Honorary Intermediaries?
Resumen
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) system is a curious institution: often ridiculed as a decorative “flower vase” for the one-Party regime, or, at best, a networking club meant to appease elite groups, it does not attract much scholarly attention. The Communist Party leadership, however, clings adamantly to what it says is a “broadly representative” intermediary body helping with policy reform and United Front work. In this article, we investigate the validity of this original logic with the help of fresh empirical data. We look at the CPPCC’s institutional history, principles of member selection, delegates’ self-conceptualisation, and their modes of operation. Intermediation, it appears, has always been a blurry task for CPPCC members, resulting in a wide array of behavioural choices – from parroting of the Party line to attempts at proactive agenda setting. After more than two decades of relative openness to innovative bottom-up policy proposals, new rules of unified conduct now again stifle the consultative potential of the CPPCCs – but there seems to be some room for intermediary agency left, especially at the local level.
Entradas del índice
Index by keyword :
CPPCC, Chinese political system, United Front, intermediary bodies, representation, elite politics, consultation.Para citar este artículo
Referencia en papel
Rebekka Åsnes Sagild y Anna Lisa Ahlers, « Honorary Intermediaries? », China Perspectives, 2019-2 | 2019, 9-16.
Referencia electrónica
Rebekka Åsnes Sagild y Anna Lisa Ahlers, « Honorary Intermediaries? », China Perspectives [En línea], 2019-2 | 2019, Publicado el 10 junio 2020, consultado el 16 octubre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/9016
Inicio de página