- 1 All quotations originally in French have been translated by us.
1Pierre Bourdieu's sociological endeavour is rooted in a profound belief in the value of science. The significance of truth lies in aligning scientific formalization, albeit somewhat idealized and nominalistic, with the state of the social world. Truth holds value in uncovering the concealed forces that underlie the workings of this world. This truth is essential for facilitating the transformation of the social world into a more habitable place. To paraphrase Durkheim, without it, sociology would lack any meaningful purpose. This deep-seated belief aligns with Descartes' rationalist project, which Bourdieu subverts by adapting a central formula to the social sciences: the aim, he contends, is to “make us, to some extent, masters and possessors of the social world”. (Bourdieu, 1982:331).
2Pierre Bourdieu developed a nomological understanding of the social sciences. He posited that by uncovering recurrences and regularities, it becomes possible to formulate a set of laws that can be better managed through objectification. Political action becomes feasible because agents possess some knowledge of the world. Enhancing and disseminating this knowledge leads to more pertinent actions. In essence, one can influence the social world by affecting the knowledge that agents possess about it (Bourdieu, 1980a:69). Bourdieu's unwavering belief in the pivotal role of science prompted him to insist that practitioners maintain stringent epistemological rigor. The more rigorous the science, the more precise its objecttification and the more meaningful and impactful its outcomes.
3Bringing to light some of these laws through sociological objectification has practical implications. On one hand, it can contribute to elevating the scientific standards of these disciplines, necessitating new criteria for rigor and introducing novel protocols and controls. On the other hand, once these laws are illuminated, certain determinations and detrimental effects can, if not entirely mitigated, at least be potentially minimized through political decisions and heightened awareness among agents.
4The objective of this paper is to elucidate the concept of public engagement, particularly the role that sociologists can play in the public sphere. This is accomplished by delineating the two levels of responsibility that permeate Bourdieu's work. The first pertains to the quality of scientific work, termed scientific responsibility. The second level involves uncovering the power dynamics and meanings that shape the social world, denoted as sociological responsibility. The latter, by framing freedom as an awareness of constraints, represents a sociological perspective rooted in Spinozist tradition. As will be elaborated upon later in this analysis, these two levels are interconnected.
- 2 Note that, despite these efforts, Bourdieu's epistemological stance is not always entirely clear. (...)
- 3 As was demonstrated in Kuhn T., 1962.
5From the early stages of his career, Bourdieu was drawn to focus his analytical attention on the epistemological conditions of scientific production. Adopting a constructivist approach2, he demonstrated that the production of science is a phenomenon among others, subjected all the while to the sociological structures and laws characteristic of the organisation of the social world3. Consequently, there is an urgent necessity to implement or strengthen the requisite measures to ensure a high level of epistemological vigilance. These measures also signify a steadfast belief that sociological objectification empowers us to exert a level of influence over or management of the world, enabling us to have a desired impact on it. This potential enhancement of our command over social phenomena through scientific objectification necessitates the marriage of rigorous science with the contemplation of the interplay between science and politics, the nexus of science and public engagement, and the transformative potential of science in society, among other considerations.
6Bourdieu contends that, beyond its capacity to illuminate, sociological theory can alter the world or, at the very least, influence it. As some of the concepts introduced in his pursuit of sociological action in the world are revisited, this paper explores the boundaries of this form of civic engagement. It also poses a straightforward question: is this mode of civic engagement the most suitable means of achieving the intended objective? In other words, how is this objective positioned between the principles inherent to an ethic of conviction – Gesinnungsethik – and the principles of an ethic of responsibility – Verantwortungsethik –, when one is more concerned with the moral principle underlying the action, and the other with the result?
- 4 If we exclude texts like that of Alexander (Alexander J. C., 2000), the reception of Bourdieu acro (...)
7Despite his visible engagement in civic life, some authors have, both in the past and now, argued that the Bourdieusian theoretical framework lacks an ethical perspective (Hong, 1999). Some even go so far as to claim that there is “no conceivable ethics” (Caillé, 1994:68), asserting that values are merely concealed self-interest. They adhere to a model that dismisses any notion of fairness, contending that all actions occur under the umbrella of domination or self-interested desires for power (Raynaud, 1980). Such biased or hastily formed interpretations, to say the least, resemble a series of commentaries occasionally fuelled by resentment (Verdès-Leroux, 2002), at times by excess (Corcuff, 2003; Onfray, 2002), and sometimes by friendship (Bouveresse, 2004)4. Bourdieu was active in virtually every social science field – anthropology, sociology, philosophy, economics, literature, geography, law, history, and more. He was deeply engaged in various political struggles, such as those against colonization, exclusion, educational inequality, neoliberalism, and all forms of domination. He championed collective intellect and maintained a commitment to the left. Consequently, Bourdieu naturally sparked a significant amount of enthusiasm, passion, and criticism. This was partly because, to the uninitiated, he long epitomized the archetype of a sociologist.
