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Cash Is Not King

Patrons and Economics at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1947-1957
L’argent n’est pas roi. Mécènes et économie à l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1947-1957
Serge Benest
p. 19-42

Résumés

Créée en 1947, la VISection de l’École pratique des hautes études (EPHE) – renommée École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) en 1975 – est souvent décrite comme le bastion institutionnel des historiens des Annales. Elle fut pourtant initialement conçue comme un lieu de formation pour les économistes afin d’œuvrer à la reconstruction d’après-guerre. En étudiant le rôle des financements ainsi que le programme de recherche scientifique de la VIe section, cet article entend démontrer la prédominance initiale de la discipline économique au sein de l’établissement puis analyser son déclin. L’article expose comment les financeurs de la section ambitionnaient de redéfinir l’identité des économistes universitaires en les réorientant vers une expertise pratique ; alors que les économistes de la section, refusant d’assumer le rôle d’experts, s’opposèrent à cette ambition.

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  • 1 Minutes of the meeting – Groupe informel Heller, April 28, 1986, Groupe informel Heller, 8D2-28, Fo (...)
  • 2 Today, its teachers-researchers’ work represents almost 10% of the cited sources in French social s (...)

1Assessing the achievements of the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in the mid-1980s, its administrator, René Marzocchi, observed: “There has been a failure to graft these high-quality economists onto the School.”1 Created in 1947 as the Sixth Section of the École pratique des hautes études (EPHE) through the joint efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the French government, the EHESS was one of the main academic institutional creation for social sciences in postwar France, and it soon became one of the leading institutions for French social sciences.2

  • 3 Annales, 2020; Coutau-Bégarie, 1989, 275-291; Mazon, 1988; Tournès, 2013, 323-331.
  • 4 I complemented my archival investigation at numerous of institutional archives, such as EHESS, Scie (...)
  • 5 Malinvaud, 1996, 93.

2Historians and sociologists of the social sciences have already addressed EHESS’s history. They describe EHESS as interdisciplinary and portray it as the institutional base of the Annales historians.3 However, when I began to work on the interaction between economics and other social sciences in the Sixth Section by investigating the archives of the RF for my doctoral dissertation, I discovered that the history of the Sixth Section was less linear than described.4 Contrary to the depiction by Edmond Malinvaud, one of its leading economists, who portrayed economics as “modest” in the Section, my findings suggest that economics was, in fact, the primary discipline within the Section at its inception.5 This article endeavors to demonstrate the initial centrality of economics and its subsequent decline within the Section.

  • 6 Monneau, 2016, 418.
  • 7 Pollak, 1976, 106.

3At the time the Section was founded, French economics was fragmented. At the institutional level, economists were divided between those serving in the administration—which the first economists had joined during the interwar period and consolidated their positions following the Liberation (Angeletti 2023, 47-105)—and those who taught in academia. Within academic faculties, economists were in a weak position, as their chairs were located in law faculties, where legal studies dominated training in economics. Even when an undergraduate degree in economics was introduced in 1954, the program offered only one economics course per semester for the first two years.6 Considering the disparate situation of economists in administration versus those in academia, Pollak explained that the “strengthening of external dependence [was] the price that the social sciences often have to pay to escape from a situation of dependence within traditional institutions.”7 Thus, examining the economists’ failure within the Sixth Section—namely, one of the main academic institutional creations for French social sciences after WWII—provides significant insight into the postwar weakness of economics in French academia.

  • 8 Historians of social sciences have focused their attention on research programs (Pooley and Solovey (...)
  • 9 On RF institutional achievements, see Gemelli, 1995; Mazon, 1988; and Tournès, 2013. On RF intellec (...)
  • 10 Benest, 2022.

4To investigate this failure, I follow the money trail by endorsing the recent historical approach that examines the role of patronage in shaping the transformation of the social sciences.8 Regarding France, historians and sociologists of the social sciences have highlighted the RF’s influence in establishing research centers and promoting such disciplines as area studies or economics.9 As I demonstrated in a recent paper, the RF played a pivotal role by funding nearly all French economic research centers during the postwar decade.10 The Foundation’s objectives were twofold: to enhance economic analysis and to promote the dissemination of economic knowledge within public administration and the private sector, thereby contributing to stabilizing the postwar political context still marked by the “threat” of Communism.

  • 11 For their useful comments and suggestions, I thank the Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines’ two (...)

5The purpose of this paper11 is to complement existing interpretations of the RF’s impact in postwar France by showing that the one who pays the piper does not necessarily call the tune. In particular, I argue that the joint efforts of RF and the French government to orient economic research toward practical expertise failed. In section 1, I present the creation of the Sixth Section of the EPHE as a joint effort between the RF and the French government to train practical economists for economic administration and the private sector. In the second section, I demonstrate that Section economists were not inclined to assume the role of experts in economic policymaking. In response, the Section’s board and the Rockefeller Foundation sought to create chairs of banking studies and fund research on contemporary economic problems. Finally, I argue that the decline of economics within the Section since the mid-1950s resulted from the persistent refusal of its economists to provide practical economic expertise to the administration.

The Sixth Section: A new institution to train economists

  • 12 Nord, 2012, 145.
  • 13 Created in 1946, after the fusion of the Service national de la statistique (SNS) and the French Na (...)

6The Liberation marked a period of profound transformation in the French economy. The state assumed control over a large portion of the national economy through the nationalization of key industries and the implementation of collaborative economic planning.12 This planning was administrated by the Commissariat général du plan [CGP], which convened representatives from various sectors of economic life, including representatives of employers, employees, and civil servants, to achieve a consensus on the orientation of economic policy. To do so, they required economic information and data provided by public institutions, such as the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) and the Bureau de statistiques et d’études financières (BSEF).13

  • 14 Desrosières, 1994. Historically, in France, the grands corps d’État were composed of high-ranking c (...)
  • 15 Touchelay, 1993, 211-28.
  • 16 Desrosières, 1995.
  • 17 At the Institut d’études politiques, economics represented roughly one third of the courses (Dreyfu (...)

7In order to provide the economic administration with economically skilled personnel, the government established a grand corps d’État of statistician-economists trained in engineering school.14 The École d’application du Service national de la statistique (SNS), originally created under the Vichy regime, was transformed into the École d’application de l’INSEE to train these new experts.15 This school offered a two-year program in economics and statistics to a dozen of the polytechnicians—elite students from a military and engineering school—aspiring to join INSEE.16 Obviously, this proved insufficient to fully staff the economic administration—while administrative schools, such as the Institut d’études politiques (IEP-Paris) and the École nationale d’administration (ENA), provided a broad-based education with weak economic training.17 These training deficiencies were further exacerbated by the weak economic training offered by the faculties, where economists were overshadowed by jurists within the law faculties, as described in the introduction.

  • 18 Quoted in Fourquet, 1980, 254.
  • 19 Baudin, 1945.

8Economists within the administration were greatly concerned about the shortcomings of the French academic system in providing adequate economic training. For instance, François Bloch-Lainé, director of the French Treasury, lamented that “economists from the faculties have lagged behind” the needs of the administration.18 His opinion was echoed in academia by economists such as Louis Baudin, a professor of economics at the faculties of law in Paris, who considered that “the vast majority of French people know nothing about this science [economics].”19 French economists were not alone in recognizing the lack of economic education in the French system; the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) also identified this deficiency.

  • 20 Fisher, 1983.
  • 21 In 1916, Joseph H. Willits received his PhD in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. His r (...)
  • 22 Morgan and Rutherford, 1998.

