Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNuméros27Literature, Narrativity and Compo...

Literature, Narrativity and Composition in the age of Artificial Intelligence

Littérature, narrativité et composition à l'ère de l'intelligence artificielle
Letteratura, narratività e composizione nell'era dell'intelligenza artificiale
Debarshi Arathdar

Résumés

Mon article tente de retracer brièvement les interactions entre A.I. et la littérature tout en notant les différentes manières par lesquelles l'intelligence artificielle participe à de tels actes de génération et de compréhension narrative. La recherche moderne en A.I. et la théorie narrative pointe encore vers le domaine pionnier de la génération narrative dans lequel les œuvres littéraires composées par les IA sont rares, confrontées à des problèmes majeurs de compréhension et d'innovation. Quels sont les facteurs qui conduisent à de tels actes appauvris de création narrative? Comment ces facteurs peuvent-ils être freinés (voire pas du tout)? Mon article tentera brièvement d'aborder les problèmes et les lacunes suivants de la génération et du traitement narratifs par A.I.s. J'emploierai un cadre cognitivo-narratologique pour évaluer les récits élaborés via A.I. programmes, en soulignant spécifiquement les domaines des conceptions de schémas et de cadres et le manque de cohérence qui en résulte dans la génération d'énoncés significatifs. Le document tentera également de parcourir les récits composés par A.I. programmes, en mettant au premier plan comment de telles compositions incompréhensibles ou souvent dis-cohérentes sont souvent connues par le lecteur humain. Qu'est-ce que cela nous informe de nos propres capacités de connaissance et de mentalisation? L'article abordera les problèmes de cognition qui jouent un rôle / obstacle majeur dans le développement de structures logiques et algorithmiques pour le processus d'écriture dans son ensemble, impliquant l'indisponibilité d'une machine à écrire (qu'elle soit sensible ou non) et la disponibilité d'écrits mécaniques. . Je crois que les différentes formes des zones interactives entre récits littéraires et structures intelligentes artificielles ouvrent un tout nouveau champ de discours digne d'un exercice cognitif; où le texte, la société et les systèmes numériques sont mis ensemble dans un état de libre jeu.

Haut de page

Texte intégral

“The essence of technology is by no means anything technological” – Martin Heidegger

“No computer has ever been designed that is ever aware of what it’s doing; but most of the time, we aren't either.” – Marvin Minsky

  • 1 David Eagleman and Anthony Brandt, The Runaway Species: How Human Creativity Remakes the World, Edi (...)

1The act of creating something anew has fascinated man ever since the early days of evolution, a quest for curiosity and creation that has moulded man into the beings that they are. The evolutionary transition spurred by the brain’s ability to bend, break and blend various elements into newer relations has led to the proliferation of cultural arts and literature1. However, for man to build something crudely and analogically similar to that of human brains capable of producing literature (i.e. in the form of AI programs composing literary works), has taken significantly less time than the evolution of the human brain itself. The problem however lies not so much with the capacity of machines to tell stories but with the quality and clarity of their execution. Although AI programs with efficient hardware can process and spurt out text or data at an unparalleled speed, the actual narrative and storytelling output fall significantly short with respect to human-produced literature in terms of clarity, conciseness, and coherence on both semantic and syntactic levels.

  • 2 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, Oxfordshire, Routle (...)
  • 3 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

2Artificial Intelligent structures extract, combine and analyse data through machine learning techniques on a continuous basis, employing neural networks and other models that serve their huge databases. Thus, in the age of information whilst processing a lot of information in a small amount of time, these structures truly champion the cause of optimized situations and circumstances by asking less of human effort. While one is surfing the internet through a particular traceable ID, such as a GPS location or IP address, the user’s data is often further fed through content-suggesting algorithms by Big Data companies which in turn personalize one’s own web content and give information for an individual’s own discourse and ideology. This arrangement shows us what we want to see, but one must always remember the error percentage of algorithms and the predominant availability of ‘Free Will’ and Sartrean ‘choice’2 that a human being has (however little it be). Discourses in cyberspace are often channelized through the postmodern fetish for ‘intensity’, the mass distribution of ‘viral posts’ and meme culture being one such example. Narrativity and narratorial experiences in the contemporary age are not totally independent acts but already deeply embedded in and governed by the web and its algorithmic structures of simulation programs, which further render the reality as a simulation phenomenon.3 But what happens when machines become narrating beings? In a sense, what significance does it bear when a program, beyond assisting us discursively, starts to perform its own narratives and in turn propound discourses?

  • 4 An artificial recurrent neural network (RNN) that is used in the field of deep learning which unlik (...)

3This paper attempts to address these questions and enquire into instances of narrative composition achieved by A.I. However, for the feasibility of research we shall only enquire into works put out by narrating/composing machines and their implications for cognition, culture and hermeneutics. Composing machines and mechanical composition probably pre-dates the entire episteme of computational composition itself, beginning as early as the Arab astrologer’s use of the Zaijra and extending to Ramon Llull, Gotfried Leibniz, Jonathan Swift and more modern developments in C.D. structures and L.S.T.M. based Neural Networks4. The scope of this paper shall be limited to exploring writing machines specifically rather than delving into the broader realm of mechanical writing. To begin with how narrativity is achieved by machines and their influence on the reader and general culture as a whole, we shall start off by asking the following questions and ruminate on them through the following passages.

  • What does it mean to hermeneutically engage with a narrative piece generated by A.I.?

  • How do features of cognition and narrativity emerge in trying to make sense of such a text?

  • How do schema and frames operate in the reader’s cognition when navigating such a text?

  • How is narrative coherence achieved and ruptured in such a text?

A.I. and literary composition

4With the advent of the World Wide Web in the age of Industry 4.0, the praxes of literature and literary activity have radically mutated while permeating across all media forms. The strict adherence to traditional genres and formats has broken down and wide-ranging literary forms, such as interactive fiction or virtual story worlds, have emerged in their place. Literature and literary narratives have been engaging in a direct discourse with A.I. structures from the very dawn of artificial intelligence, the huge database of literature being a perfect and inexhaustible pasture for the experimental grazing of AI programs.

5There are instances in the history of A.I. in which it has dealt directly with issues of text composition, storytelling and narrativity. Let us take a look at some of them.

    • 5 David E. Rumelhart, Notes on a schema for stories. in: D.G. Bobrow and A. Collins (eds.), Represent (...)
    • 6 Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, translated by Laurence Scott, Austin, University of Tex (...)