8In the wake of his numerous civic involvements, particularly in the media, and perhaps due to his own warnings about the dangers of conflating the sociologist with the social prophet, his critiques of Sartre and Sartre's ambition to embody a total intellectual raised eyebrows. Some even advocated refraining from discussing Bourdieu or civic engagement when addressing the sociologist's role in the public sphere (Callon, 1999:65).
9The point here is not to construct a fictitious biography that retrospectively imposes coherence on Bourdieu's trajectory and engagement. Bourdieu's contradictory views on the inherent risks of social prophetism should dissuade us from such an endeavour. Likewise, the goal is not to create a hagiographic portrayal of Bourdieu by tracing his positions across the various fields he traversed. Instead of rehashing the debates surrounding his political engagements, the aim here is to explore his critical stance beyond his public positions. The aim here is to explore his critical stance beyond his public positions and understand what, in this perspective, compelled him to become involved.
10The conceptual framework Pierre Bourdieu developed to explain social practices and representations led him to engage in epistemological reflection. This reflection, which had effects not only on his own career but also on his commitment to criticize and transform a world he believed was bearable only when understood and influenced (Bourdieu/Spire, 2002), plays a significant role.
- 5 Following the old principle of classical sociology, which states that an individual's worldview de (...)
11Going beyond its constructivist evolution, the development of a thought system grounded in the idea that practices are products of a system that generates them raises questions about the practice of science. This inevitably prompts a re-evaluation of sociological categories by turning them back on the analyst. Throughout his body of work, Bourdieu emphasized the point that the production of knowledge, like all social activities, is subject to power dynamics and meanings5. The first step in producing high-quality science is to make the scientific process objective.
12It has become a common assertion that a researcher's immersion in the reality being studied prevents them from confining scientific construction to a purely objective methodology. Researchers are compelled to take a stance, even if it is solely in their interpretation, and to acknowledge their position. As Callon aptly phrases it, “choosing to make visible, to connect, and to reveal links” involves restricting the manoeuvring space for some actors while affording more to others. It contributes to establishing both symmetries and asymmetries, rendering certain configurations impossible while unveiling others and facilitating yet others (Callon, 1999:76). This also entails selecting a focal point that, in one way or another, will invariably leave some issues in the shadows.
13Science exerts an influence on the social sphere. It actively shapes it, effectively “performing” it and contributing to the creation of entities, questions, and problems. To echo Bourdieu's words,
science is destined to have an effect of theory, but of a very particular kind: by manifesting in a coherent and empirically validated discourse what was hitherto ignored, namely, in some cases, implicit or repressed, it transforms the representation of the social world and, at the same time, the social world itself, to the extent that it enables practices in line with this transformed representation (Bourdieu, 2001b:194).
14For several decades now, there has been significant attention directed towards the issue of reflexivity within the sciences, encompassing both its effects and its epistemological implications. Numerous research endeavours have echoed this concern, aiming to incorporate a sociology of their own sociology (Morin, 1984), an objectification of their own objectification (Bourdieu, 1984b), or, in other words, striving to develop a form of self- or socio-analysis, or at the very least, an element of reflexivity (Ghasarian, 2003) applied to their study. This entails explaining the social issues that engage the researcher and are intertwined with their work. What has become an unavoidable challenge for some (Geertz, 1996:136) has become the central focus of extensive volumes of work for others (Bourdieu, 2004).
15Every scientific production, to some extent, is rooted in the subjectivity of the theorist's representation and necessitates an examination of the social conditions that enable the existence and evolution of ideas, reflections, and theoretical advancements. The observer should not limit themselves to disassociating from the subject under study but must scrutinize the presuppositions that shape their perception of the world and, consequently, the phenomenon they are investigating. Furthermore, they should consider the moral presuppositions, which, in one way or another, often tied to non-logical presuppositions, inherently exist in their research. This imbues the entire research process with ethical and political dimensions operating at three levels: epistemological, when the social and political relevance of the subject under study is determined; pragmatic, when it influences scientific work; and cultural, when the boundaries of scientific discourse are contemplated.
16For Bourdieu, the act of reapplying the categories of sociological analysis to the analyst involves objectifying scientific objectification (Bourdieu, 1984b). All researchers should analyse their professional trajectories, define their principal social characteristics and dispositions, and ultimately, examine how they fit into the sphere of scientific production. This entails initially investigating this space as a field shaped by power dynamics and meanings, establishing its degree of autonomy, and defining the interplay between the fields of science, power, and economics.
