- 1 This article draws upon insights from fieldwork carried out by Prem Chhetri in the Prangbung area o (...)
1This paper examines the transformations of Limbu “native” or “indigenous space” in the borderlands between eastern Nepal and Sikkim since the early twentieth century.1 “Native space” refers here to both the experience and representation of this region by the Limbu: it is the area where most of them live today, where trans-local and intra-ethnic relationships predominantly occur, and which they associate with their shared memory and collective identity. While this concept includes the notion of a “homeland,” it does not carry the sense of exclusivity and state-like borders that ethnic leaders often associate with “homeland” in this region (van Schendel 2011). It rather denotes a space with undefined boundaries, constituted as much by present connectivity as by the memory of Limbu past sovereignty in these borderlands.
2In this paper, I explore in particular how the border separating eastern Nepal from Sikkim—which has divided the Limbu community into two parts since the early nineteenth century—has impacted the Limbu “native space,” that is to say, the role and place of this border in shaping Limbu experiences and representations of these borderlands, as well as their shared sense of community.
- 2 Concerning the history of the Limbu, see among others, Chemjong ([1956] 1973); Sagant (1996); Laoti (...)
3The region where most Limbu live encompasses the present-day Terhathum, Panchthar, Ilam, and Taplejung districts in northeast Nepal, as well as West Sikkim and West Bengal (see figure 1). The Limbu had their own rulers in this region, and also allied with the Sen kingdom (16th–18th century) in the southern plains (Pradhan 2009), as well as with Sikkim in the late 17th century, until their land was conquered by the Gorkhas in the early 1770s.2 The border between eastern Nepal and Sikkim was established following the Anglo-Nepal War (through the treaties of Sugauli, 1816, and Titalia, 1817), and divided the Limbu community across three states (Nepal, Sikkim and in the Darjeeling-Kalimpong area, which became a part of British India from the 1830s).
- 3 Throughout this paper, I use the term “territory” in the mere sense of state territory, which I dif (...)
4In Nepal, although the 1774 treaty with the Gorkhas granted the Limbu relative autonomy, this autonomy was gradually curtailed from the nineteenth century onward (Laoti 2005; Caplan 1970). In Sikkim, the Limbu were among the three groups that founded the kingdom by recognizing the leadership of a Bhutia king in 1663 (Mullard 2011). Following the establishment of the border between Sikkim and Nepal, a distinction emerged between the Limbu indigenous to Sikkim and those who had migrated from Nepal after the border was formalized, and this led to the marginalization of the Limbu as a whole within the kingdom (Vandenhelsken and Khamdhak 2021). The Limbu, whose settlement in the region predates the formation of nation-states, were therefore deeply impacted by the establishment of the border. More generally, the establishment of the border marked a transition from a pre-national form of membership based on alliances to a national membership based on belonging to a territory, which transformed all borderland people’s lives in this region from the end of the eighteenth century (Gellner 2013; Michael 2012).3 Although the border between Nepal and Sikkim has never been physically closed, the concept of state territorial sovereignty that accompanied the establishment of borders in the region turned the Limbu people into a borderland community. As culture increasingly came to be viewed as aligned with state territories, the transborder connections of the Limbu became a basis for their marginalization by the state.
- 4 “Ethnic identity” here includes the sense of shared belonging and the cultural elements used to rep (...)
5This paper begins with discussing the role and place of the border in the first large-scale Limbu movement in Kalimpong in the 1920s and extends to the period of fieldwork in 2017–2020. Whereas the regional-transborder and global scales were key resources for the initial Limbu political mobilization in the 1920s, from the 1980s onward, the Limbu imagined “homeland” was increasingly aligned with national territories (Bennike 2018, Middleton 2013). In the context of the revolt of the ādivāsī-janajāti (i.e., indigenous nationalities) in Nepal from the late 1980s onward, and the new possibilities offered by the status of Scheduled Tribes in India from the 1990s onward, ethnic communities in this region redefined their “ethnic space”—i.e., both the concept of their geographical location or “homeland,” and the definition of their shared identity—in a manner recognizable to the state (Middleton 2015; Shneiderman 2011, 2015; Shneiderman and Amburgey 2023; Vandenhelsken 2009/2010).4
6In this paper, I show that this analysis is also valid for Sikkim, where Limbu claims to be involved in decision-making within the state led to an accentuation of the division within the community between those considered “Sikkimese Limbu” and those regarded as “Nepalese Limbu.” Taking Limbu agency into consideration, this process is analyzed as “borderwork,” a concept highlighting the role of borderland people in “constructing, shifting, or even erasing borders” (Rumford 2012:897). This analysis not only illustrates how the Limbu were divided by the border, but also how they internalized “territorialization”—the colonial and post-colonial spatial classification that enabled direct control over people (Amilhat Szary and Giraut 2015)—thus contributing to the transformation of this region into borderlands. This process exemplifies the concept of border as a “category of difference” creating socio-spatial distinctions between places, individuals, and groups (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002).
7However, this article seeks to go further, and, engaging with the concern of this special issue for a concept of border and borderland “beyond spatial fixations,” it also challenges the analysis of the transformations of the Limbu native space as a mere alignment to state territory that endorses the increased “fixation” of communities within borders from the 1980s–90s onward in the Eastern Himalayas. The ethnographic study of the spatial imagination of the Limbu in the Nepal-Sikkim borderlands reveals the persistence of trans-border connectivity as well as of concepts of this region as unified across the border through connectivity and memory. Here, I analyze this spatial construction using Gohain’s (2020) concept of a “non-territorial identity.” While Limbu shared memory and transborder connections imbue meaning to a space that brings together parts of northeast Nepal and west Sikkim, Gohain’s concept enables demonstrating that the Limbu borderland subjectivities, first, disrupt national territory by encroaching on the Nepal-Sikkim border, and second, are constructed through transborder connections and mobility, rather than depending on people’s fixity. State territorialization is only one among several forms of spatial construction in the region, and not necessarily the one that holds the most meaning for borderland people.
- 5 This fieldwork was part of the five-years research project “Trans-border religion: Re-composing Lim (...)
8This paper draws on twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted between 2017 and 2020 in the eastern Indo-Nepal borderland. The region of Darap, West Sikkim (Gyalshing district), was my primary study area, with an additional month spent in Kalimpong and a couple of weeks in east Nepal.5 The fieldwork focused on Limbu ritual practices, history, political mobilization, and transborder mobility in the Sikkim-Nepal borderlands (see Vandenhelsken 2016, 2021a, 2024; Vandenhelsken and Gaenszle 2021; Vandenhelsken and Khamdhak 2021).