    In 1975, Rumelhart5 proposed the first computational approaches to storytelling, postulating that stories have an internal structure similar to sentences. He broke down the story structure into Setting + Episode, and episodes in turn to Event + Reaction, and Reaction into Internal Response + Overt Response, and Overt Response into Action / Attempt. The goal was to analyse the components of a story and decipher its ‘story-ness’ and point out that “not all coherent texts are stories”. This approach, which can be seen as a systemization of Propp’s (19686) proposal for a morphology of folktales, has been followed by a number of researchers (for instance, Mandler and Johnson (1977), Thorndyke (1977).

    • 7 Roger Carl Schank, “Conceptual dependency: A theory of natural language understanding”, Cognitive P (...)

    Because of their concern with structure rather than content, story grammarians have been criticized as having very little to offer to machine understanding of texts. Another important theory is that of Conceptual Dependency (CD structures), which was developed at Yale University by Roger Carl Schank.7 In this model, the meaning of individual sentences are represented by CD structures, which consist of concepts and the relationships between them. All information and contextual knowledge implicit in a sentence are laid out explicitly within the CD structure associated with that sentence. However, although CD structures work independently of language because they break down the sentence into its theme and actions, they cannot be applied to complex sentences without their contexts being specified.

    • 8 Wendy G. Lehnert, “Plot units and narrative summarization,” Cognitive Science Vol. 5, 1981. p. 293- (...)
    • 9 Nancy M. Ide and Jean Veronis, “Artificial Intelligence and the Study of Narrative,” Poetics, Vol. (...)

    Lehnert’s research8 sought to represent stories as “affect state graphs,” which represent mental states and positive and negative events that are causally linked by things like “actualization,” “termination,” “equivalence,” and “motivation.”9

  • 10 Ibid.

6The structures discussed above could however generally process only children’s stories and simple sentences. Although BORIS (Behavioral Observation Research Interactive Software) is thought to be among the most “sophisticated understanding programs yet developed,” it is only capable of grasping very basic stories on a limited range of subjects, which means that the development of programs capable of understanding literary texts is likely still a long way off.10

  • 11 Samuel R. Bowman, et al., “Generating sentences from a continuous space,” CONLL, 2016.
  • 12 Xiaoice, The Sunshine Lost Windows, Beijing Cheers Publishing House, 2017.
  • 13 Emily Buder, “An Algorithm Wrote This Movie, and It's Somehow Amazing,” No Film School, 10 June 201 (...)
  • 14 Ross Goodwin and Kenric McDowell, 1 The Road, Paris, Jean Boîte Éditions, 2018.

7Recent research in A.I. and deep learning have developed surprising results in literary and creative activities through neural networking of data and variables. Google has been collaborating with Stanford University to improve the natural language of machines, introducing Google Brain to approximately 11,000 novels.11 The software is first tasked with understanding the variance of human languages and then given two sentences, out of which the machine composes several poems of its own. Another instance is the project of the Chinese publishing house Cheers Publishing, which put out a collection of poems written by the program Microsoft Little Ice (Xiaoice)12, in which the machine took in more than 500 sonnets and created 10,000 poems 139 of which were published. Another significant A.I. development is a website titled deepbeat.org that generates rap lyrics out of a huge database of rap songs, allowing users to suggest an initial beat or line or even letting the A.I. construct it from beginning to end. The program has recently developed its own voice, which although a bit shaky is quite a nice achievement for an A.I. program. A.I. has also had a breakthrough in screenwriting. orchestrated by scientist Ross Goodwin and his team, which created a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network that renamed itself Benjamin during an interview. It went on to produce a short screenplay titled “Sunspring,”13 which was made into a film directed by Oscar Sharp that went on to be selected as one of the 10 best short films at the festival Sci-Fi-London. There have also been attempts to produce A.I. novels through deep neural networks, as for example when an A.I. program in 2018 was sent on a road trip to emulate Jack Kerouac: The program/writer was equipped with a microphone, GPS, a camera hooked to a laptop, and a lot of linear algebra. The project was designed by Ross Goodwin and produced the text “1 The Road,”14 which is currently marketed as the first novel written by A.I. The program ingested 60 million words (approximately 360mb) for its processing. However, it is quite a frustrating read for its surreal use of language, which skews often into gibberish. Still the program achieves sentence coherence, which was a big step forward from the time of CD structures.

  • 15 Sam Shead, “Why everyone is talking about the AI text generator released by an Elon Musk-backed lab (...)
  • 16 Inderjeet Mani, “When robots read books,” Aeon.co, consulted on 15 December 2021, https://aeon.co/e (...)
  • 17 Douglas Lenat, Mayank Prakash, and Mary Shepherd, “CYC: Using Common Sense Knowledge to Overcome Br (...)

8A recent research project by Open A.I.’s GPT-315 and GPT-4, which can be partly accessed via talktotransformer.com (GPT-3), consists of a well-trained neural network that is capable of generating simulated stories or even ‘deep fakes’ by taking an initial cue from the user and completing a convincing line or paragraph for them. In addition to producing direct compositions in the past few decades, A.I. has also served the purposes of literary analysis by mining big data sets pertaining to usage. Programs such as “Witch Hunter”16 (a geo-semantic map that traces the hotspots of witchcraft activity in Denmark by mining 30,000 stories and their geographical contours) and “TimeML” (a tool that charts the spatio-temporal distinctions and pace of a narrative) use advanced machine learning techniques to bring “distant reading” techniques into a utilitarian forefront. Douglas B. Lenat’s brainchild “CYC”17 is probably the oldest existing artificial intelligence program that seeks to lay down a vast epistemological framework of basic human behaviour and common-sense. The approaches of cognitive linguistics and cognitive neuropsychology with their stress on the computational prospects of the mind in general and its literary features in particular, can further alleviate current shortcomings of A.I. research in narrative generation. As far as the future of narrative-competent A.I. goes, the so-called trans-epistemic traffic between the study of literary processes in the human mind and the conceptual challenges in attempting to represent them artificially are mutually productive and sustainable.

Cognitive-Literary Analysis of A.I. compositions

  • 18 William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive Linguistics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004
  • 19 Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2002.
  • 20 Monika Fludernik, “Narratology in the Twenty First Century: The Cognitive Approach to Narrative”, P (...)
  • 21 A theoretical construct proposed by Gilles Fauconnier corresponding to the construction of possible (...)