- 6 Passeron shows, for example, that political powers in ancient and medieval times had relatively lit (...)
17According to Bourdieu, the space of scientific production is structured by genetic, generic, and specific logics. It is genetic in nature because these logics have evolved over long periods of time. Throughout history, science has needed to emancipate itself from religious influence, and it has endeavoured to maintain independence from politics6. Additionally, it has had to establish its own rules of operation, criteria for validity, and prerequisites for entry into the scientific field. The generic aspect arises from the fact that certain elements of these logics are present across various social fields, such as the realms of power, art, and education. However, some logics are specific to the functioning of the scientific field itself.
- 7 Of course, we should also mention the career paths of the various people working in the field, the (...)
- 8 For example, the belief in the significance that the study of certain questions, whether classic o (...)
18The scientific field represents an arrangement of objective relationships among distinct positions – for instance, those of doctoral students, researchers, professors, and leaders – which exist independently of individual intentions7. Internalizing these objective structures of the field and incorporating them into one's actions results in a mode of behaviour unique to scientists. Positions within the field dictate its operational logic and, in turn, are influenced by the dynamics of the relationships that constitute the entire field. Accessing positions within the field is a competitive process that contributes to shaping the field and the interactions within it. The scientific field operates according to established rules and a shared common meaning that serve to regulate its functions8. These representations shape the practices within the field, subsequently influencing the determinations of the field itself, the governing rules and meanings, and the configuration of relationships both within the field and with external domains, such as other fields.
19At a broad and abstract level, despite its variations, the scientific community constitutes an epistemic community grounded in a belief in the “value” of science. It establishes the conditions for the legitimacy of scientific discourse, and these conditions evolve over time. In any given period, “the distribution of power [among agents] defines the structure of the field” (Bourdieu/Wacquant, 1992:94), thereby dictating the meanings and rules within the field. The scientific field operates primarily as a network of relationships. Agents and groups of agents are identified and define themselves based on their relative positions within the field. The attributes that characterize them and validate their positions construct an objective power structure that applies universally and is not reducible to any single individual. These power dynamics are determined by the overall volume and composition of capital – whether social, economic, cultural, or symbolic – and the positioning of each agent, as well as how these different elements evolve over time.
- 9 A distinction outlined in Bourdieu P., 1997b, pp.16 and 29 and made more precise in Bourdieu P., 20 (...)
20In more concrete terms, Bourdieu identifies two types of capital whose distribution among agents determines the power dynamics within the scientific field9. One type of capital is centred on scientific authority, which encompasses the intellectual influence generated through recognition and prestige. The other type is associated with power within the scientific realm – institutional and institutionalized temporal power – which bestows dominance over the means of scientific production and wields influence over budgets and other resources. A key aspect of the ongoing struggle within the scientific field concerns the control, appropriation, and potentially the transformation of the rules that govern its operation. This includes, for instance, the definition of what qualifies as “scientific,” the social hierarchy of research subjects, and more. These rules are contested in a battle that cannot be controlled by individual agents in isolation.
21The scientific context of a given era promotes the (de)valuation of specific approaches, theories, and innovations. This occurs through the consecration or depreciation of the positions held by those who develop them and by facilitating their access to positions of varying (de)valuation. According to Bourdieu, the evolution of the scientific field is, in part, a consequence of a self-regulation process within the structure of relationships among its various positions. It is also shaped by the impact of this structure on the stances taken by those within the field, ultimately moulding and defining the structure. This self-regulation involves isolated and/or diverse actions that disrupt the field to some extent and alter the significance of positions over shorter or longer periods.
22The more autonomous a field, the greater its capacity for refraction, meaning the ability of its agents to perceive reality solely through their own established rules, thereby escaping external pressures and regulations. Autonomy is essential to ensure scientific validity. According to the social norms of the scientific community, research must be conducted with utmost objectivity. This entails on the one hand, avoiding judgments, stakes, or interests external to the scientific community and, on the other hand, adhering to the rules and conventions of the scientific community. These conventions include objectivity, critical distance, impartiality, the objective study of the social world, scientific communication, peer review, and so on. These conventions, among other factors, grant science the legitimacy and significance of its discourse on the social world. However, paradoxically, despite these conventions or, in some sense, because of them, science remains entangled in a relationship of dependency. The initial consequence of this relationship is that heteronomy is one of the prerequisites for autonomy.
One of the major paradoxes of scientific fields is that they owe much of their autonomy to the fact that they are funded by the State, thereby entering into a particular form of dependence on an authority capable of supporting and enabling a production that is not immediately subject to market approval [...]. This dependence within autonomy, or vice versa, is not without ambiguity, as the State, which ensures the minimal conditions for autonomy, is also capable of imposing constraints that generate heteronomy and of serving as the mouthpiece or conduit for economic forces' constraints [...], from which it is supposed to provide liberation. (Bourdieu, 1997b:48)
- 10 Grignon, for example, believes that "civically engaged sociology at the service of a cause is no di (...)
