- 1 I thank the editors of this special issue, Louise Tillin and A. Kalaiyarsan, for their guidance and (...)
- 2 Defederalization refers to the diminishing significance of the multi-tiered structure (i.e. the pre (...)
1Over the last decade, India has witnessed unmistakable institutional and structural shifts, like the abolition of the Planning Commission, the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), constraining the category of special category states, the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act and the abrogation of Art. 370 in the Indian Constitution, which gave the state of Jammu and Kashmir special privileges, among others.1 During the same time period, the Interstate Council has been used sparsely, states have had little involvement in national-level decision-making, and there has been heightened tension between the center and the states that are ruled by opposition parties. What explains this diminishing role of states, friction in center-state relations and what can be called “defederalization”?2
2Dismissing the tenure of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) between 2004 and 2014 as a “decade of decay,” the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in its election manifesto for the general elections in 2014, promised, among other things, to “strive for harmonious center-state relations” (BJP 2014:7). As Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, the current Prime Minister, consistently said all the right things about redrawing center-state relations. Therefore, one expected ongoing federalization to go in a new direction. What we got instead is a hollowed-out federalism, which is only federal in form.
3Among students of federalism, there is growing consensus that the operation of federal systems generally is best understood through the interplay of political parties, party systems, and political practices with constitutional principles and the institutional architecture of federal systems, rather than solely relying on the latter. By focusing exclusively on the structural changes, we miss the underlying ideational motives in the process and the strategic pressures arising from party system dynamics. In this paper, I examine how the BJP’s long-held ideas regarding the nation shape the contours of a diminished federal order.
4This paper argues that the changes over the last decade represent a profound ideational shift. It highlights the gap between the BJP’s conception of federalism and the model enshrined in the Indian Constitution, showing how this ideational vision diminishes the idea of federalism. Discussions on Indian federalism have primarily focused on the changing party system to explain federal dynamics. In this study, I highlight how changes within a party may also affect the working of federalism. While Hindu nationalism has historically been wary of federalism, it lacked the political power to effect change. I argue that the altered position of the BJP within the party system combined with the simultaneous leadership change within the party created a window of opportunity to implement that vision. While considerable scholarship has examined the ideological foundations of Hindu nationalism and its influence on the BJP, my focus here is more specific.
5Rather than revisiting the well-established analysis, which has examined linkages between the project of Hindu Nationalism and the BJP, I highlight how the current generation of BJP leaders, who developed Hindu nationalist ideals during the party’s opposition years, are now translating those ideals into policy. I believe this focus on the generational shift within the party and its implications for ideological articulation and political strategy brings a fresh analytical perspective to the existing discourse.
6This paper contrasts the normative underpinnings of the idea of federalism in the Indian Constitution with that of Hindu Nationalism and the BJP. It examines how the Hindu nationalist concept of federalism differs sharply on two dimensions: national unity (territorial integrity) and pluralism (recognizing multiple identities). This dissimilarity between the constitutional and Hindu nationalist positions may help us understand why India has witnessed a diminishing of the idea of federalism over the last decade. The argument suggests that the structural changes are closely tied to the BJP’s narrow nationalist agenda.
7This paper is in two substantive parts. The first part attempts to set up the study to make sense of the BJP’s position towards federalism. It introduces the primary sources used in the study, particularly the resolutions of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) from 1951 to 1972. I contrast the constitutional position with the BJP’s in the second part. I trace the current developments vis-à-vis federalism to the longstanding views of the predecessor to the BJP, the BJS, on issues related to federalism and issues like multiple identities and pluralism. The constitutional vision, I argue, is based on civic nationalism, whereas Hindu nationalism reduces the demos to ethnos and this in turn leads to diminished federal order. The paper concludes with a summary of the key findings.
8A brief examination of the transformed nature of the party system may help to better understand the BJP’s broader ideological orientation and its stance on federalism. Over time, especially by the late 1960s, the Congress’s position as the center of the dominant party system eroded, paving the way for a more competitive party landscape. By the late 1980s, as a multiparty system took hold, parties jostled amongst each other to promote their distinct visions and agendas, each striving to replace the Congress and reframe the political discourse to their advantage; among these were parties which mobilized sections of the population along caste lines in a bid to advance the idea of social justice. The BJP tried to override caste-based mobilization by pushing for a broader unity centered around religion, cultural nationalism, and civilizational ethos. Given the fragmentary nature of caste groupings, most other non-Congress parties were limited to particular states. In sharp contrast, the narrative and priorities espoused by the BJP carried a Pan-Indian appeal and allowed space for an all-India strategy. In retrospect, it now appears that the themes the BJP brought to the table redefined the terms of political debate and displaced competing narratives.
9Given the fragmented opposition, the Congress was relatively unchallenged at the national level till the mid-80s and continued to win with a plurality of votes. Ideological differences and the competitive dynamics of the party system made the programmatic agenda of the BJP, which revolved around issues of cultural nationalism and majoritarian identity, less attractive to other parties, especially since they were chasing the same goal of toppling the Congress. Consequently, other parties believed it would be more prudent to form alliances that excluded the BJP in order to defeat the Congress without joining hands with the BJP.
