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Uniform Civil Code and Muslim Women’s Quest for Justice

A Conversation with Zakia Soman
Nazima Parveen, Usha Sanyal and Zakia Soman

Abstract

The Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), a Muslim women-led organization, has recently supported the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in India. This step by the BMMA has added a new dimension to the debate on reforms in personal laws, especially the Muslim Personal Law (MPL). More specifically, it signifies a shift in the BMMA’s position. Since its inception in 2007, the BMMA has been advocating for the codification of MPL along the lines of Hindu Law, which was enacted in 1956. In fact, this was one of the reasons behind their emergence as a Muslim women-led group aiming to assert the constitutional rights of Indian Muslim women within the framework of Islamic law and the Quran, without the Muslim women having to give up their religious identity and practices. However, the support for a uniform law for all, which may result in the abrogation of MPL or the community’s right to govern civil matters by religious codes, is a critical step in this regard. Thus, it is important to understand the ideological foundation, priorities and strategies of the BMMA in the current political moment, especially when the problematic implementation of the Triple Talaq Law, 2019, passed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its interaction with MPL has already made the issue complicated (Parveen, this issue). The conversation with Zakia Soman is an attempt to document the shifts in the BMMA’s position and to bring it into the academic discourse for understanding how Muslim women’s organizations and groups negotiate and strategize their relationship with the state under different political regimes. And to raise a basic question: Do these efforts create a “third space” in which Muslim women are engaged in redefining their identities and reformulating relations of power?

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Full text

Zakia Soman, interviewed by Nazima Parveen

Introduction and compilation by Usha Sanyal and Nazima Parveen

Introduction

  • 1 A series of personal interviews was conducted with Zakia Soman, BMMA, in May 2022 and in August-Sep (...)

1Zakia Soman is the founding member and the president of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA).1 An activist based in Ahmedabad, she was formerly a university professor and has worked with organizations such as the South Asian Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE) and Action Aid. She has also worked on the conditions faced by Dalit Muslims and issues of peace and justice in Southeast Asia. Presently, Soman is one of the leading voices representing Muslim women’s Islamic and constitutional rights in marriage and divorce.

  • 2 The Hindu Code Bill was passed by the Parliament in 1956, which brought in four separate Acts: the (...)
  • 3 For a critical evaluation of the complex overlapping between the UCC and MPL, especially after the (...)

2The BMMA, a Muslim women-led organization founded in 2007, has been advocating for the codification of Muslim Personal Law (hereafter MPL) along the lines of Hindu Law, which was enacted in 1956.2 In fact, one of the reasons behind its emergence as a Muslim women-led group was the need to assert the constitutional rights of Indian Muslim women within the framework of Islamic law and the Quran, without Muslim women having to give up their religious identity and practices.3

3Sylvia Vatuk, in her work on feminist movements, has defined the emergence of Muslim women-led groups and activists as nascent “Islamic feminist” movements. She places the ideologies and strategies of these groups in the context of the larger scholarly efforts and debates on feminist understandings of Islamic texts and traditions that initially began in Central Asia in the 1990s, and overlapped with similar protests in other parts of the world in later years (Mojab 2001; Moghissi 1999; Mernissi 1991; Ahmed 1992; Hasan 1996; Wadud 2006). Vatuk differentiates these activists from Muslim feminists, arguing that Islamic feminists are those who define gender rights within the framework of the Quran and Sharia.

  • 4 The term “Justice” in personal matters here, according to the interview, broadly means assurance/ac (...)

4Zakia Soman, however, declines to be labelled an Islamic feminist. She sees the term as part of a Western pattern of tagging and categorization. According to her, feminist scholars and activists throughout the world are questioning histories and religious philosophies that have been written and narrated from a patriarchal point of view. In India as well, feminist scholars across different communities are finding inspiration and empowerment in religious symbols and texts. Soman points out that these activists are not called “Hindu feminists,” “Christian feminists,” and so on. The BMMA believes in secular principles and has been fighting for gender-justice across different religious communities.4 In this way, the BMMA is attempting to combine the values of secularism with progressive interpretations of Islamic texts following the framework offered by scholars like Asghar Ali Engineer (Engineer 1995) and Zeenat Shaukat Ali (Ali 1996), who have written extensively about women’s rights in Islam and the need to reform MPL (Soman and Niaz 2016). The BMMA, thus, actively engages with Islamic texts as part of its strategy, arguing that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the majority of Muslim women. Thus, religion must inform its vision accordingly. However, it does not wish to be placed in a separate category called Islamic feminism.

  • 5 The BMMA’s position is also critical as, in February 2024, the BJP-led Uttarakhand government impos (...)

5The BMMA’s recent expression of support for a Uniform Civil Code (hereafter UCC) also challenges its characterization as an Islamic feminist organization. This step—after the organization, with the support of other women’s groups, successfully pushed the Indian government to enact a law against instant triple talaq (instant oral and irrevocable divorce) in 2019—signifies a major shift in its position. This move has added a new dimension to the debate on reforms in personal laws, especially the MPL, which could be abrogated. Thus, it is important to understand the ideological foundation, priorities, and strategies of the BMMA in the current political moment, especially given that the problematic implementation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act (MWA), 2019 popularly known as Triple Talaq Law, 2019 and its interaction with MPL, have already complicated the matter (Parveen, this issue).5

  • 6 Government of India (2006).