9This paper also builds on previous scholarship that sheds light on the key role of transborder connectivity in shaping present-day eastern Himalayan society (Chettri 2017; Gros and Fontanari 2024; Harris 2013; Harris, Holmes-Tagchungdarpa, Sharma, and Viehbeck 2016; Shneiderman 2015; Daurio and Turin 2019; Viehbeck 2017). It contributes to this discussion by showing that, through their cultural production, the Limbu reshape the borderland as a “native space,” registering affects and memory (Barnd 2017), and unsettling state territorial classifications. I ultimately argue that viewing Limbu identity dynamics solely as the confinement of their “homeland” within state borders is insufficient for a comprehensive analysis of today’s ethnicity and identity dynamics in the Eastern Himalayas. While ethnic spaces are confined within state territory through struggles for political participation in state governance, borderland connectivity—fostered by cultural practices, and collective memory—map out a non-territorial space that is central to community making.
Figure 1
Map of the study area (OpenStreetMap)
- 6 Following a common usage in social sciences and humanities, I use the term “boundary” for social an (...)
10An exploration of the first significant Limbu mobilization in Kalimpong (West Bengal) during the 1920s highlights, on one hand, the movement’s ability to transcend various borders and boundaries—geographical, religious, and cultural, as well as regional and global—and, on the other hand, how crossing these boundaries served as a resource that enabled the movement to establish itself and achieve its goals.6 At that time, Kalimpong was under British control and renowned for its educational institutions, established by Scottish missionaries, which were attracting students from across both regional and international borders. These institutions also contributed to the colonial effort to transform Kalimpong into a major agricultural production hub for the region’s broader plantation economy (Besky 2021).
- 7 Former accounts of this movement in Kalimpong include, among others, I. S. Chemjong ([1956] 1973), (...)
- 8 Documents attesting to the existence of the script were collected by the British diplomat Brian Hou (...)
- 9 For a complete biography of I. S. Chemjong, see Limbu (1978).
11In 1925, in Dungra, a neighborhood of Kalimpong, a group of Limbu men established an association named Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā, translating to “the Association of Limbu Chiefs / Great Men.”7 The initial main objective of this association was to revive a writing system credited to Śrijangā Singthebe, a Limbu man from the early eighteenth century. Śrijangā was assassinated in Sikkim for using his script to document Limbu deities, a practice that conflicted with Buddhism, the state religion at the time (van Driem 2001:675; Dhungel 2006). The script subsequently fell into disuse (Campbell 1842). However, the preservation of written documents enabled the association to initiate its revival.8 In the early twentieth century, the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā aimed to educate the Limbu in their mother tongue and script and to develop the community’s written culture. The association members, and in particular the now renowned Limbu scholar Iman Singh Chemjong (1904–1976),9 initiated research on Limbu history, formulating the narrative of the Limbu past in terms of their cultural “suppression” in both Sikkim and Nepal, which durably shaped Limbu collective memory.
12To connect Limbu individuals scattered from central Nepal to the Myanmar border was simultaneously an aim, and a resource for mobilizing the community. In West Bengal, most Limbu had begun migrating out of Nepal in the early nineteenth century, and, like other communities in this case, engaged in work within the colonial tea, cinchona, and timber industries (about these industries, see Besky 2021; Middleton 2024). Here, the Limbu people were recognized as one of the Indian ethnic minorities of Nepalese origin, referred to as “Gorkha” in West Bengal.
- 10 Interview with Maita Singh Thegim’s grandson, Lalit Thegim, that I conducted in Kalimpong on May 11 (...)
13The formation of the association testifies to the emergence of a middle class among the Limbu of Dungra: among the ten founders of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung were men who had served as soldiers in the Gurkha regiment of the British army. A representative case is that of Maita Singh Thegim (c. 1861–1945), born in Dungra, a neighborhood of Kalimpong.10 He had briefly served in a Gurkha regiment and worked as a sardār (‘chief,’ and, in this case: recruiting agent; see Besky 2014:74) in tea gardens. His prosperity stemmed from his supervisory role in woodcutting and the shares he acquired in two tea plantations, including the Amarawati Tea Company in Jalpaiguri.
- 11 According to Kogendra Songbangbhe, grandson of Jas Bahadur Songbangbhe, whom I interviewed over sev (...)
- 12 Sova Yolmo, grand-niece of I. S. Chemjong, whom I interviewed in Bung Busti, Kalimpong, on May 27, (...)
14The Hāng Chumlung also included people whose ancestors had been part of a landed and political elite in Nepal. This was the case of one of the founders and first secretary of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā, Jas (or Josh) Bahadur Songbangbhe (1872–1936), whose ancestors came from Poklabung, near Phedap, today in Tehrathum district, and were ministers (np. “chautara”) of Vijaypur.11 Iman Singh’s grandfather, Sansar Singh (born in the 1840s), also belonged to a landlord family from Panchthar.12
15The Limbu association thus brought together both an old elite and an emerging one. In both cases, colonization played a key role in the access of these Limbu to the emerging middle class in Kalimpong. This economic upliftment was largely enabled by the economic projects implemented by the colonizers in Kalimpong from the late nineteenth century onward, transforming the town into the region’s granary by promoting specific botanical species and reshaping the local population both socially and geographically (Besky 2021). The weakening of the caste hierarchy during this migration from Nepal to West Bengal also provided the flexibility needed for the social mobility of people considered as “tribes” (ādivāsī-janajāti, i.e., “indigenous nationalities”) in Nepal. Indeed, unlike in Nepal, the high and low caste Hindus formed only one-fifth of the Nepalese population, and the economic dominance of the higher castes was not replicated (Chalmers 2007:97).
- 13 Regarding the history of Rev. William Macfarlane in Darjeeling and Kalimpong, see McKay (2007:69 ff (...)
- 14 Sukhman volunteered to lead a new branch of the Kalimpong Mission in Bhutan, but passed away before (...)
- 15 Oral information from Sova Chemjong (Iman Singh Chemjong’s grand-niece), whom I interviewed in Kali (...)
16The presence of Protestant religious and educational institutions in Kalimpong was instrumental in the emergence of the Limbu movement, as details of Iman Singh Chemjong’s biography highlight: Iman Singh Chemjong’s elder brother, Kulhang Chemjong, as well as his cousin Buddhi Man Singh Chemjong, were founding members of the Hāng Chumlung as well. These three men’s fathers—Sukhman Limbu (Buddhi Singh Chemjong’s father) and Megbar Singh (1860–1928)—were members of the Church of Scotland introduced in Kalimpong in the 1870s by Rev. William Macfarlane (1840–1887).13 Sukhman Limbu was “a Hindu convert from Darjeeling who was one of Macfarlane’s first three catechists” (Lepcha 2017:76). It is likely that he is the same Sukhman Limbu who accessed Rev. William Macfarlane’s Normal School through a scholarship, as mentioned by Jayeeta Sharma (2017:34). He contributed to founding the Bom Busty Supporting Church in 1882, of which he became the pastor. After his demise,14 his brother Megbar Singh succeeded him (Lepcha 2017:76). As “Christianity and education were … moving along parallel paths” (Lepcha 2017:77), Megbar Singh graduated from St. Xavier’s College in Calcutta.15 The Scottish Presbyterians were instrumental in educating groups excluded from education in Nepal and other parts of British India by focusing their educational efforts on subaltern groups, in contrast to elite institutions established at the same period in other parts of British India (Sharma 2017:33). Additionally, they began teaching local minorities to read and write in their native language (Sharma 2017:32). The Scottish Universities Mission (SUM)—which evolved from the Normal School at the end of the nineteenth century (Sharma 2017:35)—continued to play a significant role in the revival of Limbu cultural practices over the years.