9In the aftermath of the Second World War, the RF revived its interwar agenda aimed at promoting a new social order based on social control.20 Under the leadership of institutional economist Joseph H. Willits, the Foundation’s Social Sciences Division pursued an agenda that supported empirical, quantitative, and historical approaches in economics.21 Willits was particularly eager to support institutional economics, which was in decline in US academia after the Second World War, due to his aversion to the increasing mathematical abstraction in the discipline.22 He divided economics into two groups:

  • 23 Quoted in Rutherford, 2005, 12.

The first I very profoundly respect. It is composed of men who know economics theoretically, empirically, and through experience, and who know a lot besides economics […]. The second group is very sharply separated from the first; with respect to them my arrogance of opinion runs free. This group includes various categories of today’s conventional economists. It is usually composed of men who are not close to what really happens or why it happens but engage in a most adroit game of formal logic or higher mathematics. I cannot develop enthusiasm about these, yet they are in the great majority. I have brought myself to recommend grants for them because I do not feel that Rockefeller Foundation grants should be limited to my narrow prejudices, but I must confess that I find it harder and harder to do so.23

  • 24 Willits explained that “In France, the issues of adjustment or conflict between Communism and Weste (...)
  • 25 “Makinsky Report”, RG2 S1945 B562 F3829 – RFA – RAC.
  • 26 “Makinsky Report”, RG2 S1945 B562 F3829 – RFA – RAC.

10Willits advocated for the production of economic knowledge as a means to tackle Communism. He asserted that economic knowledge should help to achieve economic stability, which was crucial for the preservation of democracy. After the Second World War, Willits quickly identified France as the “battleground” in the ideological conflict between Communism and Western democracy.24 He dispatched his emissary, Alexander Makinsky, across Europe to assess the needs of the liberated continent.25 In his report, Makinsky detailed the severe economic conditions in Europe, highlighting France as particularly affected. He concluded that long-term economic planning was essential for European recovery but noted that implementation of such planning in France was hindered by a lack of economic information: “I was interested to hear some Frenchmen say that while the researchers working on trade cycle research had done an excellent job under the Nazi occupation, the statistical data were still inadequate for the Government to work out a rational policy of full employment.”26

  • 27 “I asked him about the quality of economic training in the faculties of law. ‘Good for lawyers, but (...)

11Aligning his concerns about Communism and Makinsky’s conclusions, Willits focused on France during his visit to Europe in 1946. He evaluated the situation of French academia and noted significant weaknesses in economic training. His assessment was corroborated by most of the social scientists including economists, and politicians he encountered, who emphasized the shortcomings in economic education and lamented the lack of empirical and realistic economic knowledge.27

  • 28 Benest, 2022, 332-35.
  • 29 “It is a far cry from the freedom of choice in English and American institutions to this system. If (...)

12The RF’s initial efforts to strengthen French economics involved awarding individual grants to promising fellows and funding existing economic research centers.28 However, the Rockefeller officers perceived that these grants had only a limited impact on French economic training. For a time, RF officers considered supporting economic training in law faculties but soon abandoned the idea, fearing that the nationally centralized process for recruiting academic economists would become subservient to political power.29

  • 30 Morazé, 2007, 171.

13In November 1946, at the founding conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Rockefeller officer John Marshall met Charles Morazé, the speaker of the French delegation. Marshall expressed his desire to reinforce economic training, and their meeting opened new horizons for the Foundation’s intervention.30

  • 31 The agrégation d’histoire is the national examination that certifies history teachers for high scho (...)
  • 32 Morazé was involved in the creation of the IEP-Paris, and Léon Blum designated him to represent the (...)
  • 33 “My competence in those times [the immediate post-war period, the author does not give a date] was (...)

14At the time of the Liberation, Morazé served as an intermediary between the political world and academia. His involvement in the Resistance brought him into close contact with politicians such as Charles de Gaulle, while his academic reputation was enhanced by the fact that he passed the history agrégation with flying colors in 1936.31 Due to both his political and academic networks, Morazé became a key player in the postwar reform of French higher education.32 RF officers soon identified him as a promising young economist capable of having an important role in the future.33

  • 34 Under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education, the French director of Higher Educatio (...)

15In March 1947, Morazé collaborated with Pierre Auger—the director of French higher education34—to propose the creation of a new section at the EPHE. They submitted their proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation. Created in 1868, the EPHE was a public institution designed to provide a place for academics to conduct full-time research. Auger and Morazé identified it as the perfect place to extricate economic training outside the law faculties. By creating a new section within the EPHE, Auger aimed to provide:

  • 35 Interview with Pierre Auger, March 27, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – RAC.

[S]ome status and impetus to economics and sociology in France. [Auger] recognized the familiar difficulties of having economics in the law faculty[.] […] He stressed repeatedly that such a new “sixth section” as proposed would be the means whereby people really trained in economics, i.e. possessing doctors degrees, could be produced. [Auger] believe[d] that this is the only practicable solution to liberate economics and social science in general from the dominance of law faculties.35

16The Sixth Section was intended to be more than an academic research center or a training ground for scholars. It aimed to provide practical knowledge that could benefit entrepreneurs and policymakers, sharply contrasting with the theoretical approach prevalent in law faculties. Historian Lucien Febvre—the future president of the Section—articulated this objective in a supporting letter:

  • 36 Febvre’s letter to the Rockefeller foundation, November 28, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RF (...)

The instruction they [the faculties] dispense, with an eye to professional examinations, to the young people under their charge, is dogmatic and didactic instruction, having to do essentially with doctrines and not at all with the methodological, practical and technical instruction which should be given the young workers so needed in economic and social activities.36

  • 37 “The final purpose of the section is the theoretical and practical formation of social scientists. (...)

17In the funding application submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation, Auger emphasized that the Section was meant to provide practical training for social scientists.37

18In December 1947, the RF awarded a grant of $30,000 to establish the Sixth Section:

  • 38 “Grant Acceptation for the Sixth Section”, December 2-3, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – (...)

The subjects to be covered will be critical history, economic history, economic law, labor law, economics, geographical economics, social and economic research, statistics, cartography, demography, and economic theory. The school aims to provide teaching, technical, and research staff in the social sciences for the universities and faculties of law for governmental and private institutions and for the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique of the French government.38

  • 39 “Lucien Febvre’s report”, 1953, Fonds secrétariat de la direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/1, Arch (...)

19The French government, as a co-patron, also valued the “non-academic nature” of the institution and its ambition for “active participation of the Section, professors and students, in solving the economic or social issues posed by life to public authorities and administrations.”39 All the founders agreed on the creation of the Sixth Section as a means of training practical economists by providing them with technical skills and academic experience.

  • 40 André Piatier was in charge of the study of economics in the Navy during WWII and was involved in b (...)

20Although the EPHE’s recruitment rules allowed the appointment of academic outsiders with professional experience, as it did not require traditional academic credentials like the French faculties, economists were mostly appointed based on academic criteria in practice. Most were agrégés or held PhDs in economics, and only four of the first ten recruits had experience or expertise in administration.40

  • 41 Bulmer and Bulmer, 1981; Stapleton, 2003.
  • 42 Jean Lhomme (1950, 59) hoped “that action in turn may benefit from the progress of knowledge”, and (...)
  • 43 The mathematical abstraction in economics did not convince Willits, the director of the SSD. After (...)

21Most recruits came from Parisian law faculties and endorsed a socio-realistic approach. These socio-realistic economists were akin to the US institutionalist economists that the Rockefeller Foundation had supported since the interwar period.41 Like the institutionalists, the socio-realistic economists sought to strengthen economic knowledge and expertise in order to aid economic recovery. They challenged mathematical abstraction in economics and considered their quantitative socio-empirical approach as the most effective for guiding economic policy.42 Considering their intention, realistic economists aligned with the aim of the patrons of the Sixth Section.43

  • 44 Charles Bettelheim (“L’Allemagne en 1948 [Problèmes économiques et sociaux]”), Pierre Coutin (“Écon (...)
  • 45 Charles Bettelheim (“Économie politique et problèmes du travail”), Pierre Crochet-Damais (“Économie (...)
  • 46 For the year 1949, of the 4.6 million francs from the ministry of Education for the Section, 2 mill (...)

