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Access to Land and Natural Resources in the Peruvian Amazon

Between Agriculture and Artisanal Gold Mining
Accès aux ressources naturelles et foncières en Amazonie péruvienne. Entre agriculture et exploitation aurifère artisanale
Acceso a los recursos naturales y a la tierra en el Amazonas peruano. Entre agricultura y explotación aurífera artesanal
Céline Delmotte
p. 159-182

Résumés

Se fondant sur l’analyse d’une zone tampon située dans le département amazonien de Madre de Dios (Pérou), qui connaît un phénomène de ruée vers l’or depuis la moitié des années 2000, cet article explore les rapports de pouvoir entre agriculteurs et orpailleurs, en éclairant les processus de territorialisation minière au sein d’espaces agricoles, les dynamiques d’acteurs ainsi que les mécanismes d’accès et d’usage du foncier et de ses ressources. Prenant le contre-pied des analyses déjà produites sur la nature conflictuelle de leurs relations, nous tenterons dans cette contribution de mettre en lumière un phénomène distinct mais tout aussi prégnant : le caractère négocié de l’orpaillage et les arrangements mutuels entre acteurs autour de l’accès à et l’usage des ressources naturelles.

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Introduction1

  • 1 This article has been published in french: Delmotte, C. (2019). Accès aux ressources naturelles et (...)

1Mining conflicts have been mounting on the South American continent since the early 21st century (Bebbington & Bury, 2013, De Echave, 2011). The Peruvian gold mining sector, which has expanded considerably since the commodities boom and the financial crisis of 2007-2008, is no exception to this observation since it has become a fully-fledged producer of conflict (Li, 2013, Piccoli, 2017, Triscritti, 2013). More particularly, the eastern Peruvian Amazon is now the seat of intense artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM), which is generating cumulative political, ecological and social effects (Dargent et al., 2017; Brack et al., 2011; Mujica, 2014) and giving rise to new power relations between local actors as well as innovative land resource access mechanisms.

2Taking these elements into account, the scientific literature produced on artisanal and small-scale gold mining has grown substantially in recent years, drawing a multifaceted picture of the sector (Geenen, 2014; Van Bockstael, 2018). Previously analysed more from the angle of its socioenvironmental costs (deforestation, mercury contamination, sexual exploitation, etc.) and portrayed as a sector populated mainly by unscrupulous, lawless entrepreneurs (Hammond et al., 2007; Elmes et al., 2014; Vallejo Rivera, 2014), the academic world is rethinking the activity and contemplating it as leverage against poverty (Hilson, 2016; Geenen, 2014, Van Bockstael, 2018):

Indeed, ASGM “provides direct employment to tens of millions of men, women [...] and many millions more in downstream industries”, which proves “its exclusion from mainstream international development debates and dialogues” (Hilson, 2016: 547).

3For many authors (Hilson, 2011; Banchirigah, 2008; Banchirigah & Hilson, 2010; Maconachie & Bins, 2007), mining has become a specific segment of the rural agricultural economy, with artisanal and small-scale gold mining practised – in certain cases and regions – as an alternative or complement to farming (Cartier & Bürge, 2011; Fisher et al., 2009; Kamlongera, 2011). Relations between farmers and artisanal gold miners are therefore no longer analysed solely from the angle of land conflicts, but also through this new lens of a growing interconnection between the two activities. Nevertheless, and despite the well-documented close links between artisanal gold mining and agriculture, Van Bockstael (2018) points out that comparatively little attention has been paid to either bringing to light the power relations between actors or uncovering the concrete means used by the artisanal gold miners to access farmland and its resources.

4To this end, this article explores the nature of the interactions and power relations between farmers and artisanal gold miners and sheds light on their respective resource access mechanisms based on an analysis of the Tambopata National Reserve’s buffer zone in the Amazonian Madre de Dios department (Peru). A particularly interesting study focus, Madre de Dios is experiencing an unprecedented gold rush whose repercussions are being felt, among others, in the agricultural spaces. These spaces are seeing increasing land reconfigurations associated with the influx of artisanal miners. Hence the relevance of the question of connections between the two activities.