10In the mid-90s, following the BJP’s “glorious isolation” after the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, when it emerged as the single largest party in parliament but did not attract allies to form a government, the party was compelled to rethink its approach. Subsequently, the party took a more pragmatic stand on multiple issues, including alliances. It was ready to play second fiddle, especially in states in which it had a weak or negligible presence (Sridharan 2005). The party famously put aside three contentious issues which had been an integral part of its programmatic and mobilization agenda, including the building of the Ram Temple, the Uniform Civil Code, and the Abrogation of Art. 370 of the constitution. These concessions allowed the party to become coalitionable and attract many state-based parties from various parts of the country that saw the Congress party as their primary competitor.
11The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with Atal Behari Vajpayee as Prime Minister between 1999 and 2004 was a period of congenial center-state relations. This NDA government enriched the processes of the working of federalism in India. Federal coalitions were incentivized to respect states’ autonomy if only to keep the support of state-based parties (Kailash 2014). This federalizing rhetoric helped the BJP garner allies from the unlikeliest of quarters, like the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), whose programmatic agenda was at odds with that of the BJP. These practices continued even during the successive Congress-led UPA regimes, where state-based parties played a significant role. Consequently, a series of changed practices marked the two-decade-long federalizing phase.
- 3 Art. 356 in the Indian constitution creates the possibility for imposing a President’s rule in a st (...)
12The Bommai Judgement and the presence of state-based parties had reduced the probability of the misuse of Art. 356.3 Moreover, during this period, the center did not overtly try to push itself on the states, and we also see greater consultation between the two levels. These minor adjustments restrained the center from infringing on states’ autonomy and gave them a greater voice in national-level decision-making (Arora, et al. 2013).
13Given this background as a coalition maker and the campaign rhetoric of 2014, scholars believed that for the BJP to consolidate itself its power, it had to moderate itself and become centrist (Varshney 2014). Likewise, the federalizing thrust was expected to continue, given the BJP’s lack of numbers in the Rajya Sabha and the resulting need to compromise. At the same time, it was believed that adequate institutional checks and balances were in place to restrain the party. However, not everyone was optimistic. Palshikar (2015) argued that there was no incentive for the BJP to become centrist given the “majoritarian turn” and the resultant new “middle ground” of the Indian polity. He noted that if a party comes to power repeatedly over two decades, it indicates that the party’s agenda has become central to the country’s politics.
14As early as 2004, Palshikar (2004) observed that the BJP had successfully secured the Hindu mind. The values espoused by the party, including majoritarianism, limited support for minority interests, high levels of religiosity, and an insistence on keeping group boundaries, had gained widespread acceptance among large sections of the population. The study found that voters who espoused these values could be found across party lines, not just among BJP voters, thus indicating a shifting middle ground in Indian politics. Consequently, the battle is no longer about redefining the middle ground but more about who is more authentic and convincing in representing the new middle ground, signifying that the BJP now sets the terms of political competition.
- 4 Here, I understand generational shift as the transfer of leadership from the founding members of th (...)
15It should be noted that there has been a generational change within the BJP.4 The first generation of leaders worked within the constraints of a dominant Congress-led system. They did not share the “normative rules” (Bailey 1969, as cited in Jaffrelot 1996:82) and the values of the system in which they operated. Though they had the leeway to articulate the programs, goals, and vision of the party, they lacked the political space or institutional strength to implement them effectively. At the same time, the overarching framework of anti-Congressism unified opposition forces and the early leaders of the BJP, then in the BJS were compelled to temper its agenda to collaborate with non-Congress political parties (BJS 1973d:182, 192–94).
16The emergence of a more competitive multiparty system in which the BJP had an edge coincided with a generational change in the party. The younger cohort that assumed leadership had been politically socialized during a period when the party was in opposition. The limited role of the party in national politics, coupled with their own marginal role within the political landscape limited their engagement with leaders from other parties and this in turn reinforced their reliance on networks within the party and related organizations.
17The BJS and later the BJP’s ideological position on a variety of issues made it a target of mistrust among other political parties, which further reinforced its marginal status (Jaffrelot 1996:301–13). This organizational context, marked by exclusion from formal power combined with suspicion from political opponents, created a closed environment in which ideological loyalty was valued over strategic flexibility. Being in a party without access to power, the younger generation is likely to have focused more on ideological issues. Consequently, it is possible that their political apprenticeship occurred in a setting that favored ideological rigidity rather than flexibility.
18I argue that this experience of prolonged marginalization, combined with a sense of political isolation and ineffectiveness, encouraged a hardened ideological stance. This, in turn, fostered a more adversarial posture when members of this cohort eventually assumed leadership roles, shaping both their policy preferences and their approach to political competition.