6It is to be noted that the rejection of the UCC in the wake of the rise of communal politics was a key issue that provided a common platform to the women’s movement, though for completely different reasons. The mainstream women’s movement and Muslim women-led networks emerged in the post-1980s; the latter focused on protecting personal laws from state intervention and advocated for internal democratization and reform after the 1990s with the rise of the BJP (Saxena 2022). The Muslim women-led networks challenged patriarchal interpretations of the Quran and the dominance of the ulama over informal legal forums. However, the formation of the BMMA completely changed the nature of the debate.6 The organization conducted extensive surveys to understand the status of family laws and Muslim women’s views on reforms, published reports to make recommendations to the government, prepared blueprints of family law, and wrote letter(s) to the government(s) appealing to it to codify the personal laws (Niaz and Soman, BMMA, 2014; 2015a; Niaz and Soman 2015b; 2015c; EPW 2015d).

7The BJP’s rise to power in 2014 with the promise of the implementation of the UCC raised multiple concerns about the supposed neutrality of the legislative action, judicial activism in family matters, and its impact on the affected Muslim families, especially women. The mainstream women’s movement and various other Muslim women’s organizations refrained from demanding legislative intervention in personal matters. Yet despite these differences in opinion, in 2017 the women’s groups joined in the drive against the practice of instant triple talaq (see Parveen, this issue).

  • 7 For more information on the trajectory of the women’s movement’s relationship to the UCC, see: Meno (...)

8However, differences among the women’s groups emerged as the BJP-led government pushed for the criminalization of instant triple talaq under the MWA 2019 (Saxena 2022; Parveen, this issue; Chakrabarty et al. 2022; Ahmed 2019). The BMMA saw it as a step forward in the direction of comprehensive legislative reforms while the women’s movement defined it as another move against Muslims in an already shrinking public, political space for minorities, and part of the constant vilification of Muslims under BJP rule (Basu and Kaiser, this issue). In this scenario, the BMMA has been accused of being an ally of the BJP-led NDA regime. Its support for the very vague and controversial idea of a UCC, driven by the BJP’s agenda of communal politics, is also viewed with suspicion.7

9Against this backdrop, Nazima Parveen conducted a series of interviews with Zakia Soman in May 2023 and in August-September 2023. Her interviews contribute to the rich and growing scholarship that has documented the ideological bases, priorities, and strategies of Muslim women-led networks that have emerged since the 1980s and 1990s. The interviews show how Muslim women’s rights activism contributes to the complex negotiations of gender relations at the intersection of state and civil society under different political regimes and define the meanings of secularism, gender, and sexuality in Islam, Islamic history, and traditions (Khan 1998; Hasan and Menon 2004; Vatuk 2008; Jones 2010, 2020; Tschalaer 2017; Hasan 2017; Lemons 2019; Saxena 2022b). Nida Kirmani calls this activism a way of creating a “third space” in which Muslim women redefine their identities and reformulate relations of power. Her work challenges the conventional wisdom that posits religious identity and women’s rights in binary opposition to each other and the notion that Muslim women lack political will or agency (Kirmani 2009; Khan 1998).

Interview

Nazima Parveen (NP): Let’s begin with the context in which the BMMA was formed and how it contributed to the women’s rights discourse.

Zakia Soman (ZS): If I were to summarize the work of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), of which I am a co-founder, I can begin by asserting that the BMMA is a democratic organization of Muslim women formed in January 2007. It has women members spread across India, working for gender justice in Islam and equal citizenship in a secular democracy.

Noorjahan Safia Niaz, earlier associated with the Muslim Women’s Rights Network (MWRN), and myself, founded the BMMA in 2007 to demand legislative intervention in MPL. It included the organizations working with Muslim women across the country, many of which had previously been part of the MWRN. The BMMA has over 1,000,000 individual members as of now, spread across 15 Indian states, mainly the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, West Bengal, Odisha, Tamil Nadu and Telangana and the number is still increasing. The BMMA’s main objective is to improve the socio-economic status of the Muslim community as a whole and to promote the role of Muslim women to act as leaders by focusing on class, caste, and gender-based discrimination within the community. Our website states that the values of “democracy, secularism, equality, non-violence, human rights, and justice will be (our) guiding principles.” It further adds that the BMMA believes in “positive, liberal, humanist, and feminist interpretations of religion for ensuring justice and equality.”

NP: What is, in your opinion, the specific role of Muslim women’s organizations in demanding gender-justice?