5Drawing on the theoretical approaches of political ecology and the geography of power (Peluso & Watts, 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Zimmerer & Bassett, 2003) and taking a different angle to the analyses already produced on the conflictual nature of their relations, this contribution endeavours to shed light on a distinct, but no less present phenomenon: the negotiated nature of artisanal gold mining and the mutual arrangements made between stakeholders. A first section will focus on the formation of the territory in Madre de Dios and the gradual expansion of gold mining and agricultural activities. A second section will study the case of the buffer zone in question, focusing on the socioeconomic and organisational characteristics of the stakeholders (farmers, artisanal gold miners and those they work with). Based on the theoretical conceptualisations of political ecology and the geography of power, the third and last section will analyse the power relations between agriculture and artisanal gold mining together with the actors’ respective stakes and different capitals and strategies, which are crucial elements to shed light on the existence of compromises and arrangements with respect to access to and use of resources.

1. Mining Booms and Socioeconomic Formation of the Space in Madre De Dios

6The department of Madre de Dios is situated on the border with Brazil and Bolivia in south-eastern Peru. Located in the Amazonian region, most of its territory is covered by dense jungle with a rich variety of flora and fauna.

Figure 1: Location of the department of Madre de Dios (Peru)

Figure 1: Location of the department of Madre de Dios (Peru)

Source: Adapted from SERNANP, 2015.

7On the social front, Madre de Dios stands out as the least populated department in Peru, albeit with steady demographic growth since 1940. The region’s population and connection with the rest of the country have historically depended on the exploitation of natural resources. Consequently, the formation of its socioeconomic space has always been driven by veritable mining fevers (De La Torre, 1987). Madre de Dios experienced two large gold booms in the last century (1930-1950 and 1970-1989), which gave rise to large temporary Andes-Amazonia migration movements and a gradual mechanisation of working methods. This means that unlike other Amazonian regions, the social construction and land use processes in this department are not associated with agriculture, but are driven more by mining activities (Glave & Pinedo, 1997). Economically, the agricultural sector was fairly insignificant prior to the 1980s, with food produced for own consumption, small markets, virtually non-existent transit routes, low prices and, consequently, very strong dependence on imports. However, the 1985-1990 agrarian policies changed all that by ramping up loans to the sector and expanding the agricultural frontier at department level.

8Since the mid-2000s, Madre de Dios has been in the grip of a third gold rush, which stands out from the previous booms for the intensity of its migration pressure and socio-environmental effects. As observed by Borasino and Escobedo (2010), Arriarán and Gómez (2008) and Valencia Arroyo (2014), two main factors combine to explain this new gold rush. First, the meteoric and sustained rise in the price of gold on the international markets and, second, the construction of the Southern Interoceanic Highway (Fig. 1) from 2006 to 2010, which facilitated spatial mobility as a floating workforce moved to Madre de Dios and the introduction of larger-capacity engines alongside the arrival of mining inputs (mercury, fuel, etc.). These factors have driven an unprecedented intensification and expansion of the department’s artisanal and small-scale gold mining activities since the 2000s, mining that is practised on the surface rather than underground as is the case in other regions. At department level, this phenomenon is now most marked in the Tambopata National Reserve’s buffer zone, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining has grown considerably since 2007.

2. The Tambopata National Reserve Buffer Zone: A Constellation of Actors

  • 2 Law No. 26834 on Natural Protected Areas, Art. 25.

9Buffer zones in Peru were legally recognised in 1997 as being, “zones adjacent to protected natural areas that, because of their nature and location, require special treatment to guarantee the conservation of the protected area.”2 Therefore, the economic activities conducted in buffer zones cannot be allowed to compromise respect for the conservation objectives of the protected area to which they are attached. Buffer zones hence often accommodate ecotourism, conservation concessions and agroforestry systems (Solano, 2009).

10The Tambopata National Reserve buffer zone south of the Interoceanic Highway features a heterogeneous collection of actors (native communities, mixed race and local populations comprising second- or third-generation migrants, and Andean settlers who migrated to the region more recently) as well as a wide range of productive activities: ecotourism, conservation, agriculture, logging, artisanal and small-scale gold mining, etc. (Loja et al., 2012).

Figure 2: Location of the Tambopata National Reserve and its Buffer Zone

Figure 2: Location of the Tambopata National Reserve and its Buffer Zone

Source: Adapted from ACCA, 2009.

  • 3 Emergency Decree No. 012-2010.

11Aside from a handful of prescribed mining rights secured by artisanal gold miners prior to the creation of the Tambopata National Reserve and its buffer zone, mining is strictly prohibited in the area3 (as it is incompatible with the abovementioned conservation objectives). Nevertheless, driven by growing migration pressure, two mining sectors were opened up in the buffer zone in 2007, turning it into the busiest mining area in the department in the space of a few years accompanied by the deforestation of more than 3,000 ha of virgin forest (Benavides, 2015).