22At the time, these economists held a privileged position within the agenda of the Sixth Section. Economics was the subject most strongly represented in the seminars offered by the new section. In the first year of teaching, economic topics were covered in 10 of the 29 seminars.44 The following year, out of the 16 new seminars, 6 were dedicated to economics.45 Economics also received more funding than other disciplines during the first 5 years of the Section.46 However, the economists soon distanced themselves from the original aim of training practical economists to pursue their own research agendas. As a result, they lost ground within the Section.

Trying to build a “French NBER”

  • 47 Note unsigned, dated by the archivist, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/1, AN.

23As early as 1948, an internal note—unsigned and dated retrospectively by archivists—reiterated the Section’s original research agenda. This note reaffirmed the Section’s ambition to focus on economics by addressing the concern that “[t]he public authorities […] have never given economics the means to create real equipment, to train enough scientists, and finally to carry out enough essential scientific research to bring man’s knowledge, even to the level of knowledge of his means of action”.47 However, the Section’s economists, eager to pursue their own research agendas, quickly thwarted these objectives by focusing on strengthening their academic legitimacy.

  • 48 Lane to Willits, December 3, 1951, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

24One of the first actions of the Section’s economists was the creation of the Centre d’études économiques (CEE) within the Sixth Section. Established by Morazé in collaboration with the CNRS, the center housed the Section’s socio-realist economists. As Frederic Lane, appointed in 1951 as the new head of the Social Sciences Division at the RF’s Paris headquarters, noted: “They [the economists of the CEE] think economics can be made more realistic by uniting economic research more closely with historical, sociological, and statistical studies.”48

  • 49 See the review of Fourastié’s “La méthode comptable dans la science économique. Principes généraux” (...)
  • 50 Document entitled “En moins de trois ans la VIe section a publié”, undated, Fonds secrétariat direc (...)
  • 51 Margairaz and Rousso, 1987, 26.
  • 52 On the quasi-absence of academic economists in postwar French planning, see Dard (1999).
  • 53 Fourastié quoted in Rousso, 1986, 83.

25At the CEE, the economists focused on academic publishing. They published a dozen master’s theses and PhD dissertations, as well as the textbooks of Jean Fourastié and Charles Bettelheim’s courses.49 In 1950, they founded the bimonthly academic journal Revue économique,50 which reflected the interests of the Section’s economists in contemporary economic issues. Within two years, they published 6 special issues addressing various economic matters of the day: wages and employment (1950), monetary issues (1950), collective labor agreements (1951), national accounts (1951), trade balance (1951), and credit control (1951). Despite addressing these economic matters, however, the economists were not involved in the dissemination and practical application of their theoretical research, as originally planned. For instance, no document in the archives shows research projects commissioned by the economic administration. At the Commissariat général au plan (CGP)—the French central planning agency—academic economists represented only 8% of the staff,51 and of these, only Pierre Coutin and Jean Fourastié belonged to the Section.52 Fourastié even lamented that the planning administration “had nothing in common with academics.”53

26Lucien Febvre, president of the Section, was aware that the Section’s economists were prioritizing their theoretical research over the Section’s initial aims. In May 1951, he wrote to the general director of Higher Education, expressing his intention to rectify the situation:

  • 54 Febvre to the general director of higher education, May 30, 1951, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (...)

I will be by your side to do something new. To increase the efficiency of a machine [Sixth Section] perhaps a little too expensive and a little too detached from the current contingencies to provide France, in particular, with these executives of practicing economists, whom I thought from the very first minute, because the law faculties provide us with economists from the chair, and that is fine, but we must train economists of action, and it is to those that I thought above all: France needs them.54

27The transformation was not immediate. As Lucien Febvre realized that the Section’s economists wished to concentrate on their own academic work, he considered that a renewal of personnel was required to strengthen practical economic expertise. To recruit economic teachers engaged in real-life situations, Febvre decided to establish a partnership with the Association professionelle des banques (APB).

  • 55 Coleman, 1993, 130.
  • 56 Andrieu, 1994, 123.

28Created in 1941 by the Vichy regime, the APB was the compulsory association of French bankers. After the Second World War, the APB maintained its corporatist agenda by encompassing all the French banks as its members. The administration was required to consult the APB on “all general policy decisions,” and the APB, in turn, disseminated the administration’s instructions to its members.55 Having established an Institut technique de banque in 1950 at the Conservatoire national des arts et métiers—an engineering school—to train future bankers, the APB perceived Febvre’s ambition as an opportunity to replicate the creation of a banking training.56

  • 57 Delattre, 2005[2003].
  • 58 Henri Hierche to Braudel or Febvre, June 3, 1953, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 2018 (...)
  • 59 Since its creation, the Sixth Section has had its own system of recruitment, by election by an elec (...)

29Discussions between the APB and the board of the Sixth Section began in April 1953. By the following months, Henri Ardant, the former director of the bank Société générale during the occupation and known as “the principal spokesman for French private banks to the Germans and Vichy,”57 organized a luncheon meeting with Henri Hierche—a businessman involved in finance—along with Febvre and Fernand Braudel—historian and secretary of the Section. Shortly after this meeting, Hierche drafted a proposal for the creation of a center for financial studies tasked with training bank employees. To initiate “a serious start in economic education”, Hierche intended to offer five chairs in economics—Distribution and Transport; International Transfers and Settlements; Investments and Financial Markets; Geographical Economics; and Credit—to complement the teaching efforts of the Section’s economists, including Piatier, Bettelheim, and Fourastié.58 On the part of the Section, its board sought funding for four positions, two of which would be devoted to recruiting bankers to teach banking.59 While the aspirations of the APB and of the Section’s board were nearly aligned, the project required validation from all of the Section’s professors.

  • 60 “Minutes of the 17th January 1954 Council meeting”, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20 (...)
  • 61 “Preparation note for the January 1954 session of the Section Council”, undated, Fonds secrétariat (...)

30Six months later, on 17 January 1954, Febvre presented the APB project to the Council of the Section—the meeting of all professors of the Sixth Section. He stressed his commitment to the institution’s original aim of “apply[ing] theoretical science to practical activities” and described the APB project as a prime opportunity to do so.60 He detailed the project: the creation of a center for banking studies, four chairs (2 for banking technicians, 1 for a legal specialist in financial law, and 1 for a geographer interested in the history and geography of investments), a budget that included offices, facilities and 7,000 to 8,000 francs earmarked for the new center.61

  • 62 “Minutes of the 17th January 1954 Council meeting”, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20 (...)

31However, the reactions of the Council were predominantly negative. The first criticism came from jurist and law sociologist Henri Lévy-Bruhl, a member of the Section since 1948, who opposed the project on principle, regarding it as “an extremely dangerous path and [claimed] that it would be better to rely solely on governmental funds, than otherwise it would be opening the school to non-university influences.”62 Sociologist Georges Gurvitch raised another objection; he proposed that the funds allocated for one of the chairs should be available for use at the Council’s discretion. Finally, economist Jean Weiller opposed using the center as a teaching facility. The only supporter was Morazé, who considered the project aligned with the Section’s initial ambition of strengthening practical economics by bridging the gap between academics and business or public decision-makers.