9So far we have discussed some landmark moments of A.I.’s involvement in literary creation and criticism without, however, engaging in a heuristic analysis of the corpus produced. The following section shall try to address the qualitative aspects of an A.I. generated text and examine their narrative details. To account for the comprehensibility of texts composed by an A.I. program, we resort to a cognitive literary analysis of the generated works. In order to account for narrative coherence, continuity and contingency, we shall adopt the methodological premises and framework of cognitive semiotics18 and cognitive poetics19/narratology20. By analysing the texts in terms of syntactic regularity, lexical similarity, metaphorical mappings, mental spaces21 and hermeneutical potency; we enquire into the frameworks of narrative coherence as achieved, exhibited or implied. For the sake of feasibility and the scope of this paper, we shall limit our idea of the reader as essentially a reader/interpreter—one who engages in a dynamic cognitive exercise with the text—and not go into the subtleties of what it means to be a reader (human or otherwise). The following texts have been chosen as some of the unique and experimental works of literature produced by powerful fourth generation A.I. with state-of-the-art technological advancements. We shall begin with a cognitive-poetic analysis of Xiaoice’s poetry and gradually move into further intricacies of narrativity by examining “1 The Road.”

The Sunshine Lost Windows by Xiaoice

10Let us begin with one of the most popular poems composed by Xiaoice:

The rain is blowing through the sea
A bird in the sky
A night of light and calm
Sunlight
Now in the sky
Cool heart
The savage north wind
When I found a new world…

  • 22 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago., University of Chicago Press, 2003.
  • 23 This refers to the way in which contextual information is encoded into the grammatical system of a (...)
  • 24 This term refers to the view that “cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between the actin (...)
  • 25 Embodied cognition is a cognitive theory that stresses the importance of bodily features in cogniti (...)

11The poem begins with an initial frame over a seascape, one that invokes either scripts or frames of gentle rain. However, the verb “blowing” is conceptually laden with the domain of “force” and is more likely to evoke the forceful effect of a storm. Following this sight, our schema advances with the bird in the sky, a symbol of presence and motion projected via a simple figure/ground relation. In the second line, are we to understand that the bird occupies the same frame as the first line or are we to imagine a different frame (against a backdrop of clearer skies, for example)? The answer isn’t narratively explicit or coherent. Whatever our interpretative choice in the second line, the third line violently introduces a newer frame of the night being “light and calm”, which is quite ironic following the rapid shifts of frames, moods and emotions. The fourth line, consisting of one word—“Sunlight,” brings an entirely different state to the foreground. A singular noun occupying a single line for the sake of poetic effect is juxtaposed to the frame of night developed previously. In its contrastive effect of the night and day sky frames, the schema develops with a rapid influx of luminosity that constitutes both a brief pause and extends the narrative progression. As one navigates through these instantaneous changes in temporality, a conceptual insight on the rapid nature of frame dynamics itself emerges. The next lines direct us back to the schema of the sky, pushing us to imagine “cool heart” as a metaphor for an internal emotional state. Furthermore, the appearance of “cool heart” just after “...in the sky” activates the Conceptual Metaphor22 of GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN wherein the sky by default projects the ontic of the “heart” as benign and sufficiently elevated. In the next line, we continue with our “cool heart’ elevated and fluttering in the “savage north wind,” or we alternatively end the frame of the cool heart in the sky. Instead, “the savage north wind” now almost blows into the next frame with a glimpse of self-other (re-)awakening and a discovery in which the “new world” is found. It is interesting to note the presence of an “I” in the final line as it instantaneously puts the entire poem into the deictic axis23 of the implied author or even the reader (who is mentalizing in the process). One who has witnessed or even dreamt perhaps, the rapid frame shifts on an enactive24 and embodied25 level and emerges teleologically with the discovery of a new world.

  • 26 Hermeneutics refers to the theory and methodology of textual interpretation. Robert Audi, The Cambr (...)
  • 27 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990.

12The hermeneutical26 possibilities, though various, remain limited and disorganized in light of the incoherent rhetoric and lexical incongruity. However, the reader, as a result of his or her lived-experience and being-in-the-world-ness and the remarkable efforts of the narrativizing brain,27 coherently arranges the information into a situated and acted-out narrative. The power of narrative is enough to coax the reader into pleasurably gliding through the text without realizing the nature of its authorship. Indeed, it doesn’t read as being as experimental as e.e. cummings or as hip as Ginsberg. However, the point isn’t to emulate but rather to create out of scratch with the coherence of a presentable text. It is this task which Xiaoice achieves quite well, despite all the shortcomings with regard to robustness of L.S.T.M. processing. Of the 117 poems published in The Sunshine Lost Windows, some poems remain unique in their iconicity and diction while imparting a cogent sense of progression to the narrative. Consider the following lines composed by Xiaoice:

  • 28 Quoted in Shreeja Shreekumar Pillai, “The Vindication of Cyborgs in The Sunshine Lost Windows” [onl (...)

Cities are too ashamed to face the countryside,
Let us compare beautiful hearts.
And concentrate a scenery,
Like swaying with the wind28

13The poem begins with an assertive statement of comparison across the nature-culture binary apparatus. Cities with all their tentacular and network-based complexities are ashamed to come face-to-face with the simpler countryside, an image that evokes man’s eternal guilt for not taking good enough care of its all-benevolent mother (who seems to be ailing now). The second line comes almost as a demand asking us to compare “beautiful hearts,” beings that are not unlike each other. Following this, the generic frame of “a scenery” calls conceptually on ideas ranging from physical cities to biological sensations of shame to countryside to human metaphors of heart. The poem ends with the metaphor of “swaying in the wind”- a frame captures the characteristics of fleeting . The final line compliments and completes the frames built up in the first two lines, in drawing itself to the metaphor of swaying as an act of transience-presence and ethereal ephemerality. The program Xiaoice brilliantly crafts the poetic form onto the generated text by either switching each word/sentence holding a significant frame or an accretion within a given frame onto the next line. The switching between different frames and schemas with each syntactic unit (each new line) alludes formally to traditional aspects of verse, like rhythm and rhyme.

  • 29 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago, Uni (...)
  • 30 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986.
  • 31 Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and cognition,” in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, p. 263–287.