ZS: The BMMA raised the demand for a codified family law in public for the first time in 2010. In December 2012, at a national conference in Mumbai more than five hundred women participated in calling for legal reform and an end to the practice of instant triple talaq. The program was well covered by the media but the demand fell on deaf ears and we were laughed at or just ignored. Not just law-makers but even fellow women activists and organizations failed to take up the demand seriously. In fact, I remember how at one of our brainstorming conferences in Lucknow in 2006, a prominent feminist whom I truly admire, asked why we needed a separate organization for Muslim women. Different answers were given by female participants in their own words. Many women said that although their issues as women are similar to those of most other women, Muslim women face some unique problems of their own. Some activists felt that the mainstream women’s movement had failed to acknowledge the diversity amongst women. Groups such as Dalit women, fisherfolk women, and sex workers as well as Muslim women and their specific issues had not been understood by the mainstream women’s movement. In their view, Muslim women’s representation should have been taken up by more and more ordinary women themselves. Many suggested that we adopt the slogan jiski ladai, uski agwai (the oppressed must lead the struggle themselves). The need to bring Muslim women from diverse backgrounds and remote states together on a common democratic women-led national platform was felt unanimously by all. The discussion was clinched when one woman said, “we need an organization for Muslim women for the same reasons that we need a women’s organization separate from a mainstream (read men’s) organization.” Since then, Muslim women have come a long way. Today, several groups and individuals speak out for the rights of not just Muslim women but of the whole Muslim community.

NP: How do you look at the recent debates on a UCC, especially when it has been introduced as a reform package designed to mainstream the Muslim community?

  • 8 The Law Commission of India (LCI) is a non-statutory body constituted by the Government of India fr (...)
  • 9 Law Commission of India (2018).
  • 10 The BJP-ruled Uttarakhand state passed a UCC in February 2024, nearly four months after the intervi (...)
  • 11 The scholarship on women’s rights globally called for the problematization of the personal sphere t (...)

ZS: The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has always been a contentious subject in our patriarchal society dominated by religion. It was challenged at the time of independence, and it is being contested today. The political context today is different, leading to heightened opposition to the idea. The 22nd Law Commission of India has invited suggestions from the public and from religious organizations on a proposed UCC.8 Earlier, the 21st Law Commission was of the opinion that a nationwide UCC was neither necessary nor desirable (2018).9 It suggested that instead of a UCC, different communities could undertake reforms in their own respective personal laws. The goal of gender justice could be achieved through different means and reformed family laws could definitely offer a way forward. However, barring a handful of Muslim women’s groups, nobody seems to be interested in legal reform. Also, there is not much faith in a UCC being brought in by a majoritarian government. The UCC has become a highly politicized issue in our volatile polity. It has been part of the BJP’s election manifesto since the 1980s (BJP Manifesto 1989). For them it has been a political issue with huge potential for furthering Hindutva politics. The opposition parties have rejected the idea, as they call it yet another gimmick of Hindutva politics. On the other hand, the Muslim conservative leadership would like to protect the existing Muslim personal laws at all costs. They view any mention of reform in personal laws as direct interference in matters of faith and a threat to the shariat. In the backdrop of recent discussions evoked by the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, a UCC has become significant once again. The prime minister, Narendra Modi, invoked it recently at a political rally in Madhya Pradesh as a means of “help[ing our] Muslim sisters.” However, there is a serious trust deficit between the government and minorities in a religiously polarized milieu. With the general elections scheduled for early 2024, it is likely that we will see heated debates and the politicization of public discourse over the UCC.10 The original purpose of the UCC to bring gender justice and equality will predictably be lost in the melee. Justice in the family through legal reform might continue to elude Indian Muslim women.11

NP: How do you link the UCC debate with the movement against triple talaq?

  • 12 The terms like “Quranic sanction,” “Quranic rights” or injunctions means the rights guaranteed by t (...)
  • 13 Wahiduddin Khan (2009: 4:1, 32,33,34; 9:71, 72; 33:35).
  • 14 There is no nationwide data available to support this argument. A decline in cases of triple talaq (...)

ZS: The movement against instant triple talaq has been a historic development during the current decade. Beginning in 2010, several women started speaking out against this arbitrary practice. They highlighted the fact that there is no Quranic sanction for a practice such as instant unilateral divorce.12 Ordinary women joined the movement demanding justice based on Quranic values as well as constitutional principles. They openly challenged the misogynist interpretations of self-appointed guardians of religion. The women not only mobilized Parliament and the Supreme Court, but they educated the whole community and the entire Indian population. (I believe that) “Allah created man and woman as equals,” but conservative religious leaders (the ulama, who belong mostly to the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board or AIMPLB) have come in the way of gender rights granted by the Quran.13 Several women petitioned the Supreme Court and finally triple talaq was declared illegal in 2017. In our ground level work across 10 states, we have registered the fact that the incidence of instant triple talaq has gone down drastically.14 This was possible thanks to the efforts of the women themselves and the constructive role played by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Shayra Bano vs Union of India.

NP: Your observations on emerging political fault-lines regarding the UCC are important. It is also true that ever-growing communal polarization in the country has transformed the idea of a UCC into a highly contentious issue. From the point of view of gender justice, a realistic assessment of the nature of Muslim patriarchy and its wider sociological impacts is much needed. Do you think that the debate on a UCC has the potential to address these issues?

ZS: Any discussion on the UCC will remain meaningless if it is not linked to the question of gender justice. Indian Muslim women are doubly distressed. The Quranic injunctions in favor of gender equality are completely ignored by the religious elites so as to substantiate their patriarchal interpretation of Islam. At the same time, the egalitarian constitutional principles, which provide a comprehensive notion of equality, are relegated to the margins. The issues and concerns of Muslim women are defined as matters internal to the Muslim community; and for that reason, the state’s direct intervention in the social life of Muslims is seen as a kind of legal violation of minority rights.