12Artisanal and small-scale gold mining now surpasses the other economic fronts, with the phenomenon being particularly marked in the agricultural areas. A field study was conducted in the buffer zone from May to December 2017 to understand how the current power relations between farmers and artisanal gold miners are structured and their respective modes of access to land. This study took a mixed-methods approach combining: (1) a review of the existing literature; (2) structured questionnaires administered to 31 farmers in the buffer zone; (3) semi-structured interviews with local and regional stakeholders (public institutions, civil society, etc.); (4) informal discussions and unstructured interviews with artisanal miners and gold diggers (since they were somewhat suspicious of the formal framework of the structured interview); and (5) field visits/notes and direct observation. The analysis presented in the following sections sums up the data collected to provide an overview of the different actors.

2.1. Agriculture: A Sector Marked by Low Profitability and Land Insecurity

  • 4 Approximately 600 euros.

13Most of the farmers in the buffer zone are from other regions, arriving in successive waves since the 1970s. Loja et al. (2012) estimate on the basis of a survey of these farmers that 88.8% were born in another department, with 60% of them moving into the area before 2002 and 40% from 2002 to 2011. “Some bought their land from other inhabitants who decided to leave the region and others moved into the free spaces,” (Loja et al., 2012). They possess on average 42.7 ha of land, 14.2 ha of which is used for agriculture, 4.4 ha for stockbreeding and 24.1 ha left as virgin forest. The farmers therefore use only half of their land for agricultural and animal production while the rest (56.44%) remains covered by forest. The leading products grown are, in order of importance, yuccas, rice, maize and bananas, with part of their production for their own consumption (which makes agriculture an important source of food security) while the rest is taken to market in nearby villages and small towns. Stockbreeding is developing alongside agriculture in the area, concentrated in pigs, poultry and cattle. Nevertheless, due to unsuccessful agricultural policies, frequent extreme weather events (droughts, floods, etc.), inadequate farming practices, poor knowledge of the Amazonian environment and the gradual depletion of resources, agro-pastoral activities earn them a gross average of just 2,290 soles per month4 (Garcia, 2009), making them the least profitable activities in the department.

  • 5 Interview with Luisa Ríos, Regional Director, Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, Puerto Maldo (...)

14A mere 10.4% of farmers in the buffer zone have exclusive, perpetual and clearly established land tenure. For the others, access to land remains tenuous: 54.4% have no title deed (those in the free spaces) and the remaining 35.2% have a usufruct deed (Loja et al., 2012). Given that agriculture is authorised in the buffer zone, these last two categories of farmers “sought to formalise their operations to secure an agricultural title deed, but to no avail, mainly due to the regional government’s lack of political volition.”5

2.2. Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining: Internal Organisation and Local Governance

15The buffer zone also has hundreds of small mining camps where artisanal gold miners have developed a complex hierarchical system of relations and organisation based on a division of labour and shared social norms. Each mining camp forms a pyramid of actors headed by the owner of the mining capital and machines, a micro-entrepreneur with the initial funds required who invests in the mining equipment/tools and employs a group of workers. He coordinates the camp’s activities (supervising the teams’ work, hiring new staff, and keeping the camp supplied with food, fuel, machines, etc.) and makes the rules, but does not take part in the manual mining work. He may live in the camp and participate directly in its daily management or may be represented on a day-to-day basis by a trusted individual – called a “manager” – dropping by from time to time to supervise the work and collect his profits.

16Below the mining entrepreneur and manager, if any, come the gold diggers, that is the workers doing the actual mining. These are often mobile young men and women (from neighbouring departments) in pursuit of resources that will solve their economic problems on their return to their home region. The number of workers in a camp varies depending on the number of machines in operation, but there are generally six: four machine operators, one cook and one land-clearer. The first four are central to the mining activity, since they are tasked with handling the machines and pumps. They work in shifts of teams of two, with one team working the day shift and the other the night shift. The cook (a position reserved for women only) is responsible for drawing up the weekly menu and preparing the daily meals. Last but not least, the land-clearer is employed to prepare the land for mining by clearing the mining area with a machete or chain saw.