19With greater political space, organizational strength, institutional control, and a favorable electoral context at their disposal, the new leadership could pursue the party’s ideological goals with a sense of freedom the party did not have previously. While the earlier generation tempered and at times even downplayed the more contentious elements of the party’s ideology, the new generation embraced them openly and refused to make any concessions. This shift marks a decisive turn in the BJP’s trajectory from ideological timidity to ideological dominance.
20With the changed position of the BJP within the party system and the new generation of leaders, the BJP has pushed hard to translate its ideological goals into policy. When one examines the changes over the last decade, an unshackled BJP is, in many ways, not putting forward a new agenda but only implementing its longstanding vision of a Hindu nation and its interpretation of a proper ordering of center-state relations. The emphasis on cultural nationalism, uniformity over diversity, and a strong central state reflects ideological commitments that have long been embedded in the party’s foundational discourse.
21What we are today witnessing is a chapter-and-verse implementation of the ideological blueprint of the BJS, enforcing an ethnic nationalist vision. The BJP’s goals are anachronistic not merely in temporal terms, but in their misalignment with India’s constitutional and pluralistic ethos. The party’s conception of nation is rooted in a cultural and civilizational idea of oneness, which ignores the possibility of multiple identities coexisting simultaneously. It operates on the assumption that cultural homogeneity is a prerequisite for political cohesion and unity and uniformity are synonymous (Zavos 1999). This idea ignores both the diverse nature of Indian society as well as its constitutional foundation.
22This study is limited to examining the continuity and legacy of the BJP from the BJS. It relies on primary source material comprising party documents which spell out the policies, manifestos, programs, and resolutions of the BJS between 1951 and 1972. They provide valuable insights into the party’s position on various issues and its ideological position in the first twenty-five years after independence. As the anonymous compiler noted, these documents help us “understand the party’s mind” (BJS 1973a:8). These resolutions were officially compiled subject-wise and published in five volumes by the party, and they serve as the key source for this research. All resolutions of the party were numbered in chronological order, with the first two digits representing the year and the following two indicating the resolution’s serial number. The study uses volume and page numbers of these resolutions for citation purposes. The date, place, and body that passed the resolution are also mentioned at the end of each entry, providing valuable contextual information for analysis.
23In the next part, I compare the constitutional and Hindu nationalist visions on different dimensions to show how the latter undermines the idea of federalism.
24Like all nationalisms, Hindu nationalism has a territorial dimension as well as dimension in terms of values. Though the extent of territorial claims has varied over time, the value dimension has remained nearly consistent and is the hallmark of Hindu nationalism (BJS 1973a:15). For instance, some versions claim that what is called “Akhand Bharat” integrates large parts of South Asia into a larger undivided polity. However, the territorial dimension is often limited to fierce rhetoric about maintaining and defending the current territorial integrity of the country. Every infraction, real or imagined, in the interior or border region, is seen as an infringement upon India’s territorial sovereignty.
25The value dimension of Hindu nationalism has a long history and does not necessarily begin with the BJP (Sharma 2015; Zavos 2000). Not surprisingly, it has an origin myth that a nation has “always already” existed, which it uses to construct and mobilize a national identity (Vajpayee 1969:55). The underlying thread in its claim is that the “continuation of ancient ethnicity” was disrupted by foreign rule. The thrust is that we need to go back or be inspired by the pre-existing order and unite people around this identity to progress and advance.
26According to this narrative, the pre-existing order and identity is a Hindu order or way of life. The emphasis is on the people as ethnos and Hindu beliefs, practices, and cultural traditions are to be the unifying factor and the pivot around which the nation will revolve. Not surprisingly, this thesis is deeply “suspicious of the non-Hindu communities and manifests an express animosity towards Muslims” (Palshikar 2015).
27Based on his study of four key figures, Dayananda Saraswati, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, and Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who articulated Hindu concerns and nationalist ideas across different historical periods, Jyotirmaya Sharma (2015) delineates six features of Hinduism/Hindutva that are useful in making sense of the value dimension. First, there has been a consistent effort to make Hinduism appear as a unified and codified entity, erasing all forms of diversity in terms of opinions, beliefs, and practices. Second, religion was the core of national life and had to be defended militantly and aggressively. Any slack in this area allows space to be captured by other religions.
28The third element is the constant emphasis on the so-called superiority of Hinduism compared to all other religions and how it could teach others. Fourth is the claim that there is a persistent attempt to weaken Hinduism by both external and internal elements. All forms of diversity, including alternate ideas, practices, beliefs and even languages, are seen as threats. The fifth feature is that there was no space for discussing doctrinal issues, and everything had to be accepted as spelt out in the Vedas and Upanishads alone (Sharma 2015:16). Finally, following from all the above features is the attempt to defend these value elements without any moderation or concession.