14The cogent expression of the poem however comes across us to tell a narrative, a story; as Paul Ricœur notes, stories are “models for the redescription of the world.”29 Once triggered by the text, the narrativizing mind seeks to reinforce the models of the world alongside it, for as Jerome Bruner notes “the story isn’t by itself a model. It is, so to speak, an instantiation of the models we carry in our minds.”30 The Sunshine Lost Windows itself is evidence of the rapid developments in our capacity for creating texts through artificial means as well as a harbinger of the potential cultural impact of such texts. Despite having a degree of lexical, semantic, and grammatical incoherency, Xiaoice’s poems somehow seem to make sense, given the fact readers can cognize them. It would seem that, in order to make meaning of the narratives composed by A.I. programs, the reader needs to be able to move across different semantic frames, schemas,31 and domains and link them.

1 THE ROAD by Ross Goodwin

15Ross Goodwin’s phenomenal project seeks to expand the horizons of writing and composing literature, as well as deconstructing and enhancing its processes, experiences and components. 1 The Road is marketed as the first novel composed by an A.I. program and emulates Jack Kerouac’s On The Road by actually sending its maker on the road quite literally. The set-up consists of a car mounted with a camera, microphones, a GPS-tracker and a printing machine. Its program runs a sophisticatedly trained recurrent neural network while using LSTM that had ingested a corpus of approximately 60 million words, comprised of equal parts poetry, science fiction and ‘bleak’ literature.

16As Ross Goodwin aptly describes the project:

  • 32 Quoted in Digital Dozen [online], consulted 20 January 2022, http://digitaldozen.io/projects/1-the- (...)

Fueled by exploding gasoline, artificial neurons firing raw data through burning cores, not so much written as scorched onto each roll of thermal paper — by phantom authors, a mechanized pen, drivers at the wheel, or perhaps the road itself — from NYC to NOLA: 1 the Road is a book written using a car as a pen.32

  • 33 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, New York, B (...)

17On encountering the novel one shouldn’t be surprised at the incongruous and experimental narrative framings—spurting out conversations, map co-ordinates and poetry in a singular conversational strand. Being the first project of its kind, the message is as important and clear as the medium.33 Let us consider the following excerpt from the novel for a detailed analysis of narrative coherency and sense-making:

  • 34 Ross Goodwin and Kenric McDowell, 1 The Road, Paris, Jean Boîte Éditions, 2018.

Three seconds after midnight. Coca-Cola factory, Montgomery. A building in Montgomery to his father's study of this town in the same room where the band was being sent off to the police car. The time was one minute past midnight. But he was the only one who had to sit on his way back. The time was one minute after midnight and the wind was still standing on the counter and the little patch of straw was still still and the street was open.34

  • 35 Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Comp (...)

18On encountering the above lines, one is certainly struck by the eerie descriptions and surrealistic offshoots and projections they espouse. However on a closer reading, the passage seems to be pervaded by a notion of proper spatio-temporal ordering alongside elements of narrative that engages surrealistically with the background progression. It starts off with registering the time, then the location and attaches a piece of narrative related to either of the above pre-conditionals. The narrative that emerges often suffers from lexical incoherence and thus, despite achieving new blends35 in the reader’s mind, fails to adequately maintain the same space for lack of explicit domain detailing and threading. The lines above, however, display a lucid adherence to coherent progression and could at times even be said to be poetic or surrealist, at least compared other A.I. produced texts as yet in circulation. The text’s strikingly harmonious resolution of incoherent semantic constructions, which produces a surreal effect, is a result of its uniquely blended spaces and metaphors (de)constructed in the reader’s cognitive exercise. In the last line of the excerpt, we stumble upon an exquisite personification of the wind standing still on the counter alongside the little patch of straw, an image that squeezes the most miscellaneous agents into a single frame with laudable syntactic coherency. The text exhibits its novelistic form by sticking to syntactic continuity even within the rapid shifting or accretion of frames. A single full stop often separates one frame from another. However, the episodic progression informs the general schematic development of the text. In noting the spatio-temporal coordinates within the generative narrative piece, 1 The Road can come across as an avant-garde novel doing a pastiche of the travelogue or the journal-entry genre.

  • 36 “The basis of the theory is the set-theoretical idea that reality—the sum of the imaginable—is a un (...)

191 The Road also provides an avenue for an enactivist and embodied account of the narrative as established by Goodwin’s program. Goodwin’s attempt to reinforce learning and, in turn, composition by using various data input sources (the camera, microphone, the GPS tracker), with the end goal of providing a more coherent sense of narrative, highlights the importance of these stimuli in the overall process of narrative composition. It is the perception-action chains of the vehicle apparatus involved in cruising through the American landscape that is responsible for the narrative structure of the text. However, to ascribe direct embodied and enactive processes to something so mechanical yet ‘organic’ might be a misguided task, but one that needn’t be discarded outright. Goodwin’s program blurts out letters, words and sentences based on a statistical association processed through the neural network without providing a perpetuated sense of narrative coherence or association. Although the articulated prose sometimes comes off as strikingly poetic and surrealistic in guise, it is often because of the mental spaces evoked (incompletely, leading in turn to possible worlds36) are offered up to the reader’s cognitive architecture, which fills in, makes sense, and understands.

  • 37 Cited in “An AI and an artist go on the road. ‘The idea was to write a novel with a car,’” CBC Radi (...)

20Goodwin however feels responsible for the authorship of the work despite the fact that it is composed quite independently of him by the neural network system. Perhaps the sense of authorship stems from the fact that, despite the text generator’s independence, it still formulates within certain parameters set by the algorithms (which were, of course, designed in turn by Goodwin). Goodwin lays out an ethical statement and stance for the project when he says that the purpose is also to reveal how machines make sentences: “In the future when this text becomes more sophisticated, it’s a warning. If you see patterns like this, it may not have been written by a human.”37 By giving a glimpse of what bot-generated content might someday be able to achieve, Goodwin creates a manual to follow in order to avoid fake and manipulative content driven by the biased interests of the few.

Further Implications for Composing A.I. structures: Gaps, Traps and Maps

  • 38 John R. Anderson, The Architecture of Cognition, London, Psychology Press, 1983.
  • 39 Tristan Tzara, “How to Make a Dadaist Poem (method of Tristan Tzara)” [online], The Center for Prog (...)

