; Ingushs	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) to most of land being rented by small entrepreneurs
6	Tarskoe, North Ossetia	Low mountains; Ossetians, Ingushs	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
7	Novoossetinovka, North Ossetia	Plains; Ossetians, Russians, Gypsy	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) to small entrepreneurship–based land use
8	Ul'yanovskoye, Kabardino-Balkaria	Plain; Meskhetian Turks and Russians	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) small entrepreneurship–based land use
9	Novo-Ivanovskoye Kabardino-Balkaria	Foothills; Russian (Cossacks)	collective farms and municipality	collective farming (arable land)
10	Novaya Balkariya Kabardino-Balkaria	Foothills; Balkars	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) to small entrepreneurship– and family-based land use
11	Staryy Cherek Kabardino-Balkaria	Foothills; Kabardians	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (arable land) to small entrepreneurship– and family-based land use
12	Zhankhoteko Kabardino-Balkaria	Low mountains; Balkars and Kabardians	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
13	El'brus Kabardino-Balkaria	High mountains; Balkars	from state to municipality and private	from collective farming and family-based land use (pasture) to family-based land use (tourism)
14	Sadovoe, Karachay-Cherkessia	Foothills; Karachais	from collective farm to private	from collective farming (pasture) to small entrepreneurship– and family-based land use
15	Khumara Karachay-Cherkessia	Middle mountains; Circassians	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
16	Nizhnyaya Teberda Karachay-Cherkessia	Middle mountains; Karachais	from collective farm to municipality	from collective farming (pasture) to family-based land use
17	Kardonikskaya Karachay-Cherkessia	Low mountains; Russian (Cossacks), Karachais	collective farms, municipality and private	form collective farming (arable land) to small entrepreneurship– and family-based land use
18	Dombai, Karachay-Cherkessia	High mountains; Karachais, Russians	from state to municipality	no use until 1990; now, family-based land use (tourism)

Results

Regional level: borders between state, municipal and private land ownership

12The results of this study show that changes in land ownership have occurred in two directions:

• Privatisation of government-controlled lands in favour of local municipalities and (to a certain extent) private owners;

• De-collectivisation of lands of collective farms in favour of local municipalities and private owners.

14To determine the ratio between state-controlled land, municipality-owned land and private land, land ownership was mapped in two neighbouring republics: Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia (Fig. 2).

15The state continues to dominate in border areas, forested areas and protected nature territories (cf. type 1 in Fig. 2). Local actors have the most influence in the mid-mountain and low-mountain regions, which is where local communities with elements of self-organisation and self-government prevail (cf. type 2 in Fig. 2). Generally, as a powerful actor, the state is not interested in disparate patches of arable land in these areas. Local space in intermountain basins and narrow valleys constitutes special niches, relatively autonomous and independent from state regulation. These are the areas with informal traditional rules and institutions. For instance, customary law has always regulated the demarcation and use of plots of irrigated hayfields in mountains, even during the Soviet era. Given the harsh environmental conditions, state institutions are ineffective because they are less flexible and less adapted to local particularities.

16Located primarily in the fertile territories of the foothills, the third zone (cf. type 3 in Fig. 2) represents an arena of intense competition between the state and related bureaucratic circles on the one hand and local communities and business actors on the other hand. In Karachay-Cherkessia, most of this zone is privatised. However, this land is only partly under cultivation due to its low competitiveness in comparison with the large agricultural holdings of the neighbouring Stavropol Region, where 66% of the land is privatised. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the renting of land by district municipalities prevails.

Village level: distinctions in land ownership and land use management

17Based on detailed research in 18 key villages in the North Caucasus, it is evident that even within the same country, there are significant differences in the implementation of land reforms. These differences manifest themselves in a variety of actors and institutional arrangements governing access to and the use of land. As can be seen in Table 1, among the key villages there are several types:

1. villages where most of the land was redistributed among private owners (Karachay-Cherkessia);

2. villages that preserved collective land use (some settlements in the North Caucasus with mainly Russian populations);

3. villages where the state regulates access to land (Chechnya);

4. villages where municipal bureaucracy at the district level regulates access to land (many other regions in the North Caucasus);

5. villages where the right of access to land is discussed among the government and the business and local communities (e.g. villages in the tourist areas).