  • 15 According to Hindu mythology, brides and grooms promise to remain with the same spouse through seve (...)

Hindu women enjoy the protection of codified family laws to a large extent. This does not mean that Hindu women are completely liberated from patriarchy. They are equally marginalized. However, it cannot be denied that Hindu women enjoy legal protections under the various personal laws meant for the community, such as protection from polygamy under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Reform and codification of Hindu laws have provided avenues for justice for women in marriage and the family. Through these means, several unjust practices were made illegal and certain patriarchal norms ostensibly rooted in religion were outlawed. Marriage was no more a janam janam ka bandhan (a bond and a relationship of [seven] lifetimes) after the passage of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1954.15 Hindu wives and husbands could now seek recourse in divorce, with both having an equal say. Similarly, after the codification of Hindu law, a seven-year jail sentence for bigamy was introduced and child marriage was abolished, at least in the statute books. A recent amendment (2005) to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 gives married Hindu daughters a share of the property. Hindu women, in this sense, have travelled a substantive distance on the path to equality. However, the same cannot be said about Muslim women.

NP: Your argument, it seems, revolves around a gender-sensitive reading of the religious texts, especially the Quran. This is an important line of reasoning, which leads us to two questions. First, what are the possibilities of asserting such an interpretation in the Indian context? Second, how might this reinterpretation contribute to the wider issues of gender justice?

ZS: According to the Quran, Allah created men and women as equals. But women became second-class persons in patriarchal Muslim societies the world over. And this injustice was justified by interpreting the texts subjectively in the name of religion. Religious authority is a male-dominated arena across all religious communities, including among Muslims. Traditionally, this has left very little room for granting equal rights to women, although there are noteworthy examples of gender-just practices and jurisprudence. Countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Turkey are amongst the leading countries with Muslim-majority populations that have affirmative laws for women. This also establishes the fact that the shariat or Islamic law is not divine but is man-made. That is exactly what allows different Muslim countries to have different laws. Progressive scholars such as Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, and Asghar Ali Engineer have written at length about equal rights for women in Islam. Unfortunately, their work is only known to a limited audience of enlightened educated people and in activist circles. A significant majority of Muslims in India are denied the advantage of progressive and gender-just interpretations and commentaries. They are only fed misogynist ideas that support belief in the superiority of men and the inferiority of women. The conservative religious leadership thwart efforts to correct this misinformation in the name of upholding the shariat. They deny equal rights to women in family matters.

NP: This divinity of shariat argument is often evoked by the religious elite to justify its existence as the protector of Islam. What have been the implications of this argument for Muslim women’s concerns and anxieties?

ZS: According to the ulama, the shariat is divine and cannot be touched by humans. This class has obstructed every possibility of reform. This was very evident during the Shah Bano episode in 1985–86. The ulama class campaigned aggressively against the maintenance granted to 65-year-old Shah Bano after her divorce, despite said maintenance being her Quranic right (for details on the Shah Bano case, see Hasan 1989; Parveen, this issue). More recently, in 2016–17 the conservative ulama, led by the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), took a negative position on the issue of triple talaq (instant divorce pronounced three times verbally in the presence or absence of the wife). In 2016, the Shayra Bano case invoked huge public interest when the Supreme Court admitted her petition. The BMMA pleaded for halting the un-Quranic practice of instant triple talaq. But the AIMPLB pleaded to defend the practice of instant triple talaq and to maintain the status quo as the courts’ deliberations in the matter would mean interference in faith-based practices. They filed an affidavit justifying instant triple talaq and even polygamy. The women petitioners, including myself, who stood up against this, had a tough time in the face of various arguments mounted by the AIMPLB and other conservatives. In their view, everything—including triple talaq, child marriage, polygamy, denial of guardianship to mothers, denial of equal share in property to daughters, halala, and other misogynist practices—is fine. The ulama see no need for reform, as according to them everything is perfect under the divine law. When a woman raises her voice for justice, they provide a stock answer: “Islam gave rights to women 1,400 years ago.” But when the woman demands legal recourse to translate those rights into reality, they criticize her, organize campaigns, and malign the image of women fighting for justice in the family.

It is important to remember that Indian Muslims are governed by the Shariat Application Act, 1937, which is inadequate and badly in need of reform. It is silent on matters such as the age of marriage, consent, divorce, the procedure of divorce, polygamy, women’s share in property, custody, and the guardianship of children—all of which are supremely important in the life of a woman. Indian Muslims are ostensibly governed by several shariats in the absence of codified family laws. The question arises, what is shariat? Where is it written down? Does the shariat as practiced in India uphold the Quranic ideals of justice and fairness to women? As a practitioner, I have noticed dozens of times that the shariat is whatever the ulama say it is. A rare progressive religious scholar might say and do right by the principles of justice. But most of them, as a class, regard women’s position as that of second-class citizens in society and secondary to the husband in marriage. According to their interpretation, a “good woman” is one who obeys the husband or father or brother or other male family member. A “good woman” should serve the husband and in-laws without raising her voice. The ulama justify these social norms and duties in the name of Islamic law, completely ignoring the original message of the Quran and hadith (sayings and doings of the prophet).