21So far, the reader remains elemental in the role of grazing texts in that eternal pasture of hermeneutics that is fenced in only by context and cognitive limitations. It is human cognitive architecture,38 with its capacity to bend, break, and blend, that accounts for all the sense-making and dis-junctures encountered while narrativizing. In recent years, A.I. and Machine Learning have advanced drastically in technical and computational fields dealing with “memory” and “information.” However, literary applications in these fields are still in their infancy, and applications with regard to both literary creation and analysis suffer from a lack of conceptual integrity; for, although A.I. is capable of applying neural networks, it does not understand and is not aware. Leaving aside the problems of programming unconscious processes or even consciousness itself, the very complex nature of the subjective-poetic mind and its interaction with the work makes it difficult or even impossible to detect and comprehend the working principle of this dynamic. Art is not a direct product of consciousness alone but exists in the complex traffic of an elaborate cognitive and conative framework alongside an enactive encounter with the creator’s environment. It exists in the de-territorialising that constitutes the poiesis and praxis of what-is, what-isn’t and what-can-be. The creative process is characterized by both a self-awareness that resides in subtle bursts of introspective analysis during the composition of an artwork and in the ultimate loss of that awareness in the work itself. The works of art put forth by A.I. lack the “true artistic genius” that emerges from the confluence of multiple factors, including both a priori knowledge and lived experience. While an A.I. program can compose a Dadaist poem along the lines of the process that Tristan Tzara described in which an algorithm takes random words and generates “original” lines,39 it would be impossible for a program to compose a poem like “The Wasteland” by T.S. Eliot, which – although it may appear to be an assemblage of juxtapositions – remains a contextually based and conceptually constructed artefact that is hermeneutically stimulating and a remarkable feat of poetic composition.

  • 40 Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Richard Hope, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.
  • 41 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1987.
  • 42 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Fiction, non-factuals, and the principle of minimal departure,” Poetics, Vol. 9, (...)

22Reading and interpretation are dependent on the receptive value of the text and its cultural uses. Our minds are brilliant composing and comprehending “machines” to begin with, spontaneously capable of dealing with “possible worlds.” The hermeneutical stance enjoyed by the reader cannot be qualitatively formalized by mere true-false statements. Perhaps, it is precisely what Aristotle calls dynamis40 (potentiality) that is at work in the cognitive processing of the text by the reader, in the service of the logos of reading. Perhaps the key to a coherent narrative cannot be achieved and maintained by a neural network model alone that begins with a prompt and then cues in passages based on the most likely possible arrangements inferred from a probabilistic distribution of the input dataset. There needs to be an underlying context-based and concept-based structuring that begins with a consideration of both a bottom-up and top-down approach working in tandem—a sort of rule-based system that respects the basic schema patterns and frame semantics and organizes them based on the contexts in which they most often appear whilst allowing enough room for non-normativity and deviancy by maintaining a coherent awareness of the entire frame or schema. The work of art is often characterised by its non-normative and non-conformist nature that ushers in the “new” by invoking and deviating from “idealized cognitive models.”41 The diversion from idealized models of narrativity and sense-making in a work of art occur within the limits of what Marie Laure Ryan calls “the principle of minimal departure”42 that dictates the formation of both mental spaces and possible-worlds. The works produced by A.I. programs are still at a pioneering stage of creation and are liable to not make coherent sense and to use excessive poetic license in ways that do not often conform to the models, so they cannot be expected make coherent and comprehensible “departures.” The narratives in the texts generated often pose significant challenges for recognition, coherent reading, and mentalizing. As Nancy M. Ide and Jean Veronis note:

  • 43 Nancy M. Ide and Jean Veronis, “Artificial Intelligence and the Study of Narrative,” Poetics, Vol. (...)

The overall meaning of a narrative is not reducible to a final and static representation of the events of which it is composed, but is also derived from the successive steps that the reader takes in the process of reading the text.43

  • 44 Ross Goodwin, Machines making Movies (vid.), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPXPQK83Z_Y.

23The work of hermeneutics then increasingly involves the construction of new models at every turn, something which is already quite intrinsic to the ontology of hermeneutics itself. However, the level of abstraction inherent in A.I.-generated texts calls for something more from the realm of hermeneutical enquiry. Perhaps, it calls for a dynamic filling-in on the part of the reader’s imagination by achieving conceptual blends or metaphors that might not be significant at all but that are nonetheless present. In dealing with the narrative anomalies of an A.I.-generated text, the importance of the reader becomes paramount. Such a stance adheres and attests to the co-dependent productive relations of man and machines about which Ross Goodwin notes that the “generation and interpretation cycle demonstrates the true augmentative capacity of these learning machines.”44

  • 45 Gualtiero Piccinini and Sonya Bahar, Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition,” (...)
  • 46 Mark Turner, The Literary Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.
  • 47 Max Coltheart, “How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?”, Perspectives on Psycho (...)

24The fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning stem from the mechanical and computational aspects of intelligence, the basic traits of which were inferred by humans via first-hand study and observation of the human mind. Neural computation is however sui generis45 and bears no resemblance to the workings of a digital A.I. program that belongs to altogether different planes of ontology, dynamics and biochemistry. There lies significant differences between the algorithmic structures used to generate a narrative and the human cognitive structures used to generate, infer, and move through the narrative. One of the most fruitful research possibilities that can help to strengthen the praxis of A.I. functionality in terms of text comprehension and composition is to locate and try to emulate similar functional underpinnings within our own brain-mind architecture, since such processes that involve the interplay of blending, bending and breaking are uniquely inherent to the human mind. Research into conceptual integration46 across semantic domains and the cognitive mechanisms that produce creative compositions can further help us understand how such processes occur and thereby help us to engineer robust composing programs. Deeper research into cognitive science and cognitive literary studies, as well as into the computational aspects of creative cognition, might perhaps help put elucidate a wide range of aspects of narrative framing and comprehension on a logical and pragmatic level. Using brain imaging (via PET, CT-scan, fMRI) to analyse subjects performing literary tasks such as interpretation, on the other hand, could further help to test cognitive theories while avoiding the “consistency fallacy.”47 Although the capacity for tracing neural correlates for narrative composition may be at a rudimentary stage, brain imaging studies could, with technological advancements, help to shed light on the undercurrents of narrative processes in the mind. Such research could serve not only to note how such mechanisms are undergone via neuronal and nodal networks but also their further implications with regard to general cognitive processes.

  • 48 Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel, Columbus, Ohio State University P (...)
  • 49 Shanon Spaulding, “Simulation Theory”, in Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of I (...)
  • 50 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch, “Integrated information theory: fr (...)
  • 51 Ibid.
  • 52 Qualia refers to the “introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.” “Qualia, (...)
  • 53 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch, “Integrated information theory: fr (...)