23In addition to this challenge, some individuals argue that scientists must ensure the preservation of autonomy in the realm of social engagement. For instance, there is a prevalent belief that science should remain independent from social causes – be it issues concerning people, women, the environment, and so on – in order to avoid straying off course and compromising its principles10. In contrast, Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the pursuit of hypothetical axiological neutrality and the essential objectification required for scientific endeavours. In essence, he contends that not every activist endeavour is devoid of scientific merit. While the examination of educational inequalities may not constitute a neutral choice, the objective analysis of the underlying causes of these inequalities is no less scientific. Illuminating power dynamics is always a form of engagement. Academic integrity should not blind scholars to societal suffering. While science must not forsake its scientific principles in the service of a cause, the observation of societal distress can inspire scientific approaches aimed, like an epiphenomenon, at enhancing social well-being. Through their capacity to observe and comprehend, “those who have the privilege of dedicating their lives to the study of the social world cannot remain neutral and indifferent, detached from the struggles that determine the future of this world” (Bourdieu, 2001a:7). The greater the expertise of these observers in society, the better equipped they are to identify and objectify its injustices, inequalities, and arbitrary elements.
- 11 These conditions of reception lead to a hierarchy of knowledge. In this context, we can differenti (...)
24Such a conception of science entails transcending the dichotomy between a “purist” approach and an engaged approach, all while ensuring the paramount importance of safeguarding scientific autonomy. This insistence on autonomy is grounded in the belief that the utility of the social sciences is contingent upon their adherence to the imperatives of scientific rigor. The knowledge they generate can serve certain causes as long as it remains rigorously scientific. Within the framework of the theme of socio-logical responsibility in Bourdieu’s work outlined here, the first form of engagement is scientific and manifests as a desire to elevate the standards of scientific precision. This precision, furthermore, constitutes a prerequisite for the realization of a “chosen effect” of sociological theory on the social. Autonomy, therefore, assumes a central role. It is not only determined by the social circumstances under which knowledge is produced but also by the social context in which it is received 11.
- 12 Critical distance, objectification, peer review, communication, dialogues based on the best argume (...)
25The point has already been made that social sciences play a part, “as shown by the way in which [their] institutional development is linked to the needs of public administrations, in the expansion of the capacity to master the social world” (Martuccelli, 2002:137). However, in the scientific field, responses to social needs are often perceived as a “compromise and [a] risk that the requirements of rigour will be diverted to serve purposes unrelated to the quest for scientific objectivity” (Castel, 2000:281). In the eyes of researchers – but also of the social world in general – autonomy provides a guarantee of scientificity and rigour and is a decisive factor in determining the hierarchy of knowledge12. This is a key factor in determining the position that a particular piece of research takes in the range of scientific works that make up the field. Safeguarding this autonomy is already a form of engagement. To do science in the way Bourdieu advocates therefore presupposes a moral and practical engagement or, as he sees it, a virtuous engagement. As has already been pointed out, this kind of engagement presupposes that one looks inward at oneself and under the conditions that underpin scientific production.
26To earn their place, scientists must adhere to the criteria defined by the community to which they belong. These criteria are of two kinds. The first is an epistemological one, which underpins the community's legitimacy – the value of scientific production depends on compliance with the epistemological production standards laid down by the community. The second is linked to the community's responsibility towards the social world.
- 13 Researchers need to objectify the conditions of their scientific objectification in order to move (...)
27Bourdieu's reflections, like many others, illustrate the interpenetration between these two orders. In his view, the production of knowledge is a social process whose relevance and quality must be ensured by compelling objective laws in the field of the cité savante (learned city) to enforce a scientific hierarchy that is a measure of virtue. This representation of scientific work leads us to believe that controlling and modifying the conditions under which knowledge is produced depends, above all, on a field effect. While a scientist may have the means to strive for objectivity – through participatory objectification or double objectification, for example – it is nevertheless above all through a transformation of the rules of the field that a general increase in the degree of scientificity can be achieved13. Thus, Bourdieu argues that even if the individual has a relative influence on objective structures, they are ultimately decisive. It is therefore necessary to consider the structural, organisational, and institutional conditions required to achieve the autonomy and scientificity of knowledge production. The transformation of these conditions will enable the emergence of a context in which science will be produced more rigorously. In the meantime, the scientific community's move towards this transformation can be encouraged by individual behaviours which, when aggregated, contribute to changes in the rules of the scientific field.