29This is in sharp contrast to core values that underpin the idea of federalism (Elazar 1987). First, it encapsulates a vision recognizing that people can be embedded in territorially bound communities and simultaneously be part of the polity-wide community. It must be underlined that a federal order does not abandon the idea of a shared national identity. Second, there is no hierarchy of belonging, and one membership does not diminish the other. At the same time, there is no ranking of communities; all are equal. Third, it recognizes the right to be different, which is probably at the heart of the idea of federalism. States can seek autonomy on certain issues while sharing the advantages of commonality. The idea of federalism recognizes that a one-size-fits-all policy will not work, and that there can be more than one solution to a problem (Kailash 2021).
30Scholars have identified various instrumental and normative reasons why India adopted a federal order. These include territorial size and administrative efficiency (Narang 2012), nation-building, maintaining unity and integrity (Singh 2001; Tillin 2007), regional and domestic balancing (Chadda 2002), the need to recognize, accommodate and reconcile diversity (Adeney 2007; Arora and Verney 1995; Khan 1992 ), and as a democracy enhancing device (Jayal 2003; Verney 1995). Whether India adopted and maintained a federal order for instrumental reasons or by design will continue to be debated. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that once a particular set of institutions is established, the framework and ideas that inspire that structural ordering will influence political behavior; likewise, the latter influences the system’s functioning.
31However, for Hindu nationalism, the idea of federalism is problematic as it undermines the nationalist vision. The six identified features deeply influence its approach to federalism, national unity, territorial integrity, pluralism, and multiple identities.
32Theorists of nationalism make a distinction between two conceptualizations of the nation. Civic nationalism is based on an emphasis on constitutional values and principles. The idea is to forge a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values (Ignatieff 1993:6). In sharp contrast to this, we have ethnic nationalism, where identities matter more than values and institutions. While civic nationalism would suggest that a nation is constituted by its core values, principles, and institutions, ethnic nationalism would focus on the ethnic origins of the population.
33This civic nationalism, sometimes called secular nationalism (Vanaik 1992) in the Indian context, has space for distinct identities, beliefs, practices, and cultures to coexist. This nationalism underlines the idea of unity in diversity and is based on constitutional provisions that seek to protect and maintain these different and multiple ways of life. These guarantees to support distinctiveness are an integral element of the civic nation-building process. This secular nationalism recognizes that while there is a shared common identity, there could be parallel or simultaneously local, regional, or distinctive identities that could exist simultaneously. The federal order, including the asymmetric provisions of the Indian constitution, was designed to allow for this dual character, which allowed for particulars to exist within what was considered universal. The values that motivate the idea of federalism and which civic nationalism espouses are not significantly different.
34For Hindu nationalism, the idea of federalism, as summarized above, is incompatible with the idea of India. National unity comes before democracy or the idea of federalism. Hindu nationalism has consistently believed that a unitary framework is more suitable for building a cohesive nationalist ethos. It argues that a unitary form of government is the “only remedy most suited not only to successfully checkmate the present-day disruptive tendencies which threaten to destroy our national unity but is also best suited to the natural and positive growth of India as a nation.” The party has claimed that only a “unified political authority” will prevent foreign invaders from harming the country and successfully checkmate’ these disruptive tendencies that threaten to destroy national unity (BJS 1973d:77–78, 106–7).
35Furthermore, the Jan Sangh has claimed that it appreciates the “basically unitary character of our constitution” and hopes that the system, which is federal in form, will also become unitary in spirit. This is in sharp contrast to the constitutional position, where a strong federal spirit pervades its unitary form, embodying the reverse of what Hindu nationalism imagines. The party states it “has not been happy that the constitution describes India as a union of states.” According to the party, India has always been “one nation” and “national unity would be best served” if India adopted a unitary constitution instead of the present federal set-up (BJS 1973d:214).
36In contemporary federal scholarship, the focus is less on the specific institutional arrangements than on the underlying spirit or the idea of federalism. Stepan (1999) showed that a variety of federalisms can embody the federal principle of “shared rule plus self-rule.” The distribution of functions across different levels of government, which enables us to characterize federations as centralized and non-centralized, is almost always a product of historical and societal circumstances, contexts and requirements. India’s strong central model of federalism was likewise a response to the unique challenges and conditions of its time.
37The Jan Sangh saw demands for recognition that came from different parts of the country, including Nagaland, other parts of the North East, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir, as “fissiparous tendencies,” having no regard to “symbols of national honor and unity” and posing a threat to the unity and integrity of India (BJS 1973d:101–5). These demands were viewed as conspiracies that encouraged separatism in the country and by people who had ulterior motives. The Naga demand, for instance, was seen as being influenced by Christian missionaries to “establish Christian majority states” (BJS 1973d:57–59). Furthermore, like Nordlinger (1972), Hindu nationalists believed that granting autonomy to particular regions may lead to further demands for greater autonomy. The party also believed that the weakening of nationalism led to the rise of regionalism (1973d:90).