NP: Could you provide some concrete examples to elaborate this point?

  • 16 These include the four Hindu Code Bills of 1955–1956; the Indian Christian Marriage Act (1872) and (...)

ZS: A study, titled Seeking Justice Within [the] Family: A National Study on Muslim Women’s Views on Reforms in Muslim Personal Law, was conducted by the BMMA (2016). It has documented several cases where qazis (jurists), the solemnizers of Muslim marriages and guides in other family or religious matters, have put their stamp of approval on unilateral instant triple talaq without so much as verifying whether the husband’s version matches that of the wife, and without ever contacting the wife in person or even by telephone. This situation raises a few questions. Where should the Muslim woman go for justice if the ulama fail her? As a citizen of a democratic nation, does she not have the right to approach the courts and other democratic bodies? Should she not be given legal protections like the ones granted to Hindu, Christian, and other women?16 Muslims believe that justice, wisdom, kindness, and compassion are normative principles at the heart of the Quran. These should always be upheld, in all contexts. However, these essential values stand violated when a 15-year-old girl is married off on the grounds that puberty is the age of marriage in Islam. Throwing out one’s wife by pronouncing talaq thrice in an instant cannot be an act of kindness. Marrying a second time clandestinely without the knowledge or permission of the first wife is a crooked act, one that cannot be justified.

  • 17 As part of this study, 4,710 Muslim women above 18 years of age across the ten states largely belon (...)

Another nationwide study, No More Talaq Talaq Talaq: Muslim Women Call for a Ban on an Un-Islamic Practice conducted by the BMMA, found that many Indian Muslim women are aware of their Quranic rights and are seeking to reform family laws (2015). This study was conducted in Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Karnataka, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, and Odisha.17 It found serious gaps in women’s understanding and awareness of personal laws or family matters guided by such laws.

  • 18 A nikahnama is a marriage contract in Islamic law that outlines the rights and responsibilities of (...)

The study found that 55 percent of the women respondents were married before the age of eighteen. An overwhelming majority (82 percent) had no property to their name. Over 47 percent of women did not even possess their own nikahnama. Furthermore, more than 40 percent of women had received less than Rs 1,000 for mehr (dower), while 44 percent of women had not received the mehr at all.18 Most respondents were not even aware that they have the Quranic right to decide the amount of their own mehr.

Around 92 percent of women respondents spoke out against polygamy. They argued stridently that a Muslim man should not be allowed to have a second wife. About 73 percent of women thought that polygamy should not be allowed, whether or not the first wife consents. Almost 3,000 women (over 62 percent) in our survey argued that polygamy should not be allowed even if the first wife is ill. Similarly, a sizeable majority (63 percent) asserted that men should not be allowed a second marriage even if the couple did not have a child. In short, an overwhelming number of the women were against polygamy.

  • 19 Talaq-e-ahsan is a method of divorce amongst Muslims where the husband and wife must dialogue, disc (...)

The study also found that a grave injustice is done to Muslim women in cases of divorce. Of the 525 divorced women surveyed, 66 percent were divorced orally; 7 percent were divorced through a letter; 3.4 percent were divorced over the phone; three women were divorced by email, and one woman received an SMS confirming that she had been divorced! This means that 78 percent of those who faced divorce were divorced unilaterally. The survey also found that more than 88 percent of women respondents wanted the talaq-e-ahsan method,19 spread out over a period of at least ninety days, and involving discussion and negotiation (thereby avoiding arbitrariness) to be part of the legal method of divorce. We also found that 50 percent of the women surveyed received maintenance from the husband during the marriage, but 27 percent reported that they did not get any. Almost half of the divorced women were supported by their own parents. A few of them also found employment in order to sustain themselves and their children.

NP: What were the main take-aways of this report? Did you find Muslim women making any serious political demand for a gender-just law?

  • 20 Codification here has three meanings: the universalization of Islamic law to avoid anti-women inter (...)

ZS: We made some fascinating discoveries. Muslim women are mindful of their right to justice as citizens in a democracy. They want an elaborate codified family law based on a Quranic framework to cover matters such as the age of marriage, the amount of mehr, divorce procedures, polygamy, maintenance, custody of children for mothers, and equal share in property. Such a law, they assert, would also be in consonance with Indian constitutional values. The women had interesting opinions on the codification of family law, especially about the role of a democratic state.20 About 83 percent of the women in our survey felt that their marital disputes could be resolved if the laws were codified. Eighty-nine percent wanted the government to intervene in helping to codify the Muslim personal laws. Over 86 percent of women wanted religious leaders to take responsibility to enable Muslim women to get justice in the family and they wanted these leaders to support the enactment of a gender-just law. Eight-six percent of women wanted community-based legal dispute resolution mechanisms like darul qaza centers or other ulama-run centers to continue, but they wanted the functionaries to be made accountable to the law and to principles of justice. They wanted the government to help ensure this accountability through a formal mechanism. Ninety percent of women wanted qazis to be brought under legal accountability mechanisms.