  • 63 “Minutes of the 7th March 1954 Council meeting”, Assemblée des enseignants, Archives EHESS.
  • 64 “Draft protocol between High Studies School and APB”, undated, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (B (...)

32Two months later, the Section Council mandated a commission composed of “Mr. Lévy-Bruhl and the Section’s economists” to reach an agreement on the protocol envisaged by the APB.63 A few weeks later, the commission—in the absence of Lévy-Bruhl but including Fernand Braudel and the Section’s economists (Jean Fourastié, Emile James, Jean Lhomme, Jean Meynaud, Charles Morazé, Henri Noyelle, André Piatier, etc.)—unanimously rejected the draft protocol.64 The Commission opposed a specific recruitment procedure for the APB chairs and rejected the creation of a research center. The Commission approved only the appointments of four new professors—through the regular appointment procedure—to study banking and finance. They were Edouard Escarra, president of the Crédit lyonnais bank; Joseph Hamel, professor at the Faculty of Law and bank consultant; Henri Ardant; and Alfred Pose, associate professor of law and former director of the Banque nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie.

  • 65 “Yearbook of the Sixth Section 1956-1957”, Annuaires, Fonds Général, Archives EHESS.
  • 66 “List of the audience of the Escarra’s seminar”, February 2, 1955, Fonds secrétariat direction EHES (...)

33On 4 April 1954, the Section Council unanimously approved the Commission’s proposals: the creation of a specific appointment procedure was dropped, and the establishment of the Center for Banking and Financial Studies was deferred. Instead, the Council merely appointed the four bankers. Their courses began in the 1955-1956 academic year. These courses soon demonstrated their efficacy in training future bank executives: Hamel’s lectures, attended by banking students, addressed commercial law issues “in so far as these problems may be of interest to bankers,” while Pose’s teaching offered to students “destined for banking […] a more concrete idea of what credit institutions are”.65 Among the nine auditors in Escarra’s classes, four were bank employees, and four others worked in economic administration.66

34By funding four teaching positions for bankers, the APB provided the Section with an opportunity to realign the economists’ agenda with the Section’s original project. This initiative strengthened the technical and practical teaching within the Sixth Section, thus endorsing the establishment’s initial aim. A further step in this direction was the attempt to bridge the gap between the Section’s economists and economic administration.

  • 67 See footnote 46.
  • 68 Febvre to the General director of Higher Education, July 2, 1951, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (...)
  • 69 On the Institut scientifique de recherches économiques et sociales [ISRES], see Tournès (2006).
  • 70 Willits, 401 LSE RG2(1951) B536 F3586 – RFA – RAC.

35By the early 1950s, the CEE’s resources were dwindling as the Rockefeller grant came to an end, and the Sixth Section reoriented its funding toward historical studies in order to balance the budget among various disciplines.67 Economists needed new sources of funding. For the year 1952, Febvre requested a doubling of government funding to the CEE (from 3.000.000 to 6.000.000 francs).68 In mid-1952, the Section also applied for a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Concurrently, the Service d’études de l’activité économique et de la structure sociale (SEAE)—the new name of the ISRES founded by Charles Rist and funded by the RF during the interwar period—submitted a similar request.69 Upon receiving the funding applications from both centers, RF officer Frederic Lane saw an opportunity to reorganize “the mess French economics [was] in.”70

  • 71 “In combination, they form, I believe, a good administrative structure for academic economic resear (...)
  • 72 Lane to Willits, August 1, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

36Lane regarded these two centers as administratively complementary: on the one hand, the CEE, as a public research center, could secure funding from the administration; on the other hand, the private SEAE provided easy access to private funds.71 More significantly, Lane was satisfied with the composition of the two centers due to the predominance of “institutionalist” economists—i.e., socio-realistic economists—while “mathematical economists” were present but not dominant. This methodological orientation was considered optimal for providing economic policy expertise, especially since the centers comprised nongovernmental economists who wished to conduct research “with as much independence from the government as possible and complete independence from the Ministry of Finance.”72

  • 73 Lane to Willits, September 25, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC
  • 74 Meynaud to Lane, December 19, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.
  • 75 The National Bureau of Economic Research is perhaps the most influential economics think tank in th (...)

37At the end of the summer of 1952, in order to establish a coherent and ambitious research program “for the study of French economic development and economic fluctuations within their social context,” Lane invited the two centers to submit a joint funding request.73 Three months later, Jean Meynaud—director of the CEE—sent a single request for “a major survey on the evolution of the structures of the French economy” to be conducted by both centers.74 Covering a period from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, the project aimed to provide “structural indices” for studying economic cycles by describing “all the interrelationships which define the economy in France as a whole.” To do so, economists planned to create databases on various topics—such as the financial structure of companies, consumption, and the behavior of different social groups (entrepreneurs, employees in private or public sector, consumers)—intending to provide knowledge of “threefold interest: 1/historical, 2/ theoretical (in determining the limits of the validity of various economic systems or laws), 3/ practical, in providing a more accurate frame of reference for the formulation of economic policy”.75

  • 76 Lane to Willits, December 28, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.
  • 77 “Acceptance of the grant”, February 26, 1953, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 –  (...)

38Perceiving the research program as an opportunity to reinforce economic expertise by providing “a more factual frame of reference for the formulation of economic policies,” Lane wrote to Willits to advocate for the grant.76 The director of the SSD was deeply persuaded: in February 1953, the Rockefeller Foundation board approved a grant of $60,000 for a three-year research project, an increase from the initially envisioned $50,000. Members of the Rockefeller Foundation anticipated promising expansion, even suggesting that “this new collaboration could someday become the French ‘National Bureau of Economic Research’.”77

39After one year of activity, the economists reported their progress to the RF. Both centers successfully reoriented their focus toward providing practical economic expertise. Given inflation and successive devaluations of the Francs, monetary volatility affected the French economy and was a significant matter for economic stability. Accordingly, the CEE investigated the structures of different monetary zones, notably in Europe. Additionally, the CEE conducted two other studies. One explored the structure of the interest rates and debt morphology; the other was a historical study of income, examining the structural transformation of wages in metallurgy, public services, industry, and agriculture. Meanwhile, at the SEAE, economists created an index describing the production of manufactured goods from 1840 to 1953 to identify economic cycles over the studied period.

  • 78 “Note about the use of ‘crédits Rockefeller’ by the Centre d’études économiques” written by Meynaud (...)

40In line with the grant’s objectives, the economists provided economic understanding addressing the period’s needs, and, above all, the collaboration between the two centers was a significant achievement. As Jean Meynaud explained, there was a “division of labor within the project and the sharing of certain working instruments.”78 The RF grant thus facilitated the reorientation of economic research within the Sixth Section. While the Section’s economists had originally focused on theoretical research, they now provided economic expertise, as the original agenda of the Sixth Section had envisioned.

41However, despite the promising prospects of the “French NBER,” the prominence of economics within the Sixth Section soon declined dramatically.

The decline of economics in the Sixth Section

42After a shaky beginning, the economists of the Sixth Section seemed to have reached a balance between practical and theoretical studies. Yet, an event in 1955 reversed the situation and precipitated the decline of economics within the establishment. The election of economist François Perroux as professor of the Sixth Section in that year ignited a contentious dispute among its economists.

  • 79 “Minutes of the General Assembly”, Compte rendu de l’assemblée des enseignants, Fonds Général, Arch (...)

43Perroux, a former fellow of the RF, was a prominent French economist. At the time, he was one of the very few internationally recognized French economists. As director of the Institut de science économique appliquée [ISEA] (funded by the RF, it was the main economics research center of the time), he created national accounting tools for the economic planning administration after the Second World War. Although his initial application was rejected the previous year, Perroux was elected at the General Assembly on March 20, 1955. His recruitment proceeded in spite of strong opposition from the majority of the Section’s economists while Jean Meynaud, the head of the CEE and leader of the opposition, was absent.79 In response to Perroux’s recruitment, nine out of eleven economists from the CEE resigned, including Meynaud and Jean Lhomme—the secretary of the center.