28However, “it is not virtue that can establish a free intellectual order; it is a free intellectual order that can establish intellectual virtue” (Bourdieu, 1992b:557). Only the transformation of objective structures can fully ensure the emergence, consolidation, and perpetuation of a robust intellectual virtue. This underscores the importance of safeguarding the autonomy of the field, objectifying the production conditions that determine it, and challenging the legitimacy of the hierarchy of scientific objects, by whom and how is it defined? This entails raising the criteria for entry into the field; in essence, the level of epistemological and scientific rigor required to be recognized as a member of the community.
29The primacy of the field is evident on two levels: an objective level, characterized by specific structures and mechanisms, and a subjective level, involving the shaping of mental structures, normative benchmarks, their hierarchy, and patterns of perception, thought, and action. For these reasons Bourdieu contends that “morality is effective only when it is based on structures, mechanisms that make people have an interest in morality” (Bourdieu, 1996:64). He further asserts that “political morality cannot fall from the sky; it is not inscribed in human nature.” Therefore, he advocates for a collective practice of a “Realpolitik of reason” anchored in rational actions aimed at defending the social conditions under which reason operates. From this perspective, agents within the scientific field should have the capacity to convene collectively and decide on actions to transform the field, enhance its autonomy, bolster epistemological vigilance, and elevate the quality and rigor of its scientific virtues.
- 14 See for example the afterword titled Pour un corporatisme de l’universel (Bourdieu P., 1992b, pp.5 (...)
30Beyond the need for favourable institutional conditions and a controlled relationship with the field of power and politics, strengthening the field's autonomy and scientific rigor involves the collaborative creation of social conditions that cultivate researchers' commitment to their moral and scientific responsibility. This might entail, for instance, granting credit and recognition to virtuous scientists by valuing their rigorous work.At the epistemological level, we must consider the incentive for producers to maximize the quality of their work in order to ensure a robust epistemology. This, in turn, bolsters the autonomy and heightens the responsibility of the scientific community towards the social world. These two dimensions, epistemology and responsibility, are deeply intertwined. Science has an impact on the world: the more rigorous it is, the more precise its objecttives become, and the more pertinent and meaningful its scope becomes. As will be elaborated later, the community's responsibility towards the social world is encapsulated in Bourdieu's call for the emergence of a “collective intellectual”14.
31Promoting higher standards for entry into the scientific field must be accompanied by ensuring universal access. This entails “promoting the establishment of universes where all agents and their actions [...] are subject to a kind of ongoing test of universalizability practically instituted by the logic of the field” (Bourdieu, 1994:243, cited in Mauger, 1995:680) and “ensuring that an increasing number of people meet the necessary conditions to appropriate the universal” (Bourdieu, 1996:77). What does this mean? Firstly, it involves avoiding ideological imperialism, which is the ideological function and use of an illusory 'universal'. For instance, it can be seen in how dominant culture imposes itself as truth and as a universal and legitimate culture (Bourdieu, 1992a; 1998b:25), or in how science at times serves as a means of legitimization for those in power. The universal should be understood by referring to the set of laws uncovered by sociology. In fact,
revealing hidden constraints [...] is an attempt to offer everyone a possibility of liberation through awareness from the grip of [...] mechanisms and perhaps propose a program of concerted action [...]. Only such collaboration would effectively work towards the dissemination of the most universal findings of research and, to some extent, the practical universalization of access conditions to the universal (Bourdieu, 1996:94).
32With this in mind, a consideration of knowledge dissemination is essential because “scientific truth is most likely to reach those who are least inclined to accept it and have very little chance of reaching those who would have the most to gain from receiving it” (1980b:42). However, awareness alone is insufficient, as it has no automatic impact on behaviour. This collaboration necessitates bringing together researchers, actors, and activists in a collective process of critique and proposals, possibly within hybrid forums. Before delving into these proposals, it is important to note some of the effects of sociological revelation.
33There is a second responsibility that arises from the rules defining the field, from scientific value, and the potential impact of science on reality. This is a subjective moral responsibility. This subjective morality, which does not necessarily need to be understood as individual, may be determined by the orientation of a research group. It is based on convictions and may influence, in particular, the choice of research subject, the manner in which it is conducted, and the extent of the researcher's engagement with the social reality under study (Callon, 1999).
34Of course, when it comes to research subjects, nothing can be dictated. The selection of a subject and the actors with whom a scientist collaborates are influenced by institutional, scientific, ethical, and political factors. It is, therefore, important to identify the conditions that determine the choice of a research subject, understand how and at what specific moment a scientific object emerges in the realm of knowledge, and ascertain its intended use by the researcher. Analysing the conditions under which knowledge is produced can help overcome certain ideological, theoretical, and institutional constraints and may sometimes lead to a form of moral engagement that allows for the definition of scientific objects
based on the socio-historical interests of the subjects being studied... starting from real social situations and the problems they experience in their everyday lives... This can also incline us to prioritize as research subjects... those whom objective constraints... condemn to silence (Gibbal/Lebris, 1982:21).