17Note also that, gravitating around these actors directly involved in the mining activity (a floating population estimated at approximately 10,000 people in the buffer zone – Daley, 2016) is a circle of secondary actors made up of traders and suppliers of infrastructures and services essential to the development of artisanal gold mining: machine workshops, tool and machine merchants, grocer’s shops, restaurants, hotels and boarding houses, petrol stations, bureaux de change, transporters, and bars and brothels. This secondary circle includes a key actor in the mining process: the land owner. Seeing that mining is prohibited by law in the buffer zone, as mentioned above, no mining micro-entrepreneur can carry on a mining activity – legally – in the zone let alone seek to formalise a mining activity on a particular site. Therefore, if a micro-entrepreneur nevertheless wants to mine in the zone, he is not only faced with breaking the law, but also needs to find the means to gain access to the land and resources from a third party: the land owner (who may be a forester, native community, farmer, etc.). It is this question of access to resources and power relations between mining micro-entrepreneur and land owner (farmer in our case) that will be focus of the following sections.

18Therefore, contrary to popular belief that artisanal gold mining sites are lawless places, this article puts forward that behind the apparent disorder in this buffer zone lies a complex order based on a socially established and morally accepted hierarchy and power relations. Roles and tasks are distributed in the camps according to level of experience, individual know-how and physical capabilities. Hence the power relations and rules governing a camp’s internal organisation are not decreed by the state, practically absent from the sites, but derive from what Sangaré et al. (2016) call “local governance”.

2.3. The Government, Combating Artisanal Gold Mining and Crime

  • 6 Emergency Decree No. 012-2010.

19In the buffer zone, despite the alarm sounded by civil society at the first signs of deforestation, the Peruvian government was initially conspicuous in its absence from the power struggles observed at local level. It was not until 2010 that the government, in response to the regional authorities’ inaction, decided to step in with a policy to “combat illegal gold mining”6 based on greater intervention by the executive power, the establishment of a mining exclusion zone prohibiting all mining activity (which includes the buffer zone) and crackdowns that saw police and military operations seize and destroy goods, machines and inputs needed for artisanal gold mining (Valencia Arroyo, 2014). The government hence chose the path of force and retribution without, however, strengthening regional governance (Benavides, 2015). The emphasis is currently on police and military action with the assumption that once the mining micro-entrepreneurs and their workers have been chased away, they will return to their region of origin. This is in no way a tactic specific to the Peruvian government. Many African governments have also opted for military intervention as their main strategy, just as much in vain (Banchirigah, 2008; Geenen & Claessens, 2013; Hilson, 2017; Maringira & Nyamunda, 2017; Spiegel, 2014). These crackdowns (stopgap measures in the face of a lack of governance and government presence) do not dissuade the artisanal gold miners on the ground. Far from it. In the buffer zone, they actually encourage the development of an increasingly sophisticated parallel social system that supports the continuity of the mining activity, just as it does the emergence of criminal networks.

20Today, there are five closely interconnected networks in the buffer zone. As observed by Graätz (2004) in Africa, the rapid establishment of artisanal gold mining camps generates new markets and increases the circulation of money. In the buffer zone in 2014, this situation started attracting growing numbers of criminal gangs from the Peruvian coast, who indulged in holding up mining camps and mugging mine micro-entrepreneurs and workers.

21Victims of repeated violence, the micro-entrepreneurs then decided to surround themselves with security and private protection groups made up of former paramilitary operatives, ex-police officers and ex-convicts trained and practised in handling arms. These groups became an on-site defence organisation to protect camp members and defend approach routes against the assailants. This marked the start of an escalation of violence in the buffer zone as the two opposing groups clashed in daily skirmishes and murders.

  • 7 Interview with a mining micro-entrepreneur, Puerto Maldonado, 4 September 2017.

22In the face of the institutional vacuum at this level, the miners gradually added to the tasks assigned to these newly formed defence groups, turning them into a corporation managing, adjudicating and punishing all affairs relating to artisanal gold mining and mining life as well as most breaches of their law. Given that the mining camps are often remote from police stations, councils and other public institutions, the accused are rarely handed over to the official authorities, but are judged according to camp laws: “A short while ago, they caught three armed robbers, took them and burnt them in public.”7

23It has also been observed that these defence groups work in close collaboration with a third network of informal actors: the transporters who handle the intra-buffer zone mining transport (workers, prostitutes, cooks, machines, fuel, spare parts, alcohol, etc.). These transporters are in a way key suppliers for the mining micro-entrepreneurs. They control the entrances to the buffer zone in partnership with the defence groups, collecting fees from a complex internal toll system.

24In addition, the artisanal gold miners and transporters are in contact with a fourth group, the traders, who stock and sell mercury, fuel, machinery, spare parts and so on required for the development of the mining activity.

25One last criminal network with which the mining micro-entrepreneurs interact is that which traffics women for prostitution. In Madre de Dios, as in many other mining regions, the artisanal and small-scale gold mining world is inextricably linked with the trade in flesh, which concerns over four thousand women in the buffer zone.