38The party selectively distinguished between demands, categorizing some as threats to national unity while considering others as legitimate and non-threatening. Demands in non-border states, especially if not identity-based, are generally perceived as non-threatening. Consequently, the party believes that regional disparities could cause demands for state reorganization. However, even here, it is argued that regional aspirations must be reconciled to the needs of national unity and security (BJS 1973d:90–95). It is not surprising when it suggests that the North Eastern region be reorganized, considering issues like “national integration, defense, development, regional autonomy, administrative efficiency, etc” (BJS 1973d:80). There is no positive vision of multiple identities in the Hindu nationalistic vision, and the suggested design of state reorganization is probably based on the belief that the coincidence of ethnic and state-level boundaries not only sustains ethnic differentiation but also leaves space for motivations to secede.
39In sharp contrast, the idea of federalism allows for maintaining and sustaining a “dual identity” and allows for the coexistence of multiple identities. While the Hindu nationalist idea speaks of national identity in terms of culture, the idea of federalism pushes for a civic identity which recognizes and respects regional differences. While the Hindu nationalist position sees regional identities as a threat, in the constitutional vision, they are a strength (BJS 1973d:86–90). Reinforcing different identities is a safety valve as it increases everyone’s stakes in the shared government at the center and reduces the possibilities of conflicts.
40The party believed that the State Reorganisation Commission (SRC) had endorsed a unitary form of government. According to the party, efficient and effective administration must be given priority. It then suggested the decentralization of power, which is consistent with one country, one people, and one culture (BJS 1973d:103–5, 164–66).
41The issue of special provisions for the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was a preoccupation for the founders of the BJS, and many resolutions were focused on this issue (BJS 1973d:50–51). It would not be wrong to say that J&K was on top of the party’s agenda in its formative years. The party also led an “integrate Kashmir movement.” They believed special provisions were divisionary, discriminatory, and unequal and the government must ensure J&K “integrates with India in fullness” (BJS 1973d:20–22). It is believed that similar demands may come up in other parts of the country and could lead to “disruption and disintegrity” (BJS 1973d:25–9, 86–90). The party also saw symbols of differentiation as dangerous to the unity and integrity of India. It argued that J&K having a separate flag, prime minister, and so on was “detrimental to the wider interests of Indian unity” and a “violation of India’s sovereignty and the spirit of India’s constitution” (BJS 1973d:50–51).
42The party believes the distinctions and special provisions “hinder the emotional integration” (BJS 1973d:50–51) of the people with the rest of India, creating space for separatist tendencies. Furthermore, the provision of “permanent residentship” is unfair as it prevents people from other parts of the country from “enjoying elementary political and civil rights guaranteed in the constitution” (BJS 1973d:50–51).
43The party was critical of the creation of the state of Nagaland and thought it was a decision “fraught with explosive possibilities” given its location on the border. It accused the central government of giving into pressure from a “small section of the Nagas” and not following the recommendations of the States Reorganisation Commission, without considering the economic implications. The Naga problem, according to the party, was deliberately created by the British, and foreign missionaries had kept this “separatism vigorously alive” (BJS 1973d:53–54, 86–90). Furthermore, this could also lead to similar demands from other parts of the country and “regionalism and parochialism ‘[would] also get a boost’ endangering the unity and integrity of the country.” (BJS 1973d:53–54)
44The party accused Christian missionaries of sowing the seeds of discontent between the hill and the plain tribals as well as instilling separatist and anti-India sentiments (BJS 1973d:43–44). At the same time, the party was willing to allow the customs and practices of the Naga people to be respected and governed by autonomous district councils. In the same breath, the party held that the “military problem arising out of the rebellion” of the Nagas had to be tackled “on a military plane thoroughly, efficiently and swiftly by the Indian Army” (BJS 1973d:43–44).
45A couple of years later, when the government of India sent a “peace mission” to the state, the party felt that the Indian government was “going down on its knees” and instead, it suggested that “effective military measures be immediately taken to crush the revolt” (BJS 1973d, 64.09). The party argued that the “so-called cease-fire must be withdrawn and the security forces should be allowed to handle the situation” (BJS 1973d:71–73). Furthermore, the party was also wary of Jaya Prakash Narayan, who was on a peace mission of advocating “secession and separation” (BJS 1973d:71–73).
46The party argued that the formation of the state of Nagaland was a blunder as it was inspired by “Christian Nagas” without ascertaining the wishes of the “more numerous Hindu Nagas.” Furthermore, they argued that this move encouraged “separatist and disruptive forces” and “threaten[ed] complete Balkanisation of the country’s Eastern region” (BJS 1973d:71–73). Furthermore, it held that the newer demands for separate hill states in the region by the Khasi and Garo Tribes and Mizos were a direct result of the formation of Nagaland (BJS 1973d:80–81).
47Assam has been another area of focus for the Hindu nationalists. As early as 1963, the party was advocating, among other things, the eviction of “Pakistani Muslims who [had] entered into India illegally” and weeding out “persons of doubtful loyalty” from border areas, Hindus “squeezed out” of Pakistan were resettled after due compensation and territory was obtained from Pakistan (BJS 1973d:65–66). The party believed that the Muslim League attempted to get Assam included in Pakistan during partition, and India was saved only due to the efforts of Bardolai, Mookerjee, and Patel (BJS 1973d:73–75).