  • 80 I consulted the two collections (Perroux collection is preserved at Imec [Caen, France], Meynaud co (...)
  • 81 On Perroux collaboration see Simmons, 2015, 118-126; Cohen, 2006; Brisset and Fèvre, 2021.
  • 82 Gemelli, 1995, 306.
  • 83 Dreyfus, 2011, 114-127.

44The precise reasons for this mass resignation remain obscure, as Jean Meynaud destroyed his archives during this period, and Perroux’s archives provide no additional insights.80 While Perroux’s tempestuous behavior may have exacerbated conflicts, deeper underlying tensions were likely at play. Among them, Perroux’s collaboration with the Vichy regime during the Second World War contrasted sharply with the wartime resistance activities of other Section economists, such as Morazé and Piatier.81 Gemelli attributes the conflict to institutional struggles, positing that rivalry between the Sixth Section and the Institut d’études politiques, allied with its foundation, the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (FNSP), was a driving factor.82 She describes the FNSP’s concern about the rising influence of the Sixth Section. However, this interpretation is not entirely persuasive, given the close connections between the two establishments. For instance, when the Sixth Section was created, the two founders of the Section—Lucien Febvre and Charles Morazé—also served on the board of the FNSP, and many academics, including Morazé, André Piatier, and Jean Fourastié, taught at both institutions during the postwar decade.83 Additionally, the Rockefeller grant for both the CEE and the SEAE was administered through the FNSP. Therefore, institutional rivalry does not seem to have been the cause of the economists’ opposition to François Perroux. Although the exact reasons remain indeterminate, the collective resignation of these economists ultimately contributed to the decline of economics within the establishment.

  • 84 Chapsal to Gillette (Foundation Rockefeller), May 27, 1955, FNSP French Economy 1955-1958, RG 1.2 S (...)
  • 85 Interview with Clemens Heller, June 14, 1955, KW Thompson diaries-1955 – RFA – RAC.
  • 86 “However the economists in the Centre represented a conservative tradition which CH [Clemens Heller (...)
  • 87 Minutes of the meeting between Braudel and French economists, December 20, 1955, Fonds secrétariat (...)

45In the wake of the collective resignation, Jacques Chapsal, the FNSP’s administrator, notified the Rockefeller Foundation of the FNSP’s inability to ensure the continuation of the program. He proposed suspending the RF’s funding until a viable solution could be identified.84 Kenneth Thompson, an RF officer, described the crisis as an “unmitigated catastrophe.”85 As the conflict escalated to the point where no compromise seemed feasible, the board of the Sixth Section sought to preserve its reputation with the RF by discrediting its own economists.86 The Section’s board emphasized the traditional approach of their colleagues, portraying them as incapable of providing practical research and expertise. Braudel asserted that the economic center was now “half dead.”87

  • 88 On Guilbaud and French reception of game theory, see Nessah, Tazdaït and Vahabi, 2021; On Guilbaud (...)
  • 89 “The future of the Centre d’études économiques will, of course, be a matter of concern to the offic (...)
  • 90 Interview with Robert Marjolin, October 20, 1955, KW Thompson diaries-1955 – RFA – RAC.

46In an attempt to revive the CEE, two economists were recruited: Pierre Coutin, an agricultural economist involved in the Commissariat général au plan (CGP), and Georges Theodule Guilbaud. Described as the “brain of the center,” Guilbaud was a mathematical economist credited with introducing game theory to France and was involved in Operations research.88 Having served as deputy director of the ISEA—Perroux’s research center—since 1951, Guilbaud was seen as the sole person capable of maintaining calm at the center. Reassured by the new appointments, the RF released the funds in June 1955 but kept a close eye on the CEE.89 However, RF officers soon realized that the CEE’s prestige had suffered irrevocable damage despite the new recruits. Robert Marjolin—an economist, former Rockefeller fellow, and now, a prominent figure in European integration—considered that “no single research institute or center in France [is] worthy of standards of economics in the Western World. [Marjolin was] not impressed with the originality or bite of work going on at the Sixth Section”. 90

  • 91 Fernand Braudel to Charles Morazé, January 11, 1951, and Charles Morazé to Fernand Braudel, January (...)
  • 92 “Excerpt of an interview of Heller by D’Arms”, December 9, 1954, R.G. 1.2, 500 S École pratique des (...)
  • 93 The Area Studies program was established in 1955 with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Init (...)

47The Perroux conflict and its aftermath marked the first step in the decline of economics within the Section. The second step resulted from the transformation of the Section’s scientific agenda, endorsed by the historian Fernand Braudel, who had been consolidating his influence within the institution since the early 1950s. In the early months of 1951, significant tensions arose between Braudel, the Section’s secretary, and Morazé, its founder. Braudel alleged that Morazé had misappropriated the collective’s equipment and research funds for his personal use, while Morazé claimed he had an oral agreement permitting such actions.91 This rivalry persisted throughout the first half of the 1950s and attracted the attention of the Rockefeller Foundation, which noted: “Actually, Braudel and C. Moraze, the two star disciples of Lucien Febvre, are at present in a deadly rivalry.”92 As president of the Section, Febvre sided with Braudel, thereby enhancing Braudel’s influence within the establishment. Even prior to assuming the presidency in 1956 following Febvre’s death, Braudel had already begun to redirect the Section’s scientific agenda toward Area Studies—at the expense of economics—and aimed to transform the Sixth Section into a university for social sciences.93

  • 94 Febvre had deep interest in economics, as demonstrated these numerous economics book review in the (...)
  • 95 On that topic in postwar France, see De Rouvray, 2005, chap 5.
  • 96 “Historians, we who, with sociologists, are the only ones who have a right of access to everything (...)

48Unlike Febvre and Morazé, Braudel had little regard for economic research.94 In the inaugural issue of the Revue économique in 1950, Braudel described his view on the interaction between economists and historians.95 He argued that economists should “help” historians in their research—a periphrasis suggesting that economists’ role was to support the historian’s research priorities. In his view, history was paramount over economics because it, alongside sociology, was the only social science capable of investigating all facets of human beings and societies.96 Accordingly, Braudel redirected the Section’s funding toward other social scientists and urged economists to secure their own funding. While the Rockefeller Foundation excluded further support for economics, Braudel encouraged the Section’s economists to obtain research grants from the French economic administration.

  • 97 Are in the meeting : Dumontier (director of the service de la conjoncture et des études économiques (...)

49In December 1955, Braudel convened a meeting of French economists from both the economic administration and the CEE to discuss the CEE’s future.97 Relying on Febvre’s authority, Braudel expressed his clear opinion on the agenda to be adopted by the Section’s economists:

  • 98 “Minutes of the meeting between Braudel and French economists”, December 20, 1955, Fonds secrétaria (...)

We don’t want a research center that doesn’t work and which cannot respond to public administrations. That would seem to me to be an aberration. As much as we defend disinterested scientific research, it seems impossible and unjustifiable to us [Braudel and Febvre] that the work of the CEE should be theoretical, outside of reality.98

  • 99 Ibid.

50Braudel sought to persuade the CEE’s economists to embrace the initial dual role envisioned for the Sixth Section: training economists for both the private and public sectors while simultaneously providing economic expertise. In Braudel’s view, the two missions mutually nourished each other.99

  • 100 Ibid.
  • 101 Ibid.