18The villages of Sadovoye and part of Kardonikskaya (Karachay-Cherkessia) exemplify the first type. In these villages, decentralisation and the strengthening of local self-governance are most advanced; the privatisation of agricultural land has been carried out. However, the privatised lands are either leased or not in use because of low competitiveness.

19The settlements that have maintained collective use belong to the second type. Authoritative leaders managed to preserve not only the land but also the organisational structure and technology. The collective farm has been converted into an agricultural production cooperative. In Novo-Ivanovskoye, practically all the attributes of a collective farm, including management and large-scale dairy production, as well as commodity farms and equipment, have remained.

20Chechnya exemplifies the third type, where the state regulates access to land. Because the state farms (goskhoz) are not effective, the question of transforming state farms into more effective enterprises has been widely discussed at various levels (e.g. among experts and in the Chechen parliament).

21The majority of settlements belong to the fourth type: settlements where officials from district municipalities regulate access to the land. District municipalities collect taxes and lease the land. Lands in the foothills and on the plains are of special interest, and their use is based on rent by small businesses.

22The fifth type includes settlements that have valuable land and successfully compete with external actors represented by the state and business. This type is discussed in detail below in the example of the Elbrus settlement.

23According to our study of the key settlements, progress on land reforms can be expressed in different ways. In most cases, with the exception of Karachay-Cherkessia, a bureaucratic layer at the district level controls the distribution of land, especially in the foothills. The role of individual subsistence farms as an independent form of land use has grown and is based on family organisation with private (mostly non-formalised) ownership of small land plots, with a majority of settlements in high- and mid-mountain areas. The remoteness of many villages and poor resource management have led to the marginalisation of local communities that have consequently become reliant on state subsidies (Kenhi, Kurush, etc.).

24The mapping of contemporary and Soviet-era land use has revealed that land reforms have affected the overall structure of land use to the extent that land is used more intensively in the vicinity of villages. Land located far from a village has become unprofitable because individual farmers are unable to carry out long-distance movements with their herds, and agricultural production has become more expensive. Thus, instead of traditional mountain farming, a monoculture-oriented market economy that extensively utilises fertilisers and pesticides began to develop (e.g. cabbage and other vegetables in the intermountain basins and foothills of the North Caucasus). During the process of land reform, new geographic elements of growth have emerged: areas that represent a type of “garden-factory”, based on familial forms of work organisation (e.g. vegetable farms in the middle basins), or suburban territories in alpine recreation areas. By contrast, the remote mountain grasslands have been experiencing a sharp decline in interest. These pastures are no longer used intensively, which has led to bushy vegetation growing more abundantly than grass.

25The diversification of the rights of land users is spatially illustrated by the results of the survey of the Baksan Valley (Kabardino-Balkaria):

1. Most closely situated plots of land are privately owned. Their size varies depending on the area. During the Soviet period, there were official restrictions; for example, in the highlands (Terskol, 2,100 m above sea level), the maximum size is around 4 to 6 acres of land, in the Upper Baksan (1450 m) 10 to 12 acres, and in the foothills this figure reaches 20 acres or more.

2. Irrigated hayfields rank second on the value chain. Traditionally, local mountain populations have owned these lands, and ownership has been passed down from generation to generation, although, as a rule, ownership is not documented.

3. Local communities have long practised collective ownership of surrounding pastures and hayfields. During the Soviet period, they formally belonged to collective or state farms, but in fact they are used according to traditional rules, taking into account collective interests and limitations.

4. Pastures located far from a village previously belonged to collective farms and the state. Now, the state and local municipalities lease them to the local population for a token price.

26Proximity to large agricultural holdings in the plains and the lack of state support had a devastating impact on mountain agriculture, which is relatively unprofitable. Improving the competitiveness of mountain agriculture by advertising eco-friendly products or developing regional brands is still poorly practised in the North Caucasus.