25A significant approach that aims at a cognitive view of preliminary narrative formation is that of the “Theory of Mind,”48 which aims to understand the desires, beliefs and intentions of a person from another perspective. The dualist approach of Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST)49 together pave the way for capturing the context-based inference and plausibility of human thoughts and causality. It is far too early to predict a programmable version for the Theory of Mind or Enactivism since most of the mind’s cognitive and conative architecture remains latent and un-representable, yet with advanced and persistent research such undercurrents should come to light. Should it suffice to say then that an A.I. program will actually “understand” what its correspondent is referring to, in terms of performing a mentalizing action? Perhaps it is too early to entertain the idea of such functionality, for an A.I. program needs to have both a certain level of consciousness and embodied, enactive cognition to participate in acts of “subjective” mentalizing rather than just optimizing with respect to the guidelines initially programmed by/with human intervention. Consciousness remains far from programmable by the very fact that it is not yet detectable and strictly recognizable, on either a local level or across the broad spectrum of mind and neural networks. A recent 2014 study at the University of Wisconsin-Madison posited a surprising hypothesis in grasping/annotating the “presence” of consciousness both empirically and formally: Giulio Tononi postulated that a being’s “consciousness” is directly proportional to the amount of “integrated information” it possesses.50 “Integrated Information Theory” (I.I.T.) accounts quantitatively for how the integration density of a system implies a higher state of synergy, which in turn determines the depth of the system’s conscious experience51; whilst informational geometry in turn seeks to account for the qualitative experience of consciousness or qualia.52 Such a theory starts from ‘experience itself’ and notes its essential properties (axioms) in order to identify characteristics within physical systems that can support such axioms (postulates)53.

26Perhaps someday in the future we might be able to apply these quantifying measures to physical systems comprising A.I. programs and thus (in principle) be able to determine their relative levels of consciousness. One of the most challenging factors, besides that of programming conscious experiences, is the idea of creativity and imagination as acts that can be meaningfully simulated. However, such a one-time simulation precludes the very possibility of “originality,” which allows for both following rules and breaking them and which endows the creative act with its very charisma.

  • 54 George Lakoff, “The Neural Theory of Metaphor” in Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of (...)

27Narrative and literary texts incorporate elements and elemental knowledge of vast discursive fields across all epistemes. Thus, to understand, create, or analyse literature, the machine has to have access to information to which even humans do not have direct access. For it isn’t possible to either program all the a priori knowledge or account for a systematic formulation of all the cultural knowledge acquired post-birth. Machine learning techniques, through the synthetic formulation of the logic of natural systems into algorithms, uses problem-tackling scenarios based upon the data sets on which it was trained. While encountering a new data set (that may be dramatically different from the previous ones), the program can exhibit higher rates of anomaly. The processing of text by humans, on the other hand, is by default subject to multiple interpretations, many contradictory or conflicting, but each given a respectable position in its contextual development. A possible explanation for the act might be our innate ability to simulate, inhabit overlapping “schemas,” construct frames, and metaphorically co-relate or bind54 distant domains while exercising what Mark Turner calls “double-scope blending” with relative ease. This problem might also illuminate the reasons for the wide constructional gap between narrow A.I. and Artificial General Intelligence.

  • 55 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.
  • 56 Georg Lukács, History & Class Consciousness, London, Merlin Press, 1967.

28Even if there might emerge in the near future an artificial cognitive apparatus that emulates conscious-like behaviour, it will have the same problem with regard to dealing with texts that the homologists have with social analysis in the critique of Raymond Williams—its ideology being easily separable from its lived experience.55 The system can be programmed without (embodied) contextual relevance, giving rise to a situation labelled as “false consciousness” by Adorno and Lukács.56 Unless, of course, the program is enactively designed with a corporeal apparatus (like a cyborg) mimicking the cognitive and social processes of humans and the ability to learn heuristically. The act of stimulating the processes of the creative human mind within an algorithm or network is still at a basic and developing stage of research, yet further work should be able to shed more light on the epistemic gaps with regard to advancements in time and technology. However, it is for the very non-comprehensibility of the exact working principles of creative and comprehensive processes that A.I. still struggles to generate its own sensical narratives (which is a reflection of our inability to pin down the same processes). Although we experience and understand a piece of literary narrative with relative ease, we cannot precisely codify the ways in which we “experience” or “understand” them. Perhaps, a wider understanding of general cognitive mechanisms and their relational combinations in presenting sensical narratives can help to address these shortcomings.

  • 57 José Ortega y Gasset, “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface,” in Phenomenology and Art, transl (...)

29A.I. and Literature still have a long way to go, and each aspect of their mutual development is augmented by a relentless traffic of cross-disciplinary (ex)changes. In an age of rapid automation and encoded-ness, it is perhaps literature and art that can give one solace from the roller-coaster ride of information and excess. The function of art, however, is not to defy technology or escape the information age; rather it develops new forms with every technological advancement. Art and literature in positing an inexhaustible noumena-like ontic, as espoused by Ortega y Gasset,57 remain ever-refreshing forms that mime the very dynamic nature of the mind, the world, and their complementary transactions. The work of art thus provides a site for not only exploring the world and its relation to the self, but also the shifting relations that (re-)create the semblance of the self while navigating through the world-at-hand, a feature that has been useful for humans and might be for machines as well.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

“An AI and an artist go on the road. ‘The idea was to write a novel with a car,’” CBC Radio, 12 October 2018.

Anderson, John R., The Architecture of Cognition, London, Psychology Press, 1983

Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Richard Hope, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.

Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Black, J.B, Wilensky. R, “An evaluation of story grammars,” Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, 1979, p. 213-230.

Bostrom, Nick, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

Bowman, Samuel R. et al., “Generating sentences from a continuous space,” CONLL, 2016.

Bruner, Jerome, Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990.

Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986.

“The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry, Chicago, Vol. 18, 1991, p. 1–21.

Buder, Emily, “An Algorithm Wrote This Movie, and It's Somehow Amazing,” No Film School, 10 June 2016.

Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 1998, p. 7-19.

Coltheart, Max, “How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?”, Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2013, p. 98-103.

Croft, William, and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive Linguistics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Cullingford, R.E, “Script application: Computer understanding of newspaper stories,” Yale University Computer Science Research, Report No. 116, 1978.