- 16 On the “sanitization” of Kirant religion, see Schlemmer (2004:121, 2009:65, fn. 9) and Gaenszle (20 (...)
17This information shows that the life trajectories of the founders of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā are embedded in the colonial projects in the region, with which the educational mission of the Protestant mission converged (Besky 2021:449). The association’s project to develop Limbu written culture—a significant move given the centrality of orality in Limbu culture (Gaenszle 2013)—alongside the expression of tribal practices, the denunciation of elite domination in the reconceptualization of Limbu history, and the project of religious “sanitization,”16 were inspired by the colonial concept of development, which the founders of the association used to “uplift” the Limbu people. Similarly, the concept of “upliftment” was central to the development of Nepali language and literature at the same period in the Darjeeling region (Onta 1996: chapter 4; Chalmers 2003: chapter 3).
18Thus, the social mobility afforded to tribal groups by the colonial economy and Protestant education contributed to the foundation of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā. Placing the Limbu “Kalimpong-movement” within the colonial context not only highlights the role of colonial social and economic dynamics in enabling its emergence but also reveals the influence of Protestant concepts—particularly that of martyrdom—on the reinterpretation of Limbu history. Martyrdom thus crossed religious boundaries, as we shall see now.
19In his account of the public address that led to the foundation of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā on July 26, 1925, Chemjong referred to the “creator” (or “revealer,” according to today’s most common interpretation of this narrative) of the Śrijangā script as a “martyred incarnation”:
As soon as they [the participants] heard the history of the martyred incarnation Sirijangā all present rose in a group. We must study Kirāt script. We must call it Sirijangā script after the martyred incarnation Sirijangā. It was voted unanimously to do research on the Kirāt script (Chemjong [1956] 1973:16–17).
- 17 On this point, see also Schlemmer (2004). See also Gaenszle (2002) for an analysis of Chemjong’s hi (...)
20With this conceptualization of Śrijangā as a martyr, Chemjong conferred sanctity upon the Limbu writing system. Present-day popular images of Śrijangā on Limbu book covers or posters portray him with halos over his head, tied to a tree, and pierced with arrows (see figure 2 below). This depiction bears a close resemblance to that of Saint Sebastian (c. CE 256–288), whose characteristic attributes, from the fifth century, are the bow, the arrows, and the tree trunk (Cabrera Mimbrera 2022). Martyrdom also played an important role in the late seventeenth-century history of the Scottish Presbyterian Church (Starkey 1974), to which I. S. Chemjong, his brother, and cousin belonged. During times of political strife, similar depictions of murdered Scottish Presbyterians made it possible to compare their fate to that of early Christian martyrs (Starkey 1974; about the representation of early Christians as martyrs, see Castelli 2004). Therefore, I. S. Chemjong not only revealed the life story of Śrijangā to the Limbu public but very likely also determined his representation as a saint and martyr.17
21In the quotation above, Chemjong writes that the representation of Śrijangā as a martyr generated collective mobilization among the Limbu (“As soon as they [the participants] heard the history of the martyred incarnation Sirijangā all present rose in a group”). This shows that he utilized the narration of the history of Śrijangā’s martyrdom as a means to persuade the participants to learn and propagate the Śrijangā script, resorting to martyrology as “a means of drawing upon the past to find strength for a new struggle” (Starkey 1974:489). Here, we observe, following Elizabeth Castelli’s analysis of early Christian martyrs (2004:4), the culture-making aspects of the representation of Śrijangā, along with the ideological potency of martyrological representations; this particular way of reconstructing the past facilitated the mobilization of the twentieth-century Limbu community.
22The representation of Śrijangā as a martyr stands in contrast to more recent portrayals of Śrijangā as a hāng or “king” (see figure 3 below). Presently, references to the ten Limbu “kings” and their “districts” (thum in Limbu) evoke the pre-Gorkha and pre-colonial sovereignty of the Limbu in today’s Nepal-Sikkim borderland. Both these depictions of Śrijangā unveil contrasting representations of the past: whereas sainthood and martyrdom point at the violence of the integration of the Limbu into the nation-state, kingship refers to Limbu past political control and sovereignty over the region now divided between Nepal and India. The priority given to one or the other of these images sheds light on the context of their elaboration: in the early twentieth century, in a context of opposition to the Nepalese Rana regime by Indian Nepalese, Chemjong’s interpretation of history challenged the “suppression” of Limbu language and culture subsequent to their integration into the state (both in eighteenth-century Sikkim and nineteenth-century Nepal). Chemjong’s movement rallied a transnational community aiming to simultaneously interrogate the nationalist imagination of Nepalese history as “unification” (see Onta 1996), contest the erosion of sovereignty of the Limbu, reclaim the prestige associated with its distinct writing system, propel the education of the Limbu, and the “sanitization” of their religious practices.
23Conversely, the depiction of Limbu hāng as “kings”—whereas other accounts depict them rather as chiefs whose power depended on their success and strength, and was therefore regularly shifting (Sagant 1996)—conveyed a concept of power as hereditary, hence durable, and territorialized. This shaping of memory aligning with a state-centric concept of sovereignty emerged from a context of claims centered on localized political participation, as we shall see in more detail below.
Figure 2
- 18 Painted by I. B. Subba, Gangtok. Photo of the painting: the author at Limbu Bhawan, Gangtok.
Śrijangā as martyr saint18
Figure 3
Śrijangā as king
- 19 On Phalgunanda and the Satyahangma movement, see among others Gaenszle (2013, 2016), Jones (1976), (...)
- 20 Timalsina (2010) argues that the entanglement of a reformist social agenda with bhākti (devotional) (...)