3. Access To Farmland and Its Resources: Negotiated Rights

3.1. Power Relations and Rights of Access to Resources: Theoretical Considerations

26Given that power relations are central to our analysis, we draw on the theoretical frameworks of the geography of power and political ecology. The geography of power, as spearheaded by Raffestin (1980) and as political ecology researchers practise it, seeks to capture the power struggles and economic interests affecting actors and places as well as the specific circumstances in which the environmental crisis is expressed (Gauthier & Benjanminsen, 2012; Simmons et al., 2007). Power is understood here, through a Foucauldian lens, as the capacity of an individual, social group or institution to influence someone else’s action (Foucault, 1982)

27Extending this idea to territories, Raffestin (1980) finds that power is ubiquitous in the production of territories and resources and that, more broadly speaking, attention needs to be paid to the intentions and purposes of the actors, their strategies and the issues that express the predominantly dissymmetrical nature of the relations. In our case study, we are interested in the question of the right of access/use of these resources, which is the major issue of the power relations between farmers and artisanal gold miners.

28To this end, we refer to the theory of Ostrom and Schlager (1992) who propose a definition of property rights broken down into five rights: (1) the right of access, a minimal right to enter a property; (2) the right of withdrawal, authorising the extraction of resources; (3) the right of management, regulating the terms of use of the resources and the necessary changes to improve them; (4) the right of exclusion, determining who has an access right and how that right may (or may not) be transferred; and (5) the right of alienation, making it possible to sell or lease in whole or in part either or both of the rights of exclusion and management. Applied to the land issue, the stake involved in the power relations is therefore, for each actor, to access or guarantee these different hierarchical rights.

29The actors therefore put in place a series of strategies based, as Scoones (1998) puts it, on the type and level of the capitals at their disposal (Bourdieux, 1980) and on their capability to leverage them (Sen, 1992). Capital can be defined as a material or social good (Bourdieu, 1980) that combines with other goods and takes different forms: economic wealth, land rights, autochthony, etc. Still in terms of strategy, it is also interesting to bring into play the notion of territorialisation as a spatial tactic for access to and control of resources. Drawing on the work by Sack (1983, 1986), Vandergeest & Peluso (1995) and Peluso (2005), territorialisation can be defined as a spatial strategy deployed by actors involved in power struggles to control access to and use of a resource by means of a delimited geographical area over which these actors seek to assert their authority. This territorialisation is a spatial strategy in that the actors can use and transform the nature of a space, for example by means of changes in everyday practices or by causing damage (Peluso, 2005) as a means of control over the resources.

3.2. Negotiation: A Process Key to Interactions and Power Relations Between Farmers and Mining Entrepreneurs

30Based on these theoretical elements of analysis, this section will consider the mechanisms of interaction and power relations between artisanal gold miners and farmers in the buffer zone studied as well as the concrete means used by the artisanal gold miners to secure access to farmland and its resources. We take as a starting point Van Bockstael’s (2018) observation that, “Rural ‘traditional’ communities are often portrayed as helpless victims of the greed of artisanal miners […] whose actions destroy valuable farmland”, and that we now need to emphasise “the agency of local landowning communities in their interactions with artisanal miners, thereby de-obscuring the negotiated nature of artisanal mining”. Far from minimising the importance of the conflictual nature of certain power relations between farmers and miners, since there are very many cases of conflicts in the buffer zone, the purpose of this section is to shed light on an equally significant parallel phenomenon in the shape of the intrinsic negotiated nature of artisanal gold mining and the mutual arrangements between actors.

31The field visits observed that, in many farmlands in the buffer zone, mining territorialisation processes were underway and there were intense social interactions between the two groups, contradicting our initial intuition that relations between mining micro-entrepreneurs and farmers were essentially conflictual. Today, relations between farming and artisanal gold mining are effectively also fed by ongoing negotiations. When the space becomes more densely populated and access to resources becomes more competitive, access becomes a major stake in power relations between actors. In a context of land pressure, access to resources is not open to all: it has to be negotiated. Analysis of the power stakes therefore sheds light here on how the actors seek to control the space in order to gain control over their access to the resources; the notion of access being understood here in terms of the definition given by Ribot and Peluso (2003), i.e. “the ability to derive benefits” from a resource rather than the right to benefit from a resource, a formulation that these authors feel “brings attention to a wider range of social relationships that constrain or enable people to benefit from resources.”