NP: How does the BMMA imagine a codified Muslim Family Law?

  • 21 The draft act invokes Indian constitutional principles related to gender equality (e.g. Articles 14 (...)

ZS: A codified Muslim family law must ideally regulate all aspects of marriage and the family. Such a law should be based on Quranic values of gender justice, and on the constitutional values of equality and protection from discrimination based on gender. Such a law should be proposed by concerned members of the community following wide consultation. It should be passed by Parliament on the lines of Hindu family laws. The BMMA has prepared a draft family law in consultation with over 50,000 women as well as jurists, academics, scholars, and activists. Some priorities in this draft law include age of marriage to be 18 years for the girl and 21 for the boy, a just and fair divorce procedure based on the talaq-e-ahsan method, no polygamy at all in any circumstance, custody and guardianship of children for the mother, and an equal share of property for women.21 It is important to mention that many Hindutva politicians demonize Muslims because of polygamy. Some Indian Muslims suffer from the misplaced belief that a Muslim man can marry four times. Very few people are aware that this is not true! The Quran gives a man permission for more than one marriage under strict conditions, but nowhere is a man encouraged to marry a second time. In fact, there is a clear preference that he marry only once. According to the Quran (4:2, 4:3, 4:127, 4:129), a Muslim man cannot freely marry a second time while the first wife is alive. He has to be able to fulfil certain elaborate conditions if he wants to marry again. The woman he wants to marry has to be a widow or an orphan. The second marriage can occur only under specific circumstances if there is an emergency or crisis in society which has left a large number of women widowed and children orphaned. Even so, he has to treat both wives equally and justly. He has to be able to provide for both the wives equally in social and material terms. If he is able to do all this somehow, then he has to be able to love both his wives equally which, the Quran says, he simply cannot do despite his best intentions. Therefore, the Quran says, marry only once (4:2, 4:3, 4:127, 4:129)! These verses completely rule out second marriage and therefore one can say that the Quran doesn’t encourage polygamy. However, both the ulama class and the Hindutva politicians propagate the belief that it does.

NP: Where do you place the UCC in this framework?

  • 22 Hate speech and hate crimes against Muslims have pushed an already poor and backward community to t (...)

ZS: Several decades after independence, Indian Muslims are lagging behind socially, educationally, and economically, as per the Sachar Committee Report (2006). Muslims also lack a political voice and live in constant fear and insecurity owing to communalism and communal violence, although the legal discrimination of Muslim women is age-old and communalism is not new. Several reports have shown that religious polarization and hate against the community have increased since 2014 (Ahmed 2023; Kaisar, this issue).22 The community is under an onslaught of pressure from majoritarian politics, anti-Muslim propaganda, and systematic Islamophobia. This environment of open hatred and discrimination by the regime has led to existential fears among Indian Muslims. In such a scenario, it is obvious why the government’s move to bring in a UCC is viewed with skepticism. It is perceived as yet another ploy with which to attack Muslims on the basis of their religious beliefs. Besides, the government pushing for a UCC is hardly known for its commitment to gender justice. In the past the government brought in a law against triple talaq in the form of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. This law, which criminalized the act of triple talaq with a jail term for the husband, was widely opposed by the community. It was viewed as another pretext to punish Muslims in an already divided society. Because of this, large sections of the community view government actions on matters related to personal law with suspicion. Moreover, India’s largest minority has always been dominated by the orthodox leadership, both socially and politically, for whom gender justice was never a priority. Nor was it a priority for the previous governments, many of whom claimed to be secular. This is why Muslims dismiss the UCC announcement as the latest offensive by the ruling regime in the name of Muslim women and reject it outright.

But then, the time for gender justice is never right! The reform of family law was not a priority during earlier decades when the Congress and other coalitions ruled at the center. Political parties, those in government or in the opposition, as well as civil society, failed to understand the need to enable Muslim women to attain their legal rights. For the Congress, it was against the principles of secularism to “interfere” in the affairs of the largest minority community. The Congress argued that the reform should come from “within.” However, the “within” meant the stranglehold of the conservative ulama or Islamic scholars. Child marriages, unilateral divorces, polygamy, and mutah (temporary) marriages continue to be practiced, in gross violation of Quranic as well as constitutional principles. The BJP took advantage of this situation by calling this kind of politics “appeasement” of Muslims. In fact, it was the appeasement of certain religious figureheads and some politicians. This so-called appeasement has led to the utter violation of women’s rights and proved detrimental to the whole community. Many ordinary Indians bought into the BJP’s narrative of appeasement and the BJP finally came to power at the center in 2014.

The BMMA and its women members ideally want codified Muslim family laws. In the last ten years we have shared the draft law we prepared with several progressive members of Parliament, women’s commissions, and minority commissions, apart from law commissions and the law ministry. But this demand has not led to material results. Now that the 22nd Law Commission has solicited Muslims’ views on a UCC, we have made our representation to them. The representation highlights the affirmative provisions for women in Islamic jurisprudence and calls for special attention to uphold the legal rights of Muslim women in any proposed draft of the UCC.