51The administration’s officials at the meeting endorsed Braudel’s view. They emphasized the need for economic skills within the French administration and lamented the weakness of economic research and training in France. Clouzon, a member of the Institut de statistique de l’université de Paris (ISUP) stated that “from the point of view of intellectual training, we have a considerable lack of researchers”.100 François Bloch-Lainé, the director of the Caisse des dépôts et consignations—a public bank dedicated to social investments such as public housing—described France as a country “intellectually underdeveloped […] in the economic field”.101 Members of the economic administration advocated for the Sixth Section to mitigate these shortcomings by training future economists. However, Coutin and Guilbaud had different perspectives. They considered that the task for training economists lay with the Faculty of Law, asserting that the Sixth Section should focus exclusively on providing advanced training in economics to supplement the initial economic education provided by the law faculties.

  • 102 Ibid.
  • 103 Ibid.
  • 104 Ibid.
  • 105 Ibid.
  • 106 Ibid.

52The discussion also stumbled over the production of economic expertise. Members of the administration requested research that could inform economic policy. Bloch-Lainé urged the development of “concrete studies […] which could usefully build a bridge between the University and the administration and which would really benefit everyone”.102 Like Bloch-Lainé, other administration members sought enhanced interaction between academic economists and the administration. They suggested various methods to achieve this: some spoke of “giving an order” regarding research topics, while others believed economists should merely remain “attentive to the needs of public administrations.”103 The economists of the Sixth Section were reluctant to align their research with the administration’s requirement. Guilbaud opposed that the Sixth Section provides practical research for the implementation of economic policy, asserting that this duty belonged to the economic administration services—INSEE and the Service des études économiques et financières (SEEF) in the Ministry of Finance. In response to Guilbaud, Braudel insisted on and advocated for addressing “very practical, very short-term requests, which take the form of surveys.”104 But Guilbaud rejected such surveys, advocating instead for long-term theoretical studies. Braudel maintained that “the short term always nourishes a research center. Let the long term be its luxury, if you will, but the short term is a necessity, almost…”105 However, he was interrupted by Guilbaud, who interjected: “His luxury and his life.”106 The mathematical economist was unwavering: long-term theoretical studies were at the core of his research center, despite Braudel’s opinion. Braudel had to concede that his plan was at odds with the aspirations of economists.

  • 107 The cumulative director of study of the Sixth Section are a specific appointment: the scholars have (...)
  • 108 On February 1952, the BSEF was renamed SEEF.

53As president of the Section since Febvre’s death in September 1956, Braudel preferred to recruit new economists who were already involved in the economic administration rather than trying to convert the Section’s economists. In May 1957, Edmond Malinvaud and Claude Gruson were recruited as cumulative candidates—a position that offered only a salary supplement while they retained their primary position within the administration.107 Malinvaud, an alumnus of the engineering school Polytechnique and of the École d’application de l’INSEE and former Rockefeller Fellow at the Cowles Commission in 1950-1951, was the head of the National income accounting at the INSEE. Gruson, who also graduated from Polytechnique and served as finance inspector before the Second World War, had been director of the Service des études économiques et financières (SEEF) since 1957, providing economic forecasts for the administration.108

  • 109 “The Centre d’études économiques of the Sixieme (Coutin) is now ‘mediocre’ and scarcely merits furt (...)

54But Braudel soon changed his agenda, and economics suffered under his tenure. In 1958, when the “French NBER” grant came to an end, the Sixth Section’s board informed the Rockefeller Foundation that the CEE had become mediocre and did not merit further support.109 More significantly, economics no longer benefited from new recruitments. From the election of Malinvaud and Gruson until Braudel’s departure in 1972, only 6 economists were appointed among more than 150 social scientists recruited. This policy profoundly impacted the discipline within the Section, leading to the near disappearance of economics from the Sixth Section during the 1960s. Whereas economics had constituted more than 25% of the Section’s teaching in the academic year 1959-1960, with 24 out of the 88 courses—by the academic year 1972-1973, it accounted for just over 20% of the courses taught in the Sixth Section, with only 17 courses—a 30% drop from the previous decade.

Conclusion

55By examining the funding and the scientific agenda of the Sixth Section, I have shown that the main motivation for its creation was to strengthen economics training in French academia. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Ministry of Education joined forces to establish an institution that could supplement the theoretical training offered by law faculties with a more practical training. However, the economists of the Section opposed the patrons’ aim as they were not interested in taking on the role of experts. Despite various attempts by the Section’s head and its patrons to direct economic research toward practical expertise, the economists persistently refused to provide such expertise and remained committed to theoretical research. Once Braudel took the helm of the institution, he changed its original scientific agenda and accordingly limited the role of economists within the section.

56The creation of the Sixth Section was one of the main governmental efforts regarding the social sciences in France after the Second World War. Given this, the failure of economists to forge their place within the institution—despite the Section’s foundational purpose to move economic training out of the law faculties—provides important insight into the weakness of economists in French postwar academia.

57The case of the economists in the Sixth Section is significant for highlighting the influence of funding on academia. The Section’s funders sought to transform the identity of academic economists by reorienting them toward practical expertise. The sticking point was not a methodological issue—the Rockefeller Foundation particularly appreciated the realistic approach—but an issue of freedom in defining research topics. The economists of the Section consistently opposed having their research topics shaped by the requirements of the economic administration. Social scientists—and economists in particular—frequently asserted the social value of their work but also objected to their research being determined by external factors.

  • 110 The following achievements of economists at the EHESS are investigated by Godechot (2011) and Benes (...)

58Finally, these events raise the question of disciplinary autonomy within an interdisciplinary framework. In practice, the Section’s economists were never in a position to define their own scientific agenda before Braudel’s retirement.110 The supposed collaboration between social scientists masked struggles of jurisdiction between social scientists and economists. Economists emerged defeated from these jurisdictional struggles, which resulted in a loss of resources and power.

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Notes

1 Minutes of the meeting – Groupe informel Heller, April 28, 1986, Groupe informel Heller, 8D2-28, Fonds Charles Morazé – Archives de la FMSH.

2 Today, its teachers-researchers’ work represents almost 10% of the cited sources in French social science academic publications. Report of the Cours des comptes, March 3, 2021, online: https://page.hn/0fgvc6 (accessed on January 17, 2025).

3 Annales, 2020; Coutau-Bégarie, 1989, 275-291; Mazon, 1988; Tournès, 2013, 323-331.

4 I complemented my archival investigation at numerous of institutional archives, such as EHESS, Sciences-Po, Archives nationales; and personal archives, such as Braudel archives (Académie française and Archives nationales), Morazé archives (Fondation Maison des sciences de l’Homme), Lucien Febvre (Archives nationales).

5 Malinvaud, 1996, 93.

6 Monneau, 2016, 418.

7 Pollak, 1976, 106.

8 Historians of social sciences have focused their attention on research programs (Pooley and Solovey, 2010 on the Ford Foundation’s Behavioral Sciences Program), on patrons themselves (Solovey 2013, 2020 on the National Science Foundation), on disciplines (Van Horn et al., 2017 on the contributions of business to economic), or on a broader scope (such as Crowther-Heyck, 2006 on the shift in patronage for the postwar behavioral and social sciences).

9 On RF institutional achievements, see Gemelli, 1995; Mazon, 1988; and Tournès, 2013. On RF intellectual achievements, see De Rouvray, 2005 on economic history and Popa, 2015, 2016, 2017 on Area Studies.