  • 8 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone. Puerto Maldonado, 8 September 2017.

32In the buffer zone, the key stake in the power relations revolves around the acquisition (for the artisanal gold miners) or the retention/sale by compensation (for the farmers) of rights to the resources. To this end, each actor seeks to leverage a maximum of capitals that will carry more weight in the relationship. First of all, the farmers have three main capitals that they can use as bargaining power. A right of ownership or possession constitutes a first major source of capital that farmers can use to grant part of their resources to another party. In addition, the farmer’s status as first arrival gives him a second strong argument to justify a raft of rights over the resources. First arrivals need to prove their legitimacy in the eyes of newcomers to ensure that the latter recognise the former’s particular rights (Chauveau et al., 2004). Farmers also have considerable land capital. As discussed, farmers in the buffer zone possess an average of some 40 hectares of land, only half of which they use for productive purposes. This gives them the possibility to allocate part of this land to other uses without having any impact on the scale of their own activities or productivity. However, one type of capital in desperately short supply for all farmers in the buffer zone is economic capital. Recent years in Amazonia have been marked by the gradual impoverishment of the farming sector. These adverse circumstances combined with harsh living and working conditions in agriculture are driving many smallholder farmers to artisanal gold mining as an alternative or supplement to farming: “Some of my neighbours managed to get bank loans, buy their machines and become miners.”8 Conversely, the mining micro-entrepreneur’s economic capital is an asset and gives him considerable power in his relations with the farmer. Secondly, the demographic weight of the mining community is increasingly in the majority in the buffer zone. Strength in numbers therefore hovers like a threat over relations, encouraging farmers to err on the side of caution and compromise rather than immediate riposte. Thirdly, just as important to consider is the mining entrepreneur’s social capital. Mining entrepreneurs are surrounded by a strong network of allies (bodyguards, transporters, workers, etc.) who are prepared to help them with their strategy in any way. Lastly, they possess not-inconsiderable political capital. In 2014, the local mining industry became the dominant socio-political force in the department; a candidate backed by the miners was elected department governor, which means that mining now has the support of the political power in place.

33All these elements clearly point to a capital imbalance between the two types of actors that gives more weight to the mining entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it has been observed that farmers are still in a good position due to their right of ownership or possession or, failing that, their status as first arrivals. Whatever the farmer’s status (ownership, possession or no rights, but first arrival), the miners see the farmers as having the five rights of Ostrom and Schlager (1992) over their land, from access to alienation. The stake for the mining actor is therefore to gain certain rights to be able to take advantage of the farmland’s mining resources.

34With respect to the first right defined by Ostrom and Schlager (1992), i.e. access, our field observations revealed the co-existence of three distinct models. First, access to farmland by the miners can take the form of what we call “territorialisation by force”: the miners turn up on the farmland one day and start working without asking the land user’s permission. Werthmann (2006) contends that this type of access is spontaneous and may be equated with an invasion. Secondly, mining entrepreneurs may also opt for “authorised territorialisation”, which entails locating the desired plot of land, identifying its agricultural owner/user and formally requesting permission to access it:

  • 9 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 22 September 2017.

For now, I have an agreement with a farmer […]. As he is the owner of the land, I have to first ask him for his permission. We discuss it and, if he’s okay with the offer, he lets me have access.9

35The third model is “territorialisation by invitation”. Some artisanal gold mining camps are created by explicit invitation extended by an agricultural owner or user to an artisanal goldminer – who he already knows – to explore or test his land for gold.

  • 10 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 27 September 2017.
  • 11 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 3 September 2017.
  • 12 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone, 9 September 2017.
  • 13 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 2 October 2017.

36The first access strategy presented is the riskiest, but not the least widespread. It has the advantage of the effects of surprise and number (since the miner is already on site with his workers), which can prove useful in future negotiations for withdrawal rights. Indeed, the subsequent focus of the power relations between artisanal gold miners and farmers is the negotiation of a right of withdrawal of the gold resources from the farmland (second Ostrom & Schlager right, 1992). When the mining entrepreneur arrives in pursuit of a plot of land, regardless of whether the farmer finds him working on his land or invites him to do so, negotiations commence between the two parties to discuss their respective motives and decide on the terms on which they intend to distribute the rights. At the end of the discussion, the two parties come to an agreement on the nature of the rights allocated and how much they are worth in return. In most of the cases observed in the buffer zone, the mining entrepreneur is verbally granted a right of access to and withdrawal of the mining resources in return for regular remuneration in the form of a share of the gold yield or earnings pegged to the gold yield. The size of this share depends on the power of the negotiating actors: “The charge I pay the farmer depends on the power of my machines. I pay approximately three grams of gold per week”;10 “The owner of the land comes on Saturdays. I work Monday to Friday for myself, and Saturdays, all the gold production is for him”;11 “The miner gives me 10% of his weekly output”;12 and “We came to an arrangement, I give him 1.2 grams of gold per week.”13 This arrangement is a winning strategy for the farmer because, although he risks prosecution, he can diversify and build up his economic capital while continuing his agro-pastoral activities. As for the miner, it secures him guaranteed access to and withdrawal of the resources.