24The crossing of religious boundaries also sought to reform Limbu religious practices as part of a broader agenda of socio-religious transformation largely inspired by Hindu “reforms” (Gaenszle 2018). Within this framework, Chemjong entered into contact with Phalgunanda Lingden (1885–1949), the founder of the Satyahangma religious movement.19 This movement emerged as a pan-ethnic religion inspired by late nineteenth-century Hindu reforms, particularly the Josmanī sect, a bhakti sect that rejected many of the hierarchical aspects of Hindu orthodoxy (Whelpton 2005:80), and opened to all classes (Timalsina 2010:202, 219), including Rai and Limbu (Gaenszle 2018:71).20 Chemjong met Guru Phalgunanda in Lungthap Basti in Darjeeling in January 1931 (Chemjong [1956] 1973:22). Phalgunanda had come to meet him with twelve disciples, and, “after gaining much knowledge of Kirāt literature returned to Limbuwan” (Chemjong [1956] 1973:22). Chemjong also took part in a gathering later that year (Baisak 14th 1988 B.S., April-May 1931 A.D.) at Lalikharka where Guru Phalgunanda was present (Chemjong [1956] 1973:19). During this meeting, he emphasized the significance of education in “Kirāt knowledge” (Chemjong [1956] 1973:19). This event led to the declaration known as Satya Dharmako Muchulkā (or Deed of Truth and Righteousness) and is remembered today as “a great event for social reform, literacy campaign in Sirijonga script and cultural as well as religious awakening” (Subba 1995:34). Its objective extended beyond disseminating the Śrijangā script, encompassing the education of the Limbus about their ethnic identity, language, and literature (Subba 1995).
- 21 According to Kogendra Songbangbhe, whom I interviewed in Dungra, May 22, 2019. Opinions differ on h (...)
- 22 Personal communication of Buddhi L. Khamdhak.
- 23 According to Kogendra Songbangbhe, May 22, 2019.
- 24 According to Kogendra Songbangbhe, May 22, 2019.
- 25 This was narrated to me by several persons in Dungra, all interviewed in May 2019 (Lalit Thegim, Ko (...)
25Lalsor Sendang is another participant in the Kalimpong Limbu movement who crossed national and religious boundaries. Hailing from Nigraden, Tehrathum (likely Nidhuradin, currently situated in the south of Taplejung district), he was a Josmanī follower who fled Nepal to evade the Rana police seeking his arrest for having taught the Limbu language.21 Between 1914 and 1915, he resided in West Sikkim, and taught the Śrijangā script as well as “moral advises” (khāhun in Limbu), or, in other words, religious precepts.22 He was invited by the Hāng Chumlung to Kalimpong in either November 1926 (Chemjong [1956] 1973:20) or at the end of 1927.23 According to Chemjong, Lalsor Sendang was then 84 years old ([1956] 1973:17). However, some residents of Dungra believe that he was born in 1842, and had already died once, and been reincarnated.24 According to Chemjong ([1956] 1973:17 and 20), the objective of the Hāng Chumlung in inviting Lalsor Sendang to Kalimpong was to “have him read the old Kirāt books,” and to “to write down all the traditional texts known to him.” In Kalimpong, he brought his old “Kirāt books” and taught in a room in the house of the donor of the land of the first Limbu school in Dungra, Zambuk school. Choosing to reside in the nearby forest, as would an ascetic, he sported long hair and wore a simple doti.25
Figure 4
- 26 This painting on canvas is in the possession of Kharka Bahadur Limbu, lower Dungra, Kalimpong, who (...)
Lalsor Sendang, painting by Mrs. Champa Subba26
26In Chemjong’s connections with both Phalgunanda and Lalsor Sendang, religious and national borders were crossed simultaneously, driven by a common concern for the revival of the Śrijangā script. Unlike many present-day Limbu intellectuals who view the Satyahangma and Josmani influences as foreign to Limbu culture, Chemjong did not seem to have perceived these elements as “foreign.” Instead, he integrated aspects from various religious traditions—including Christian, “reformed” Hindu, and Limbu—into a distinctly Limbu tradition and imagery, which has endured over time. Today, the narrative of Śrijangā’s martyrdom is recounted in Northeast Nepal, Sikkim, and West Bengal, making it a significant element of the Limbu’s transnational shared memory.
27These connections in the 1920s not only highlight the transnational dimension of the Limbu region but also the porous nature of Nepal’s eastern border at that time, a porousness facilitated by the colonial presence in West Bengal. Indeed, a Nepalese fugitive like Lalsor Sendang was able to settle in Kalimpong thanks to his knowledge of ancient texts, illustrating not only the feasibility of crossing the eastern Nepal border and the appeal of the Limbu movement there, but also the disposition of the colonial authorities in Kalimpong to permit his settlement. Sendang’s settlement thus also points to the power dynamics between Nepal, Sikkim, and British India. Overall, Chemjong fostered lasting transborder connections within the Limbu community extending as far as the Burmese border, therefore within the region under colonial control, taking advantage of colonial-era opportunities to cross social, religious, and spatial boundaries and borders simultaneously.
- 27 Interview I conducted in Dungra on May 22, 2019. Translation from Nepali to English by Ambika Rai. (...)
28However, Lalsor Sendang’s way of life was also subject to criticism in Kalimpong, highlighting the emergence of more rigid religious and ethnic boundaries. Indeed, his religious commitment did not seem to have fit in well in Dungra, as Subedar Major Kharka Bahadur Limbu recalls:27
Lalsor Sendang was carrying the Śrijangā script up to Class three, inside a nettle bag. In 1925, he gave it to the old men of the region. He did not wear anything other than a dhoti, ate only fruits, had long hair. He used to be naked, and never took bath, he put ashes all over his body, did not eat rice and salt. He used to talk very less. The Limbu of this region branded him as mad (pāgla in Nepali); they failed to recognize him. They also asked him to lend them some money, which he did.
29This criticism of Lalsor Sendang’s lifestyle reveals that the emerging Limbu movement provided the framework for defining a shared identity, notably by excluding certain religious practices like those of Lalsor Sendang. This echoes the definition of a shared identity through the establishment of Nepali as the common language for all communities of Nepalese origin in the region discussed by Chalmers (2003 and 2007). In the quotation above, the reference to Lalsor Sendang lending money—which implies that, despite his ascetic lifestyle, he was actually wealthy—illustrates what Chalmers (2003:23) views as a contradictory impulse in the formation of Nepalese conceptions of community and belonging in the Darjeeling region:
The urge to return to a supposed golden age of religious purity and cultural perfection competing with calls for economic and industrial modernisation accompanied by social reforms such as the education of women and loosening of caste restrictions.
30As we will examine further below, the exclusion of certain elements and the reinforcement of religious, ethnic, and national boundaries for the Limbu people—as for the other communities in the region—intensified from the 1980s onward. However, prior to that period, in addition to crossing religious, social, and national boundaries, the Kalimpong Limbu movement also benefited from crossing linguistic boundaries, as we shall see now.
- 28 On the history of a Nepali language-based collective consciousness and of Nepali literature, see al (...)