48Furthermore, in 1965, the party claimed that Pakistan had continuously been trying to get ahold of Assam for 17 years by having infiltrators settle in the state. These infiltrators were supposedly attempting to convert the state into a Muslim-majority state, and they were settling in key areas which could endanger the inclusion of Assam in India (BJS 1973d:73–75). The party suggested a 10-mile belt be cleared of all “doubtful elements” in the region and that “retired soldiers and Hindu refugees” who could be “armed and trained to act as the first line of defence” be settled in the region (BJS 1973d:73–75).
49This Hindu nationalist position on federalism particularly diverges from the constitutional consensus in its narrow understanding of equality. The constitutional position posits that all citizens should carry equal weight. It frequently emphasizes that it advocates for the equal rights of all Indian citizens, regardless of caste, creed, or community, and opposes granting special privileges or promoting any particular group (BJS 1973d:126–131).
50The Hindu nationalist understanding of equality reflects elements of the dominant but limited conceptualizations of equality. In his study of equality, Beitz (1989) notes that a more substantial ideal of equality requires three components: “recognition” as an “equal member of the polity,” “equitable treatment” that safeguards individuals against political outcomes that could harm their prospects, and “deliberation” that provides space for meaningful discussion of public affairs.
51For Hindu nationalism, the recognition of any practice, belief, or need that is different from the dominant cultural thesis that it advocates is seen as a threat. For instance, it has been critical of the division of people in terms of “majority” and “‘minority”—linguistic or religious as it encourages separatism and is dangerous to national unity (BJS 1973d:103–105, 126–131). The party believed that “majority” and “minority” based on religion are opposed to nationalism and held that “stabilisation of any kind of separatism in the name of protecting the rights of so-called minorities” must be prevented (BJS 1973d:118–120). This conceptualization of equality is against any special privileges or concessions and believes everyone should have the same rights.
52However, a substantial version of equality demands differentiation, as treating everyone equally does not necessarily lead to equal outcomes. Without any differential treatment, the majority benefits much more than minority groups. Provisions of asymmetric federalism push for a substantial version of equality, as they give national minorities a degree of autonomy to protect their specific requirements, which we might lose sight of if everyone is treated similarly.
53Likewise, the party holds that the adoption of secularism was not prompted by a desire to placate anyone. At the same time, it argues that this does not mean that “India should cut itself off from its moorings, snap its links with its age-old golden and glorious traditions and life-stream” (BJS 1973d:126–131). It must preserve the “precious legacy of its traditional values” (BJS 1973d:126–131). Here again, a refusal to give any concession to smaller groups is unfair and unequal.
54Hindu Nationalists do not appreciate plurality and diversity. While noting that “territorial unity” cannot be the basis of nationalism, the party suggests that culture is the “unifying bond” (BJS 1973d:40–41). The party claims that “despite political divisions, the people of India have remained one through the bonds of national culture” (BJS 1973d:44–46). This theme of oneness in culture is constantly reiterated, and there are also suggestions as to how it can be strengthened to build bonds.
- 5 Bharatiya “Sanskriti” and “maryada” revolves around traditional Indian culture and means upholding (...)
55“One Country, One People and One Culture” is an article of faith for Hindu nationalism. For the party, the “people of a country become a nation only when they are united by one common culture” (BJS 1973d:126–131). The party’s objective is to rebuild Bharat based on Bharatiya “Sanskriti” and “Maryada.”5 Narrow loyalties should be replaced by higher loyalties, and there is no space for “composite culture,” which the party thought was “unrealistic, illogical and dangerous” to national unity (BJS 1973a:48–49). There is no space for diverse beliefs, practices, and ideas (BJS 1973d:126–131). Every idea or practice that diverges from the dominant beliefs is seen as a threat to national unity and as hampering the nation’s advancement.
56For instance, the party believes that any expression of diversities and differences in terms of religion, language or region is a form of separatism that undermines national unity and jeopardizes the nation itself (BJS 1973d:118–120). Likewise, it argues that while “unity in diversity is, no doubt, a commendable characteristic,” diversity should not grow too much lest it undermine the nation. The focus, therefore, should be not on allowing them the space to “stress their separate identity” but to encourage them to merge “themselves in the mainstream of national life” (BJS 1973d:126–131).
57According to the party, one of the main obstacles to national integration is that various religious, linguistic and other denominational groups, instead of merging themselves in the mainstream of national life, are prone to put greater emphasis on their separate identity. The party argues that while unity in diversity is undoubtedly a commendable characteristic of (our) nationhood, if we allow diversity to grow to such an extent that the basic unity becomes undermined, the nation’s very existence will be imperiled.