37Thirdly, and once the question of the rights of access/withdrawal has been settled by the two parties, the negotiations need to turn to the terms of use of the resources, wherein the farmer asserts his right of management (third Ostrom and Schlager right, 1992). These terms concern two main elements: the location and area of farmland to be occupied by the mining entrepreneur as well as the post-mine closure and management arrangements. The choice of location and land area is generally made by an exploration process conducted beforehand by the miner. This choice then needs to be accepted by the farmer. Generally, given that gold is not inexhaustible, discussions about location and surface area need to be constantly renewed between the parties since mining is conditional on the richness of the soil. When gold runs low in the mined area, profitability plummets and the mining entrepreneur has to change location. If he wishes to remain on the same farmer’s property, he has to not only ask him for permission to set up on a new plot of land, but also needs to respect certain conditions regarding the closure of the first goldfield. These closure conditions are designed to restore the site to an appearance and use similar to before the mining work. They therefore concern not only the dismantlement of the camp itself (dismantling the mining infrastructures, managing tailings, removing work equipment and materials, and moving worker accommodation and facilities), but also the rehabilitation of the site (backfilling the mine, remodelling/levelling the mined land and, as far as possible, replanting vegetation cover to allow for relative subsoil recuperation). When these conditions are not respected, the farmer can theoretically exercise his right of exclusion (fourth Ostrom and Schlager right, 1992) and restrict the mining entrepreneur’s access. Yet in fact, it has been observed that, once the artisanal gold miners are established on the site, it is very hard to evict them. The mining migration pressure in this gold rush is such that once the artisanal gold miners have become established, the farmer is outnumbered by the mining contingent and his right of exclusion becomes hard to exercise. As some actors in public and civil society circles put it:

  • 14 Interview with Luisa Ríos, Regional Director, Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, Puerto Maldo (...)

What actually happens is that the mining entrepreneur advances through the farmlands with or without permission, whether he rehabilitates the site or not. That depends purely on his goodwill and whether he continues to find enough gold. If not, he can disappear overnight, leaving the mined area in the state he left it.14

38For all these reasons, some farmers in the buffer zone have decided to exercise their right of alienation (fifth Ostrom and Schlager right, 1992) and transfer/sell some or all of their property to the mining entrepreneur:

  • 15 Interview with Juan Jose Bustinza, Monitoring and Surveillance Manager, Tambopata National Reserve (...)

Some verbal agreements have gone badly for the farmers as the miners have advanced further into their land without permission, forcing them into a clash or, under pressure, into abandoning or selling their land.15

  • 16 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 5 September 2017.
  • 17 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone, Puerto Maldonado, 4 October 2017.
  • 18 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 3 September 2017.

39Therefore, the negotiated nature of artisanal gold mining and the mutual arrangements between actors do not always guarantee peaceful power relations in the long run. These relations can be marked by threat and mutual distrust: “The owner of the land sometimes comes to the camp to check on the work; they don’t trust us,”16 or “The miners keep a yield book, but they rip you off, always, and you can’t check up on their output every day, because you’ve got to work too.”17 Nevertheless, some relations develop into friendships: “The farmer we work with is a good person. We often chat and he tells me what he grows and what he sells. We’ve become good friends.”18 Lastly, other relationships can also deteriorate and become conflictual. This is the case, for example, when miners prove incapable of respecting their commitments and regularly paying their dues.

Conclusion

40For nearly a century, the Madre de Dios department has been experiencing considerable social and territorial reconfigurations due to the expansion of its mining front. Struggles and conflicts over access, competition and defence of resources are hence nothing new in the area. Nevertheless, since the commodities boom of the 2000s, parallel mechanisms of interaction between local actors have developed and alternative provisions for access to and use of the land and its resources have appeared.