31The foundation of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā coincided with the period when the Nepali language became a common cultural feature and symbol of the distinct identity of Indian Nepalese, uniting various groups who had originally migrated from Nepal but spoke different languages (Chalmers 2003, 2007), as well as communities that had older roots in the region. This “language-based interpretation of identity” (Chalmers 2003:41) facilitated the emergence of a Nepalese collective consciousness in India, which later extended to Nepal; it also played an increasingly mobilizing role for these groups to assert specific rights (Chalmers 2003:41).28
- 29 On the introduction of the Nepali language in schools in Darjeeling and its region, see Chalmers (2 (...)
32The Limbu movement in Kalimpong thus represented one of the “counter-discourses,” asserting collective identities distinct from the Indian-Nepalese one (Chalmers 2003:17). Today in Sikkim, distinguishing from Indian-Nepalese attributes is a key aspect of Limbu identity construction. But in Kalimpong during the 1920s, what were the relations between the movement initiated by Chemjong and the emerging Nepalese identity movement? There is no indication that, for the founding members of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung, advocating for the dissemination of knowledge in a non-Nepali mother tongue excluded or opposed the self-identification as Indian-Nepalese. The foundation of the Yākthung Hāng Chumlung Sābhā coincided with the year when Nepali was introduced as the educational medium in Darjeeling and Kalimpong.29 Besides, Chemjong’s and Kogendra Songbangbhe’s families included the only founding members of the Hāng Chumlung having known the Śrijangā script before the birth of the association. The others could have spoken Limbu, but likely spoke Nepali as well. Possibly, the Hāng Chumlung’s project centered around the Śrijangā script benefited from the emerging significance of Nepali writing as a medium of education and as a basis for the formation of a collective identity. The Kalimpong context prompted the founders of the movement to assign a comparable role to the mother tongue of an ethnic minority.
33Additionally, the community concerned by the project of the Hāng Chumlung was initially loosely defined: All the members of the Hāng Chumlung were Limbu, and the Limbu endonym “Yākthung” was given to the name of the association. However, this movement was not merely centered on the identity and language defined as Limbu (or Yākthung). In his account of the inaugural meeting, I. S. Chemjong refers to the Chumlung’s members as “Kirāti,” and labels the script “Kirāt” or “Śrijangā script”: “in 1925, Kirātis living in Kalimpong researched Kirāt literature and began to actively propagate the Śrijangā script” (Chemjong [1956] 1973:15–16). “Kirant” or “Kirāt” is primarily both a geographical category—referring to mountain and forest people in general (Schlemmer 2019), and to northeast Nepal in particular—and a linguistic one. It includes closely related linguistic groups such as the numerous Rai groups, the Limbu, the Yakkha, the Sunuwar, and the Hayu (Gaenszle 2016; Schlemmer 2009, 2019). In Nepal, it has also become an ethnic designation as well as a religious category (more precisely under the name “kirantism”), introduced in the national census in 1991 (Schlemmer 2019:10). The cultural and literary movement initiated with the foundation of the Hāng Chumlung was thus linked to both Kirāt and Yākthung identities; these two categories were therefore combined, rather than opposed as they are today in Sikkim. This can be explained by the then purpose of the association:
34Ethnic associations established in Darjeeling and Kalimpong in the 1920s were predominantly focused on “civil society concerns,” emphasizing cultural preservation and social welfare rather than the delineation of community ethnic boundaries in pursuit of state recognition (N. Chhetri 2018:170). Writing, education, cultural preservation, and social reform were also central objectives of the emerging Nepalese “public sphere” (Chalmers 2003:119, 153). Therefore, Chemjong’s use of the term “Kirāt” in addition to “Limbu” and “Yākthung” likely reflects the fact that defining rigid ethnic boundaries was not as crucial a concern for the members of the Hāng Chumlung as it would later become for the Limbu and other ethnic communities in the region from the 1980s onward. Maintaining fluid boundaries that allowed for multiple ethnic and linguistic affiliations was, in fact, a resource for the central objective of Limbu mobilization, which combined cultural preservation, education, religious reform, and social mobility.
35Soon, however, the early development of Limbu literature clearly prompted a negotiation among the Limbu regarding the definition of “Limbuness,” in particular regarding what to call the community and the determination of markers of belonging; this mirrors the way the emergence of Nepalese literature became the “discursive space within which interpretations of identity and belonging were negotiated” (Chalmers 2003:16). Chemjong’s historical interpretation offers an example of how such negotiation operated by encouraging the fluidity of some boundaries, while reifying others.
- 30 Kogendra Songbangbhe, May 22, 2019
36In his book History and Culture of Kirat People, Chemjong establishes several connections between Limbu rulers in a distant past, Tibet, and Buddhism. For example, in his view, a seventh-century king, Morong Hang, designed the first Kirāt script, and translated Buddhist scriptures in the “Rong Kirat language” ([1956] 2003:88–94). Nevertheless, Chemjong also introduced modifications to the Śrijangā script under the influence of Devanāgarī (Sprigg 1959:591; van Driem 1987:551) whereas the Devanāgarī influence was perceived as a result of how the Nepalese government deceived the Limbu people, as well as of the acceptance or complicity of certain Limbu individuals with the Nepalese authorities. This influence was also seen as a means of altering the Limbu language, and hence regarded as a form of “suppression” impacting their culture and collective identity.30 This debate concerning the Tibetan and Devanāgarī influences on the Śrijangā script is to be understood in relation to a broader tendency among Kirāt indigenists to consider that Aryans, identified as Hindus, were responsible for the marginalization of contemporary Kirāt (Schlemmer 2004).
37To summarize, while the 1920s-Limbu mobilization transcended ethnic, religious, linguistic boundaries—including adapting the Śrijangā script to Devanāgarī—and crossing national borders supported its endeavors, Chemjong also accentuated certain divides: Arya versus Kirāt, Hinduism versus Buddhism, India versus Tibet. Blurred ethnic boundaries and religious blending were not viewed as contradictions or as threats to the Limbu cause, as they are today in Sikkim. On the contrary, they served as resources for the primary objective of the movement, which was the welfare of the community.
- 31 Regarding the collaboration of the Scottish missionaries with the colonial economy developed specif (...)