10 Benest, 2022.

11 For their useful comments and suggestions, I thank the Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines’ two anonymous referees and its editor, Olivier Orain. A very first version of this article was presented at the conference « L’État des économistes. La science économique face à la puissance publique (xxe-xxisiècles) », Université de Picardie, Amiens, 2019. My gratitude extends to the Rockefeller Archive Center (Sleepy Hollow, N.Y.) and its staff—notably Mary Ann Quinn, Tom Rosenbaum, Patricia Rosenfield, and James Allen Smith; to the service des archives de l’EHESS (Paris) and its staff—Magali Nié and Naomi Russo; and to Yann Potin of the Archives nationales (Paris), Goulven Lebrech of Mission archives de Sciences Po (Paris), and Fabienne Queyroux and Cécile Bouet of the bibliothèque de l’Institut de France (Paris). All errors and omissions remain my responsibility.

12 Nord, 2012, 145.

13 Created in 1946, after the fusion of the Service national de la statistique (SNS) and the French Navy’s Service des études économiques (SEE), INSEE had the mission of providing the administration with economic and demographic statistics (Touchelay, 1993, 211-28). The ministère des Finances created the Bureau de statistiques et d’études financières (BSEF) in 1947. As the main governmental and statistical service, it provided quantitative information in order to “improve public financial management and decision-making in the field of economic action” (Terray, 2002, 52-53).

14 Desrosières, 1994. Historically, in France, the grands corps d’État were composed of high-ranking civil servants who had completed their training as engineers in prestigious grandes écoles and were destined to work with State services and public industries for providing public utilities, such as the corps of Ponts et chaussées (roads), the corps of Mines (mining), or the corps of Eaux et forêts (agriculture). On French grands corps d’État, see Suleiman, 2016 [1978].

15 Touchelay, 1993, 211-28.

16 Desrosières, 1995.

17 At the Institut d’études politiques, economics represented roughly one third of the courses (Dreyfus, 2011, 128). At the École nationale d’administration (ENA), economics represented roughly one quarter of the courses (Kolopp, 2013, 58).

18 Quoted in Fourquet, 1980, 254.

19 Baudin, 1945.

20 Fisher, 1983.

21 In 1916, Joseph H. Willits received his PhD in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. His research endorsed institutionalist methodological approaches based on empirical investigation (De Rouvray, 2005, 83). He continued to support institutional economics throughout his career. Prior to his tenure as head of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Social Sciences (1939-1955), he held significant academic and administrative positions, including director of the Industrial Economics Research Department at the University of Pennsylvania (1921-1939) and dean of the Wharton School of Business (1933-1939). After helping to establish the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER—see footnote 75) with the support of the Division of Social Sciences, he became its first president (1934-1936) and later served as its executive director (1936-1939).

22 Morgan and Rutherford, 1998.

23 Quoted in Rutherford, 2005, 12.

24 Willits explained that “In France, the issues of adjustment or conflict between Communism and Western democracy appear in most acute form. She is the battleground or laboratory”, quoted by Stapleton, 2003, 108. Willits asked for weekly reports about “the program and policies proposed by the Communist Party in France.” Willits to Robert T. Crane, December 3, 1946, Crane, Robert Treat (Visit) 1946-1948, RG1.1 700S B23 F169 – Rockefeller Foundation Archive [RFA] – Rockefeller Archive Center [RAC].

25 “Makinsky Report”, RG2 S1945 B562 F3829 – RFA – RAC.

26 “Makinsky Report”, RG2 S1945 B562 F3829 – RFA – RAC.

27 “I asked him about the quality of economic training in the faculties of law. ‘Good for lawyers, but not so good for economists. No training in empirical research’”; Interview with Jeanneney, October 16, 1946, Willits Diaries – RFA – RAC.

28 Benest, 2022, 332-35.

29 “It is a far cry from the freedom of choice in English and American institutions to this system. If a truly political minister came in, one wonders what would happen to University freedom”; Interview with Rueff, October 14, 1946, Willits Diaries – RFA – RAC.

30 Morazé, 2007, 171.

31 The agrégation d’histoire is the national examination that certifies history teachers for high school instruction.

32 Morazé was involved in the creation of the IEP-Paris, and Léon Blum designated him to represent the French delegation at the founding conference of UNESCO (Morazé, 2007, 162).

33 “My competence in those times [the immediate post-war period, the author does not give a date] was that of a heretical economist” (Morazé, 2007, 151). “JM was more than ever impressed by Morazé: he is extremely bright and seems an admirable choice for the Committee’s secretary”; Interview with Charles Morazé and Robert Fawtier, May 5, 1947, John Marshall Diairies – RFA – RAC.

34 Under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education, the French director of Higher Education acted as a deputy minister of French higher education.

35 Interview with Pierre Auger, March 27, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – RAC.

36 Febvre’s letter to the Rockefeller foundation, November 28, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – RAC.

37 “The final purpose of the section is the theoretical and practical formation of social scientists. It would provide teaching, technical and research staff for the Universities and Faculties of Law, the Government and private institutions, the National Center for Scientific Research/Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). A real improvement in the status of the social sciences in France can thus be expected”; “Application for a grant to the École pratique des hautes études”, Pierre Auger to Rockefeller Foundation, November 5, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – RAC.

38 “Grant Acceptation for the Sixth Section”, December 2-3, 1947, 500R EPHE RG12 S500 B16 F146 – RFA – RAC.

39 “Lucien Febvre’s report”, 1953, Fonds secrétariat de la direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/1, Archives nationales [AN].

40 André Piatier was in charge of the study of economics in the Navy during WWII and was involved in both the finance and foreign ministries after the war. Pierre Coutin was ministerial counselor at Ministry of National Economy between 1945 and 1946, and participated in the CGP from 1947. Jean Gottmann was involved at the Ministry of National Economy in 1945, while Charles Bettelheim was ministerial counselor at the Ministry of Labor between 1944 and 1948. Dossier des enseignants, Fonds général, Archives EHESS.

41 Bulmer and Bulmer, 1981; Stapleton, 2003.

42 Jean Lhomme (1950, 59) hoped “that action in turn may benefit from the progress of knowledge”, and André Marchal (1953, 189) described “a practical goal [for economics]: to predict historical evolution, to guide action”.

43 The mathematical abstraction in economics did not convince Willits, the director of the SSD. After meeting Allais, the leading French mathematical economist of the time, Willits lamented: “He [Allais] may be as limited in his preoccupation with a mathematical method to the exclusion of any other as are the faculties of Law from their point of view. I remember A. Marshall’s dictum: ‘In approaching a question of economic policy, take those things that are measurable first, they will constitute somewhat less than half the total.’” Interview with Allais, October 21, 1946; Willits Diaries – RFA – RAC.

44 Charles Bettelheim (“L’Allemagne en 1948 [Problèmes économiques et sociaux]”), Pierre Coutin (“Économies paysannes”), Jean Fourastié (“Méthode comptable”), Georges Friedmann (“Machinisme et psychologie”), Alexandre Koyré (“Science et machinisme”), Ernest Labrousse (“Histoire et statistique économique”), Jean Lhomme (“Méthode statistique”), Charles Morazé (“Histoire économique”), Alfred Pose (“Banque et Crédit”), Jean Weiller (“Échanges internationaux”).

45 Charles Bettelheim (“Économie politique et problèmes du travail”), Pierre Crochet-Damais (“Économie des transports”), Jean Gottman (“Géographie des matières premières”), Bertrand Nogaro (“Méthode historique, méthode économique”), Jean Lhomme (“Structures économiques, structures sociales”), Victor Rouquet la Garrigue (“Économie mathématique et économétrie appliquée”).

46 For the year 1949, of the 4.6 million francs from the ministry of Education for the Section, 2 million were dedicated to economics—which is twice more than for history and four times more than for sociology. In 1951, 3 million francs, which was more than half of the Section’s budget from the government, was directed to economics. It was only in 1953 that the distribution of funds was balanced among the disciplines: the centre d’études économiques (CEE) and the centre de recherche historique (CRH) each received 2.25 million francs.