Although the UCC concerns all Indian citizens and not just Muslims, there is a perception that it is opposed mainly by Muslims. This is owing to the majoritarianism in vogue today and also because the orthodox ulama have sought to make it their prime occupation to oppose it. Of course, Indian diversity must be upheld as a democratic ideal. But at the same time, there can be no room for misogyny and injustice in the name of diverse religious or cultural practices. A community’s need to preserve its diverse culture or personal laws cannot override the imperative of equal rights for women and girls.

NP: How do you see the nature of the BJP’s politics on a UCC?

ZS: The UCC might well be about politics for the BJP, but can it be denied that women need protection against discrimination? And if this discrimination is taking place on the pretext of personal laws, then they need to be either reformed or abolished. If the ulama continue to stall on the codification of personal laws, then a UCC may be the only path to justice for Muslim women. Should a UCC be opposed just because it is being proposed by the BJP? Should it not be respected as a constitutional ideal? It is a question of obtaining equal rights as Indian citizens. Muslim women are capable of leading democratic movements, as seen in recent times in their protests against the CAA and against triple talaq.

The ruling party and its supporters may well be dangling a UCC over our heads for political purposes, given that they have so far failed to present the country with a draft proposal of a UCC. The opposition parties can take the lead by coming out with a comprehensive draft of their own. It could be an affirmative draft based on the modern principles of jurisprudence with gender justice at its core. There are several shortcomings and contradictions in the government’s position on gender issues, which could be debated and scrutinized in the public domain in light of such a draft.

The opposition and civil society should engage constructively with the formulation of a UCC. By rejecting the idea of a UCC outright, we are allowing the BJP to walk away with taking credit for gender justice without actually contributing to the cause. Ordinary Indians are being alienated, as they fail to understand why anyone would be opposed to something as noble as a UCC. This is adding fuel to the fire of anti-Muslim political imagery. It is energizing the polarization that has gripped the country and is yet again denying Muslim women an opportunity for justice in the family. We believe our draft MPL is a positive step in the right direction, and should be given serious consideration by all participants in this debate.

The Uttarakhand UCC that became a law in March 2024 imposes a complete ban on polygamy and child marriage, and introduces a uniform process for divorce. It also provides equal rights to women of all religions in their ancestral property. Furthermore, fixing the age for marriage to 18 for women and 21 for men in all communities, the bill makes marriage registration mandatory in all religions without which the union will not be considered valid. The Uttarakhand UCC has added new dimensions to the debate. The Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind has strongly opposed the move, calling it “discriminatory in nature” and “an attempt to curtail religious freedom of the citizens” (Salam 2024).

Conclusion

10While Soman described the invalidation of polygamy as a “welcome feature,” pointing out that a UCC is the best bet for Muslim women in the absence of reform in MPL, she also pointed out that it is a blueprint to understand the definition of gender equality under the current regime. At the same time, she wants to seek amendments in clauses which go against the goals of gender-justice, and to propose and fight for a more democratic legal framework. Therefore, Indian Muslims and the country at large need to have a more substantive context-specific and legally justifiable debate on the idea of gender-justice based on legal schema. She insists that as Muslim women we must engage with this multifaceted process (Bahri 2024).

11The BMMA’s ever-evolving position on UCC reflects the complex nature of the debate on gender-justice and legislative reforms, especially under the current regime. The BMMA has claimed to raise the question of gender-justice beyond the secular-communal binary; however, we must critically analyze how these efforts set the terms of negotiations and get translated into an effective tool to achieve the constitutional right to equality and religious freedom. More specifically, one must recognize the complexities associated with an obscure and ambiguous idea of UCC itself (Menon 2024). What is significant in these developments is the ways in which BMMA, one of the Muslim women-led organizations, seems to create a position which Nida Kirmani calls a “third space.”

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Notes

1 A series of personal interviews was conducted with Zakia Soman, BMMA, in May 2022 and in August-September 2023. The interviews aimed at understanding BMMA members’ experiences and reflections on Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 (MWA) after four years of its implementation, and the debate on UCC. Parts of her interview have been used in the paper, “Criminalization of Divorce and Muslim Women in India: A Reality Check of Triple Talaq Law, 2019,” this issue. The current paper summarizes Soman’s opinion on UCC expressed during her verbal conversation, written responses and parts of her opinion page published in the Indian Express (Soman 2023).

2 The Hindu Code Bill was passed by the Parliament in 1956, which brought in four separate Acts: the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Although the reforms were merely a way of imposing homogenization, they paved the way for further legislative reforms, including the recently added equal property rights in 2005.

3 For a critical evaluation of the complex overlapping between the UCC and MPL, especially after the criminalization of triple talaq, see Menon (2024).

4 The term “Justice” in personal matters here, according to the interview, broadly means assurance/achievement of the rights granted by the Quran to women in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and childcare. In marriage, it means marriageable age, consent, mehr (dower), physical, financial, and emotional well-being; protection against polygamy, and nikah halala. In matters of divorce, it means equal right to divorce followed by negotiations to ensure maintenance and childcare.