Damasio, Antonio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, San Diego, Harcourt Brace and Co, 1999.

Dennett, Daniel, Content and Consciousness, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2010.

Digital Dozen [online], consulted 20 January 2022, http://digitaldozen.io/projects/1-the-road/

DiMaggio, Paul, “Culture and cognition,” in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, p. 263–287.

Du Castel, Bertrand, “Pattern Activation/Recognition Theory of Mind,” Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 90, 2015.

Eagleman, David, Brandt Anthony, The Runaway Species: How Human Creativity Remakes the World, Edinburgh, Canongate Books Ltd, 2017.

“Enactivism,” Wikipedia, consulted 17 January 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism.

Fauconnier, Gilles, Mental Spaces, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1984.

Fillmore, Charles J., “Chapter 10: Frame semantics,” in Dirk Geeraerts (eds), Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings, Berlin, New York, De Gruyter Mouton, 2008, p. 373-400.

Fillmore, Charles J. and Collin F. Baker, “Frame semantics for text understanding,” in Proceedings of WordNet and Other Lexical Resources Workshop, NAACL, 2001.

Fludernik, Monika, “Narratology in the Twenty First Century: The Cognitive Approach to Narrative,” PMLA Special Topic: Literary Criticism for the Twenty-First century, Vol. 125, 2010, p. 924-930.

Galloway, P., “Narrative theories as computational models: Reader-oriented theory and artificial intelligence,” Computers and the Humanities, Vol. 17, 1983, p. 169-174.

Goodwin, Ross and Kenric McDowell, 1 The Road, Paris, Jean Boîte Éditions, 2018.

Machines making Movies (vid.), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPXPQK83Z_Y.

Herman, David, Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, Stanford, CSLI, 2003.

“Narrative Theory after the Second Cognitive Revolution.” In L. Zunshine (eds), Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2010, p. 155–75.

Hogan, Patrick Colm, The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Ide, Nancy M.; Veronis, Jean, “Artificial Intelligence and the Study of Narrative,” Poetics, Vol. 19, 1990, p. 37-63.

Iovino, Serenella, and Serpil Opperman, “Material Ecocriticism: Materiality, Agency, and Models of Narrativity,” Ecozon@, Vol 3. No. 1, Spring 2012.

Jahn, Manfred “Frames, Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives: Toward a Cognitive Narratology,” Poetics Today, Vol.18, No. 4, 1997, p. 441–68.

Janssen, Theo A. J. M., “Deixis from a cognitive point of view,” in Ellen Contini Morava, and Barbara S. Goldberg, (ed.), Meaning as Explanation, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter Mouton, 2011, p. 245-270.

Lakoff, George, “The Neural Theory of Metaphor” in Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 17-37.

Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Lars Bernaerts, Dirk de Geest, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck (eds), Stories and Minds: Cognitive Approaches to Literary Narrative, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 2013.

Lehnert, W.G., “Plot units and narrative summarization,” Cognitive Science Vol. 5, 1981. p. 293-331.

Lenat, Douglas B., “Artificial Intelligence”, Scientific American, Vol. 273, No. 3, September 1995, p. 80-82.

Lenat, Douglas B., Mayank Prakash, and Mary Shepherd, “CYC: Using Common Sense Knowledge to Overcome Brittleness and Knowledge Acquisition,” AI Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1986, p. 65–85.

Lukács, Georg, History & Class Consciousness, London, Merlin Press, 1967.

Mani, Inderjeet, “When robots read books,” Aeon, consulted on 15 December 2021, https://aeon.co/essays/how-ai-is-revolutionising-the-role-of-the-literary-critic.

McLuhan, Marshall and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, New York, Bantam Books, 1967.

Minsky, Marvin, “Artificial Intelligence,” Scientific American, Vol. 215, No. 3, September 1966, p. 246-263.

“A framework for representing knowledge” in J. Haugeland (ed.), Mind design, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1981, p. 95-128.

Miyazono, Kengo; Liao Shen-Yi, “The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative Resistance,” in Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2016.

Ortega y Gasset, José, “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface,” in Phenomenology and Art, translated by Philip W. Silver, New York, W.W. Norton, 1975.

Piccinini, G. and S. Bahar, “Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition,” Cognitive Science, No. 37, 2013, p. 453-488.

Propp, Vladimir, Morphology of the Folktale, translated by Laurence Scott, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2009.

“Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], consulted 17 January 2022, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/.

Ricœur, Paul, Time and Narrative, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Rumelhart, D.E., “Notes on a Schema for Stories,” in D.G. Bobrow and A. Collins (eds.), Representation and understanding: Studies in cognitive science, New York, Academic Press, 1975, p. 211-236.

Ryan, Marie-Laure “Cognitive Maps and the Construction of Narrative Space,” in D. Herman (ed.), Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, Stanford, CSLI, 2003, p. 214–42.

“Fiction, non-factuals, and the principle of minimal departure”, Poetics, Vol. 9, 1980, 403-422.

“Possible-Worlds Theory,” in David Herman, Manfred Jahn, Marie-Laure Ryan (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2005.Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2020.

Pillai, Shreeja Shreekumar, “The Vindication of Cyborgs in The Sunshine Lost Windows” [online], mutemelodist, consulted 20 January 2022 https://www.mutemelodist.com/postings.php?pid=614&cid=10&subid=37.

Shead, Sam, “Why everyone is talking about the AI text generator released by an Elon Musk-backed lab,” CNBC Tech., 23 July 2020.

Schank, R.C., “Conceptual dependency: A theory of natural language understanding”, Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 552-631.

Spaulding, Shanon, “Simulation Theory”, in Amy Kind (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2016.

Stockwell, Peter, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2002.

Thompson, Evan, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010.

Tononi, Giulio, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch, “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 17, p. 450–461, 2016.

Turner, Mark, and Gilles Fauconnier, The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities, New York, Basic Books, 2002.

Tzara, Tristan, “How to Make a Dadaist Poem (method of Tristan Tzara)” [online], The Center for Programs in Contemporary Writing at UPenn, consulted 20 January 2022, https://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88v/tzara.html.

Williams, Raymond, Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.

Wilson, Robert A. and Lucia Foglia, "Embodied Cognition" in Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2011.

Xiaoice, The Sunshine Lost Windows, Beijing Cheers Publishing House, 2017.

Zunshine, Lisa, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2006.