38This approach involved bridging social and cultural categories as this was defined by the colonists and missionaries as a condition of social mobility, which also facilitated local people’s conversion to Christianity and contribution to the colonial political economy.31
39In Sikkim, Limbu leaders played a key role in the foundation of the kingdom in the late seventeenth century (Mullard 2011). However, the establishment of the border between eastern Nepal and Sikkim in the early nineteenth century divided the community into two parts. Consequently, the Limbu became categorized as either “Sikkimese Limbu,” recognized as indigenous to the Sikkim side of the border, or “Nepalese Limbu,” who settled in Sikkim after the border was established (Vandenhelsken 2024). These categories significantly influenced the internal relations within the Limbu community and the public perception of the Limbu. Furthermore, during the colonization of the kingdom (1888–1918), legal classifications categorized residents as either “natives” or “settlers,” similar to practices in other British colonies (Mamdani 2012). Then, as part of the nation-building process, all Limbu, whether identified as “Sikkimese” or “Nepalese,” came to be classified as settlers (Arora 2007; Vandenhelsken 2021b). By the 1960s, being considered as “settler” or “native” became critical for all residents in Sikkim as it began to determine eligibility for citizenship (Pradhan 2020). Indigeneity actually became the criterion for full recognition as a citizen. The categorization of the Limbu as settlers and “Nepalese” thus posed significant challenges for their community, leading to Limbu leaders’ effort to dissociate their community, politically as culturally, from the Nepalese communities of Sikkim, and to assert their indigeneity (Sengupta 1985; Vandenhelsken 2021b).
40However, since indigeneity was defined by presence in the kingdom prior to the establishment of the border, not all Limbu could claim to be indigenous to Sikkim. Sikkimese Limbu, known in Sikkim as “Tsong,” were encouraged by the Sikkimese ruling elite to differentiate themselves from the “Nepalese Limbu” amid rising political tensions between the rulers and the descendants of Nepalese migrants. For example, in 1967, a seat reserved for the Tsong was introduced in the Sikkim State Council. In response, Nepalese political leaders accused the ruling elite of attempting to fracture the Nepalese community by dividing the Limbu.
41Since the fall of the Sikkimese monarchy and the integration of Sikkim as a federated state of India in 1975, indigeneity has become a prerequisite for accessing an increasing range of benefits, as well as political participation (Thatal 2020). The project of extension of the Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to more communities in Sikkim from the 1990s onward—following the recommendations of the Mandal Commission—significantly contributed to this process, particularly because indigeneity is one criterion for recognition as a ST (more or less officially: Middleton 2015), and the recognition as a ST gives access to the most advantageous form of citizenship in terms of political participation and state benefits (on “differentiated citizenship” in India, see Jayal [2013]).
42The Limbu applied for ST status as early as 1976, but, unlike the other Sikkimese “natives,” namely the Bhutia and Lepcha, they were only recognized as a ST in 2003. In the meantime, their differentiation from the Nepalese communities of Sikkim—whose very name durably recalls their historical position as settlers in Sikkimese society, even though they are now referred to as “Sikkimese Nepalese”—was a key element of their claim to be recognized as indigenous to Sikkim. In this context, the label “Kirāt,” perceived as connecting the Limbu to Nepal, and “diluting Limbu identity,” as some ethnic leaders say, was increasingly rejected (see Vandenhelsken and Khamdhak 2021).
- 32 Interview of Nor Dhoj Limbu by Buddhi L. Khamdhak and Vandenhelsken, Dungra, May 5, 2019.
43The narrowing of the focus of the movement to just Limbu also characterizes the trajectory of the Kirāt/Limbu ethnic movements in Kalimpong (Chhetri 2023:64). The initial Limbu mobilization lost momentum after Chemjong left, having been appointed as a professor at Tribhuvan University in 1961. In 1976, the Sarva Kirāt Chumlung was founded in Kalimpong. Persons involved in this association today report that this name was given in order to bring together a larger number of people in the association, whereas only a few Limbu had actively contributed to former Limbu associative activities. N. Chhetri shows that the efforts to unite the Limbu, Rai, and Yakkhas under the Kiranti banner in the late 1970s did not last long, largely because: “Limbus regarded Sirijunga script as a Limbu script whereas Khambu Rais wanted it to be recognized as Kirāti script” (2018:164, note 30). The Sarva Kirāt Chumlung was replaced in 1994 by the Yākthung Chong Chumpo to support the claim for recognition as a Scheduled Tribe of the Sikkimese Limbu.32
44This shows once again, firstly, how state ethnology “can be both an instrument of modern governance and a resource for emerging sociopolitical forms” (Middleton 2015:21). It secondly sheds light on the territorial implication of the politicization of ethnology (Middleton 2013). Limbu political struggles from the 1990s onward in Nepal clearly demonstrate the process of alignment of ethnic “homeland” with state territory: in the 1990s, Limbu political leaders such as Bir Nembang proposed the idea of declaring the autonomy of the transborder “Greater Limbuvān” that included Limbu-populated areas in northeast Nepal, West Bengal, and Sikkim (Yatru 2003:34). However, following the 2015 Nepalese Constitution, the call for a federal Limbuvān state within Nepal led to the redefinition of the Limbu “homeland” within Nepal borders; then, Limbuvān was reimagined as being “circumscribed by the contemporary nation” (Bennike 2018:238).
45The ethnographic study conducted by Prem Chhetri and myself in Northeast Nepal and West Sikkim between 2017 and 2019 (see note 3) revealed that, at the same time as the Limbu imagined homeland aligned with the Nepalese national territory as part of their claim for an increased political participation in regional governance, new religious divides began to emerge within the Limbu community.
46Until recently in Nepal, the religious movement initiated by Phalgunanda Lingden (1885–1949), known as the Satyahangma Dharmā, was well accepted alongside other religious traditions within the Limbu community, such as the cult of the old Limbu deities led by Limbu tribal priests (in Limbu: Phedangba) and shamans (the Yeba and Samba), today referred to as “shamanism” by the Limbu themselves (Gaenszle 2016, 2018; Vandenhelsken and Gaenszle 2021). As an indication of his integral role in the Limbu and Kirāt cultural landscape in Nepal, Phalgunanda is represented with one of the three statues in front of the central office of the main Nepalese Limbu- Kirāt association, the Kirat Yakthung Chumlung in Lalitpur.
- 33 This is one of the findings of a fieldwork study carried out by Prem Chhetri, collaborator in the A (...)
47However, the recent political changes in Nepal, and the subsequent redefinition of the country as a secular republic, and a federation after 2008, have created conditions for the redefinition of Limbu religious identity: whereas the adhesion to the Satyahangma Dharmā has historically been prevalent among the urban middle class, Prem Chhetri’s recent fieldwork in the Prangbung area, near the Sikkim border, revealed that the Satyahangma Dharmā and other newer religious sects such as “Lovism,” led by Omnanda, have now expanded their influence in rural settings.33 Additionally, rather than coexisting as they did in the past, followers of these movements are now locked in enduring conflict with the followers of shamanism, a tension that came to light in all the community rituals Chhetri observed.