35Taking this reflection further, the researcher would, to some extent, become a spokesperson or could provide a platform for certain groups to voice their experiences.
- 15 Lahire's recent proposal that social sciences should be taught from primary school, which he descr (...)
36While this may not have always been Bourdieu's explicit intention, it nevertheless appears to characterize a work like The Weight of the World (La misère du monde). This book reflects a different relationship to sociological science in the author's work. Faced with the challenges sociological discourse faces in being received, Bourdieu opted for a form of social maieutic in which individuals objectify their (dis)position15. Within this framework, sociological knowledge is democratised. However, it still does not provide the solutions required to overcome disenchantment. One might question whether a completely transparent and disenchanted social universe brought about by fully developed social science would indeed be liveable. Bourdieu, on his part, seems to believe that “social relationships would be much less unhappy if people at least understood the mechanisms that lead them to contribute to their own misery” (Bourdieu, 1980b:33). The sociologist's primary role, and to some extent, their responsibility, is to contribute to our understanding of these social mechanisms.
37Bourdieu distinguishes between freedom upstream and freedom downstream of sociological awareness (Hilgers, 2006). The former appears almost illusory. Internalizing structures allows us to perceive ourselves as free without being aware of our own determinations. The latter, which results from self-reflection based on a reflexive distancing from structures – an awareness of one's own habitus – permits a degree of self-control. Much like in the work of Spinoza (Eth., V), this acquired freedom entails virtue. In the scientific context, for instance, a double objectification involves an ethics that fosters scientific virtue, specifically elevating the standards of scientific rigor. First,
because it is a science, and secondly because if it is true that it is through the knowledge of determinations provided by science that a form of freedom, which is the condition and correlative of an ethics, becomes possible, then it is also true that a reflexive science implies or includes an ethics (Bourdieu/Wacquant, 1992:171).
- 16 Necessity, the non-necessity of which can be demonstrated by means of objectification.
38The expansion of freedom brought about by sociological awareness makes it possible to make a normative choice, which consists of accepting or rejecting necessity16. The agent or the political world can introduce modifying elements that may be sufficient to “transform the results of mechanisms in the direction of our desires” (Bourdieu, 1982:20). The mere act of learning about mechanisms whose effectiveness is rooted in a lack of knowledge, such as cases of “symbolic violence,” helps alter their effects. By unveiling reality, the science of sociology is emancipatory. It encourages indignation by denaturalizing necessity, by demonstrating that it is a product of social relations, that these social relations can be transformed, and that what appears necessary is not necessarily so. Sociology, according to Bourdieu, “defatalizes.” In doing so, it introduces a degree of freedom from primary allegiance and enables us to become, to some extent, “master and possessor of the social nature,” to “control the effects of determinisms that operate on the social world” (Bourdieu, 1987:112). Sociological analysis may help diminish social determinism and contribute to “universalizing the conditions of access to the universal.” The freedom that knowledge provides carries ethical and moral implications. An awareness of the structures of socialization and the mechanisms governing social relationships in a given field can serve to broaden access to the universal.
39In shifting from a reflection on form – the question of freedom in a theory of practices – to a reflection on substance – the question of freedom in the social world – Bourdieu also shifts from a scientific discourse on practices to a politically engaged discourse on morality. The focus is no longer solely on the relationship between socialization and freedom but on the relationship between freedom and emancipation. The goal is not merely to provide those who are dominated with the possibility of attaining, through awareness, the level of freedom that those who are dominant sometimes enjoy through their habitus. What is at stake is genuine self-liberation through knowledge, which in this sense applies without distinction to all social agents. Only by becoming aware of and distancing themselves from the objective structures they adapt to can agents exercise genuine free will.
40Material freedom, while a necessary condition, is not the same as freedom of conscience. The freedom of choice afforded by the unveiling of the logic of practice requires individuals to make normative choices based on subjective moral values; they may even strive to be open to something other than their own habitus. By demonstrating that the unity of conduct is determined by habitus, agents' consciousness can become aware of the workings of practical logic. This allows them to perform actions that modify the actual objective structure of the axiological universe and become, to some extent, autonomous in relation to their social determinations.