47 Note unsigned, dated by the archivist, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/1, AN.

48 Lane to Willits, December 3, 1951, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

49 See the review of Fourastié’s “La méthode comptable dans la science économique. Principes généraux” by Febvre (1949).

50 Document entitled “En moins de trois ans la VIe section a publié”, undated, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/2, AN.

51 Margairaz and Rousso, 1987, 26.

52 On the quasi-absence of academic economists in postwar French planning, see Dard (1999).

53 Fourastié quoted in Rousso, 1986, 83.

54 Febvre to the general director of higher education, May 30, 1951, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/2, AN. Emphasis in original.

55 Coleman, 1993, 130.

56 Andrieu, 1994, 123.

57 Delattre, 2005[2003].

58 Henri Hierche to Braudel or Febvre, June 3, 1953, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

59 Since its creation, the Sixth Section has had its own system of recruitment, by election by an electoral college composed of all professor of the establishment. Regardless of his or her field of study, each candidate is elected by all the members of the institution’s faculty.

60 “Minutes of the 17th January 1954 Council meeting”, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/2, AN.

61 “Preparation note for the January 1954 session of the Section Council”, undated, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

62 “Minutes of the 17th January 1954 Council meeting”, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/2, AN.

63 “Minutes of the 7th March 1954 Council meeting”, Assemblée des enseignants, Archives EHESS.

64 “Draft protocol between High Studies School and APB”, undated, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

65 “Yearbook of the Sixth Section 1956-1957”, Annuaires, Fonds Général, Archives EHESS.

66 “List of the audience of the Escarra’s seminar”, February 2, 1955, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

67 See footnote 46.

68 Febvre to the General director of Higher Education, July 2, 1951, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/2, AN.

69 On the Institut scientifique de recherches économiques et sociales [ISRES], see Tournès (2006).

70 Willits, 401 LSE RG2(1951) B536 F3586 – RFA – RAC.

71 “In combination, they form, I believe, a good administrative structure for academic economic research”; Lane to J.H. Willits, August 1, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

72 Lane to Willits, August 1, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

73 Lane to Willits, September 25, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

74 Meynaud to Lane, December 19, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

75 The National Bureau of Economic Research is perhaps the most influential economics think tank in the US. It defines itself as “a private, nonpartisan organization that facilitates cutting-edge investigation and analysis of major economic issues. It disseminates research findings to academics, public- and private-sector decision-makers, and the public”, online: https://www.nber.org/about-nber (accessed June 12, 2024). “The evolution of the structures of the French economy”, December 18, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

76 Lane to Willits, December 28, 1952, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

77 “Acceptance of the grant”, February 26, 1953, FNSP French Economy 1952-1953 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F161 – RFA – RAC.

78 “Note about the use of ‘crédits Rockefeller’ by the Centre d’études économiques” written by Meynaud, October 2, 1954, FNSP French Economy 1955-1958 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F162 – RFA – RAC.

79 “Minutes of the General Assembly”, Compte rendu de l’assemblée des enseignants, Fonds Général, Archives EHESS.

80 I consulted the two collections (Perroux collection is preserved at Imec [Caen, France], Meynaud collection is preserved at Sciences Po [Paris, France]) in which I didn’t found any glue to understand the real cause of the collective resignation and the archivists confirmed me that there is not document about that point.

81 On Perroux collaboration see Simmons, 2015, 118-126; Cohen, 2006; Brisset and Fèvre, 2021.

82 Gemelli, 1995, 306.

83 Dreyfus, 2011, 114-127.

84 Chapsal to Gillette (Foundation Rockefeller), May 27, 1955, FNSP French Economy 1955-1958, RG 1.2 S500 B18 F162 – RFA – RAC.

85 Interview with Clemens Heller, June 14, 1955, KW Thompson diaries-1955 – RFA – RAC.

86 “However the economists in the Centre represented a conservative tradition which CH [Clemens Heller] argues has not been particularly productive. The economists in the Centre had been associated with the École de droit and had blocked the entry of other economists of a more practical orientation”; Interview with Heller, June 14, 1955, KW Thompson diaries-1955 – RFA – RAC.

87 Minutes of the meeting between Braudel and French economists, December 20, 1955, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

88 On Guilbaud and French reception of game theory, see Nessah, Tazdaït and Vahabi, 2021; On Guilbaud and Operations research and cybernetic see Le Roux, 2018.

89 “The future of the Centre d’études économiques will, of course, be a matter of concern to the officers of the Foundations”; “Excerpt from a K.W. Thompson’s letter to C. Heller”, August 31, 1955, FNSP French Economy 1955-1958 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F162 – RFA – RAC.

90 Interview with Robert Marjolin, October 20, 1955, KW Thompson diaries-1955 – RFA – RAC.

91 Fernand Braudel to Charles Morazé, January 11, 1951, and Charles Morazé to Fernand Braudel, January 16, 1951; Correspondances Lucien Febvre, FLF (NC)/70 – 591 AP – EHESS–AN.

92 “Excerpt of an interview of Heller by D’Arms”, December 9, 1954, R.G. 1.2, 500 S École pratique des hautes études B16 F147 – RFA – RAC.

93 The Area Studies program was established in 1955 with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Initially hesitant to support the program, the RF agreed to fund it after Braudel assured them that the research would not promote communist ideology, specifically a Marxist perspective. Additionally, Braudel shifted the research focus toward regions under communist influence, such as Russia and China, instead of the initially planned Islamic and Eastern areas. (Benest 2019, 161-70)

94 Febvre had deep interest in economics, as demonstrated these numerous economics book review in the Annales review. For instance, Febvre (1951).

95 On that topic in postwar France, see De Rouvray, 2005, chap 5.

96 “Historians, we who, with sociologists, are the only ones who have a right of access to everything that belongs to man, it is our profession, our torment too”; Braudel, 1950, 44. Emphasized in the text.

97 Are in the meeting : Dumontier (director of the service de la conjoncture et des études économiques de l’INSEE), François Bloch-Lainé (director of the Caisse des dépôts et de consignation), Coutin (Sixth Section), Etienne Hirsch (Director of the Commissariat général au plan), Guilbaud (Sixth Section), Rottier (Centre de recherche et de documentation sur la consommation), Meyer (direction of the service de la conjoncture et des études économiques de l’INSEE), Jean Ripert (Commissariat général au plan), Clouzon (Institut de statistique), Yves Ullmo (ENA). “Minutes of the meeting between Braudel and French economists”, December 20, 1955, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

98 “Minutes of the meeting between Braudel and French economists”, December 20, 1955, Fonds secrétariat direction EHESS (Braudel), 20180531/3, AN.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 The cumulative director of study of the Sixth Section are a specific appointment: the scholars have in charge a seminar (around 12 classes a year) in the Section but have no more charge and kept a full position in an others academic institution or in administration.

108 On February 1952, the BSEF was renamed SEEF.

109 “The Centre d’études économiques of the Sixieme (Coutin) is now ‘mediocre’ and scarcely merits further RF support”; Interview with Clemens Heller, October 9, 1958, FNSP French Economy 1955-1958 RG 1.2 S500 B18 F162 – RFA – RAC.

110 The following achievements of economists at the EHESS are investigated by Godechot (2011) and Benest (2024).

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Serge Benest, « Cash Is Not King »Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines [En ligne], 45 | 2024, mis en ligne le 07 février 2025, consulté le 25 mars 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rhsh/9672 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/13auy

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Serge Benest

Théma (CNRS, UMR 8184)
IUT de Cergy-Pontoise

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