48A similar situation unfolded in Sikkim in the early 2000s, when a movement called Yumaism emerged, led by a young Limbu woman who claimed to be the incarnation of the Limbu deity Yuma (Gustavsson 2017; Vandenhelsken 2021a). While a significant number of Limbu shamans initially shared common ground with Yumaism regarding the need to “modernize” Limbu religious practices, these two factions began to clash, particularly with regard to Nepalese influence (Vandenhelsken 2021a). Yumaism increasingly criticized shamanic practices, eventually questioning their very legitimacy. In response, those working to preserve shamanism criticize the Hindu influence on Yumaism. Presently, the majority of Limbu associations in Sikkim consider that Yumaism causes divisions within the Limbu community, and view Limbu shamanism as the “genuine” and “authentic” Limbu religion.
- 34 “De-Hinduisation” has been generalized from the 1990s among indigenous nationalities as part of the (...)
49The redefinition of Limbu cultural authenticity lies at the heart of these religious divides in both Nepal and Sikkim, with the rejection of Hinduism playing a central role in this process.34 In Nepal, the reshaping of Limbu cultural authenticity as “shamanic” and “non-Hindu” coincides with the claim for a form of political autonomy—recently redefined as the transfer of certain powers from the central authority to regions or minorities—following the introduction of federalism in the Nepalese Constitution (Bennike 2018). While the rejection of Hindu influence reflects the Limbu leaders’ claim to emancipate from the Nepalese monarchy and exercise direct power in their federal state, the repositioning of the Limbu “homeland” within state territory highlights their concept of autonomy within the frame of the Nepalese state. In other words, the assertion of a religious boundary supports the redefinition of the Limbu homeland as both autonomous from the central power and yet within the Nepalese state; it is thus a means to negotiate the terms of the integration of the Limbu within the state.
50In Sikkim, the dispute between Yumaism and “shamanism” is intricately linked to the broader struggle of the Limbu to be recognized as a ST, which was achieved in 2003 (see Vandenhelsken and Khamdhak 2021). As explained above, this struggle encouraged the rejection of all Hindu influence in Limbu religious practices because it undermined their claim to being indigenous to Sikkim. Therefore, defining shamanism as the authentic Limbu religion—both in Sikkim and Nepal—led to the confinement of the community within state borders, aligning ethnicity with territory.
- 35 Personal communication of one of the participants in this meeting.
51Interestingly, in Nepal in 2018, during a meeting, several Limbu political leaders decided collectively to rename Limbu shamanism as “Yumaism.”35 This meeting brought together political parties advocating that the eastern province of Nepal be named “Limbuvān” within the Nepalese federation. The term “Yumaism,” which frames Limbu shamanism as a unified religion, not only reinforced the divide between shamanism and the reform-oriented Limbu religious movements, but also between the Nepalese Limbu and Sikkimese Limbu. Indeed, in Sikkim, “Yumaism” refers not to shamanism, but to the recent reformed religious movement. My Sikkimese Limbu interlocutors expressed disappointment upon discovering that the name “Yumaism” was selected in Nepal for “shamanism.” In their view, the Nepalese Limbu ignored the use of this term in Sikkim to refer to the “opposing camp,” regretting the missed opportunity to unify their causes. Whether this oversight was unintentional or deliberate, employing the same term to describe opposed religious traditions underscores the distance introduced between the Sikkimese and Nepalese Limbu through the community’s recent political movements.
52This situation shows that the deepening of religious divides within the Limbu community and the strengthening of the border between Nepal and Sikkim are interconnected processes. Both reflect an increased alignment between territory and culture, or, in other words, the “territorialization” of ethnic identity. This alignment offers an example of Gupta and Ferguson’s (1992:7) concept of the “isomorphy of culture and (state) territory.” This highlights a recent form of state-making that conditions the political participation of socially and geographically marginalized communities on their indigeneity and cultural distinctiveness, and, in doing so, confine them within state borders.
53The conflict between supporters of Limbu shamanism and proponents of religious reforms shows that it is no longer possible to embrace both simultaneously, unlike it was before the 1990s. This shift highlights the Limbu’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the state, including its spatial and social categories. Reclaiming their cultural identity supports their demand for greater political autonomy within the framework of the state, leading to the alignment between Limbu identity and spatial imagination, on the one hand, and state spatial and social classifications, on the other.
54Schimanski and Wolfe’s (2010) concept of the cultural production of borders provides a useful lens for further analyzing this situation. They argue that the border concept circulates across different registers, and that borders are produced through culture. The case of the Limbu makes it possible to extend this analysis to the religious sphere, showing that the religious divides within the Limbu community perform the border between eastern Nepal and Sikkim, being thus not just an outcome of border-making, but, in fact, a means of both border- and state-making.
55The sections above have shown that whereas crossing borders and boundaries was a necessity and a resource for the first Limbu mobilization in the 1920s in Kalimpong, the imagined Limbu homeland has since been increasingly confined within state borders in Nepal and Sikkim, dividing the Limbu community along both geographical and religious lines. The question I raised in the introduction concerns the relevance of this analysis for understanding the cultural dynamics and sense of belonging among the Limbu: can we understand Limbu ethnicity merely in terms of an increasing political and cultural division within the community that aligns with the border, reflecting both community leaders’ political aspirations to integrate the state apparatus and state policies conditioning this integration on the adoption of state cultural and spatial classifications by the communities?
56I argue here that, while this analysis accurately addresses the production of political identities, an ethnography in the borderlands reveals other dynamics of identity and belonging at play, particularly transborder connectivity. These dynamics are significant to understanding forms of community-making that do not align with the border and, in this way, unsettle state territorialization.
- 36 Findings of a coordinated fieldwork study carried out by Prem Chhetri in the Prangbung area, and by (...)
57To start with, Limbu from the Nepalese and Sikkimese borderlands still intermarry today. For example, this is the case between the village of Chitre, near Prangbung in Nepal, and Limbu villages in the Rimbik Valley in Sikkim (see figure 1).36 Most Limbu villages in this region are inhabited by one single clan. Clan exogamy leads Limbu to find their marriage partners in another village. In the same generation, several marriages can be contracted between two villages. Then the villages change to avoid marriages between close relatives on the mother’s side. Here, as in other northeast Indian borderlands, marriage rules respect clan boundaries and not the modern boundaries of nations (Gohain 2020:131).
58Additionally, there are numerous instances of cross-border cultural and intellectual exchanges between Sikkim and east Nepal. Notably, the Limbu drum association from Sombaria actively participates in Limbu and/or Kirāt festivals celebrated in Panchthar. Moreover, today, public university and college departments dedicated to Limbu Studies exist in both Sikkim and Nepal, offering language instruction and organizing research on Limbu culture. Limbu scholars from Nepal and Sikkim engage in an exchange of knowledge through conferences, common publications, and meetings, contributing to a cross-border “native” intellectual community.