41Drawing on the theoretical tools of political ecology and the geography of power, this article has endeavoured to show that mining territorialisation processes are not solely conflictual, but can also be the result of negotiated processes among actors. In the buffer zone studied, power relations, based in part on leveraging different capitals, are central to mutual arrangements between mining entrepreneurs and farmers and give rise to a range of forms of access to resources and compensation mechanisms for rights of withdrawal.

42By choosing negotiation, the two groups in the buffer zone engage in collective rejection, if not subversion of the national mining code, which to date offers no realistic way of regulating the unbridled development of artisanal and small-scale gold mining. The same applies to the criminal networks that elude public policy when they are the ones that ultimately benefit the most from the gold mining activities and their unregulated nature. A more in-depth understanding of the underlying issues is therefore called for to see the advent of policies geared more to the realities on the ground and also capable of protecting the wealth of biodiversity in this part of Amazonia.

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Notes

1 This article has been published in french: Delmotte, C. (2019). Accès aux ressources naturelles et foncières en Amazonie péruvienne. Entre agriculture et exploitation aurifère artisanale. Revue internationale des études du développement, 238, 219-244. https://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ried.238.0219

2 Law No. 26834 on Natural Protected Areas, Art. 25.

3 Emergency Decree No. 012-2010.

4 Approximately 600 euros.

5 Interview with Luisa Ríos, Regional Director, Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, Puerto Maldonado, 11 September 2017.

6 Emergency Decree No. 012-2010.

7 Interview with a mining micro-entrepreneur, Puerto Maldonado, 4 September 2017.

8 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone. Puerto Maldonado, 8 September 2017.

9 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 22 September 2017.

10 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 27 September 2017.

11 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 3 September 2017.

12 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone, 9 September 2017.

13 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 2 October 2017.

14 Interview with Luisa Ríos, Regional Director, Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, Puerto Maldonado, 11 September 2017.

15 Interview with Juan Jose Bustinza, Monitoring and Surveillance Manager, Tambopata National Reserve, Puerto Maldonado, 15 September 2017.

16 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 5 September 2017.

17 Interview with a farmer in the buffer zone, Puerto Maldonado, 4 October 2017.

18 Interview with a micro-entrepreneur in the buffer zone, 3 September 2017.

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Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1: Location of the department of Madre de Dios (Peru)
Crédits Source: Adapted from SERNANP, 2015.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/ried/docannexe/image/2287/img-1.png
Fichier image/png, 578k
Titre Figure 2: Location of the Tambopata National Reserve and its Buffer Zone
Crédits Source: Adapted from ACCA, 2009.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/ried/docannexe/image/2287/img-2.png
Fichier image/png, 585k
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Céline Delmotte, « Access to Land and Natural Resources in the Peruvian Amazon »Revue internationale des études du développement, 250 | 2022, 159-182.

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Céline Delmotte, « Access to Land and Natural Resources in the Peruvian Amazon »Revue internationale des études du développement [En ligne], 250 | 2022, mis en ligne le 21 octobre 2022, consulté le 21 mai 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ried/2287 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ried.2287

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Auteur

Céline Delmotte

Céline Delmotte is a postdoctoral researcher in political and social sciences at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)/FNRS (Belgium). A political analyst specialised in development studies, her research focuses on rural stakeholder dynamics and power relations, circular migration, artisanal and small-scale gold mining and access to natural resources with particular reference to and fieldwork on the South American continent (Andean and Amazonian regions).
Recent publications
Delmotte, C. (2020). Circulaciones migratorias, infraestructura vial y economía campesina. Un análisis de las movilidades dentro y fuera del distrito andino de Ocongate (1980-2017). In Leyens, S., Yépez del Castillo, I., Delgado Pugley, D. (Eds.). Ocongate hacia el siglo XXI. Desafios Comunitarios y Responsabilidad social Universitaria en los Andes. Centro Bartolomé de las Casas/Universidad San Antonio Abad del Cusco. http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/232634
Delmotte, C. (2019). Résistance ou négociation ? Intégration régionale, extractivisme minier et conflits pour l’accès aux ressources foncières en Amazonie péruvienne. In Yepez, I., Charlier, S., Lemaître, A., Piccoli, E., & Verhaegen, E. (Eds.). Le développement revisité : 60 ans d’études du développement (205-224). Presses universitaires de Louvain. https://dial.uclouvain.be/pr/boreal/en/object/boreal%3A208568/datastream/PDF_02/view
Delmotte, C. (2016). Small-Scale Gold Mining, Mercury Exposure and the Struggle for the Right to Water in the Peruvian Amazon. Alternautas, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.31273/alternautas.v3i2.1044

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