Haut de page

Notes

1 David Eagleman and Anthony Brandt, The Runaway Species: How Human Creativity Remakes the World, Edinburgh, Canongate Books Ltd, 2017.

2 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2020.

3 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

4 An artificial recurrent neural network (RNN) that is used in the field of deep learning which unlike standard feed-forward neural networks also possesses feedback connections.

5 David E. Rumelhart, Notes on a schema for stories. in: D.G. Bobrow and A. Collins (eds.), Representation and understanding: Studies in cognitive science, New York: Academic Press,1975, 211-236.

6 Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, translated by Laurence Scott, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2009.

7 Roger Carl Schank, “Conceptual dependency: A theory of natural language understanding”, Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 552-631.

8 Wendy G. Lehnert, “Plot units and narrative summarization,” Cognitive Science Vol. 5, 1981. p. 293-331.

9 Nancy M. Ide and Jean Veronis, “Artificial Intelligence and the Study of Narrative,” Poetics, Vol. 19, 1990, p. 37-63.

10 Ibid.

11 Samuel R. Bowman, et al., “Generating sentences from a continuous space,” CONLL, 2016.

12 Xiaoice, The Sunshine Lost Windows, Beijing Cheers Publishing House, 2017.

13 Emily Buder, “An Algorithm Wrote This Movie, and It's Somehow Amazing,” No Film School, 10 June 2016.

14 Ross Goodwin and Kenric McDowell, 1 The Road, Paris, Jean Boîte Éditions, 2018.

15 Sam Shead, “Why everyone is talking about the AI text generator released by an Elon Musk-backed lab,” CNBC Tech., 23 July 2020..

16 Inderjeet Mani, “When robots read books,” Aeon.co, consulted on 15 December 2021, https://aeon.co/essays/how-ai-is-revolutionising-the-role-of-the-literary-critic.

17 Douglas Lenat, Mayank Prakash, and Mary Shepherd, “CYC: Using Common Sense Knowledge to Overcome Brittleness and Knowledge Acquisition,” AI Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1986, p. 65–85.

18 William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive Linguistics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

19 Peter Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2002.

20 Monika Fludernik, “Narratology in the Twenty First Century: The Cognitive Approach to Narrative”, PMLA Special Topic: Literary Criticism for the Twenty-First century, Vol no. 125, 2010, 924-930.

21 A theoretical construct proposed by Gilles Fauconnier corresponding to the construction of possible worlds in truth-conditional semantics. Gilles Fauconnier, Mental Spaces, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1984.

22 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago., University of Chicago Press, 2003.

23 This refers to the way in which contextual information is encoded into the grammatical system of a language. Theo A. J. M. Janssen, “Deixis from a cognitive point of view,” in Ellen Contini Morava, and Barbara S. Goldberg, (ed.), Meaning as Explanation, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter Mouton, 2011, p. 245-270.

24 This term refers to the view that “cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between the acting organism and its environment.” See “Enactivism,” Wikipedia, consulted 17 January 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enactivism. See also Evan Thompson, Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2010.

25 Embodied cognition is a cognitive theory that stresses the importance of bodily features in cognitive tasks ranging from somatosensory to higher complex processes. Robert A. Wilson and Lucia Foglia, "Embodied Cognition" in Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2011.

26 Hermeneutics refers to the theory and methodology of textual interpretation. Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 377.

27 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990.

28 Quoted in Shreeja Shreekumar Pillai, “The Vindication of Cyborgs in The Sunshine Lost Windows” [online], mutemelodist, consulted 20 January 2022 https://www.mutemelodist.com/postings.php?pid=614&cid=10&subid=37.

29 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983.

30 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986.

31 Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and cognition,” in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, p. 263–287.

32 Quoted in Digital Dozen [online], consulted 20 January 2022, http://digitaldozen.io/projects/1-the-road/

33 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, New York, Bantam Books, 1967

34 Ross Goodwin and Kenric McDowell, 1 The Road, Paris, Jean Boîte Éditions, 2018.

35 Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities, New York, Basic Books, 2002.

36 “The basis of the theory is the set-theoretical idea that reality—the sum of the imaginable—is a universe composed of a plurality of distinct elements.” Marie Laure Ryan, “Possible-Worlds Theory,” in David Herman, Manfred Jahn, Marie-Laure Ryan (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2005, p. 446.

37 Cited in “An AI and an artist go on the road. ‘The idea was to write a novel with a car,’” CBC Radio, 12 October 2018.

38 John R. Anderson, The Architecture of Cognition, London, Psychology Press, 1983.

39 Tristan Tzara, “How to Make a Dadaist Poem (method of Tristan Tzara)” [online], The Center for Programs in Contemporary Writing at UPenn, consulted 20 January 2022, https://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88v/tzara.html.

40 Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Richard Hope, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.

41 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1987.

42 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Fiction, non-factuals, and the principle of minimal departure,” Poetics, Vol. 9, 1980, 403-422.

43 Nancy M. Ide and Jean Veronis, “Artificial Intelligence and the Study of Narrative,” Poetics, Vol. 19, 1990, p. 37-63.

44 Ross Goodwin, Machines making Movies (vid.), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPXPQK83Z_Y.

45 Gualtiero Piccinini and Sonya Bahar, Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition,” Cognitive Science, No. 37, 2013, p. 453-488.

46 Mark Turner, The Literary Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.

47 Max Coltheart, “How Can Functional Neuroimaging Inform Cognitive Theories?”, Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2013, p. 98-103.

48 Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2006.

49 Shanon Spaulding, “Simulation Theory”, in Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2016.

50 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch, “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 17, p. 450–461, 2016

51 Ibid.

52 Qualia refers to the “introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives.” “Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], consulted 17 January 2022, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/. See also Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, San Diego, Harcourt Brace and Co, 1999.

53 Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch, “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Vol. 17, p. 450–461, 2016.

54 George Lakoff, “The Neural Theory of Metaphor” in Raymond W. Gibbs (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 17-37.

55 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.

56 Georg Lukács, History & Class Consciousness, London, Merlin Press, 1967.

57 José Ortega y Gasset, “An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface,” in Phenomenology and Art, translated by Philip W. Silver, New York, W.W. Norton, 1975.

Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique

Debarshi Arathdar, « Literature, Narrativity and Composition in the age of Artificial Intelligence »TRANS- [En ligne], 27 | 2021, mis en ligne le 29 décembre 2021, consulté le 14 janvier 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/trans/6804 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/trans.6804

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

Le texte et les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés), sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

Haut de page
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search