59Shamanic Limbu ritual performances also give life to a transborder Limbu space. This is particularly evident in two Limbu “shamanic” rituals known as Mangena and Nahangma. Both rituals aim at “raising the head high,” or in other words, restore both an individual’s life force and luck (on these rituals, see Sagant [1996]). In my research area in West Sikkim, the Nahangma ritual is generally performed for ritual specialists, while Mangena is conducted for other individuals. During both rituals, offerings are mentally brought by the ritual specialist to the Mangena lungdhung (i.e., “stone”), also referred to as Mangena yok (“fortress” [Kainla 2010:354]). Most often, the Mangena lungdhung is the place of origin of the clan, with each clan having its own. Given that many Limbu clans in Sikkim trace their roots back to present-day Nepal, the majority of Mangena lungdhung sites are situated in Nepal. In a Nahangma ritual that I observed in December 2018 in Singpheng, near Darap in West Sikkim, the ritual specialist firstly evoked the family’s place of origin for the Yangwago clan, the recipient of the ritual. He proceeded to trace the journey from the clan’s origin to its current settlement. He stated:
- 37 Translated from Limbu by Buddhi L. Khamdhak.
The Yangwago came from Sige-ja in Yangrok district [today’s Yangwarak]; from there, they went to Alley; from there they crossed the river; they stopped to foresee where they could settle, but they could not see where they were supposed to go.37
Figure 5
The Yangwago clan’s original migration journey
60Then the ritual specialist mentioned several places where at each attempt, the community faced challenges in establishing settlements: Yembung (today called Yampung), Chongri, Senkhola, Rimbi and Singpheng, where they eventually settled. Concluding the narrative, the ritual specialist added:
- 38 Translated from Limbu by Buddhi L. Khamdhak.
Here, they cleared the forest, started cultivating their lands and, using their crops, prepared this thisok [millet beer made from the first harvest] that they are now offering to you.38
61Thus, through ritual, a map of the region is drawn, marked with landmarks significant to the community, and notably undivided by the border; instead, family relations connect both sides of the border.
62Lastly, during Limbu funeral rituals, so as to end the mourning period, an elderly member of the clan addresses the crowd to seek permission for the bereaved family to resume social interactions. In the final part of a death ritual that I observed in Singpheng in 2018, the assembly was addressed as “the ten Limbu” (“das Limbu” in Nepali), a term that evokes the ten Limbu kings who historically ruled Limbuvān. In this context, this reference serves to denote the entire Limbu community. Hereby, the ritual maintains the memory of the Limbu pre-colonial sovereignty in the borderlands.
63The relevance of a unified approach to the eastern Himalayas that considers the historical, kinship, and religious links between Nepal, Sikkim, and West Bengal has already been highlighted (Chettri 2017; Harris 2013; Harris et al. 2016; Shneiderman 2015). The study of Limbu borderlanders’ transborder connections confirms this analysis, showing how instrumental these connections are in holding the Limbu together as a single ethnic unit by preserving a shared transborder memory and connectivity through transborder marriages, cultural and intellectual exchanges.
64The mere connections of the Limbu to the other side of the border challenge the state-centric fiction that national, regional, and village boundaries “enclose cultures and regulate cultural exchange” (Gupta and Fergusson 1992:19). While this leads the analysis, “beyond the imagery of ‘terrains’ as spatially fixed geographical containers for social processes” (Sheller and Urry 2006:209), it does not, however, state the absence of the states as “containers for societies” (Sheller and Urry 2006:210) in this region. Beyond religious divisions, the current border is indeed a tangible presence in the lives of the Limbu living in the borderlands. For instance, several inhabitants of the borderlands on both sides of the border between eastern Nepal and Sikkim report that it is today difficult to obtain permission to settle permanently on the other side. This difficulty particularly affects Nepali citizens, and even more Limbu women married in Sikkim; many of them are then forced to live in illegality, with the border thus impacting their personal lives.
65The recent cultural and political history of the Limbu, combined with ethnographic research in the Nepal-Sikkim border region, highlights the emergence of multiple borderland subjectivities shaped by both representations and lived experiences of space. Navigating economic, ethnic, religious, and national borders was a resource for the Kirāt-Limbu movement in Kalimpong during the 1920s. In contrast, in Sikkim, since the colonial expansion and the politicization of the native-settler divide, divisions within the Limbu community have become increasingly territorialized. More recently, in both Nepal and Sikkim, religious divisions within the Limbu community have emerged in the context of political struggles for greater political participation, eventually spatially confining further both parts of the Limbu within their respective state, and contributing to border-making. This shows that the establishment of the border in this region was supported by cultural divisions within the Limbu community, and highlights the spatial implications of the confinement of people into controllable categories in the region.
66However, alongside the alignment of the imagined Limbu homeland with state borders as part of political struggles, the imagination of a unified transborder Limbu space remains. This Limbu native space is not necessarily bounded by continuous, and fixed borders. Drawing on Gohain’s (2020) concept of “non-territorial” imagined geography in Arunachal Pradesh, where interconnected “nodes” confer significance to space rather than fixed people and borders, the imagined Limbu native borderland space gains meaning through connectivity. It challenges state border regime not only because it encroaches upon the border, but also because it derives significance from connectivity. The shared memory of pre-colonial Limbu sovereignty in this region, recollections of clans’ original migratory journeys, and the continued practice of transborder marriages and cultural exchanges remain key to the social reproduction of the Limbu community (see Michael [2012] for other examples of resilient pre-colonial sovereignties in the region). In brief, Limbu borderland subjectivity constructs a “non-territorial space of belonging” (Gohain 2020), characterized by mobility, fluidity, change, and interconnected landmarks, standing in contrast to the state’s territorialization based on fixed identities and contiguous borders. This spatial construction can also be understood as an “indigenous geography” (Barnd 2017).
67The history of this borderland people demonstrates that the border is neither a fixed line nor a clear one for everyone. It shows, on the one hand, that the construction of the region as a borderland by states is an ongoing process, and on the other, that this is merely one way among others to define the region—one subjectivity among many. It also lends support to a perspective on South Asian societies that “de-centre[s] the nation-state as a sealed ‘container’ of history” (Harris et al. 2016; van Schendel 2002), challenging analyses of identity formation in the region as simply the alignment of culture and territory.
68As for the subjectivities of the Limbu borderland people, they not only transform over time but can also coexist with other forms of border subjectivities, particularly with the state’s border regime. Today, the memory of pre-colonial Limbu sovereignty and of the original transborder migratory journeys of Limbu clans coexist with the constraints imposed by the border regime, which redefines the conditions of belonging. Borderland people navigate both these subjectivities, experiencing the constraints of the border regime in their daily lives while retaining the memory of a unified space, which is reactivated through ritual practices and transborder cultural exchanges. Religious divisions reflect the influence of the border on the cultural practices of the Limbu people, yet transborder connectivity remains a resource for shaping Limbu identity and community. Thus, indigenous geography and state territory are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, co-constitutive.