5 The BMMA’s position is also critical as, in February 2024, the BJP-led Uttarakhand government imposed a model UCC called the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand, 2024. Following this, a number of other BJP-ruled states have committed themselves to bring out a draft UCC in the wake of the 2024 national elections. The UCC aims to eliminate separate religious laws that govern civil matters such as marriage, land, divorce, property and inheritance. See: https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/civil-code-bill-english0001-520761.pdf

6 Government of India (2006).

7 For more information on the trajectory of the women’s movement’s relationship to the UCC, see: Menon (1998).

8 The Law Commission of India (LCI) is a non-statutory body constituted by the Government of India from time to time. It works as an advisory body to the Ministry of Law and Justice. The LCI undertakes research, reviews the existing laws, makes recommendations to the Government on reforms or the enactment of the new legislations. UCC and personal laws have been a matter of constant reviews. The LCI 2018 dismissed the need for a UCC. However in 2022, the 22nd LCI was formed around the same issue. It decided again to the solicit their views and the ideas of the public at large and of recognized religious organizations on the matter. The term of the commission was extended from July 2024 to August 31, 2024.For details, see: Public Notice on UCC: https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2023/06/2023061446.pdf

9 Law Commission of India (2018).

10 The BJP-ruled Uttarakhand state passed a UCC in February 2024, nearly four months after the interview (conducted in August-September 2023).

11 The scholarship on women’s rights globally called for the problematization of the personal sphere to highlight the unequal terms on which women entered the public sphere. The second wave of feminist movement called out hierarchies and discrimination within the family and in marriage that prevailed under the garb of religion, custom, culture or faith. In India too, personal laws were criticized along the same lines. This position changed in the post-1980s when scholars began to treat personal codes as a necessary recognition of religious differences by asserting to create a more democratic and safe space for women so that they do not have to choose between their religious identity and constitutional rights. See: Saxena (2022b).

12 The terms like “Quranic sanction,” “Quranic rights” or injunctions means the rights guaranteed by the Quran to women. The feminist interpretation of Islam cites a number of chapters and verses that treat women and men as equal. Soman cited a few (4:1, 32, 33, 34; 9:71, 72; 33:35). For details see: BMMA (2015a).

13 Wahiduddin Khan (2009: 4:1, 32,33,34; 9:71, 72; 33:35).

14 There is no nationwide data available to support this argument. A decline in cases of triple talaq has been recognized by a few organizations like Shaheen Foundation, Hyderabad, in their usual family surveys, though the MWA has destabilized Muslim families in a number of other ways. See Parveen, this issue.

15 According to Hindu mythology, brides and grooms promise to remain with the same spouse through seven births (sat Janam) as per the seven vows that the bride and groom take in a saptpadi Hindu marriage.

16 These include the four Hindu Code Bills of 1955–1956; the Indian Christian Marriage Act (1872) and Indian Divorce Act (1869) and the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (1936).

17 As part of this study, 4,710 Muslim women above 18 years of age across the ten states largely belonging to the weak economic sections of society were surveyed directly. The purpose of the study was to ascertain the status of Muslim women pertaining to matters such as marriage, divorce, maintenance, custody of children, and so on, and their views on the legal provisions. The data was collected from July to December 2013.

18 A nikahnama is a marriage contract in Islamic law that outlines the rights and responsibilities of a Muslim couple.

19 Talaq-e-ahsan is a method of divorce amongst Muslims where the husband and wife must dialogue, discuss, and arbitrate for a minimum of 90 days before settling for a final divorce.

20 Codification here has three meanings: the universalization of Islamic law to avoid anti-women interpretations, which at the moment are followed by different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and amongst Sunni and Shia communities, complete abolition of certain practices like child marriage, nikah halala (temporary contractual marriage of the divorced wife following which the divorced couple can remarry each other) and polygamy, which could be done through multiple laws or through a comprehensive amendment in the MPL; and, to give legal protection to women in family matters, which is denied in the absence of a unified, codified and modernized law of personal status. See: Jones (2020).

21 The draft act invokes Indian constitutional principles related to gender equality (e.g. Articles 14–15), existing statutory legislation on civil and personal laws (Sharia Application Act 1935, Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939, Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929), the Special Marriage Act (1954), Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (2005), the Juvenile Justice Act and so on). Further, it refers to international rights law and declarations, especially women’s rights charters such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979. It also refers to the provisions from the personal status codes of some Muslim majority countries. See: BMMA (2014). For an analysis of the BMMA’s draft, see Jones (2020).

22 Hate speech and hate crimes against Muslims have pushed an already poor and backward community to the margins. Hate mongering is backed by discriminatory policies, including the so-called love jihad laws criminalizing inter-faith marriages. See: Nidah Kaiser, “Becoming a Muslim Woman and the Myth of ‘Love Jihad,’” this issue.

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References

Electronic reference

Nazima Parveen, Usha Sanyal and Zakia Soman, Uniform Civil Code and Muslim Women’s Quest for JusticeSouth Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], 32 | 2024, Online since 24 January 2025, connection on 16 February 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/9842; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/136km

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About the authors

Nazima Parveen

Independent Research Scholar

By this author

Usha Sanyal

Wingate University

By this author

Zakia Soman

Founding Member and President of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA)

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