58Like all nationalisms, Hindu Nationalism is based on the social construction of a Hindu-Hindi identity as equated with Indian identity, and this serves the interests of a particular group more than others. It claims these identities are natural and ancient at the same time. Consequently, there is a constant call for “Indianization” to achieve and maintain unity (BJS 1973d:44–46, 136–139). People are encouraged to identify with a common cultural identity, voluntarily assimilate into the dominant culture, and give up their distinctive, “foreign” ways of life. Alternate identities are seen as a shortcoming in building a nation.
59For instance, the party believed that only after Pakistan and separatist communal Muslim organizations are given a dressing down will Muslim masses become “nationalistically oriented” (BJS 1973d:77–79). Furthermore, according to the party, Indian tradition and nationalism are not hostile to any form of worship, and even modern Islam should not be an “impediment in the building up of national integration.”
60Like the older modernization theory, Hindu nationalism expects that the so-called “foreign” and “undesirable” cultures, practices and beliefs which came about as a result of foreign rule shall be incorporated into the so-called national mainstream and over a period of time, they will gradually be homogenized and forced to accept the cultural ethos of the dominant Hindu traditional order. For instance, the party was critical of the role of Christian missionaries in the North Eastern region and argued that “Hindu missionaries and sadhus should be given equal facilities to carry on their moral uplift activities in the region” (BJS 1973d:86–90).
61The party views regionalism and sub-regionalism as threatening national unity and integrity. It believes that the weakening of the central government has led to attempts to develop and project the personalities of different states at the cost of the country’s personality. The state boundaries, it argues, have begun to be treated as more sacrosanct than the boundaries of the country, which are steadily shrinking. The formation of Meghalaya has encouraged protagonists of sub-regional states in other parts of the country (BJS 1973d:136–139). These trends, the party concludes, challenge efforts to build national integration and undermine the cohesion of the nation-state.
62It is critical of those who speak of a multinational state and those who argue that India is not an ancient nation but a nation in the making. For instance, the party is critical of the Communist Party (Marxist)’s stance on a multinational state (BJS 1973d:90–95, 126–131). Arguments and positions like these are seen as endangering national unity and strengthening outside forces that try to disrupt the country to further their own self-interests. While Hindu nationalism believes nationalism is a Western concept, their idea of nation is Western when they believe that a nation-state should have one hegemonic language and culture. This idea ignores that people may have “multiple and complementary identities” (Arora and Verney 1995).
63The insistence on a singular national identity translates into a readiness to use force as a means for achieving unity and suppressing dissent. It appears that there is no space for negotiation and dialogue on questions of national security (BJS 1973d:75–77). The party has constantly advocated using force to put things in order. Negotiation and dialogue are seen as a sign of weakness and compromise. The suggestion has often been that the military should be “given a free hand” to deal with the situation without interference from “civil authorities.” On issues in border regions, the Jan Sangh believed the “border areas” should be “ruthlessly cleared of all doubtful elements” and “no false notion of secularism” should be allowed to stand in the way of national security (BJS 1973d:75–77).
64The party also suggested that “refugees” from Pakistan and “ex-soldiers” who should be trained and armed must be settled in border areas. The party suggested adopting this policy in all border states, including Rajasthan, Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. The party has held that many current problems may not have arisen if the “army had been given a free hand” (BJS 1973d:75–77).
65The party’s position on languages appears contradictory. On the one hand, it is believed that development, a resurgence of national life and the expression of culture can only happen through regional languages. However, it does not appear to consider all languages to be on an equal plane. It wants select languages to be recognized while explicitly stating that other languages should not get special treatment or recognition.
66For instance, it wanted Sindhi to be included in the schedule of languages, and the ostensible reason for this was that people who spoke the language had to settle in other parts of the country after partition, losing their ancestral homes and so on (BJS 1973e:32–33). Likewise, it wants Hindi to be a compulsory language to be taught throughout the course of education and all post-graduate and specialized scientific studies to be conducted in Hindi (BJS 1973e:21–22). Furthermore, it wants Sanskrit to be revived, and its’ “knowledge should be considered essential for scholarliness” (BJS 1973d:24–25).
67At the same time, it considered the demand for a Punjabi state as theocratic, divisionary, bigoted, and communal. It believed the Akali movement was antinational and would lead to “Balkanisation” (BJS 1973d:102–103, 114–116, 124–126 ). It considered Urdu a foreign language and those advocating using Urdu as having “antinational” and “separatist” tendencies. Urdu, according to the party, is not the language of the region, it is a foreign and unacceptable style of Hindi and a foreign vocabulary imposed on India during a period of foreign domination. (BJS 1973e:21–22).
68The accommodation of regional languages appears to be motivated primarily by instrumental considerations and not necessarily by a genuine recognition of linguistic differences (BJS 1973e:21–22, 30–31). The party also suggested all Indian languages should adopt the Devanagari script, imposing it as well on dialects that do not use this script and have adopted the Roman script (BJS 1973e:21–22). The position is justified as follows: because the Roman script was introduced by missionaries during the colonial period, it is viewed as a legacy of foreign influence.