41Extending the scope of social consciousness is essential to compensate for the inequalities produced by objective structures and to develop the capacity for change that lies within every social agent. Sociology can provide the rational means to “fully use the margins of manoeuvre left to freedom” (Bourdieu, 1993:1454). In other words, it is not about confining social agents to an 'original social being' treated as destiny or nature, but about offering them the possibility to embrace their habitus without guilt or suffering. Agents can gradually emancipate themselves from their determinism. As they progress, emancipation becomes a duty because freedom of conscience implies great responsibility: “knowledge of objective necessity offers the possibility of freedom from that necessity, and thus of a practical ethics aimed at increasing that freedom” (Bourdieu, 1997a:139).
42Bourdieu transposes Weber's position on the religious field (Bourdieu, 1971) to what the Marxist tradition calls “external consciousness.” He argues that :
- 17 See also Bourdieu P., 1984b.
Those who occupy dominated positions in the social space are also situated in dominated positions in the field of symbolic production. It is not clear where the instruments of symbolic production necessary for expressing their own point of view on the social could come from if it were not for the logic specific to the field of cultural production and the specific interests that arise in it. This logic inclines a fraction of the professionals engaged in this field to offer the dominated, based on a homology of position, the instruments of rupture with the representations that are generated in the immediate complicity of social structures and mental structures. (Bourdieu, 2001b:313)17
43This explains, in particular, the need to organize forums that bring together researchers, artists, actors, activists, writers, and others who are in some way outside the mainstream and share a structural affinity, a homology of position with the dominated. Bourdieu believes that meetings and long-term discussions on issues of general interest are needed to discover the intersection between different protest movements. The social forces already concentrated in specific universes need to be “concerted,” so that they can unite and act collectively.
44Thus, Bourdieu concurs with the idea of a forum as developed by other social scientists. In these forums, sociologists should play a particular role on certain issues. For example, they can help clarify situations and prevent people from making uninformed statements about the social world (Bourdieu, 1980b:19). Engagement involves writing and “occasionally speaking,” but not becoming a politician (Bourdieu, 2000:44). The question is how to give force to ideas without re-entering the political field and political game. Drawing from and applying Spinoza's principles to sociology, Bourdieu asserts that “there is no intrinsic force to the true idea.” Truth is a subject of struggle. Sociological work can help us understand what is at stake in these struggles, their meaning, how they are played out, and the influence they have on society. It can also help avoid certain pitfalls. For example, by illustrating
one of the most tragic antinomies of symbolic domination: how to rebel against a socially imposed categorization if not by organizing into a category constructed according to that categorization, thereby bringing into existence the classifications and restrictions it intends to resist (instead of, for example, fighting for a new order in which the distinction between different statuses would be indifferent?) (Bourdieu, 1998a:131).
45Sociologists can help rebuild politics by participating in discussions with social movements that reject traditional forms of mobilization, invent original actions with strong symbolic content, are highly internationalized, oppose neo-liberalism, and emphasize solidarity. Their knowledge of social dynamics and their ability to bring individuals together through various networks can help counter the logic of domination and minimize differences, ensuring, among other things, that specific skills are combined and united to form a collective intellectual.
46This collective intellectual is formed by bringing together specific intellectuals (in Foucault's sense) into networks capable of creating a strong critical mass and establishing “the social conditions for the collective production of realistic utopias” (Bourdieu, 2001a:37). Recognizing that science is inherently social, the collective intellectual goes beyond the dichotomy between pure science and engaged science. They should have the capacity to organize collective research, stimulate and participate in new forms of political action, mobilization, and collaborative projects, and facilitate the emergence of new forms of identity.
They can play a midwife role by assisting the dynamics of working groups in their effort to express, and thereby discover, what they are and what they could or should be, contributing to the collection and accumulation of vast social knowledge about the social world (Bourdieu, 2001a:37).
- 18 It should be noted that Bourdieu's emphasis on sociologists, implicitly considering them as pivota (...)
47To achieve this, researchers, as well as artists and writers, must transcend the internal boundaries of the academic world, engage with the outside world, and promote “engaged knowledge, scholarship with engagement, which is a policy of intervention in the political world that follows, as much as possible, the rules prevailing in the scientific field” (Ibid.:40). This is especially important as dominant forces outside the field often invoke the authority of science and seek to align themselves with it to advance their ideological agendas18.
48If, in general, the scientific community disapproves of compromises with the research market, even while being somewhat dominated by it, it's because within its logic, “asserting a scientific truth based on extrinsic assumptions would represent an ethical contradiction since the scientist would be assuming a heteronymic definition of their intellectual autonomy” (Passeron, 2004:35). Engagement does not imply heteronomy. Sociologists are answerable to the broader community and to their peers for the quality, and hence the relevance, of their work. This work exposes the state of the world. In the face of a world burdened by injustices and relations of domination, none can remain indifferent. The sociologist's role is to foster awareness. This sociological responsibility must be the corollary of fully embraced scientific responsibility.