Variety of land ownership: Elbrus area case study

27The Elbrus area is located at the foot of Elbrus Mountain, in the Baksan River Valley. It includes six villages with more than 5,000 people in total. This area has traditionally been inhabited by Balkars. A significant number of Russians arrived during the period of intensive tourism development in the 1960s and 1970s. This development led to a significant change in traditional agriculture and land use. Cable cars, ski lifts, campsites, holiday homes and hotels were built 40 to 50 years ago, leading to a recreational “boom”. At the beginning of the 1980s, up to 3 million tourists travelled to the region every year, which provoked multilateral conflicts between traditional agriculture, tourism and environmental protection. As a response to the urgent need to resolve these conflicts, the Elbrus National Park was established in 1986. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Elbrus region has become less and less attractive for summer and winter holidays due to general social, political and economic transformation processes in the Northern Caucasus, including the rise in social tension and violent conflicts and a decrease in state subsidies for infrastructure support. The number of tourists anticipated decreased six to seven times, mainly because of the high cost of hotels and the refusal of trade unions to pay part of the costs for their employees. In the mid-1990s, the ratio of agricultural to recreational activities changed dramatically in favour of the traditional agricultural lifestyle. A change of direction is currently underway in recreational development, trending away from large hotel construction and towards small- and medium-sized campsites and private cottages. Land capitalisation has been enhanced, and land allotment for the construction of private houses has become commonplace.

28The state remains the most important actor responsible for development and innovation (Fig. 3). The role of the local community has increased markedly as a result of the state’s involvement in the mechanisms of land use regulation. High competitiveness characterises relations between the state and local communities. The state’s attempts to limit the rights of the local community by tightening the rules, changing the land status and even changing the status of the village of Elbrus (an attempt to transform it from a rural to an urban-type settlement) met with resistance from the local community.

29The demonopolisation of the state’s rights to land has led to a diversity of land ownership relations and the emergence of the need to regulate these relations. At the same time, problems such as the division of property between the state and local communities, the efficiency of different forms of ownership in the tourism sector, the legitimacy of private land ownership near and even within protected areas, and other issues have arisen. Tourist cluster implementation sharpened the contradictions between formal and informal institutions.

30The major actors in the field of land use have changed over time: In the 1980s, state and collective enterprises were the major land owners. At present, authorities in local communities and businesses (including state supported businesses) are expanding rapidly. Given that their interests overlap, there are heated conflicts. Pastures in remote areas that were formerly used by collective enterprises are now owned by the state. However, most of them are in decline and remain underutilised because most food is imported to the Elbrus region, and the interest in land as an agricultural resource is falling. Small areas at the bottom of the Baksan River Valley near the main road fall within the sphere of interests of competing actors. But the surrounding lands – hills and remote areas – almost never fall under the scope of the entrepreneurs’ interests.

31This example shows that various forms of land ownership exist, and the areal proportion of these forms is not yet stable: There are essential changes in the legal base, and the state initiates new projects that penetrate the local level. Now that the period of the largest liberalisation of land relations has passed, a strengthening of the centralisation of power is observed. However, some local communities that have already experienced freedom have defended their rights successfully.

Conclusion

32The land reforms implemented in the Caucasus over the past few years can be described as a ‘top-down’ approach, where initiatives and mechanisms for their implementation stem from above, mostly from the state and related businesses. Although the land reforms have not been based on a multilateral analysis of local interests, the purposes proposed have nevertheless promised many beneficial outcomes for the local population. In most cases, the local community has agreed to reforms that promise such positive changes, despite many current management practices not being effective. In some cases, land reforms affect the fundamental tenets of existence and thus result in conflicts between the state and local community. With regard to local governments, although the state has taken seemingly formal steps to release the local level from excessive state custody, much of the anticipated municipal level power has remained on paper only: The necessary resource capabilities have not been granted for their realisation. The differences in land reform are manifested in regions with different levels of power centralisation. The state has continued the Soviet policy of penetrating down into the local level, whereby the majority of municipalities have remained essentially part of the state, bureaucratic groups close to state structures control the land, and peasants are tied to the state by means of land leasing.