69The continued use of English was portrayed as a sign of subjugation, an impediment to the development of national consciousness, and a source of internal division. Advocates of English were accused of “sowing the poison seed of disruption and division.” Within this discourse, democracy was framed as viable only when it was carried out in the vernacular languages of the people. The party also resolved that communication with foreign countries should be in Hindi (BJS 1973e:30–31). In this framework, Hindi was elevated to the status of the sole legitimate vehicle for expression, and its promotion was tied to unity, democracy, and national assertion vis-à-vis other countries.
70The party asserted that national culture should be at the core of the educational curriculum (BJS 1973d:24–25, 44–46). It also emphasized that all citizens should be familiar with texts like the Upanishads, Gita, Ramayana, and Mahabharata, framing that this knowledge was “essential in all walks of social life.” Furthermore, it proposed that Holi, Vijay Dashami, Raksha Bandhan and Diwali be designated national festivals, thereby helping to institutionalize a specific religious and cultural tradition. This vision left no space for literature, norms, and values from other religions. In a similar vein, the party advocated rewriting history not as foreign invasions and aggressions but as a narrative of revolutions and agitations within the country, with a focus on the global spread of Indian culture and values (BJS 1973d:24–25, 44–46).
71It can be seen that the party attempted to frame education and culture as part of a larger project to define national identity through a singular historical and religious lens. For instance, the party claims that Indian history contains “numerous examples of sacrifice and heroism in the defence of dharma and life values.” In this context, the resolution mentions the practice of Jauhar, a practice of self-immolation by women in a particular region to avoid capture by invaders, as a cultural value worth preserving (BJS 1973d:77–79).
72Not only is this a retrograde and inhuman practice, which has no space in the modern world, but it is clearly tied to a specific religion. The Hindu nationalist tradition assumes that a cohesive national identity can be distilled from a shared past. However, it is unclear how such cultural practices will bring about national unification. This perspective ignores the point that history is often contested, and there could be multiple, often conflicting narratives and interpretations of events, people and places. In promoting one version of the past through educational curricula, celebration of festivals, or reinterpretation of the past, the party is advancing a homogenized and exclusionary vision of India, which may alienate large segments of society.
73This paper focused on the Hindu nationalist ideas of federalism, focusing specifically on issues of territorial integrity and pluralism, which the BJS, the predecessor to the BJP, had put forward. While these ideas remained on paper for a long time, a transformed party system and the generational shift within the BJP, has allowed Hindu nationalism to bring them to the forefront of Indian politics.
74Hindu Nationalism has consistently preferred a unitary rather than a federal system. Unlike the constitutional position, which recognizes and celebrates diversity, Hindu nationalism has pushed the idea of “one nation, one culture, one people.” This worldview has no space for differences, and it expects all pre-existing identities to get assimilated into the so-called national mainstream over time. The national mainstream is the cultural ethos of the traditional Hindu order. Consequently, all demands for autonomy from minorities are seen as a threat to the nation. The BJP’s vision of “one India, one culture and one people” is entirely at odds with the civic nationalist position of the coexistence of multiple identities embedded in the Indian Constitution.
75This study has argued that the exclusion of first, the BJS and later the BJP from power fostered insular networks within the party and its affiliated organizations, leading to a distinct pattern of socialization among the younger leaders. This environment, I have argued, prioritized ideological commitment over consensus-building and compromise. As a result, it created a generation of leaders whose ideological rigidity and adversarial posture became pronounced once they came to power.
76The policy outcomes of this ideological vision are visible in key decisions such as the abrogation of Article 370, the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act, New Education Policy, and the implementation of the Goods and Service Tax. Jammu and Kashmir has been a key priority for Hindu nationalism since India’s independence. Between 1952 and 1972, over 20 percent of the resolutions passed at various BJS party forums referred to Jammu and Kashmir, making it the most frequently discussed state. This historical emphasis may explain why the BJP acted swiftly to revoke Article 370 when the opportunity arose in 2019.
77Likewise, the issue of infiltration from then Pakistan, to now Bangladesh, also prominently featured in the BJS’s concerns. The Citizenship Amendment Act, which allows non-Muslim minorities from the region to seek citizenship in India, reflects the continuity of these longstanding priorities of Hindu nationalism (BJS 1973c, 56.07).
78Similarly, the BJP’s acceptance of the GST proposals, despite being critical of the same when it was in opposition, aligned with its broader ideological goals. While it was introduced as pushing for fiscal consolidation and efficiency, the GST has effectively centralized fiscal authority, significantly strengthening the central government at the expense of state autonomy.
79Each of these policy choices reflects the BJP’s longstanding goals, including consolidating central authority, privileging a particular cultural identity, and reducing state autonomy. The party’s approach to federalism which prioritizes uniformity over diversity and central control over state autonomy marks a decisive shift from the constitutional position and therefore has significant implications for India’s federal and pluralistic foundations.