49It's evident from this analysis that autonomy is a potent tool for engaged thinking. However, it requires reflective effort to comprehend and objectify its own conditions of possibility. From this perspective, the politics of pure science is, in a sense, an inconsequence of intellectual production. When fully embraced, intellectual production gives rise to various forms of engagement, without which it loses its meaning and risks becoming an ideology, in the Marxian sense, serving the legitimation of domination and the dominant. From this viewpoint, engagement is the logical consequence of autonomy and indeed one of its conditions of possibility, as it contributes to the intellectual's reclaiming of their own discourse. The intellectual cannot, therefore, be understood through a dichotomy between autonomy and engagement.
50As a “two-dimensional character,” but hopefully neither dichotomous nor schizophrenic, an intellectual exists as such only if they enjoy the credit granted by a relatively autonomous scientific community and commit this credit to a political struggle (Bourdieu, 1992b:547). According to Bourdieu, regardless of country or culture, threats to autonomy are structurally analogous in scientific subfields, contributing to a structural affinity between the agents within them, making their unity more attainable. This objective structuration can help foster a collective approach if agents set aside substantial differences to consider the invariants defining the homology of their positions. Only then can what the author calls an “International of Intellectuals” emerge, in which cultural producers retain control of the means of knowledge production. This International could collectively reinvest in public discourse through its power of vigilance, criticism, and even proposition. Once again, the process of objectification is a fundamental dimension of the intellectual's autonomy and engagement.
- 19 This observation aligns with a project that never came to fruition: “Goffman once told me that we (...)
51“The disclosure of a form of domination through scientific analysis necessarily has social effects, but they can be opposing: it can either symbolically reinforce domination [...] or contribute to neutralizing it” (Bourdieu, 1998a:121)19. So, what can we conclude from this observation? Should we consider sociological production in a way that anticipates its theoretical effects, no matter how minimal they may be? Should we create a science against fatalism? How can we act if revealing the truth may prove harmful? What ensures that sociological denaturalization will inevitably lead to defatalization? Bourdieu offers neither a definitive solution nor a conclusive answer to these questions. In contrast to his other reflections, his final text suggests the need to shield the social world from complete sociological disillusionment. He discusses the myth of the all-encompassing intellectual, burdened with immense tasks like contemplating the foundations of science or history, and who, by virtue of these tasks, believes he is on a mission for humanity. Bourdieu argues that it is essential to defend,
- 20 On this topic, see also Lahire B., 2005, pp.128-137.
at all costs, against all odds, and perhaps above all against a sociological interpretation of the sociological description of the intellectual world... the myth of the intellectual and their universal mission... it is one of those tricks of historical reason that lead intellectuals, who are most sensitive to the benefits of universality, to contribute, in the name of motivations that may have nothing universal about them, to the progress of the universal (Bourdieu, 2004:41)20.
52But who determines this Realpolitik? How can this myth be defended while still addressing the need to objectify the social conditions of knowledge production? Who has the authority to decide which idols should be safeguarded from the sociological critique? Shouldn't the sociologist, at some point, be divested of their knowledge to allow the public to decide whether to accept or reject the knowledge they produce? Are the answers in the hands of a collective intellectual? And once again, how are collective decisions reached? Reading Bourdieu's work leaves these questions unanswered. Nonetheless, until change arrives, the accumulation of virtuous individual behaviours may already help steer the field towards a configuration that is more conducive to its autonomy and scientific rigor.
- 21 On justifying the researcher's intervention in society, Lahire B., 2002, pp.63-64.
53Bourdieu himself combined three recurring forms of justification when legitimizing the researcher's involvement in the public sphere21: a specific competence, recognition, and a commitment to “universal” values. He contributed to shedding light on their sensitivity, various forms of domination, specific social laws, or certain structures and configurations of power relations, meaning, and authority. This was the essence of his engagement. However, apart from his own positions in the public sphere, he allocated limited time to the analysis of different forms of struggle and potential alternatives. While his approach employs essential tools for thinking about, describing, and interpreting society, the question arises as to whether, beyond their performative value, they are the most suitable for its transformation. Uncovering the logics of how society operates may indeed inspire a realistic program for collective action by intellectuals, but this outcome is not guaranteed. Except for occasional reminders of the need to maintain a discourse of freedom, the sociologist does not provide a comprehensive program for this purpose (Bourdieu, 1992b:546). These descriptions and prescriptions of realistic utopias, of the universality of corporatism, of the collective intellectual are thought-provoking, yet they remain elusive. In other words, to enhance sociology's contribution to understanding the social world and striving for a more just one, we must continue to think with Bourdieu beyond Bourdieu.
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